NETWORK HOMOGENISATION & PARTY DISENGAGEMENT

THE POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY OF POST-INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES: AN AUSTRALIAN CASE STUDY

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ABSTRACT

Over the last half century Australia has experienced palpable declines in political party satisfaction, identification, confidence and participation. Evidence suggests that the trend toward party disengagement undermines representative democracy by eroding the ability of party organisations to act as conduits between majority will and government. Although there is substantial analysis available into how value orientations, social capital and interpersonal trust influence confidence and involvement in political institutions, relatively little research exists on the network homogenising causes of declining party involvement, something this thesis seeks to address by conducting a close study of this phenomenon in the Australian context.

It is argued in this thesis that the decline in party engagement can largely be attributed to rising levels of 'social modularity', by which is meant the flexibility to both forge and discontinue social connections. This raised degree of social modularity is found to be facilitating a replacement of 'bridging' social capital with 'bonding' social capital thereby altering skills and experiences and social and political tolerance and expectations. Increased social autonomy is associated with the post-industrial stage of development; consequently, the findings of this investigation into political sociological trends in Australia are likely to be applicable to most other post-industrial democracies.

This thesis draws on my own survey findings as well as raw data from Australian World Values Survey (WVS) waves. The latter were analysed to produce age stratified frequency and correlation statistics. WVS waves provide an invaluable source of data from which trends in values, interpersonal trust, institutional confidence, generosity and community and civic involvement can be analysed. These statistics are supplemented by Pearson correlations collated from responses to the questions posed in my own detailed 'Political Participation & Conflict Avoidance Survey', in which 36 subjects participated.

Social network homogenisation is found to be linked to a post-industrial generational attitudinal shift from an emphasis on conformity and hierarchical survival values to autonomy and egalitarian self-expression values. That is, statistics reveal that a Self-Expression Values Homogenous Social Network (SEVHSN) Complex now exists. The statistics also show that, and suggest reasons why party confidence, identification and engagement are negatively correlated with immersion in the Complex. Additionally, statistics presented indicate that an increasing proportion of the Australian population is becoming more heavily embedded in the Complex (largely through generational replacement). They also reveal that Complex-immersion is mainly being driven by trends associated with greater social modularity and empowerment (brought about by post-industrialisation). These trends relate to technology use, economic development/financial security, education attainment and news/information dissemination. The statistical analysis present in this thesis suggests that my Homogenisation arguments may have better explanatory power than the two dominant rival sociological engagement theories: Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel's 'Modernisation' and Robert Putnam's 'Lamentation' theories, both of which are critically evaluated.

PLAGIARISM DECLARATION

I certify that this work contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in my name in any university or other tertiary institution and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference has been made in the text. In addition, I certify that no part of this work will, in the future, be used in a submission in my name for any other degree or diploma in any university or other tertiary institution without the prior approval of the University of Adelaide and where applicable, any partner institution responsible for the joint-award of this degree.

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I acknowledge the support I have received for my research through the provision of an Australian Government Research Training Program Scholarship.

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GLOSSARY

Acronyms

AISNDS	Average Ideological Social Network Difference Score: The average degree of ideological difference that participants believe to exist between them and members of their close social network.
ASSNDS	Average Structural Social Network Difference Score: The average degree of structural difference that participants believe to exist between them and members of their close social network.
AVSNDS	Average Values Social Network Difference Score: The average degree of difference that participants believe exists between the emphasis they place on values and the emphasis placed on those same values by members of their close social network.
ISNDS	Ideological Social Network Difference Score: The degree of ideological difference that participants believe to exist between them and members of their close social network.
(SEVHSN) Complex / the Complex	Self-Expression Values Homogenous Social Network Complex: a sociological nexus in which an increasing emphasis on self-expression values is linked to homogenising social networks within advanced post-industrial societies.
SNHPE Chart	Social Network Homogenisation and Political Engagement Chart.
SNH - Social Network Homogenisation	A trend toward more bonding and less bridging social capital.
SID - Societal Ideological Diversification	A trend toward a more ideologically heterogenous society.
WVS	World Values Survey

Generational Definitions according to theorists Neil Howe and William Strauss

Generation G.I.	Birthyears 1901 – 1924
Generation Silent	Birthyears 1925 – 1942
Generation Boomer	Birthyears 1943 – 1960
Generation X	Birthyears 1961 – 1981

Generation Millennial / Y	Birthyears 1982 – 2004[1]

Other Thesis Term

Bonding social capital/connections	That between people with similar life experiences, views and priorities. According to Putnam it is "inward looking and tend[s] to reinforce exclusive identities and homogenous groups" and it "is good for under girding specific reciprocity and mobilising solidarity".[2]
Bridging social capital/connections	That between people with different backgrounds, attitudes and interests. According to Putnam it is "outward looking and encompass[es] people across diverse social cleavages" and it is "better [than 'bonding' social capital] for linkage to external assets and for information diffusion".[3]
Close social networks	Friends, work colleagues, family members and others with whom one feels comfortable talking to about serious and private matters and whom one can call on for help.
Complex-immersion / Complex-embeddedness	Being immersed or embedded in the Self-Expression Values Homogenous Social Network (SEVHSN) Complex.
Conventional participation	Activities that are expected of good citizens such as voting, active involvement in political parties and campaigns, making campaign donations and serving in public office.
Cross-cutting cleavages	Groups on one cleavage overlapping among groups on another cleavage. Cleavages may include those related to education, socio-eco status, profession, ethnic heritage, religious beliefs and cultural and political values.
Egalitarian decision-making	Procedures and processes that allow rank and file members to influence group/organisational decisions.
Egalitarian leadership-selection	Procedures and processes that allow rank and file members to influence the selection of group/organisational leaders.
External political efficacy	The belief that government will respond to one's demands.

[1] Howe, Neil and Strauss, William. (1991) *Generations: The History of America's Future, 1584 to 2069,* Harper Perennial, New York, p.32 & 42

[2] Putnam, Robert D. (2000), *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and revival of American Community,* Simon & Schuster, New York, p.22

[3] Putnam, *Bowling Alone,* p.22

Formal organisations/groups	Groups with fixed (often codified) sets of rules, structures and procedures that seemingly leave little discretion for interpretation.
Formal Organisational Engagement Score	The degree to which participants in my 'Political Participation and Conflict Avoidance Survey' were engaged in, and actively involved in the decision-making of, formal groups/organisations.
Formal social capital	Social capital derived from participation in formal groups/organisations.
Formal social connections	Interpersonal relationships that are forged and exist because of mutual participation in formal groups/organisations.
Formal social networks	Social networks that are forged from and rely on participation in formal groups/organisations.
Homogenisation hypothesis/theory/thesis	This thesis' argument that ideologically bridging is being replaced over decades by ideologically bonding social capital and that this trend has eroded conventional/electoral/party political involvement.
Human capital	Knowledge, skills and creativity that enables greater production of economic value.
Human flourishing	A context in which the individuals of a community can realise and fulfil their talents and potentialities.
Ideologically homogenous/reinforcing networks	Social networks in which members have very similar political views and emphasise political values in a similar way.
Ideological Network Homogenisation	A trend toward greater ideological homogeneity within social networks.
Informal social capital	Social capital that exists between family, friends and others outside the context of formal organisations.
Informal social connections	Interpersonal relationships that exist outside of (and are typically not forged in) formal groups/organisations.
Informal social networks	Friendship, familial and other networks that exist outside of (and are typically not forged from) formal groups/organisations.
Internal political efficacy	Belief that one can understand, and therefore participate in politics.
Lamentation theory/thesis	The theory that modern technology and societal trends have had a negative impact on social capital. Lamentationists hold that both informal and formal structural social capital are in decline. These trends, they

	contend, are resulting in falling community and civic oriented interests and values by reducing social and political trust, empathy and efficacy. This in turn, they reason, has profoundly contributed to a reduction in both conventional/electoral and unconventional/non-electoral political engagement. This position is most comprehensively articulated by Robert Putnam's *"Bowling Alone"* thesis.
Modernisation theory/thesis	Most notably espoused by Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, Modernisation theories allege that technological and economic development raise levels of education, labour productivity, occupational specialisation and personal income. Modernisationists assert that this process of development, increases individual autonomy and sense of personal security by expanding people's material, cognitive and social resources. These trends produce cultural changes including greater emphasis on "rational/secular" and "self-expression" (autonomy) values and "more critical and less easily led publics."[4] According to Modernisationists, these cultural changes then alter social capital and political engagement from forms which are formal, and elite led (both political and non-political), to those which are egalitarian, elite challenging and informal.
Political conflict aversion/avoidance	Avoidance of discussion-topics and situations which may precipitate arguments over conflicting political views.
Political Participation & Conflict Avoidance Survey	My survey gauging participants' social network homogeneity as well as measures of social capital and political confidence and engagement.
Post-material values	Greater emphasis on autonomy and self-expression over physical security and economic wellbeing.
Prime Circuit	Three variables (1. conventional/conflict prone engagement, 2. representativeness/responsiveness of the political parties and system, and 3. satisfaction with the political parties and system) that feed into each other; each amplifying the effect of Social Network Homogenisation on the other two either directly or indirectly.
Self-Expression values	Greater emphasis on autonomy and egalitarianism/equality over conformity and hierarchy.
Social atomisation	A process resulting in the social ties binding individuals together becoming weaker or more easily severed.

[4] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.5, 6 & 19

Social capital	"The social networks between individuals as well as the trust, shared norms and reciprocities that underpin and in turn arise from such connections."[5]
Social connections	Interpersonal relationships.
Social Connectivity	The quality and number of familial, friendship and other social connections between individuals.
Social modularity	Flexibility to forge and discontinue social connections.
Societal Diversification	A trend toward a more structurally and/or ideologically heterogenous society.
Structural heterogeneity/difference	The degree to which members of groups (e.g. nations or social networks) have different structural characteristics and/or traits such as age, religion, neighbourhood, ethnicity, gender, occupation, educational background/level and income/wealth.
Structural homogeneity/similarity	The degree to which members of groups (e.g. nations or social networks) share structural characteristics and/or traits such as age, religion, neighbourhood, ethnicity, gender, occupation, educational background/level and income/wealth.
Structurally homogenous networks	Social networks whose members share structural characteristics/traits to a significant degree.
Structural social capital	The network of people who an individual knows and upon whom they can draw for information and/or assistance. It is distinct from cognitive (shared values, attitudes and beliefs) and relational (trust, trustworthiness, norms, sanctions, obligations, expectations, identity and identification) social capital.[6]
Survival Values	Greater emphasis on conformity and elite authority (over autonomy and egalitarianism/equality) when survival is more precarious.
Unconventional political participation	Activities that are legal but often considered inappropriate such as signing petitions, supporting boycotts, and staging demonstrations and protests.

[5] Henn, Matt., Hodgkinson, Sarah and Weinstein, Mark. (2007) 'Social capital and political participation: Understanding the dynamics of young people's political disengagement in contemporary Britain', *Social Policy and Society,* vol:6(4), p.467

[6] Claridge, Tristan. (2018) 'What is Structural Social Capital', *Social Capital: Research & Training,* viewed 7 March 2018, https://www.socialcapitalresearch.com/structural-social-capital/

[7]



[8]

[7] Top. Putnam, Robert. The John Adams Institute: American Culture in the Netherlands, viewed 10 February 2018, https://www.john-adams.nl/robert-putnam-interview-in-fd/; Middle-Left. Welzel, Christian. Wikipedia, viewed 10 February 2018, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christian_Welzel; Middle-Right. Inglehart, Ronald. *Georgetown University: Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs,* viewed 10 February 2018, https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/people/ronald-inglehart

INTRODUCTION

> "I was so excited about tonight ... every indication was that this was going to be a great night. An historic night, for women, for America and it's just not the case."[9]
>
> - Meredith Baker, 9th of November 2016, Washington D.C

> "Shocked actually. I cannot believe it's going the way it is ... there was a shadow vote of people who were afraid to admit that they were going to vote for Trump and apparently, they came out en masse. That's the only thing that makes any sense."[10]
>
> - Ann Flynn, 9th of November 2016, New York City

When asked to comment by New York Times journalists these were the responses of Clinton supporters Meredith Baker and Ann Flynn on the night of the 2016 US Presidential Election. The election had been perhaps the most polarising in living memory. The victor was seen by many as a boorish populist with no prior experience holding political office:

- offering trade protection,[11] immigration restrictions[12] and an isolationist foreign policy;[13] and
- stoking and channelling fear, prejudice, and economic resentment with incendiary tirades against "corrupt" elites and "dangerous" minorities.[14]

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[8] *WorldNews.* (2018) 'Bursting social-class bubbles', viewed 10 February 2018, http://www.worldnews.easybranches.com/regions/singapore/Bursting-social-class-bubbles-620329

[9] Baker, Meredith. 9th of November 2016, speaking in Washington D.C. 'Women Express Surprise at Trump Win: The New York Times', *YouTube,* viewed 1 February 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r4dxwdlfmhc

[10] Flynn, Ann. 9th of November 2016, speaking in New York City 'Women Express Surprise at Trump Win: The New York Times', *YouTube,* viewed 1 February 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r4dxwdlfmhc

[11] *The Guardian: Australia,* (2016) 'Trump economic policies: protectionism, low taxes and coal mines', viewed 14 February 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/nov/09/trumps-economic-policies-protectionism-low-taxes-and-coal-mines

[12] Preston, Julia. (2016) 'Many What-Ifs in Donald Trumps Plan for Migrants', *The New York Times,* viewed 14 February 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/19/us/politics/donald-trump-immigration.html

[13] Hirsh, Michael. (2016) 'Why George Washington Would Have Agreed With Donald Trump', *POLITICO MAGAZINE,* viewed 14 February 2018, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/05/founding-fathers-2016-donald-trump-america-first-foreign-policy-isolationist-213873

[14] McElwee, Sean and McDaniel, Jason. (2017) 'Fear of Diversity Made People More Likely to Vote Trump', *The Nation,* viewed 14 February 2018, https://www.thenation.com/article/fear-of-diversity-made-people-more-likely-to-vote-trump/; Beauchamp, Zack. (2016) 'Donald Trump's victory is part of a global white backlash', *Vox,* viewed 14 February 2018, https://www.vox.com/world/2016/11/9/13572174/president-elect-donald-

The defeated candidate was a polished member of the establishment and former First Lady, Senator and Secretary of State:

- espousing continued globalisation,[15] multiculturalism[16] and an active world leadership role for the United States;[17] but
- failing to submit, or even acknowledge the need for, a compelling comprehensive tax, welfare, health care, education, industrial relations, campaign finance and electoral reform agenda to assist the losers of trade liberalisation and automation and restore faith in American democracy.

The reflections of Baker and Flynn convey not only disappointment but more significantly astonishment. From these typical citizens through to celebrities, television personalities and talk show hosts most Americans of a left, liberal or establishment persuasion had become convinced that their political views were accepted by an overwhelming majority of their countrymen-and-women. Embedded in social/ideological bubbles they had been disconnected from reality.

Post-industrial Political Distrust & Electoral and Party Disengagement

Since the mid-twentieth century many western post-industrial countries, whose citizens enjoy remarkable physical security and financial and technological empowerment, have experienced a marked rise in political distrust as well as striking declines in electoral and political party engagement. Between 1986 and 2013 the proportion of the UK population surveyed reporting that they 'almost never' trust government grew from 10% to 30%.[18] The proportion of Canadians surveyed who reported trusting the government in Ottawa to do

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trump-2016-victory-racism-xenophobia; Wallis, Claudia. (2016) 'Trump's Victory and the Politics of Resentment', *SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN,* viewed 14 February 2018, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/trump-s-victory-and-the-politics-of-resentment/

[15] Chon, Gina. (2016) 'Clinton and Kaine become globalization's defenders', *REUTERS,* viewed 23 March 2018, http://blogs.reuters.com/breakingviews/2016/07/23/clinton-and-kaine-become-globalizations-defenders/

[16] Reilly, Katie. (2016) 'Read Hillary Clinton's Speech on Donald Trump and the GOP's Radical Fringe', *TIME,* viewed 23 March 2018, http://time.com/4466706/hillary-clinton-donald-trump-radical-fringe-hate-transcript/

[17] C-SPAN, (2016) 'NOVEMBER 19, 2015: CLIP OF PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE HILLARY CLINTON NATIONAL SECURITY ADDRESS', viewed 23 March 2018, https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4609071/clinton-american-leadership

[18] Houses of Parliament: Parliamentary Office of Science & Technology, (June 2015) 'Trends in Political Participation', *POSTNOTE Number 498*, p.2

what is right most or all of the time eroded from 60% in the late 1960s to just 28% in 2013.[19] Trust in government has also been declining in the United States and many continental European countries.[20] Moreover, since the 1970s rates of voter turnout have been declining in the western world.[21] In the 1972 German General Election 91.1% of eligible electors turned out to vote. In 2017 only 76.2% participated.[22] In the French First-Round Legislative Elections of the 1970s voter turnout was above 80%. By 2017 it had eroded to below 50%.[23] The official turnout rate in the Canadian Federal General Election of 1963 was 79%.[24] By 2015 it was just 68%.[25] Furthermore, since the early 1950s the number of UK citizens who are political party members has fallen dramatically from four million to less than one million,[26] despite the population of the UK increasing from 50 million to over 60 million during the same period.[27] Between 1988 and 2008 the proportion of the Canadian electorate that were political party members declined among each age group: from 5 to 2% among 18-29-year-olds; from 8 to 4% among 30-59-year-olds and from 13 to 8% among those aged 60 and over.[28] In the early 1960s nearly 10% of eligible voters in the Netherlands belonged to a

[19] Graves, Frank. (2013) 'THE TRUST DEFICIT: WHAT DOES IT MEAN', *EKOS:POLITICS,* p.1
[20] Ceka, Besir. (2013) 'The EU may have a democratic deficit, but national governments are facing an even greater legitimacy crisis', *The London School of Economics and Political Science,* viewed 17 March 2018, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2013/10/29/the-eu-may-have-a-democratic-deficit-but-national-governments-are-facing-an-even-greater-legitimacy-crisis/; Pew Research Center, (2015) '1. Trust in government: 1958-2015', *BEYOND DISTRUST: HOW AMERICANS VIEW THEIR GOVERNMENT,* viewed 17 March 2018, http://www.people-press.org/2015/11/23/1-trust-in-government-1958-2015/
[21] Ferrini, Luca. (2012) 'Why is Turnout at Elections Declining Across the Democratic World?', *E-INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS STUDENTS,* viewed 23 March 2018, http://www.e-ir.info/2012/09/27/why-is-turnout-at-elections-declining-across-the-democratic-world/
[22] Statista, (2018) 'Voter turnout a general elections in Germany from 1949 to 2017', viewed 23 March 2018, https://www.statista.com/statistics/753732/german-elections-voter-turnout/
[23] Kostelka, Filip. (2017) 'The 2017 French Legislative Elections: Why Was Voter Turnout So Low and What Can Be Done About It?', *MAKING ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY WORK,* viewed 23 March 2018, http://electoraldemocracy.com/2017-french-legislative-election-voter-turnout-2405
[24] Elections Canada, (2017) 'Estimation of Voter Turnout by Age Group and Gender at the 2011 Federal General Election', http://www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=res&dir=rec/part/estim/41ge&document=report41&lang=e
[25] Elections Canada, (2016) 'Voter Turnout by Age Group', viewed 23 March 2018, http://www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=res&dir=rec/eval/pes2015/vtsa&document=table1&lang=e
[26] Keen, Richard and Jackson, Lydia. (2018) 'Membership of UK Political Parties', *HOUSE of COMMONS: LIBRARY,* Briefing Paper Number SNO5125, p.7
[27] Lahmeyer, Jan. (2015) 'The United Kingdom: historical demographical data of the whole country', *POPULATION STATISTICS,* viewed 17 March 2018, http://www.populstat.info/Europe/unkingdc.htm
[28] Martin, Aaron. (2012) *Young people and political engagement: Comparing Anglo-American democracies,* Routledge, Florence Kentucky USA, p.78

political party. By 2010 only 3% were members.[29] Significant declines in rates of party membership have also occurred over the last several decades in New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, Finland, Ireland, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Portugal and Austria.[30]

Thesis Argument, Scope & Data Sources

Katz and Mair (1995) and Whiteley (2009a) reason that party disengagement renders the representativeness and responsiveness of democratic institutions susceptible to erosion by sectional and elite/monied interests.[31] This thesis argues that:

1) technological and economic development in post-industrial societies have precipitated a generational values shift; and
2) these patterns have paradoxically both reduced the ideological diversity within, and raised the ideological difference between, social networks in turn:
    a) diminishing involvement in, and confidence and satisfaction with, conventional/conflict-prone political organisations (including parties), thereby
    b) undermining representative democracy.

This thesis argues that these 'social capital'[32] and political engagement trends can largely be attributed to rising levels of 'social modularity', by which is meant the flexibility to both forge and discontinue social connections. This raised social modularity is facilitating a replacement of 'bridging social capital' (between people with different backgrounds,

[29] Tall, Stephen. (2012) 'The Lib Dem membership slump: how it compares and how we can respond', *Liberal Democrat Voice,* viewed 17 March 2018, https://www.libdemvoice.org/lib-dem-party-membership-figures-2011-29703.html

[30] Edwards, Bryce. (2008) 'Party membership 4: Electoral-Professional party', *Liberation,* viewed 17 March 2018, http://liberation.typepad.com/liberation/2008/06/party-members-4.html; Biezen, Ingrid. (2013) 'The decline in party membership across Europe means that political parties need to reconsider how they engage with the electorate', *EUROPP: European Politics and Policy,* viewed 17 March 2018, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2013/05/06/decline-in-party-membership-europe-ingrid-van-biezen/; Scarrow, Susan, E and Gezgor, Burcu. (2010) 'Declining memberships, changing members? European political party members in a new era', *PARTY POLITICS,* p.1-21

[31] Katz, Richard, S and Mair, Peter. (1995) 'Changing Models of Party Organisation and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party', *Party Politics,* vol:1(1), p.15, 16 & 21-23; Whiteley, Paul. (2009) 'Party membership and activism in comparative perspective', in DeBardeleben, Joan and Pammett, Jon, H, *Activating the citizen: Dilemmas of participation in Europe and Canada,* Palgrave macmillan, England, p.131

[32] Henn, Hodgkinson and Weinstein define social capital as "[t]he social networks between individuals as well as the trust, shared norms and reciprocities that underpin and in turn arise from such connections." Henn, Hodgkinson and Weinstein, 'Social capital and political participation', p.467

attitudes and interests) with 'bonding social capital' (between people with similar life experiences, views and priorities), thereby altering skills and experiences and social and political tolerance and expectations. By conducting a close study of this phenomenon in the Australian context, this thesis uncovers the network homogenising causes of declining party participation (a gap in the scholarly literature). Raised social modularity and autonomy is linked to the post-industrial stage of development; therefore, the findings of this enquiry into political sociological trends in Australia are likely to be applicable to most other post-industrial democracies.

This thesis draws on my own survey findings as well as raw data from Australian World Values Survey (WVS) waves. The latter are analysed to produce age stratified frequency and correlation statistics. WVS waves provide an invaluable source of data from which trends in values, interpersonal trust, institutional confidence, generosity and community and civic involvement can be analysed. These statistics are supplemented by Pearson correlations collated from responses to the questions posed in my own detailed 'Political Participation & Conflict Avoidance Survey.' Data from my survey is used to assess the degree to which the views and value emphases of participants reflect those of the participants' close friends, work colleagues and family members. These evaluations are found to be significantly correlated with survey responses pertaining to measures of, and possible factors influencing social capital and political confidence and engagement. The survey was thorough and complex, requiring at least 2 hours for each of the 36 participants to complete. Participants were found using snowball sampling techniques in which existing survey participants recruit future participants from among their acquaintances. Participants were asked to recruit a diverse range of subjects (if possible) and each participant was offered an honorarium of $25 for their involvement.

Social network homogenisation is found to be linked to a post-industrial generational attitudinal shift from an emphasis on conformity and hierarchical survival values to autonomy and egalitarian self-expression values. That is, my statistics reveal that a Self-Expression Values Homogenous Social Network (SEVHSN) Complex now exists.[33] The statistics also show that, and suggest reasons why party confidence, identification and engagement are

[33] See Chapter Six

negatively correlated with immersion in the Complex. Additionally, statistics presented indicate that an increasing proportion of the Australian population is becoming more heavily embedded in the Complex (largely through generational replacement). They also reveal that Complex-immersion is mainly being driven by trends associated with greater social modularity and empowerment (brought about by post-industrialisation). These trends relate to technology use, economic development/financial security, education attainment and news/information dissemination.[34] The statistical analysis present in this thesis suggests that my Homogenisation arguments may have better explanatory power than the two dominant rival sociological engagement theories: Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel's 'Modernisation' and Robert Putnam's 'Lamentation' theories, both of which are critically evaluated. I have personally coined the term Lamentationists to describe theorists contending that modern technology and societal trends have eroded all (or most forms of) social capital (formal and informal, bonding and bridging), trust, civic oriented values and political engagement.

Why an 'Australian' Case Study?

Due to nineteenth and twentieth century settlement and migration patterns Australia is relatively ethnically, philosophically and ideologically homogenous compared to other Western developed nations such as the Netherlands, France, Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom. Australian societal homogeneity may somewhat mitigate the growing political intolerance,[35] distrust[36] and dissatisfaction[37] as well as electoral and party disengagement[38] induced by network homogenisation. The difference between the experiences, values, beliefs and expectations of people embedded in social bubbles, and those who more frequently interact with people unlike themselves, are not as great when there is less variance between bubbles. Though the consequences of contemporary Social Network Homogenisation (SNH) may not be as severe in Australia relative to many other post-industrial nations, Australia's ideological network homogenisation and societal

[34] See Chapter Seven
[35] See Chapter Eight
[36] See Chapters Three, Six & Eight
[37] See Chapters One, Four & Eight
[38] See Chapters One, Three & Eight

diversification are, compared to similar trends in other countries, less of an amplification of philosophical purity/divergence within/between ethnicities and regions. Therefore, Australian sociological trends cannot be dismissed as simply a legacy of the cultural evolution, trauma and demographic shifts of a bygone era. For this reason, Australia is a worthy case study for how social capital patterns associated with the post-industrial stage of development influence political involvement.

Ideological Diversification and Political Polarisation

Network homogenisation and societal diversification exacerbate policy cleavages and the degree to which individuals overestimate the prevalence of their own political beliefs within, and the ideological homogeneity of, society.[39] This is widening the gap between electoral/policy expectations and outcomes, and augmenting distrust of, intolerance toward and dissatisfaction with party organisations and politicians.[40] In recent years there has been a spate of particularly polarising referenda and national elections across the Western world in which a large proportion of citizens were astounded by the level of support received by campaigns and politicians previously deemed far removed from mainstream politics. From the rising popularity of the *Alternative für Deutschland*, the French National front, Pauline Hanson's One Nation, Lega Nord, the Five-Star Movement and the Austrian and Dutch Freedom parties, through to Brexit and the Trump election, many nationals have not just been disheartened but bewildered by these developments.[41] Without reforms guided by a full appreciation of the post-industrial factors and trends (network homogenisation and societal diversification) driving party disengagement and greater political division, intolerance and dissatisfaction, representative democracy and social cohesion are likely to come under greater pressure and threat. Through an Australian investigation, I endeavour to demonstrate how, contrary to conventional wisdom, sociological trends linked to post-industrial

[39] See Chapters Six & Eight; Boase, Jeffrey and Ikeda, Ken'ichi. (2011) 'Multiple discussion networks and their consequence for political participation', *Communication Research,* vol:38(5), p.661

[40] See Chapter Eight

[41] *The Economist,* (2015) 'France's far-right National Front loses a round, but they will be back', viewed 14 February 2018, https://www.economist.com/news/europe/21683995-tactical-manoeuvring-mainstream-left-and-right-blocks-marine-le-pen-winning-regional; Edwards, Catherine. (2018) 'Political Cheat Sheet: understanding Italy's Five Star Movement', *THE LOCAL,* viewed 14 February, https://www.thelocal.it/20180206/political-election-understanding-italys-five-star-movement-m5s-di-maio-grillo; Parry, Tom. (2016) 'Brexit win sends shocked Remain voters to the pubs', *CBCnews,* viewed 14 February 2018, http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/brexit-day-after-streeter-1.3651221

development have a twin-pronged effect: they erode bridging while at the same time strengthen bonding connections. These patterns, in turn, undermine party and electoral involvement and erode confidence in our democratic institutions.

Thesis Structure

The first two chapters identify and scrutinise sociological participation theories that could potentially explain diminished rates of Australian party and electoral involvement. Chapter One presents a summary of declining rates of Australian party and electoral engagement and evaluates how these patterns are inimical to an inclusive and flourishing democracy. The number of Australian major party members has fallen from approximately 350,000 members in the mid-twentieth century to 100,000 members in 2010;[42] despite the population of Australia almost trebling in that same period.[43] Indeed, the proportion of Australians who are political party members has shrunk by 75% since the 1960s.[44] Lisa Hill and Serrin Rutledge-Prior have found that intentional informal voting among Australian youth is on the rise.[45] Their research also reveals that between 1983 and 2013 levels of informal voting in Australian House of Representatives elections rose by 180%.[46] Additionally, Aaron Martin has found that party identification in Australia is in generational decline. In 1990 only 5% of Australian young people did not identify with a party. By 2010 that figure had grown to 24%.[47] The chapter also discerns two pre-eminent sociological participation theories: Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel's 'Modernisation' and Robert Putnam's *Bowling Alone* 'Lamentation' theses. Additionally, it discusses evidence for why my third, 'Homogenisation' theory, deserves exploration.

The second chapter reveals that both Modernisation and Lamentation theses have weaknesses as well as potency. Evidence is shown to corroborate the Modernisation

[42] Jacobs, Colin. (2010) 'Politics: Pick a team and play', *The Sydney Morning Herald,* viewed 18 March 2018, https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/politics-pick-a-team-and-play-20100816-126f3.html
[43] *Country Digest,* (2017) 'AUSTRALIA POPULATION 2017', viewed 18 March 2018, https://countrydigest.org/australia-population/
[44] Cross, William and Gauja, Anika. (2014) 'Evolving membership strategies in Australian political parties', *Australian Journal of Political Science,* vol:49(4), p.614/615
[45] Hill, Lisa and Rutledge-Prior, Serrin. (2016) 'Young people and intentional informal voting in Australia', *Australian Journal of Political Science,* vol:51(3), p.400-417
[46]Hill and Rutledge-Prior, 'Young people and intentional informal voting in Australia', p.402
[47] Martin, *Young people and political engagement,* p.76

argument that social atomisation, induced by economic and technological advance, enables human liberation and autonomy by reshaping rather than diminishing social connections, cultural expectations and civil and political governing structures and processes. Yet, Inglehart and Welzel's contention that 'bonding' is being replaced by 'bridging' social capital is found to overlook data and research indicating that the Modernisation theorists' identified instigators of social modularity may also be homogenising networks and diversifying societal beliefs and ideals. Similarly, not all the trends Putnam argues as having an eroding effect on social capital and political participation are validated by other, and my own data analysis. Moreover, Putnam's position that almost all forms of social capital are (or were) in secular decline is judged unduly bleak: largely because it concentrates excessively on traditional community and political involvement patterns and neglects trends in newer and more informal modes of engagement.

Chapter Three assesses the extent to which Australian value, social capital and political involvement trends are consistent with Modernisation, Lamentation and Homogenisation theses by exploring age-and-generation-stratified frequency statistics from the 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 World Values Surveys (WVS). Overall this WVS evidence undermines Modernisation and Lamentation theses and shapes my more compelling Homogenisationist explanation. Trends regarding changing education, employment and familial demographics, levels of subjectively sensed autonomy, value orientations and informal/unconventional political engagement are found to be consistent with Modernisation and Homogenisation theories. In contrast, data concerning shifting value orientations and unconventional political participation are shown to weaken Putnam's Lamentation arguments, at least in the Australian context. Patterns discordant with Modernisation and Lamentation theories are uncovered by subsequent examination of trends in political interest levels as well as involvement and confidence in formal organisations and institutions. Nevertheless, a sociological context of ideologically and recreationally homogenising networks is demonstrated to be congruent with this evidence. Finally, changing levels of interpersonal trust, happiness and financial and life satisfaction are found not to provide potent support for, but to be compatible with my Homogenisation theory.

Chapters Four and Five analyse Australian age-stratified WVS correlation, and other statistics to gauge the veracity of Lamentationist, Modernisationist and my Homogenisationist views regarding factors ostensibly influencing political and social values, capital and engagement. These factors include:

- a subjective sense of autonomy;
- economic variables potentially affecting actual autonomy levels (Chapter Four);
- familial compositions;
- sex and female employment status;
- TV viewing;
- religious service attendance; and
- town/city size (Chapter Five).

The fundamental difference between Modernisation and Homogenisation theories are their opposing positions regarding the direction of generational shifts between bonding and bridging social capital. WVS questions do not enquire about the degree of ideological/political commonality between participants and their social network members (friends, work colleagues and family members). Therefore, findings in these chapters tend to support both Modernisation and Homogenisation theories but weaken Putnam's Lamentation thesis. The data indicates that many of the variables Putnam considers to be significant factors, have little or no influence on, or relationship with, value orientations, social capital and political engagement. Furthermore, Putnam's Lamentation arguments regarding the role of labour market deregulation are revealed to be irrelevant in the Australian context. Contrastingly, higher incomes and financial satisfaction, education and the extent to which one's vocation demands creativity are found to markedly influence social and political values, capital and involvement in ways largely consistent with Modernisation and Homogenisation theories. Additionally, the impact of inequality is shown to be fairly consistent with my Homogenisation thesis.

Having enfeebled Putnam's Lamentation thesis in previous chapters (at least in the Australian context), Chapters Six and Seven focus on the divergence between my

Homogenisation and Inglehart and Welzel's Modernisation theses. Where there is difference, most statistics drawn from my own Political Participation and Conflict Avoidance Survey support my argument. Statistics discussed in Chapter Six indicate that:

1) a Self-Expression Values Homogenous Social Network (SEVHSN) Complex exists;
2) a generationally growing proportion of Australians are immersed in it, and
3) it is linked to:
    a) more informal structural social capital;
    b) more general interpersonal trust;
    c) more trust/confidence in decentralise local/state government, and
    d) less trust/confidence in the centralised federal government; and
4) it is undermining:
    a) exposure to ideological diversity; and
    b) willingness to debate, compromise and participate in conflict prone forms of engagement.

I argue that many of these trends will have (and are having) an undesirable impact on the strength and functionality of, and confidence in, Australian politics.

Chapter Seven investigates the validity of theorised drivers of SEVHSN Complex-immersion, including:

- use of technologies (such as online communication and audio and screen entertainment);
- financial security/economic development;
- education attainment; and
- news/information dissemination.

The extent to which my Homogenisation arguments are supported by correlations between these variables and indicators of Complex-embeddedness is reviewed. I reason that these variables drive network homogenisation and societal diversification by enhancing individual empowerment.

The final chapter evaluates the ways in which SNH influences political engagement. Pernicious patterns and factors linked to SNH are explored. My statistics uncover many correlations between patterns/trends symptomatic of, and theoretically associated with Complex-immersion and social network homogeneity. These strengthen my Homogenisation argument. To conclude, Chapter Eight speculates ways in which reform of Australian electoral regimes and intraparty decision-making procedures may alleviate the extent to which SNH suppresses party membership and involvement.

In sum, this thesis contends that the significant declines in party membership and engagement experienced in Australia, and numerous other post-industrial societies, since the mid-twentieth century is connected to a dramatic rise in levels of individual empowerment. Increased personal autonomy enables greater social modularity that can produce ideological, philosophical and recreational network homogenisation and paradoxically, societal diversification. These trends can erode engagement in, and identification with, diverse and conflict prone organisations (such as political parties) by precipitating reductions in preparedness to compromise and inefficacy in debate, deliberation and negotiation: exacerbating political mistrust and dissatisfaction. Australian levels of political trust and satisfaction as well as party identification, membership and involvement have fallen remarkably during the last half century. These patterns potentially undermine the representativeness, responsiveness, resilience and effectiveness of our democratic institutions and procedures. Subjecting Australian social capital and civic involvement patterns to thorough evaluation will help raise awareness of the key causes of political intolerance and conflict aversion. This is necessary for elites to initiate electoral and internal party reforms aimed at adapting to generational shifts in values and expectations.

CHAPTER ONE

--PARTY POLITICAL DISENGAGEMENT--

A Literature Review

> "I liked the idea of carving out a new kind of role in politics, one that didn't involve deceit and nastiness … or the destruction of decent people's efforts to build up the Party. But it was a vision of the future that I rapidly decided I could not make into a reality. … The factions that exist in the [party] organisation have served literally no productive purpose. What they have done is deterred hundreds of talented, worthwhile people from a participation in politics."[48]

These despairing words written by John Hyde Page, former youth member of the Australian Liberal party and current Sydney barrister, were published in his 2006 memoir *The Education of a Young Liberal*. Page's bitter insights are reflective of significant, broad and consequential generational trends in Australian political attitudes and behaviour and are particularly applicable to youth. These patterns appear to be widespread and may even extend to the populations of most developed countries. Page's views both encapsulate a sense of distrust and inefficacy that has increasingly come to epitomise the sentiments of many Australians toward traditional political institutions and organisations[49] and indicate a reluctance to engage in conflict prone political activity.

Australian Party and Electoral Disengagement

Electoral democracy is gradually being undermined by youth disengagement from electoral and party politics (discussed in the introduction and below). Using Australia as a case study, this thesis, an exercise in political sociology, focuses on the reasons behind post-

[48] Page, John, Hyde. (2006) *The Education of a Young Liberal,* Melbourne University Press, Carlton, Victoria, p.309-312
[49] Martin, *Young people and political engagement*, p.51

industrial generational changes in political attitudes and behaviour. Today's youth generally profess a desire for consensus and are more politically disillusioned and conflict averse than previous generations.[50] Evidence discussed later in this chapter suggests they are also less willing than previous generations to compromise and participate in the kinds of debate, deliberation and negotiation necessary to arrive at widely accepted political decisions, such as those encountered when participating in a political party. Additionally, they are more inclined to cast informal votes at State and Federal elections. Indeed, Lisa Hill and Serrin Rutledge-Prior have found that intentional informal voting among Australian youth is on the rise.[51] Hill has also reported that around 20 or more percent of 18 to 25 year old Australians are not enrolled to vote and that the voting rate of young Australians 18 to 25 is regularly 10 percentage points below that of the all-age population.[52]

The number of Australian major party members has also fallen from approximately 350,000 members in the mid-twentieth century to 100,000 members in 2010;[53] despite the population of Australia almost trebling during the same period.[54] Indeed, the proportion of Australians who are political party members has shrunk by 75% since the 1960s.[55] Aaron Martin has found that only 3% of Australians aged between 18 and 29 are political party members, whereas 10% of Australians aged 60 and over are party members.[56] Martin was unable to find data on whether Australian party membership within particular age brackets have been declining over time. However, he has found that party membership across each of the age groups 18 to 29, 30 to 59 and 60+ has been declining in both Canada and the UK and that this is partly due to generational declines.[57] In his words: "The generational decline in party membership also suggests that membership levels will reach even lower levels in the

[50] Henn, Matt., Weinstein, Mark and Wring, Dominic. (2002) 'A generation apart? Youth and political participation in Britain', *British Journal of Politics and International Relations,* vol:4(2), p.170 & 179; *The Examiner* (2014) 'Tassie youth disillusioned by formal politics', viewed 14 June 2014, http://www.examiner.com.au/story/2149938/tassie-youth-disillusioned-by-formal-politics/; Byrne, Susan., Heller, Allison., Keevy, Nicky and Ohlin, Jackie. (2010) 'How young people participate in civic activities using the internet and mobile technologies', *Report to the National Youth Affairs Research Scheme (NYARS),* Ministerial Council on Education, Employment, Training and Youth Affairs (MCEETYA), p.104
[51] Hill and Rutledge-Prior, 'Young people and intentional informal voting in Australia', p.400-417
[52] Hill, Lisa. (2011) 'Informal Voting Under a System of Compulsory Voting', in Costar, B., Orr, G. and Tham, J. (eds) *Electoral Democracy: Australian Prospects,* Melbourne University Press
[53] Jacobs, 'Politics: Pick a team and play'
[54] *Country Digest,* 'AUSTRALIA POPULATION 2017'
[55] Cross and Gauja, 'Evolving membership strategies in Australian political parties', p.614/615
[56] Martin, *Young people and political engagement,* p.80
[57] Martin, *Young people and political engagement,* p.78 & 79

future."[58] These findings, combined with the fact that party identification in Australia is in generational decline (see below), suggests that Australian party membership has been declining in a similar fashion across generational cohorts and time periods. Indeed, we know that in 1990 only 5% of Australian young people did not identify with a party. By 2010 that figure had grown to 24%.[59]

Paradoxically, interest in politics (as opposed to party/electoral engagement) has trended upwards across all age brackets (including the young) over the last 40 years rendering the politically apathetic Gen Y stereotype unfounded.[60] Indeed young people are increasingly willing to participate in single issue public demonstrations, petition signing, online forums and political consumerism.[61] However, this shift from conventional/electoral participatory forms such as party membership and voting, toward unconventional/non-electoral engagement represents a potential threat to the inclusiveness, integrity and efficacy of our democratic institutions.

The Significance of Mass Participation:

Schumpeter, Value Pluralism & the Classical Doctrine of Democracy

To properly locate my research within the relevant literature, its premise, that declining electoral and party engagement is detrimental to an inclusive and thriving democracy, must first be defended. While some scholars like Joseph Schumpeter would look favourably upon these trends, believing in an extremely limited decision-making role in public affairs for what they consider is a largely ignorant, superficial and irrational public, their beliefs are based on questionable premises. Schumpeter describes the Classical Doctrine of Democracy as the view that democracy is an "institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions which will [realise] the common good by making … [the public] itself decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its will."[62] He assumes that those who believe in what he describes as the Classical Doctrine of

[58] Martin, *Young people and political engagement,* p.79
[59] Martin, *Young people and political engagement,* p.76
[60] Martin, *Young people and political engagement,* p.62; Harris, Anita., Wyn, Johanna and Younes, Salem. (2007) 'Young people and citizenship: An everyday perspective', *Youth Studies Australia,* vol:26(3), p.25
[61] Martin, *Young people and political engagement,* p.17; Fyfe, Ian. (2009) 'Researching youth political participation in Australia', *Youth Studies Australia,* vol:28(1), p.40
[62] Schumpeter, Joseph, A. (1961) *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy,* George Allen and Unwin Ltd, London, p.250

Democracy, necessarily hold that most people are rational and "there exists a Common Good … which is always simple to define and which every normal person can be made to see by means of rational [utilitarian] argument."[63] However, Schumpeter fails to grasp that not all believers in the classical school are "utilitarian"[64] value monists. Although those who support the Classical Doctrine do necessarily believe that most people are rational, it does not follow that they hold that people will always be able to arrive at consensus on government policy issues through deliberation. As ultimate values are incommensurable when devoid of context, there are often multiple rational ways to balance these frequently conflicting values within particular contexts.[65] Accordant with this value pluralist view, highly representative democracy (as advocated by adherents of the Classical Doctrine of Democracy) is therefore, the only legitimate way to overcome disputes over equally rational policy positions advocated by rational individuals of equal moral worth.

Thus, declining party membership is genuinely concerning as it threatens the ability of political parties to effectively represent constituencies and supporters by delegating the selection of candidates and adoption of policies to an increasingly narrow and unrepresentative sample. This may place democracy itself in jeopardy by encouraging emaciated party organisations to seek state assistance and sponsorship in lieu of grassroots support. This would encourage major party elites to become increasingly detached from, and unrepresentative of, their constituencies without suffering significant financial or electoral consequences.[66] Hence research into the causes of declining party membership and electoral participation across time periods and generational cohorts is warranted. Scholars seem to be exposing, and developing theories founded on fragmented reasons for these phenomena without investigating whether the pieces are connected and can be amalgamated into a single, more complete argument.

[63] Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy,* p.250
[64] Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy,* p.251 & 252
[65] Hardy, Henry. (2007) 'Taking Pluralism Seriously', Crowder, George and Hardy, Henry, *The One and the Many,* Prometheus Books, New York, p.283; Crowder, George. (2006) 'Value Pluralism and Communitarianism', *Contemporary Political Theory, vol.5,* Palgrave Macmillian Ltd, p.417
[66] Katz and Mair. 'Changing Models of Party Organisation and Party Democracy', p.15, 16 & 21-23; Whiteley. 'Party membership and activism in comparative perspective', p.131

Participation Theories

Declines in party and electoral participation are often attributed to changes in the number, significance and types of associations in which people are involved (that is structural social capital) and the perceived failings of the political and electoral systems.[67] However, no comprehensive study has yet been conducted into the relationships between social network homogeneity, political conflict avoidance and 'declining' party membership and participation. Instead, some researchers have assumed that conflict avoidance is an inherent characteristic within certain individuals rather than a generational or period trend: thus focusing their investigations on the effects of this characteristic rather than its origins.[68] Other analysts have studied the connection between political participation and generational and period trends. However, they have yet to fully and adequately explore the links between economic, social and technological modernisation and social atomisation, declining engagement in traditional and formal non-political associations, and social network homogenisation. Furthermore, they have not sufficiently evaluated how these patterns might have an adverse impact on dependent variables. These include efficacy in, and tolerance for, political debate, deliberation and negotiation; preparedness to compromise; conflict avoidance; electoral and party participation and political, electoral and party structures, systems and processes. Instead, they have focused on the relationships between some of these trends and factors while neglecting the role of others.[69] In the following paragraphs I consider the arguments of

[67] Fahmy, Eldin. (2006) *Young Citizens: Young people's involvement in Politics and Decision Making,* Ashgate Publishing Ltd, England, p.13; Klingemann, H, D. (1999) 'Mapping Political Support in the 1990s: A Global Analysis', in Norris, P, *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government,* Oxford University Press, New York, p.32; Amna, Erik and Zetterberg, Par. (2010) 'A political science perspective on socialization research: young Nordic citizens in a comparative light', in Flanagan, Constance., Sherrod, Lonnie, R., and Torney-Purta, Judith, *Handbook of Research on Civic Engagement in Youth,* John Wiley & sons Inc, New Jersey, p.48; McVey, Andrew and Vowles, Jack. (2005) 'Virtuous circle or cul de sac? Social capital and political participation in New Zealand', *Social Science,* vol:57(5), p.5; Whiteley, 'Party membership and activism in comparative perspective', p.131; Cross, William and Crysler, John. (2009) 'Grassroots Participation and party leadership selection: Examining the British and Canadian Cases', in Deburdeleben, Joan and Pammett, Jon, H. *Activating the Citizen: Dilemmas of Participation in Europe and Canada,* Palgrave Macmillan, New York, p.174 & 175

[68] Ulbig, Stacy, G and Funk, Carolyn, L (1999) 'Conflict avoidance and political participation', *Political Behavior,* vol:21(3), p.268-270

[69] Boase and Ikeda, 'Multiple discussion networks and their consequence for political participation', p.660; Putnam, Robert D. (2000), *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and revival of American Community,* Simon & Schuster, New York; Inglehart, R and Welzel, C. (2005) *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence,* Cambridge University Press, New York, p.4,19,25 & 118

some of these key thinkers before summarising and citing evidence supporting my own line of investigation.

Lamentation & Modernisation

Participation theories are based on theorists' conception of social capital and technological, economic, cultural and political development as well as how these forces have and/or are likely to affect citizen engagement with certain institutional and organisational structures and processes. Social capital has been defined as "the social networks between individuals as well as the trust, shared norms and reciprocities that underpin and in turn arise from such connections."[70] Many and varied theories in political sociology exist through which academics rate and analyse the engagement, functionality and health of democracies. The two most comprehensive and compelling participation theories are Robert Putnam's Lamentation theory and Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel's Modernisation theory. Recognition of the underlying assumptions behind these theoretical perspectives is necessary before making a proper evaluation of their adherents' arguments and comparing their performance to the alternative theory developed within this thesis (my own Homogenisation theory).

Social capital Lamentationists, such as Robert Putnam author of the often-cited *Bowling Alone* thesis, allege that modern technology and certain societal trends have had a negative impact on social capital. Such technological advances comprise the invention and widespread use of television, the internet and social media.[71] Pernicious social patterns include globalisation/delocalisation, labour market deregulation, secularisation, and a higher portion of people living in the suburbs of large cities rather than in small towns.[72] Declining rates of marriage and fertility, rising rates of divorce and two career families, more lifestyle enclaves and longer times spent commuting are also deemed insidious and destructive.[73]

Lamentationists hold that both informal and formal structural social capital are in decline. These comprise informal get-togethers among friends and acquaintances as well as

[70] Henn, Hodgkinson and Weinstein, 'Social capital and political participation', p.467
[71] Putnam, *Bowling Alone,* p.216-219, 221-223, 225, 228, 230, 231, 235-238, 242-244 & 283
[72] Putnam, *Bowling Alone,* p.66-78, 88-90, 138, 191, 205-207, 282 & 283
[73] Putnam, *Bowling Alone,* p.194-196, 202, 209, 210, 212, 213, 248 & 278

involvement in traditional and formal associations such as church congregations, sports clubs, charities, volunteer organisations, trade unions and political parties. Youth, Putnam argues, have been disproportionally affected by the erosion of social capital as young people have had more intense exposure to various technologies and social changes in their formative years.[74] These trends, Lamentationists contend, are resulting in falling community and civic oriented interests and values by reducing empathy, interpersonal trust and political confidence and efficacy,[75] both internal and external.[76] That is, they maintain that empathy, trust and political efficacy are strengthened by social embeddedness and interaction and that:

- empathy motivates compassion, generosity and political interest;
- interpersonal and political trust raise confidence in cooperation and collective decision-making; and
- political efficacy induces a belief among citizens that they have the individual competence and ability to have their views and ideals (that are guided by their compassion, generosity and interest) realised through cooperation and collective action.

Lamentationists reason that declines community and civic oriented interests and values have profoundly contributed to a reduction in both conventional/electoral and unconventional/non-electoral political engagement.[77] Indeed Neilson and Paxton (2010) and

[74] Putnam, *Bowling Alone,* p.35 & 261

[75] Konrath, S, H., O'Brien, E, H., and Hsing, C. (2011) 'Changes in dispositional empathy in American college students over time: A meta-analysis', *Personality and Social Psychology Review,* vol:15, p.185 & 186; Putnam, *Bowling Alone,* p.25, 36, 37, 47, 139-141, 143, 146, 147 & 219; Malahy, Lori, W., Rubinlicht, Michelle, A., and Kaiser, Cheryl, R. (2009) 'Justifying inequality: A Cross-temporal investigation of U.S. income disparities and just-world beliefs from 1973 to 2006', *Social Justice Research,* vol:22, p.375; Stewart, Kenneth, D and Bernhardt, Paul, C. (2010) 'Comparing Millennials to pre-1987 students and with one another', *North American Journal of Psychology,* vol:12, p.596; Twenge, Jean, M and Foster, Joshua, D. (2010) 'Birth cohort increases in narcissistic personality traits among American college students, 1982-2009', *Social Psychological & Personality Science,* vol:1, p.101-103; Twenge, Jean, M., Freeman, Elise, C and Campbell, W, K. (2012) 'Personality Processes and individual differences: Generational Differences in Young Adults' Life Goals, Concerns for others, and Civic Orientation, 1966-2009', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* vol:102(5), p.1054-1058

[76] For the definitions of internal and external political efficacy see Glossary or - Zuniga, Homero., Diehl, Trevor and Ardevol-Abreu, Alberto. (2017) 'Internal, External, and Government Political Efficacy: Effects on News Use, Discussion, and Political Participation', *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media,* vol:61(3), p.576/577

[77] Putnam, *Bowling Alone,* p.34, 35, 38-42 & 46; Twenge, Freeman and Campbell, 'Personality Processes and individual differences: Generational Differences in Young Adults' Life Goals, Concerns for others, and Civic Orientation, 1966-2009', p.1056

Henn, Hodgkinson and Weinstein (2007) found a positive link between participation in voluntary associations and political interest and activity.[78]

According to Putnam 'bonding' social capital is that which is "inward looking and tend[s] to reinforce exclusive identities and homogenous groups".[79] He argues that it "is good for under girding specific reciprocity and mobilising solidarity",[80] by which is meant strengthening mutual support and consensus between persons with common (economic, ethnic, religious, lifestyle and/or political) interests. Conversely, Putnam defines 'bridging' social capital as that which is "outward looking and encompass[es] people across diverse social cleavages".[81] He maintains that it is "better [than 'bonding' social capital] for linkage to external assets and for information diffusion",[82] by which is meant access to skills and knowledge scarce among members of one's own interest/identity group(s). Lamentationists maintain that 'bonding' and 'bridging' social capital are in decline[83] and technological, social, and economic trends that have contributed to these reductions are not inevitable consequences of modernisation. Therefore, governments and communities should seek to reinvigorate society by encouraging individuals to, and implementing policies which would, raise and facilitate the formation of social capital thereby lifting political engagement.

Contrastingly, Modernisationists hold that technological, economic and human capital development and changing social and political values, trust, engagement, structures, institutions and processes are inextricably linked in a sliding scale of modernisation.[84] These views are most notably espoused by Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel.

Figure 1.1

[78] Neilson, Lisa, A and Paxton, Pamela. (2010) 'Social capital and political consumerism: A multilevel analysis', *Social Problems,* vol:57(1), University of California Press, p.8 & 19; Henn, Hodgkinson, and Weinstein, 'Social capital and political participation', p.467, 468, 471 & 472
[79] Putnam, *Bowling Alone,* p.22
[80] Putnam, *Bowling Alone,* p.22
[81] Putnam, *Bowling Alone,* p.22
[82] Putnam, *Bowling Alone,* p.22
[83] Putnam, *Bowling Alone,* p.22 & 23
[84] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.2-5, 19 & 21

SCALE OF MODERNISATION

	Traditional Society	Industrial Society	Post-industrial Society
Socio-economic Dimension	-Subsistence farming -Little control over nature -Little social mobility -Existential insecurity	-Factory work / manufacturing -Greater control over nature -Little social mobility -Existential insecurity	-Services requiring educated / skilled workforce -Humans dominant over nature -Significant social mobility -Rising economic prosperity & existential security - Welfare-state development
Cultural Dimension	- High religiosity -Strong familial & community norms & obligations -Little personal autonomy	-Rising secularism and materialistic values -Strong familial & community norms & obligations -Modest personal autonomy	-Slowing rise in secular & rising postmaterialist values -Weakening familial & community norms & obligations -Significant & growing personal autonomy
Institutional/political Dimension	Hierarchical / authoritarian regimes (absolute monarchies, theocracy, serfdom)	-Modern secular ideologies (fascism, communism, utilitarianism & liberalism) -Not necessarily liberal or democratic	-Governance and civil society become increasingly liberal, egalitarian and democratic

[85]

Modernisationists argue that technological and economic development raise levels of education, labour productivity, occupational specialisation and personal income. This process of development, they assert, increases individual autonomy and sense of personal security by expanding people's material, cognitive and social resources.[86] These trends produce cultural changes including greater emphasis on "rational/secular" and "self-expression" (autonomy) values and "more critical and less easily led publics."[87] Evidence presented by Henn, Hodgkinson, and Weinstein (2007) is consistent with Inglehart and Welzel's Modernisation theory. Their study of young people's social capital and political participation in Britain found that youth with qualifications were far more critical of political actors than those without qualifications.[88] This would seem to suggest that formal education may be an individual-

[85] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.3, 15, 16, 22-32, 34-36, 52, 98, 104 & 166
[86] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.2, 3 & 19
[87] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.5, 6 & 19
[88] Henn, Hodgkinson, and Weinstein, 'Social capital and political participation', p.474

empowering influence: encouraging young people to think more independently and question political authority.

According to Modernisationists, these cultural changes then alter social capital and political engagement from forms which are formal, and elite led (both political and nonpolitical), to those which are egalitarian, elite challenging and informal. That is, engagement in party organisations and electoral processes, church congregations, volunteer organisations, trade unions, professional associations and sports, music, recreational and ethnic clubs and societies is in decline. Modernisationists contend that these forms of involvement are being replaced by online networking on specific issue forums, sites and webpages, attending demonstrations, signing (often online) petitions and political consumerism.[89] In the words of Inglehart and Welzel: "Elite led forms of participation are dwindling. Mass loyalties to long-established hierarchical political parties are weakening. No longer content to be disciplined troops, the public has become increasingly autonomous and elite challenging."[90] It is further argued by Modernisationists that these trends are conducive to democracy because they place pressure on elites to reform social and political structures, institutions and processes to better reflect society's egalitarian, post-materialist and self-expression values.[91] The reasons for, rather than the consequences of, changes in political engagement are the foci of this thesis, however, this last and contentious[92] Modernisationist view has been presented to illustrate the full divergence between the major participation theories.

Putnam also finds that "cooperative" civic behaviour, has been declining more rapidly than "expressive" behaviour. The former requires more intensive group collaboration (which is often hierarchical), whereas the latter involves more fluid and temporary single-issue collaborations, as well as activities which can be undertaken individually.[93] However, Putnam

[89] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.44, 116-118 & 262
[90] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.44
[91] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.25, 33, 104, 105, 116, 118, 157, 158, 223, 251-253, 271 & 293
[92] Biezen, Ingrid and Poguntke, Thomas. (2014) 'The decline of membership-based politics', *Party Politics,* vol:20(2), p.215; Teorell, Jan. (1999) 'A Deliberative Defence of Intra-party Democracy', *Party Politics,* vol:5(3), p.363-382
[93] Putnam, *Bowling Alone,* p.45 & 46

alleges (in his Lamentation thesis) that these behavioural trends undermine political efficacy by hindering the aggregation of interests and the development of inclusive policy solutions.[94]

> The changing pattern of civic participation in American communities over the last two decades has shifted the balance in the larger society between the articulation of grievances and the aggregation of coalitions to address those grievances. In this sense, this disjunctive pattern of decline - cooperation falling more rapidly than self-expression - may well have encouraged the single issue blare and declining civility of contemporary political discourse.[95]

Modernisationists contend that the forms of structural social capital that are in decline tend to be bonding, while those that are bridging are becoming more widespread. That is, membership of, and participation in, diminishing traditional/hierarchical forms of structural social capital tend to facilitate bonding ties between people of similar faith, class, profession, ethnicity and interests. Conversely, unconventional, informal and bridging ties connecting people of different religious beliefs, traditions, socio-economic strata, ethnic heritage and lifestyles (often for shared social and political causes) are growing.[96] In the words of Harris, Wyn and Younes (2007):

> Social change has resulted in the fragmentation of older collective identifications and resulted in the increased significance of individual choice and action…young people are not "bowling alone", but they tend to prefer to be engaged in informal activities that are not structured through organisations or by adults. … As traditional forms of associational life are no longer available or of interest to young people, less formal social bonds … are taking their place and keeping them connected.[97]

Hence, rather than deteriorating, Modernisationists contend that the essence of social capital is evolving: becoming more inclusive and accepting of difference.[98] They hold that technological, economic and educational development and trends in social and political values, trust and engagement are cause for celebration. Far from wanting to reverse what they consider to be societal progress, Modernisationists favour accommodation of these

[94] Putnam, *Bowling Alone,* p.45 & 46; Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.209, 219, 221, 296 & 297
[95] Putnam, *Bowling Alone,* p.46
[96] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.142 & 294
[97] Harris., Wyn, and Younes, 'Young people and citizenship', p.22 & 24
[98] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.141 & 142

patterns through changes to how social and political institutions and organisations are structured and the processes by which they operate. In fact, Modernisationists believe that such societal trends including their institutional/organisational accommodation are inextricably linked in a sliding scale of modernisation. Societies can move both up and down the scale but a society's economic, cultural and political development must (to a large extent) reflect the same stage on the modernisation scale at any one time.[99]

While substantially divergent, Putnam's Lamentation and Inglehart and Welzel's Modernisation theories also share noteworthy similarities. As previously elucidated, both theories maintain that changing values (whether driven by pernicious social patterns or post-industrial modernisation) have precipitated declines in conventional political engagement. Likewise, both theses hold that bonding social capital, formal group involvement and political trust are dwindling. Still, more theoretical congruence is yet to be discussed. Both Putnam's Lamentation and Inglehart and Welzel's Modernisation theories maintain that changes in social and political trust, values and engagement tend to occur primarily through generational replacement. Inglehart and Welzel are particularly thorough in their description of generational values adaptation. They insist that the fundamental value orientations of individuals (which determine their social capital and political engagement patterns) are developed in youth and remain largely constant throughout their lives.[100] A person's value orientations are developed by both their socialisation into their society's cultural norms and their first-hand experience of economic and environmental conditions present during their pre-adult years. In the words of Inglehart and Welzel:

> the older generations in each society tend to transmit their values to their children; this cultural heritage is not easily dispelled, but if it is inconsistent with one's first-hand experience, it can gradually erode.[101]

> if the original reason behind a given norm vanishes, it … open[s] the way for that norm to weaken gradually. People begin to experiment with new ideas and norms, creating new life-styles. New generations then face a confrontation between old and new norms and life-styles, which offer them alternative role models among which they can choose. Insofar

[99] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.2-5, 19 & 21
[100] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.7, 34, 95, 99, 102 & 129
[101] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.98

> as the new worldview fits the new generations' first-hand formative experiences, they tend to adopt it. Thus, new values, life-styles, and role models can replace older ones in a gradual process of generational replacement.[102]

However, Inglehart and Welzel also acknowledge that feelings of stability and security can be eroded by short-term period effects and catastrophic events such as economic collapse or an all-out military conflict. These, they argue, can have a strong impact on an adult individual's values but are temporary in nature: not enduring like generational value patterns precipitated by relatively longer-term trends in economic and environmental conditions.[103]

A Third Theoretical Explanation

My own thesis 'Social Network Homogenisation' (SNH) is a third theoretical explanation for generational declines in electoral and party engagement. Some academics have claimed that in the United States (a post-industrial Anglosphere country with which Australia has strong linguistic, historical and cultural similarities) social networks have become increasingly homogenous, polarising political perspectives.[104] As articulated by Fischer and Mattson (2009) "the number of new discrete, and separated social worlds increased between 1970 and 2005."[105] Research conducted by Gillani et al., (2018) later supported this finding. "Americans are increasingly sorting themselves according to their ideological stances on political issues and allegiances to political parties. … these forces, among others, have contributed to an increase in levels of affective polarization".[106]

Many scholars and journalists have attributed these phenomena almost entirely to online filter and social media bubbles.[107] Evidence from Dahlberg (2007), Pariser (2011),

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[102] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.34
[103] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.38 & 102
[104] Evans, Tucker and Fu, Feng. (2018) 'Opinion formation on dynamic networks: identifying conditions for the emergence of partisan echo chambers', *Physics and Society,* p.9; Dellaposta, Daniel., Shi, Yongren and Macy, Michael. (2015) 'Why Do Liberals Drink Lattes?', *American Journal of Sociology,* vol:120(5), p.1473-1511
[105] Fischer, Claude, S and Mattson, Greggor. (2009) 'Is America Fragmenting?', *Annual Review of Sociology,* vol:35, p.446
[106] Gillani, Nebeel., Yuan, Ann., Saveski, Martin., Vosovghi, Soroush and Roy, Deb. (2018) 'Me, My Echo Chamber, and I: Introspection on Social Media Polarization', *Cornell University Library,* p.1
[107] Halbertam, Yosh and Kight, Brian. (2016) 'Homophily, group size and the diffusion of political information in social networks: Evidence from Twitter', *Journal of Public Economics,* vol:143, p.73-88; Sunstein, C, R. (2002)

Brossard and Scheufele (2013) and Bakshy, Messing and Adamic (2015) reveal that the algorithms internet companies (such as Google and Facebook) use to adjust our search results and filter our news streams make it easier in the online, than in the offline, world to avoid political ideas and positions with which we disagree.[108] According to Halberstam and Knight (2016) "Social media may be a force for increasing exposure to like-minded information for all groups. To the extent that such information is influential, this could lead to a further increase in political polarization within the electorate."[109] Their research reveals that 91% of retweets of tweets by Democratic party candidates in the United States are spread by left of centre voters, and 99% of retweets of tweets by Republican party candidates are shared by conservative voters.[110] Other studies have also revealed that social media sites intensify "ideological cocooning" by providing easily found and accessible spaces where people with similar political ideas and perspectives can convene to discuss particular topics.[111] In the words of Batorski and Grzywinska (2018) "The architecture of … [social media

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'The Law of Group Polarization', *Journal of Political Philosophy,* vol:10, p.175-195; Batorski, Dominik and Grzywinska, Ilono. (2018) 'Three dimensions of the public sphere on Facebook', *Information, Communication & Society,* vol:21(3), p.356-374; Groshek, Jacob and Koc-Michalska, Karolina. (2017) 'Helping populism win? Social media use, filter bubbles, and support for populist presidential candidates in the 2016 US election campaign', *Information, Communication & Society,* vol:20(9), p.1389-1407; Flaxman, Seth., Goal, Sharad and Rao, Justin, M. (2016) 'Filter Bubbles, Echo Chambers, and Online News Consumption', *Public Opinion Quarterly,* vol:80, p.298-320;
Grimes, David, R. (2017) 'Echo Chambers are dangerous – we must try to break free of our online bubbles', *The Guardian,* viewed 20 March 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/science/blog/2017/dec/04/echo-chambers-are-dangerous-we-must-try-to-break-free-of-our-online-bubbles; Bernstein, David. (2016) 'The danger of living in a political-ideological bubble, Clinton campaign edition', *The Washington Post,* viewed 20 March 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/12/01/the-dangers-of-living-in-a-political-ideological-bubble-clinton-campaign-edition/?utm_term=.5cda64f6ae73; Goldhill, Oliver. (2017) 'One graph shows how morally outraged tweets stay within their political bubble', *QUARTZ,* viewed 20 March 2018, https://qz.com/1024117/one-visualization-shows-how-morally-outraged-tweets-stay-within-their-political-bubble/; Hess, Amanda. (2017) 'How to Escape Your Political Bubble for a Clearer View', *The New York Times,* viewed 20 March 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/03/arts/the-battle-over-your-political-bubble.html

[108] Dahlberg, Lincoln. (2007) 'Rethinking the fragmentation of the cyberpublic: From consensus to contestation', *New Media & Society,* vol:9(5), p.827-847; Pariser, Eli. (2011) *The filter bubble: How the new personalized web is changing what we read and how we think,* Penguin, New York; Brossard, Dominique and Scheufele, Dietram, A. (2013) 'Science, new media, and the public', *Science,* vol:339(6115), p.40 & 41; Bakshy, Eytan., Messing, Solomon and Adamic, Lada, A. (2015) 'Exposure to ideologically diverse news and opinion on Facebook', *Science,* vol:348(6239), p.1130-1132

[109] Halbertam, and Kight. 'Homophily, group size and the diffusion of political information in social networks', p.87

[110] Halbertam, and Kight. 'Homophily, group size and the diffusion of political information in social networks', p.82

[111] Yardi, Sarita and Boyd, Danah. (2010) 'Dynamic debates: An analysis of group polarization over time on twitter', *Bulletin of Science, Technology and Society,* vol:30(5), p.316-327; Gillani, Yuan, Saveski, Vosovghi and Roy, 'Me, My Echo Chamber, and I', p.2; Davis, Richard. (2000) 'The Web of Politics: The Internet's Impact on the American Political System', *Public Online Quarterly,* vol:64(3), p.361-364; Hill, Kevin, A and Hughes, John, E.

sites] allows people to quickly find other users and communities that have similar views and opinions. … People avoid information that contradicts their pre-existing beliefs and seek and engage with information that confirms it."[112]

Huber and Malhotra's research indicates that the internet maybe intensifying political congruence between romantic partners. Their 2016 experimental study of online dating behaviour demonstrates that people respond far more positively to profiles that reflect their own political ideology and interest level than to those that do not.[113] This research suggests that relative to traditional institutions (such as school, work, family-connections, clubs and bars), online dating provides individuals with the means to more effectively find potential romantic partners who share their political proclivities. Consequently, Huber and Malhotra posit that the increasing use of online dating sites could be acting to reduce political disagreement within households by creating political enclaves that may in turn "increase polarization and decrease political tolerance".[114]

No published work has thoroughly linked network homogenisation and ideological diversification/polarisation to:

- declining party membership/involvement, and
- raised social modularity brought about by value shifts and numerous social trends associated with post-industrialisation.

My Homogenisation theory developed within this thesis fills this void in the literature. By insisting that social capital is evolving, not diminishing; it is like the Modernisation, and unlike the Lamentation, theories. However, in contrast to Modernisation theory, it holds that dwindling bridging is giving way to ascendant bonding social capital. [As mentioned bridging connections exist between people with different backgrounds, attitudes and interests. Contrastingly, bonding connections are those between people with similar life experiences,

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(1998) *Cyberpolitics: Citizen activism in the age of the internet,* Rowman & Littlefield, New York; Wilhelm, Anthony, G. (1998) 'Virtual sounding boards: How deliberative is on-line political discussion?', *Information, Communication & Society,* vol:1(3), p.313-338

[112] Batorski, and Grzywinska, 'Three dimensions of the public sphere on Facebook', p.359 & 360

[113] Huber, Gregory, A and Malhotra, Neil. (2016) 'Political Homophily in Social Relationships: Evidence from online Dating Behaviour', *Journal of Politics,* vol:79(1), p.282

[114] Huber, and Malhotra, 'Political Homophily in Social Relationships', p.270 & 271

views and priorities.] At the same time, Homogenisation theory is congruous with Lamentation arguments in alleging that contemporary changes in social capital within advanced post-industrial societies are having an adverse impact on effective democracy.

The relationship between societal levels of network homogeneity (the extent to which individual social networks have homogenous memberships) and generational trends in political activity has been largely unexplored. Some research has positively correlated politically heterogeneous discussion networks (described further into this section) with political participation.[115] Though, this relationship is contested. Mutz's investigation drawing on two American surveys indicates that ideologically heterogenous networks dampen political engagement by increasing conflict aversion and weakening policy and partisan conviction.[116] However, Mutz acknowledges that prior research suggests her findings may strictly apply to the United States because interpersonal disagreements seem particularly difficult for Americans relative to citizens of other countries.[117]

No study has yet explored the possible connections between these conflicting conclusions and those findings which link participation in particular political activities to involvement in formal non-political associations.[118] By comprehensively investigating these relationships in ensuing chapters, I endeavour to uncover the reasons for declines in Australian electoral engagement and party membership across both time periods and generational cohorts. This first chapter continues with a review of preliminary evidence consistent with Homogenisation theory; justifying the decision to undertake this thesis investigation. Unless otherwise stated Strauss and Howe's birthyear definitions of living adult generational cohorts are used when referring to specific generations in this thesis.

Table 1.1

[115] Boase, and Ikeda, 'Multiple discussion networks and their consequence for political participation'; Ulbig, and Funk, 'Conflict avoidance and political participation'
[116] Mutz, Diana, C. (2002) 'The Consequences of Cross-Cutting Networks for Political Participation', *American Journal of Political Science,* vol:46(4), p.838-855
[117] Mutz, 'The Consequences of Cross-Cutting Networks for Political Participation', p.851
[118] Henn, Hodgkinson, and Weinstein, 'Social capital and political participation'; Putnam, *Bowling Alone*; Neilson, and Paxton, 'Social capital and political consumerism'; Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*; Dalton, Russel, J. (2005) 'The Social Transformation of Trust in Government', *International Review of Sociology: Revue Internationale de Sociologie,* vol:15(1), p.133-154

Birthyears of Generations

GENERATION	BIRTHYEARS
G.I.	1901 – 1924
Silent	1925 – 1942
Boomer	1943 – 1960
X	1961 – 1981
Millennial / Y	1982 – 2004

[119]

Considerable evidence has already accumulated indicating that homogenous social networks are inimical to conventional political engagement[120] and suggesting (but not proving) that levels of social network homogeneity are rising in advanced post-industrial societies like Australia.[121] In the Japanese context, Jeffrey Boase and Ken'ichi Ikeda (2011) have found that discussing politics both as the main topic of conversation and as a by-product of conversation about other matters was positively correlated with greater political participation.[122] They established this using bivariate and multivariate analyses of data from the 2003 Japanese General Social Survey.[123] They also revealed that discussing politics in 'politically heterogeneous discussion networks' has a stronger correlation with political participation than discussing politics in 'politically homogenous discussion networks'.[124] The exception was in work related discussion networks which seems to suggest that the

[119] Howe, Neil and Strauss, William. (1991) *Generations: The History of America's Future, 1584 to 2069,* Harper Perennial, New York, p.32 & 421

[120] Anderson, C, J and Paskeviciute, A. (2005) 'Macro-politics and micro-behavior: mainstream politics and the frequency of political discussion in contemporary democracies', in Zuckerman, A, S, *The Social Logic of Politics: Personal Networks as Contexts for Political Behavior,* Temple University Press, Philadelphia, p.228-250; Campbell, D, E. (2006) *Why We Vote: How Schools and Communities Shape Our Civic Life,* Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ; Oliver, J, E. (2001) *Democracy in Suburbia,* Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ; Gimpel, J, G., Lay, J, C, and Schuknecht, J, E. (2003) *Cultivating Democracy: Civic Environments and Political Socialization in America,* Brookings Institute, Washington DC

[121] Evans, and Fu, 'Opinion formation on dynamic networks', p.9; Dellaposta, Shi, and Macy, 'Why Do Liberals Drink Lattes?', p.1473-1511; Fischer, and Mattson, 'Is America Fragmenting?', p.446; Gillani, Yuan, Saveski, Vosovghi, and Roy, 'Me, My Echo Chamber, and I', p.1

[122] Boase, and Ikeda, 'Multiple discussion networks and their consequence for political participation', p.677 & 679

[123] Boase, and Ikeda, 'Multiple discussion networks and their consequence for political participation', p.674

[124] Politically heterogenous discussion networks are those in which members vote for different political parties, whereas politically homogenous discussion networks are those in which members vote for the same political party Boase, and Ikeda, 'Multiple discussion networks and their consequence for political participation', p.673, 677 & 678

workplace is a much too sensitive setting for politically conflictual discussion to lead to greater political participation, at least in Japan.[125] These results possibly suggest that discussions in politically heterogenous networks tend to stimulate deeper political thought (consideration of political issues from multiple perspectives) than political discussion in networks in which members largely agree. Still, there are other possible interpretations for this data. Those who are more politically interested may be both more inclined to become politically involved and more willing to discuss politics in heterogenous networks, than those less politically interested, less willing to have their political ideas tested and less motivated to win over others.

In political science, as in all social sciences, causation is often extremely difficult to prove. Currently there is much debate about the role and effectiveness of contemporary big data sources and computational programs in proving causal relationships.[126] Until recently researchers have relied heavily on experimentation to demonstrate these connections.[127] Unfortunately, such experiments would not have been appropriate for my thesis investigation. Furthermore, the degree to which the philosophical and ideological views and beliefs of individual Australians differ from those of their social network members cannot be adequately ascertained from existing big data sources. Moreover, correlation statistics are often drawn from survey data provided by participants whose recollections, self-assessments and motives are not always conducive to accurate research. Even when respondents are dependable and significant third variables are controlled there are almost always multiple interpretations of correlation statistics. Therefore, social scientists should consider collated data holistically and be guided by what would logically appear to be the most likely explanation for those statistics. Indeed, Boase and Ikeda's research considered in conjunction with other findings presented in later chapters of this thesis seem to indicate that changing degrees of social network homogeneity within society can influence levels of, and trends in, political engagement. These conclusions are consistent with my Homogenisation theory.

[125] Boase, and Ikeda, 'Multiple discussion networks and their consequence for political participation', p.678
[126] Cowls, Josh and Schroeder, Ralph. (2015) 'Causation, Correlation, and Big Data in Social Science Research', *Policy & Internet,* vol:7(4), p.447-472
[127] Cowls, and Schroeder, 'Causation, Correlation, and Big Data in Social Science Research', p.468

Additionally, the theory that changing levels of social network homogeneity within society can affect rates of, and patterns in, political participation may also be supported by the works of La Due Lake (1998), Putnam (2000), Henn, Hodgkinson and Weinstein (2007) and Neilson and Paxton (2010). These contributions identify a positive correlation between involvement in traditional formal non-political associations and political interest, knowledge, engagement and party identification.[128] Homogenisationists might argue that due to a greater presence of unavoidable cross-cutting cleavages, traditional/formal non-political associations are likely to be relatively more ideologically heterogeneous than informal networks based on individual preferences. Such unavoidable cross-cutting cleavages may include those in education, socio-economic status, profession, ethnic heritage, religious beliefs and cultural and political values. Consequently, declining engagement in traditional/formal non-political associations may instigate a homogenisation of social networks which, according to Boase and Ikeda, could lower political engagement. This is fervently denied by Modernisationists who insist that declining involvement in traditional/formal associations is precipitating the formation of more heterogeneous social networks. They maintain that, by reducing the number and strength of bonds between people who share (and join groups based on) common identities, these trends empower individuals to forge alternative bridging connections with people unlike themselves.[129]

Group Engagement, Social Modularity & Generational Values Transition

Transforming compositions of, and engagement with, formal and informal groups will be more thoroughly explored in later chapters. It will be argued that while involvement in both political and non-political formal organisations declined rapidly in the last third of the twentieth century, rates of participation in many types of 'non-political' formal groups have been slowly rising in the early twenty-first. Despite this rise in formal engagement, it will be argued that SNH continues unabated due to a proliferation of contemporary formal groups

[128] La Due Lake, Ronald and Huckfeldt, Robert. (1998) 'Social Capital, Social Networks, and Political Participation', *Political Psychology,* vol:19(3), 579; Henn, Hodgkinson, and Weinstein, 'Social capital and political participation', p.467, 468 & 472; Putnam, *Bowling Alone*, p.35 & 261; Neilson, and Paxton, 'Social capital and political consumerism', p.7, 8 & 19

[129] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.142 & 294

producing a dynamic and agile market of relatively more homogenous organisations than had existed in previous decades.

No study has yet delved into how changes in levels of social network homogeneity across time periods and generational cohorts may affect societal trends in political participation, hence this thesis topic. Such research is well justified as there is general academic agreement that atomising social trends since the 1960s as well as technological modernisation have reshaped structural social capital. That is, these social and technological developments have both eroded participation in, and the significance of, traditional and formal associations while empowering people to form new and informal networks based on individual preferences.[130] My Homogenisation theory regarding the likely outcomes of these trends is supported by the works of Huber and Malhotra (2016), Centola et al. (2007), Knoke (1990), Berschied (1985) and Byrne (1971), which reveal that people present greater liking for those who possess similar attitudes and values to their own.[131] This would indicate that individuals are now sufficiently free from traditional ties and responsibilities, and enabled by modern technology, to more effectively pursue an apparently near universal, desire for homogenous social networks than were persons more socially bound in the past.

Therefore, it is highly likely that social networks have been ideologically homogenising for some decades due to rising levels of homophily (the tendency of people to surround themselves with others who share their views, traits and/or characteristics).[132] That is, the nature of social capital in advanced liberal democracies may indeed be transforming from intra-network diversity, inclusion and learning toward uniformity, exclusion and reinforcement: fragmenting society by increasing the ideological and characteristic

[130] Harris, Wyn, and Younes, 'Young people and citizenship', p.22 & p.24; Bourdieu, Pierre. (1986) 'The Forms of Capital', in Richardson, John, G. *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education,* Greenwood Press, New York, p.241-258; Coleman, James, S. (1988) 'Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital', *American Journal of Sociology,* vol:94(S), p.95-120; Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.19 & 25

[131] Huber, and Malhotra, 'Political Homophily in Social Relationships', p.269-283; Centola, Damon., Gonzalez-Avella, Juan, C., Eguiluz, Victor, M and Migual, Max, S. (2007) 'Homophily, Cultural Drift, and the Co-Evolution of Cultural Groups', *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* vol:51(6), p.905-906; Knoke, David. (1990) 'Networks of Political Action: Towards Theory Construction', *Social Forces,* vol:68(4), p.1045; Berschied, Ellen. (1985) 'Interpersonal attraction', in Lindzey, G. and Aronson, E, *Handbook of Social Psychology, 3rd edition,* Random House, New York; Byrne, Donn. (1971) *The Attraction Paradigm,* Academic Press, New York

[132] Gillani, Yuan, Saveski, Vosovghi, and Roy, 'Me, My Echo Chamber, and I', p.1; Centola, Gonzalez-Avella, Eguiluz, and Migual, 'Homophily, Cultural Drift, and the Co-Evolution of Cultural Groups', p.905-906

differences between networks. Evans and Fu (2018) have already observed similar patterns in the United States. Their research indicates a rise in the salience of homophily in American politics that has resulted in greater partisanship and polarization. In their words "If this trend continues, we are likely to see only greater political division in the future rather than a return towards greater cohesion."[133]

My Homogenisation thesis maintains that ideological network homogenisation stems from a rise in social modularity brought about by technological, economic and human capital development and increasing emphasis on self-expression values within post-industrial societies. Post-industrial technological, economic and human capital advance precipitate a generational shift from survival to self-expression values. These technological, material and cognitive resources also empower individuals to pursue, forge, maintain and sever social connections in accordance with these values. Self-expression values place greater emphasis on personal preference and less on obligation, than do survival values. Consequently, the values shift in advancing post-industrial societies is necessarily linked to increased ideological/political homophily. That is, there exists a Self-Expression Values / 'ideologically' Homogenous Social Network (SEVHSN) Complex. Ideological homophily, liberal views and a preference for egalitarian social/organisational structures and processes are measures of immersion in this Complex. The ways in which Complex-embeddedness can influence ideas, opinions and levels of political tolerance, satisfaction and engagement are discussed in Chapters Six, Seven and Eight. Some of these patterns are summarised later in this chapter.

The degree to which people are immersed in the SEVHSN Complex is largely dependent on value emphases crystallised in youth. Specifically, my Homogenisation theory is consistent with Inglehart and Welzel's Modernisationist arguments that the value orientations of children and youth become increasingly less malleable during and following their late pre-adult years. These value orientations are moulded by both parental/community socialisation and the extent to which children are technologically and financially empowered and intellectually stimulated. Consequently, a full values adaptation to a dramatic rise in a society's level of personal empowerment and security may not be complete for several

[133] Evans, and Fu, 'Opinion formation on dynamic networks', p.9

generations.[134] That is, transmitted value emphases established in, and suited to the circumstances of a precarious and restricted past are diluted and ultimately replaced over numerous generations by value orientations relevant to the present.

Over the three decades following the Second World War there was a dramatic rise in living standards, personal empowerment and security in western industrialised societies. Arguably some of these countries have since experienced a stagnation in, or even (in more recent years) a slight erosion of levels of economic empowerment,[135] particularly among young people.[136] Still, the levels of intellectual, technological and financial empowerment experienced by Millennials in the late-twentieth and early-twenty-first centuries in post-industrial societies were/are far higher than the levels experience by the Silent generation in those same countries during the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s.[137] Thus, the unabated generational shift from survival to self-expression values orientation in Australia, since the early Boomers reached adulthood in the 1960s (discussed in following chapters), is consistent with both

[134] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.7, 34, 95, 98, 99, 102 & 129

[135] Mislinski, Jill. (2017) 'U.S. Household Incomes: A 50-Year Perspective', *ADVISOR PERSPECTIVES,* viewed 22 March 2018, https://www.advisorperspectives.com/dshort/updates/2017/09/19/u-s-household-incomes-a-50-year-perspective; Roser, Max., Thewissen, Stefan and Nolan, Brian. (2015) 'Incomes across the Distribution', *Our World in Data,* viewed 22 March 2018, https://ourworldindata.org/incomes-across-the-distribution#median-income-growth; *An Economic Sense,* (2015) 'Why Wages Have Stagnated While GDP Has Grown: The Proximate Factors', viewed 22 March 2018, https://aneconomicsense.org/category/econ-data/distribution-of-income/page/2/

[136] Messman, Lauren. (2017) 'Millennials Are Way Poorer Than Boomers Ever Were', *VICE,* viewed 22 March 2018, https://www.vice.com/en_au/article/8qq43g/millennials-are-way-poorer-than-boomers-ever-were; Booth, Robert. (2017) 'Millennials spend three times more of income on housing than grandparents', *The Guardian,* viewed 22 March 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/society/2017/sep/20/millennials-spend-three-times-more-of-income-on-housing-than-grandparents; Alini, Erica and Ferreras, Jesse. (2017) 'Boomers, gen-x, millennials: How living costs compare then and now', *Global NEWS,* viewed 22 March 2018, https://globalnews.ca/news/3854264/boomers-gen-x-millennials-cost-of-living-canada/; Magliarachi, Sergio. (2017) 'Australian Millennials are the most unhappy about work and life in the world', *FINANCIAL REVIEW,* viewed 22 March 2018, http://www.afr.com/leadership/careers/aussie-millennials-the-most-unhappy-about-work-life-20170207-gu721r

[137] National Museum Australia, 'Great Depression', *DEFINING MOMENTS IN AUSTRALIAN HISTORY*, viewed 23 March 2018, http://www.nma.gov.au/online_features/defining_moments/featured/great-depression; JOHN CURTIN'S LEGACY, 'FAMILIES: COPING WITH WAR', viewed 23 March 2018, http://john.curtin.edu.au/legacyex/families.html; Tippett, Rebecca. (2015) 'NC in Focus: Increasing Education Attainment', *UNC: CAROLINA POPULATION CENTER,* viewed 22 March 2018, http://demography.cpc.unc.edu/2015/12/10/nc-in-focus-increasing-educational-attainment/; Government of Canada. (2017) 'Youth in Canada Today', viewed 22 March 2018, http://www.horizons.gc.ca/en/content/youth-canada-today; Fry, Richard., Igielnik, Ruth and Patten, Eileen. (2018) 'How Millennials today compare with their grandparents 50 years ago', *PEW Research Center,* viewed 22 March 2018, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/03/16/how-millennials-compare-with-their-grandparents/; Kane, Libby. (2017) 'Millennials are turning out better than we expected – and it may be thanks to their helicopter parents', *BUSINESS INSIDER: AUSTRALIA,* viewed 22 March 2018, https://www.businessinsider.com.au/millennials-generational-research-2017-9?r=US&IR=T

Modernisation theory and my Homogenisation thesis. However, Inglehart cautions that this shift toward autonomy and egalitarian self-expression values may be reversed over the next several decades if the transition to, and the displacement caused by automation is not well managed.[138]

Structural versus Ideological Homogenisation

I am not hypothesising or arguing that social networks are becoming increasingly ethnically or geographically homogenous. Our country has experienced a profound demographic shift since the mass immigration of continental European refugees, post World War II, and the dismantlement of the White Australia Policy in the 1960s and 70s. Our new-found diversity has enhanced opportunities to forge cross-cultural connections by simply raising the level and likelihood of cross-cultural encounters. Over the last several decades there has been a shift toward greater trade liberalisation, international collaboration, labour-market mobility, internet access and social-media engagement.[139] These patterns have also provided the tools and context for more geographically spread social connections and networks to develop than what there were prior to contemporary globalisation.

While conceding that Australian social networks have become structurally (ethnically, linguistically, religiously, and geographically) more diverse over the last half century this thesis argues that they are homogenising ideologically. I reason that this homogenisation of moral, social and political values and attitudes within networks is having significant effects on how citizens engage politically. The Complex-immersed tend to have more 'structurally' homogenous networks than those relatively less embedded, despite social networks having

[138] Inglehart, Ronald. (2017) 'Ronald Inglehart: Trump and the Xenophobic Populist Parties', *YouTube,* viewed 22 March 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fuc1yxGCiYI&t=2425s

[139] *Centre for International Economics.* (2017) 'Australian trade liberalisation: Analysis of the economic impacts', Report for the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, viewed 8 March 2018, https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/trade-investment/Documents/cie-report-trade-liberalisation.pdf, p.3-7; Boughton, James, M. (2002) 'Globalisation and the Silent Revolution of the 1980s', *Finance & Development,* vol:39(1), p.40-4; Czaika, Mathias and Haas, Hein, D. (2014) 'The Globalization of Migration: Has the World Become More Migratory?', *International Migration Review,* vol:48(2), p.283-323; *Internet World Stats: Usage and Population Statistics,* (2017) 'Internet Growth Statistics', viewed 8 March 2018, https://www.internetworldstats.com/emarketing.htm; Hulting, Niclas. (2017) 'The Past, Present and Future of Social Media', *Britton,* viewed 8 March 2018, http://www.brittonmdg.com/the-britton-blog/the-past-present-and-future-of-social-media

become more structurally diverse over recent decades. To explain, structural characteristics (such as socio-economic status, education, occupation, religion and ethnicity) often have an enormous bearing on personal values, beliefs, and interests. Consequently, when controlling for other variables, deeper immersion in the Complex is associated with both more ideologically and structurally homogenous social networks.[140] Thus, any future slowing of globalisation, demographic shifts and technological advances in long-distance communication may foreshadow a reversion of certain social capital trends in advanced post-industrial societies like Australia. That is, social connections may become increasingly *bonding along*, rather than *bridging across*, structural cleavages.

The Impact of SNH on Political Engagement;

(according to Homogenisation theory)

From here, this first chapter summarises the ways in which Social Network Homogenisation or SNH (a core component of the SEVHSN Complex) influences political participation according to my Homogenisation thesis. This is done by referring to the Social Network Homogenisation and Political Engagement (SNHPE) Chart on the next page.

[140] See Chapter Six

Figure 1.2



SNHPE Chart

The reader is encouraged to refer to the Social Network Homogenisation and Political Engagement (SNHPE) Chart on the previous page while contemplating the following summary of the ways in which political involvement is shaped by SNH. This summary is supported by statistics presented in Chapter Eight. Consider the three Red Arrows in the Chart. Together, they constitute what I describe as a "Prime Circuit" comprising three variables:

1. conventional/conflict-prone engagement,
2. representativeness/responsiveness of the political parties and system, and
3. satisfaction with the political parties and system.

These variables are tied by causal relationships. A decline in conventional/conflict-prone engagement (which includes political party involvement) is likely to erode the representativeness and responsiveness of the political system and parties. That is, as party memberships wane (particularly among certain demographics)[141], their organisations become more heavily reliant on, and responsive to sectional and often affluent/elite interests.[142] Reductions in representativeness and responsiveness, in turn, diminishes satisfaction with, the political system and parties.[143] Arguably, these trends mean fewer citizens can identify with major/parliamentary parties. Consequently, more are inclined to believe that conventional (party and electoral) participation is ineffective and that the political system has become corrupted by a few big interests. Declining satisfaction and identification with political parties and a more widely held view that conventional political engagement is ineffective then acts to further lessen conventional involvement;[144] completing the Circuit. Per my Homogenisation thesis, SNH indirectly diminishes each of the Prime Circuit variables separately; an effect that is amplified by their feeding into each other.

[141] Alexander, Cathey. (2013) 'The party's over: which clubs have the most members?', *Crikey,* viewed 3 November 2017, https://www.crikey.com.au/2013/07/18/the-partys-over-which-clubs-have-the-most-members/;
[142] Katz and Mair. 'Changing Models of Party Organisation and Party Democracy', p.15, 16 & 21-23
[143] Minta, Michael, D and Sinclair-Chapman, Valeria. (2013) 'Diversity in Political Institutions and Congressional Responsiveness to Minority Interests', *Political Research Quarterly,* vol:66(1), p.136 & 137; Esaiasson, Peter., Gilljain, Mikael., and Persson, Mikael. (2017) 'Responsiveness Beyond Policy Satisfaction: Does It Matter to Citizens?', *Comparative Political Studies,* vol:50(6), p.760 & 761
[144] Selle, Per and Svasand, Lars. (1991) 'Membership in Party Organisations and the Problem of Decline in Parties', *Comparative Political Studies,* vol:23(4), p.463; Karp and Banducci 'Political Efficacy and Participation in Twenty-Seven Democracies', p.313

Network Homogenisation and Societal Diversification

From here the ways in which SNH undermines variables of the Prime Circuit, according to my Homogenisation theory, are discussed. Focus first on the Grey Arrows of the SNHPE Chart. Through this thesis, perhaps counter-intuitively, I argue that ideological SNH tends to precipitate a greater diversification of ideological, philosophical and political preferences within a society. That is, homogenous networks may be reinforcing the views of their members and encouraging these beliefs to drift further away from those held by the median or average citizen. The diversification of the Australian electorate's political preferences is demonstrated by the significant rise of non-major party voting since 1975. In 1975 non-major parties received 4% of valid votes cast in the House of Representatives election and 7.5% of those cast in the Senate election. In 2016 non-major parties received 23.2% of the valid votes cast in the House of Representatives election and 35.0% of those cast in the Senate election.[145] These trends are possibly indicative of rising levels of ideological, philosophical and political social network homogeneity within Australia, instigating corresponding increases in the diversity of Australia's ideological, philosophical and political preferences.

This process of Societal Ideological Diversification (SID) undermines the extent to which parliamentary parties are representative of, and responsive to the political views, ideas and concerns of the electorate. This is because Australian electoral regimes (particularly the majoritarian single membered district Alternative Vote system) severely restrict the ideological diversity of parliamentarians such that many voters are without true representation of their political beliefs, ideas and interests. This situation is compounded/exacerbated when society becomes more ideologically heterogeneous. Consequently, a growing proportion of the electorate is inclined to believe that the political system and parties are unrepresentative, unresponsive and possibly corrupt and that conventional (party and electoral) political participation is ineffective and not worthwhile.

[145] Antony Green's Election Blog, (19 November 2013), 'Record Vote for Minor Parties at 2013 Federal Election', *ABC Elections,* viewed 22 May 2014, http://blogs.abc.net.au/antonygreen/2013/11/record-vote-for-minor-parties-at-2013-federal-election.html; Australian Electoral Commission, (2016), '2016 Federal Election: First preferences by Party', *AEC Tally Room,* viewed 21 November 2016, http://results.aec.gov.au/20499/Website/HouseStateFirstPrefsByParty-20499-NAT.htm; Australian Electoral Commission, (2016), '2016 Federal Election: First preferences by Senate group', *AEC Tally Room,* viewed 21 November 2016, http://results.aec.gov.au/20499/Website/SenateStateFirstPrefsByGroup-20499-NAT.htm

The relationships between Complex-embeddedness and trust/confidence in government/politicians are explored in Chapter Six. Correlations between Complex-immersion and both external political inefficacy and dissatisfaction with the way democracy works in Australia are examined in Chapter Eight. Furthermore, these patterns reduce the proportion of citizens who identify with a political party. Dissatisfaction with the political system and parties, disbelief in the efficacy of conventional (party and electoral) engagement and lower party identification then act to diminish conventional/conflict-prone political involvement.

However, it is also possible that the ideological spread of Australia's political values, views and attitudes has not grown significantly over the last 40 years. Instead, Australia's major parties may have drifted relatively further from the views and political attitudes of contemporary mainstream Australians. The major parties could also have converged ideologically leaving relatively more voters dissatisfied with both Labor and the Coalition. This trend may have been encouraged by the Alternative Vote (AV) system employed in Australian House of Representatives elections since 1918.[146] AV tends to encourage catch-all parties to aggregate at the political centre.[147] Still, given the consistency and persistence of declining major party support these two 'representation'-focused explanations appear to be relatively less plausible than the 'sociological' interpretation of diversifying Australian political views, attitudes and values emphases. Had the major parties been drifting from the Australian mainstream, they probably would have changed course long ago to reap electoral advantage and prevent further hemorrhaging of support. Likewise, it is doubtful that centripetal forces have enjoyed a continuous ascendency for forty years. In major political parties, there are balances between forces pushing and pulling these organisations toward and from the political centre.

Some may argue that growing minor party support is a cyclical phenomenon. Australia's early twentieth century history provides precedence for diverse Australian electoral preferences. Indeed, the first three Australian federal elections produced hung

[146] *The Electoral Knowledge Network,* 'Australia: The Alternative Vote System', viewed 8 March 2018, http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/es/annex/esy/esy_au

[147] Horowitz, Donald, L. (2004) 'The alternative vote and interethnic moderation: A reply to Fraenkel and Grofman', *Public Choice,* vol:121(3), p.508

parliaments.[148] However, these initial electoral results were more likely the product of our modern party system's nascent stage of development. Others may deem declining major party support to be a natural stage of a country's political evolution. The share of votes received by our major parties far exceeds major party voting in other western countries. That is, the Australian electorate and party system may simply be maturing to resemble a continental European political landscape. This too is unconvincing as Australia is one of the world's oldest democracies. Unlike most European countries, Australia does not have a proportional system of electing its house of government. Instead, the relative success of Australian major parties is primarily due to Australian minor parties having been placed at a distinct disadvantage. They have not been granted the same opportunities afforded equivalent parties in Europe to garner greater recognition, trust and respect from the voting public by participating more directly and meaningfully in parliamentary politics. Hence, social network homogenisation (a sociological rather than a representational, cyclical, institutional or procedural explanation) seems the most compelling account for the near secular decline in major party voting over the last forty years.

Contrastingly Lamentationists, like Putnam, allege that such diversification and polarisation of electoral preferences are primarily due to disproportionally high rates of decline in electoral participation among median voters. This enables those with more extreme and unusual views to gain undue influence.[149] While declining turnout is of some concern this thesis is primarily focused on decreasing party membership and engagement. Additionally, Putnam's arguments are rendered unconvincing when applied to Australia. Although there have been modest generational increases in the rate of informal voting (with a growing proportion of Australians assumed to cast intentionally informal votes)[150] compulsory voting and registration has maintained stable and high Australian electoral participation.[151] Therefore, the diversification of Australian electoral preferences is more

[148] Barber, Stephen. (2017) 'Federal election results 1901-2016', *PARLIAMENT of AUSTRALIA,* viewed 10 March 2018, https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1617/FederalElectionResults

[149] Putnam, *Bowling Alone,* p.34, 35, 46 & 340-342

[150] Hill and Rutledge-Prior, 'Young people and intentional informal voting in Australia', p.400-417

[151] Australian Electoral Commission, (2016) 'Voter turnout: 2016 House of Representatives and Senate elections', viewed 22 March 2018, http://www.aec.gov.au/About_AEC/research/files/voter-turnout-2016.pdf

likely indicative of parallel divergences of ideological and policy based preferences: consistent with the Homogenisation thesis.

Intolerance, Inefficacy, Intransigence & Conflict Aversion

This chapter continues with the articulation of the relationships between homogenous social networks and political engagement illustrated by the SNHPE Chart arrows before discussing preliminary evidence justifying this thesis' examination of these Homogenisation arguments. The second way in which SNH influences the Prime Circuit is illustrated by the Green Arrows of the SNHPE Chart. According to my Homogenisation theory those embedded in the SEVHSN Complex (and hence those tending to have highly homogenous social networks) have less exposure to alternative political views and perspectives than those who are less Complex-immersed. Consequently, those heavily immersed tend to more severely over-estimate the prevalence of their own political beliefs within, and the ideological homogeneity of, their society than do those less embedded. Therefore, they may be less inclined to recognise the necessity for, or to accept political compromise or even to hear alternative political positions. This includes compromise between their own views and those of a political party. That is, they are probably less willing to have their views and beliefs moulded for them by a party. Thus, I hypothesise that rising and intensifying Complex-embeddedness precipitates a decline in party identification.

Furthermore, the heavily Complex-immersed may be disposed to underestimate the degree to which policies espoused by governments and major parties truly reflect those of the population at large. This is because they tend to severely overestimate the prevalence of their own political views within, and the ideological homogeneity of, their society. This may encourage them to view the political system and parties as unrepresentative, unresponsive and possibly even corrupt; leading to the belief that conventional (party and electoral) participation is ineffective and not worthwhile. For these reasons, those with more ideologically homogenous social networks maybe less inclined to engage in party and electoral politics than those with relatively diverse networks.

Now consider the Brown Arrows on the SNHPE Chart. These relationships exacerbate the extent to which SNH hinders conventional/conflict-prone forms of involvement, including party participation. Those who have ideologically/politically homogenous social networks are more inclined than those with relatively heterogeneous networks to:

1. severely overestimate the ideological homogeneity of society and the degree to which their own views are reflected by those of other citizens,
2. be intolerant of persons/parties holding different political views from their own, and
3. think that debating people with whom they politically disagree is pointless.

These corollaries can (per my theory/hypothesis) intensify/induce political-conflict-aversion and exacerbate avoidance of political debate and discussion with those with whom one disagrees. Conflict aversion can discourage conventional/conflict-prone political engagement and perpetuate inexperience encountering/debating people with whom one politically/philosophically disagrees. This relative lack of encountering and engaging with alternative perspectives and ideas seems to be the underlying reason for why SNH diminishes conventional/conflict-prone political involvement. Factors undermining conventional/conflict-prone participation (which includes party engagement) stem from (or can be retraced to) this one influence which is inextricably tied to SNH. Thus, (per my Homogenisation theory) the causal relationships indicated by the Brown Arrows exacerbate the extent to which SNH impedes party (a form of conventional and conflict-prone) engagement.

Cast your eyes to the Blue Arrows (which refer to statistics presented in Chapter Eight). Those with ideologically homogenous social networks tend to have less experience debating those with political views different from their own than do persons with relatively more diverse networks. Therefore, they tend to have underdeveloped skills in, and less confidence debating. This inefficacy and under-confidence debating political matters can render people politically-conflict-avoidant: less inclined to believe that the possible benefits (they consider unlikely) of political debate and discussion outweigh their potential social and emotional costs (they deem probable). Per my Homogenisation theory, this is the third way in

which SNH has a negative effect on a variable of (which is then amplified by) the Prime Circuit.

Like the Brown Arrows, the Pink Arrow represents an amplification of SNH's eroding impacts on Prime Circuit variables, including conventional/conflict prone political engagement. Per my Homogenisation theory, a decline in conventional/conflict prone political involvement is likely to contribute to a reduction in the frequency of encounters and debates between those with opposing and contrasting political views, ideas and concerns. This lack of experience encountering and debating ideological and political opponents is the core explanation for the impact of SNH on party participation. All influences diminishing forms of party and other conventional/conflict-prone involvement stem from (or can be retraced to) this one factor, which is inextricably linked to SNH.

Finally, my theory maintains that those more SEVHSN Complex-immersed are disposed to compensate for their dis-inclination to participate in conventional/conflict-prone political activities by engaging more heavily in unconventional and relatively conflict-free forms of involvement. This Homogenisation argument is supported by evidence presented in later chapters.

Other scholars have already found evidence consistent with and justifying, the investigation of this Homogenisation thesis summary of the ways in which SNH influences political participation. Boase and Ikeda (2011) have determined that citizens with particularly homogenous social networks are inclined to overestimate the level of public support for their own political views and opinions. Furthermore, they reveal that these citizens are disposed to underestimate the degree to which politicians and political institutions represent the attitudes of the polity.[152] Schyns and Koop (2010) found that those who participated in non-political formal associations were significantly more likely to feel politically efficacious than those who did not.[153] Arguably, formal associations were previously more likely to be heterogeneous than other groups due to relatively harder to avoid cross-cutting cleavages. Therefore probable, but unproven, Australian SNH trends may be facilitating declines in

[152] Boase, and Ikeda, 'Multiple discussion networks and their consequence for political participation', p.661
[153] Schyns, Peggy and Koop, Christel. (2010) 'Political Distrust and Social Capital in Europe and the USA' in *Social Indicators Research,* vol:96(1), p.147

personal tolerance for political disagreement, reductions in preparedness to politically compromise, and inefficacy in political debate, deliberation and negotiation. Alternatively, intolerance, intransigence and/or inefficacy may be inhibiting participation in both political and non-political organisations. This thesis aims to test for and understand these relationships.

The research of Harris, Wyn, and Younes (2007), Martin (2012), and Hill and Rutledge-Prior (2014) support Homogenisation theory. These studies suggest that today's youth feel less efficacious engaging in traditional electoral and party politics and are less inclined to identify with political parties than older generations were at a similar age.[154] Party identification is an act of compromise between one's own views and opinions and that of a party. Evidence from Whiteley (2009a) also denotes homogenisation trends by revealing that party members and activists (who are dwindling in number) are more tolerant, than are ex-members and non-members of both:

- individuals/groups holding different views from their own, and
- unpopular minorities.[155]

There is considerable debate within the political participation literature over the primary causes of party disengagement. Some scholars, like Thomas Poguntke, emphasise a growing disconnect between elite and mass opinion regarding the "role, function and performance" of political parties as a factor independent of "underlying social changes."[156] Contrastingly, other researchers, such as Peter Mair, have attempted to explain party demobilisation by stressing the decline of traditional (e.g. labour and religious) movements and organisations which had heavily supported and were reinforced by political parties during the mid-twentieth century.[157] The author of this thesis will argue that long-term declines in party identification and involvement are partly due to a growing dissatisfaction

[154] Martin, *Young people and political engagement,* p.17, 71, 75, 76, 77 & 85; Harris, Wyn, and Younes, 'Young people and citizenship', p.24; Hill, Lisa and Rutledge-Prior, Serrin, (2014). 'Intentional Informality and Young People: Trends in Behaviour and Attitudes', Paper prepared for the Australian Election Study Workshop, ANU, Canberra, 21-22 Feb., 2014

[155] Whiteley, 'Party membership and activism in comparative perspective', p.137

[156] Poguntke, Thomas. (1996) 'Anti-party sentiment – Conceptual thoughts and empirical evidence: Explorations into a minefield', *European Journal of Political Research,* vol:29, p.323 & 324

[157] Mair, Peter. (1984). 'Party politics in contemporary Europe: A challenge to party?', *West European Politics,* vol:7(4), p.174 & 180

with (particularly major) political parties. However, much of this disapproval stems from sociological trends rather than being a reaction to either decisions taken by party elites, or the personalities of their leaders.

Party identification and engagement require a compromise between one's own views and opinions and party policy. Those whose ideas have been spared from challenge in ideologically homogenous networks are probably less prepared than those with relatively more diverse networks to tolerate political disagreement or accept political compromise. This includes the compromise necessary to identify with, and join, a political party. Indeed, later chapters reveal that immersion in ideologically homogenous networks is positively correlated with believing society is ideologically homogenous, and negatively correlated with:

- being willing to accept political compromise and
- supporting political checks and balances.

Believing that society is ideologically homogenous is also found to be negatively correlated with being willing to accept political compromise. Hence, sociological trends which raise levels of social network homogeneity may be contributing to generational declines in personal tolerance for political disagreement, reductions in preparedness to politically compromise and inefficacy in political debate, deliberation and negotiation. This, in turn, could be responsible for rising levels of conflict aversion and subsequent party disengagement, patterns I test for in this thesis.

Additionally, Ariadne Vromen's research has revealed that while "the Internet reinforces existing 'real world' participation" it "is not used by the general population of young people as an alternative forum for community and political discussion."[158] That is, the Internet and social media are not replacing, but supplementing, traditional and party participation. Sociological trends (SNH) raising conflict avoidance is the most compelling explanation for declines in party engagement. To interpret these declines as simply a disconnect between mass opinion and recent generations of party leaders and their public

[158] Vromen, Ariadne. (2007) 'Australian young people's participatory practices and internet use', *Information, Communication and society,* vol:10(1), p.61

policy decisions (as argued by Poguntke)[159] or a response to new online networks and strategies is unsound.

Social scientists have found that most people consider political discussion stressful and avoid political activity because it threatens interpersonal harmony.[160] In their 1999 article on Conflict Avoidance and Political Participation Ulbig and Funk state that "discussion [of politics] clearly entails an open expression of beliefs and, as such, provides an opportunity for interpersonal conflict with those of differing views."[161] Their study demonstrates that conflict avoidant individuals are less inclined to politically participate in conflict prone environments, such as those one encounters when actively engaging in a political party, than those who are relatively more conflict tolerant.[162]

This research using Pearson correlations and multivariate analysis to collate data from the United States' Citizen Participation Study (CPS) indicates that conflict avoidance is ultimately about costs and benefits. Some people are less accustomed to, and are less tolerant of, social and political disagreement and are less prepared to politically compromise than are others. They are likely to consider the psychological, emotional and other costs of engaging in conflict prone settings and organisations higher than are those who have greater experience in, and tolerance for, social and political argument. Those who have not developed proficient skills in debating, negotiation and compromise are less likely to be effective and thus less likely to benefit from political debate in conflict settings than those who have developed these skills in heterogeneous social networks. Ulbig and Funk reveal that less formal education and lower incomes are linked to political conflict aversion. They suggest that this is due to the role of education and many high-status professions in training individuals to expect intellectual disagreement. In their words:

> The strongest social correlates with conflict avoidance suggest that those with less education and lower income are more likely to avoid interpersonal conflict. Education and income are two of the strongest and most reliable correlates of participation. Higher social

[159] Poguntke, 'Anti-party sentiment – Conceptual thoughts and empirical evidence', p.323 & 324
[160] Rosenberg, Morris (1954-55) 'Some determinants of political apathy', *Public Opinion Quarterly,* vol:18(4), p.349-366; Schudson, M. (1997) 'Why conversation is not the soul of democracy', *Critical Studies in Mass Communication,* vol:14, p.297-309
[161] Ulbig, and Funk, 'Conflict avoidance and political participation', p.270
[162] Ulbig, and Funk, 'Conflict avoidance and political participation', p.268-270

> status (especially higher education) is thought to provide a wide variety of resources that facilitate participation, ranging from wider social networks to experience in writing letters and making decisions in group settings. ... In some sense, college education may train people to tolerate and expect intellectual disagreement. Many of the more lucrative professional roles would be likely to have a similar effect. Lawyers and politicians, for example, engage in a good deal of conflict in their professional roles.[163]

Putnam contends that generational declines in political efficacy are indeed linked to waning participation in non-political associations.[164] Contrastingly, Inglehart and Welzel are convinced that while trust in political institutions and organisations has declined generationally, people are more politically empowered (have greater influence over government decision making) now than ever before. They hold that this raised empowerment stems from increased participation in unconventional elite-challenging political activities, such as protests.[165] These activities more effectively draw the attention of voters to specific issues and grievances than do conventional elite-led activities such as party membership. Generational declines in party identification and engagement are consistent with both Putnam's Lamentation and Inglehart and Welzel's Modernisation theories.[166] However, the finding that party members are more tolerant than non-members contradicts the Modernisationists' claim that members of traditional/hierarchical associations (such as political parties) are relatively more inclined than non-members to emphasise survival (conformity) over self-expression (autonomy) values.[167] Conversely this evidence supports the Lamentationist position that social and civic engagement is positively correlated with liberal tolerance. In the words of Putnam:

> Social joiners and civic activists are as a rule more tolerant of dissent and unconventional behaviour than social isolates are … Except for the very common finding that religious involvement, especially involvement in fundamentalist church, is linked to intolerance, I have not found a single empirical study that confirms that supposed link between community involvement and intolerance. … Far from being incompatible, liberty and fraternity are mutually supportive, and this remains true when we control for other factors

[163] Ulbig, and Funk, 'Conflict avoidance and political participation', p.277
[164] Putnam, *Bowling Alone,* p.40-62
[165] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.117 & 118
[166] Putnam, *Bowling Alone,* p.38-41 & 266; Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.116 & 117
[167] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.52, 54, 142, 143 & 262

> like education, income, urbanism, and so on. The most tolerant communities in America are precisely the places with the greatest civic involvement. Conversely, communities whose residents bowl alone are the least tolerant places in America[168]

Later chapters of this thesis investigate whether the effects of SNH on political tolerance and efficacy are raising levels of Australian political conflict avoidance. Correlation statistics drawn from 'World Values Survey' data and responses to my own 'Political Participation and Conflict Avoidance Survey' will to a great extent support the Homogenisationist argument. That is, the influence of SNH is found to be largely responsible for declining membership and involvement within multi-issue conflict prone party organisations and increased participation in single issue political groups and activities.[169] My research suggests that these trends have occurred both across time periods and generational cohorts. As political party membership and affiliation is a known correlate of propensity to vote, these patterns may partly explain declines in electoral participation, particularly among youth.[170]

Conclusion

This chapter has presented an overview of Australia's waning rates of party and electoral participation and identified two main sociological engagement theories. It has also provided evidence for why a third theory warrants further investigation. The next chapter will more comprehensively describe and interpret both Modernisation and Lamentation theories while using other research to evaluate their merits and reveal their shortcomings. Chapter Three will consider the extent to which Australian value, social capital and political participation patterns are consistent with Modernisation, Lamentation and Homogenisation theories by evaluating World Values Survey percentage statistics.

[168] Putnam, *Bowling Alone,* p.355 & 356
[169] Martin, *Young people and political engagement,* p.14 & 17
[170] Hill, and Prior, 'Intentional Informality and Young People'; Hill, 'Informal Voting Under a System of Compulsory Voting'

CHAPTER TWO

--MODERNISATION & LAMENTATION--

An Evaluation

This chapter compares conflicting Modernisationist and Lamentationist conceptions of social atomisation in post-industrial democracies. By examining these theories in detail, the chapter reveals strengths that should be incorporated into, and weaknesses that should be disregarded by my Homogenisation thesis. According to Inglehart and Welzel social atomisation facilitates human liberation and autonomy by transforming social connections, cultural expectations and civil and political governing institutions and procedures. The Modernisationist view that these social, cultural and political patterns are linked to stages of economic and technological development is largely supported. Putnam's Lamentationist contention is also convincing. He argues that by embracing certain atomising developments, individuals have unwittingly sacrificed the long-term integrity, functionality and responsiveness of democratic institutions and organisations for more tangible and immediate autonomy and convenience. Hence, Inglehart and Welzel's optimistic conviction that contemporary social capital trends are uniformly empowering individuals (including politically) is deemed wanting. However, Putnam's thesis that almost all forms of social capital are (or were) in decline I reason to be overly pessimistic: focusing too heavily on traditional community and civic participation patterns and neglecting trends in more recent and informal modes of involvement.

Differences in the definition and perceived effects of social atomisation can be identified across the works of social capital and values theorists including those of Putnam, Inglehart and Welzel. However, most agree that social atomisation loosely defined is a process resulting in the social ties binding individuals together becoming weaker or more easily severed. For Inglehart and Welzel social atomisation is a key facet of human liberation and autonomy. They argue that as individuals have become materially and intellectually empowered, social connections have become increasingly a matter of choice rather than

obligation or necessity. For them, social atomisation means a transformation, not a net decline, in interpersonal relationships. That is, connections maintained by hierarchal traditional institutions/organisations and cultural expectations are purportedly being replaced by those willingly cultivated on an egalitarian basis between individuals with greater, and more realistic, exit options.[171]

Contrastingly, Putnam's understanding of social atomisation is pessimistic. He contends that this phenomenon degrades overall social connectivity and actually limits/contracts life options and opportunities. He holds that these trends are brought about principally by a myriad of technological, cultural and political/legal developments. Putnam maintains that these developments have allowed and encouraged the willing acceptance by individuals and society of some transparent opportunity costs in exchange for greater autonomy and/or other benefits in particular contexts. However, these relatively small and conspicuous opportunity costs are often positively correlated to those which are more significant and yet unnoticed. For example, television and other electronic technologies have empowered individuals with greater choice over how and when they consume knowledge and entertainment. However, Putnam maintains that they have also eroded the time and energy invested in social connections, thereby weakening channels of assistance and diminishing local community information dissemination.[172] According to Putnam, people are making decisions about how to invest their time without fully appreciating the costs associated with their choices. These include the unwitting sacrifice of overall levels of autonomy, happiness, social justice, life satisfaction/meaning, political engagement and the integrity, functionality and responsiveness of our democratic institutions and organisations.[173]

[171] Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.118
[172] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.216, 222-225, 228-231, 235-238, 243, 244 & 283
[173] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.34, 35, 40-47, 261-265, 346 & 358-360

Individual Empowerment & Social Modularity

Technological, Economic & Welfare-State Development

Inglehart and Welzel have identified three main sets of interrelated atomising trends that have empowered individuals in post-industrial societies with enhanced social modularity, by which is meant flexibility to both forge and discontinue social connections. The first is the reduction of poverty and want through economic growth, technological innovation and welfare state development. These advances raise existential security, life expectancy and living standards by providing greater opportunities to accumulate wealth as well as access to food, clothing, shelter, housing, education and health services for those in need.[174] When life was more precarious rigid/obligatory familial and community bonds were deemed essential. Acting as a safety net, inferior and imperfect though they were, they significantly raised chances of survival and life expectancy beyond what was possible at lower stages of development had individuals been more independent.[175] According to Inglehart and Welzel, the welfare state has empowered individuals with alternatives to, and exit options from interdependencies that had traditionally existed between parents and children. In their words:

> Formerly, children's survival largely depended on whether their parents provided for them, and children took care of their parents when they reached old age. Although the role of the family is still important, the life-or-death nature of this relationship has been eroded by the welfare state. Maintaining family relations is nowadays a matter of choice, not of necessity. One-parent families and childless old people are far more viable under contemporary conditions then they once were. … This makes people more independent, diminishing social constraints on human choice.[176]

Other scholars have uncovered supporting trends. Troth and Kemmelmeier (2009) found that people in wealthier nations tend to be considerably more accepting of divorce than people in less developed countries.[177] Merz and Liefbroer (2012) establish that people in more economically advanced northern and western European countries tend to have more

[174] Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.28
[175] Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.138
[176] Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.29
[177] Toth, Katalin and Kemmelmier, Markus. (2009) 'Divorce Attitudes Around the World: Distinguishing the Impact of Culture on Evaluations and Attitude Structure', *Cross-Cultural Research,* vol:43(3), p.288 & 289

accepting attitudes toward voluntary childlessness than people in relatively less developed southern and eastern European nations.[178]

> Macro differences in the attitude toward voluntary childlessness were strongly related to the extent to which countries have advanced … In well advanced regions, such as Scandinavia ... more emphasis is put on individual autonomy, emancipation and modernisation, leading to higher approval of voluntary childlessness. [In] Eastern European countries, however, … traditional family norms and values may still be dominant because the process of individualisation just started.[179]

These studies support the Modernisationist proposition that economic and technological development induce cultural and value adaptations to enhance personal choice.[180]

Interestingly, Putnam does not consider the welfare state to be a socially atomising development. According to Putnam the welfare state has no identifiable bearing on the level of community and civic engagement within society. Although Putnam finds a correlation between welfare spending and social capital he cannot determine a causal link.

> Social capital appears to be highest of all in the big-spending welfare states of Scandinavia. This simple analysis, of course cannot tell us whether social connectedness encourages welfare spending, whether the welfare state fosters civic engagement, or whether both are the result of some other unmeasured factor(s).[181]

> America has epitomized market capitalism for several centuries, during which our stocks of social capital and civic engagement have been through great swings. A constant can't explain a variable.[182]

Conversely Inglehart and Welzel deem the development of state provided safety nets within advanced market economies as an important factor affording individuals with realistic

[178] Merz, Eva-Maria and Liefbroer, Aart, C. (2012) 'The Attitude Toward Voluntary Childlessness in Europe: Cultural and Institutional Explanations' in Journal of Marriage and Family, vol:74, p.594
[179] Merz and Liefbroer. 'The Attitude Toward Voluntary Childlessness in Europe: Cultural and Institutional Explanations' p.597
[180] Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.2-4, 6 & 19
[181] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.281
[182] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.282

exit options from traditional social bonds.[183] This supposed point of contention between Putnam's Lamentation and Inglehart and Welzel's Modernisation theories may be due to a difference in their conceptions of social atomisation. Inglehart and Welzel do not argue that people in welfare states are less socially connected. Instead, they contend that citizens of advanced welfare states have more power to choose which connections they forge, maintain and terminate.[184] This enhanced autonomy over, rather than a decline in the number and intensity of, interpersonal relationships (i.e. social modularity) is the type of social atomisation which constitutes the focus of Inglehart and Welzel's investigation.

Factors which have contributed to the rise of existential security in contemporary developed societies have also afforded even relatively under-privileged persons with new means to connect with those sharing similar interests and concerns.[185] These factors include increased affluence and accessibility of modern inventions such as the Internet and smartphone technologies. These economic and technological advances in conjunction with the values shifts revealed by Modernisationists may precipitate social network homogenisation thereby reducing exposure to political disagreement. According to Homogenisationists this would raise political conflict avoidance (decreasing party identification and involvement) by negatively impacting efficacy in, and tolerance for, political debate, deliberation and negotiation, and preparedness to compromise. Indeed, statistics drawn from my own survey data reveal positive correlations between the degree to which the political values of participants tended to be reinforced by the members of their close social networks and the time participants spent both looking at screens and communicating online for non-work-related purposes.[186] This link is consistent with Social Network Homogenisation and is discussed in greater depth in Chapter Seven.

Knowledge & Intellectual Empowerment

The second class of post-industrial atomising trends identified by Inglehart and Welzel are those which mobilise our cognitive abilities fuelling intellectual independence. According

[183] Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.29 & 138
[184] Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.24, 28, 29, 118, 262 & 294
[185] Salt, Bernard. (2013, August 29) 'The digital divide is genuine but it is closing slowly', *The Australian,* viewed 16 February 2015, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/opinion/the-digital-divide-is-genuine-but-it-is-closing-slowly/story-e6frg9jx-1226706049286
[186] See Chapter Seven

to this reasoning, the expansion of modern tertiary (services) sector professions requiring greater autonomy and cognitive skills has ignited the demand for a more educated workforce prompting workers to seek, and governments to provide, greater access to advanced formal education.[187] Knowledge itself including news and current affairs information has also become more accessible with the proliferation of modern communications technology such as television, radio, the Internet and social media.[188] These developments have empowered individuals to research and to think critically about their consumer options, rather than just rely on and accept information provided by traditional contextual sources of authority such as GPs, teachers, even mechanics and tradespeople. The salience of such tight hierarchical relationships between consumers/civilians and professionals/specialists has dwindled as increased availability of knowledge and enhanced cognitive abilities have enabled more informal/autonomous choices to be made. Furthermore, these trends have induced greater competition between market suppliers. In the words of Inglehart and Welzel: "rising levels of education, increasing cognitive and informal requirements in economic activities, and increasing proliferation of knowledge via mass media make people intellectually more independent, diminishing cognitive constraints on human choice."[189]

Knowledge and education certainly empower and liberate individuals from an overreliance on others (particularly traditional authority figures) and have become more widely accessible and disseminated because of economic necessity. This is consistent with Modernisation theory.[190] However, Inglehart and Welzel's thesis is contradicted by a raft of academic research concluding that formal education raises formal community and civic engagement; likely to include elite led political party involvement.[191] In fact, education is

[187] Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.28
[188] Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.29
[189] Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.29
[190] Berger, Noah and Fisher, Peter. (22 August 2013), 'A Well-Educated Workforce Is Key to State Prosperity', *Economic Policy Institute*, viewed 8 December 2016, http://www.epi.org/publication/states-education-productivity-growth-foundations/; Sharrock, Geoff. 'OECD figures are not what they seem in higher education', *THE CONVERSATION*, viewed 8 December 2016, http://theconversation.com/oecd-figures-are-not-what-they-seem-in-higher-education-60786; Barns, Angela., Jefferson, Therese., and Preston, Alison. (April 2009), 'Women's employment in the context of the economic downturn', *Australian Human Rights Commission*, viewed 8 December 2016, https://www.humanrights.gov.au/publications/women-s-employment-context-economic-downturn-2009; OECD Better Life Index: Australia, viewed 8 December 2016, http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/countries/australia/
[191] Vromen, Ariadne. (2012) 'New forms of participation and social movements', in Smith, Rodney., Vromen, Ariadne., and Cook, Ian., *Contemporary Politics in Australia: Theories, Practices and Issues,* Cambridge

perhaps the most significant-catalyst for political activity. Verb, Schlozman and Brady (1995), Lake and Huckfeldt (1998), Downs (1957), Rosenberg (1988) and Becker (1964) each found that higher education provides knowledge and intellectual and cognitive skills that increase the accessibility of political participation.[192]

Yet, despite an enormous growth in education levels 'traditional' forms of political engagement have declined over the last half century in advanced post-industrial countries.[193] In Putnam's words "education boosts civic engagement sharply, and education levels have risen massively. … If anything, the growth of education should have increased civic engagement."[194] Nevertheless, Putnam found that in absolute terms declines in traditional civic involvement have been greatest among the better educated.[195] Therefore, the extent to which education positively effects levels of conventional political participation may be being increasingly eroded, inhibited or mitigated by recent/contemporary sociological trends.

Indeed, there is some evidence that higher education reduces party identification by enabling/promoting independent thought, including political ideas unguided by major parties and party elites.[196] Party identification is almost always a precondition for party membership and involvement. Hence, this finding certainly supports Inglehart and Welzel's thesis regarding the intellectually liberating power of education and the influence of this empowerment on traditional elite-led forms of political engagement.[197] However, this on its own does not explain why the influence of education on party identification has become

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University Press, Melbourne, p.201; Wolfinger, R, E and Rosenstone, S, J. (1980) *Who votes?,* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press; Verba, S., Schlozman, K, L., and Brady, H, E. (1995) *Voice and equality: Civic voluntarism in American politics,* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Downs, A. (1957) *An economic theory of democracy,* New York: Harper; Lake, Ronald, L, D and Huckfeldt, Robert. (1998) 'Social Capital, Social Networks, and Political Participation', *Political Psychology,* vol:19(3), p.567-569, 576 & 579; Coleman, 'Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital', p.95-120; Vromen, 'Australian young people's participatory practices and internet use', p.61; Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.46 & 187

[192] Becker, G. (1964) Human capital. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research; Rosenberg, S, W. (1988) 'The structure of political thinking', *American Journal of Political Science,* vol:32, p.539-566; Verba., Schlozman and Brady, *Voice and equality: Civic voluntarism in American politics*; Downs, *An economic theory of democracy*; Lake, and Huckfeldt. 'Social Capital, Social Networks, and Political Participation,' p.568

[193] Hill and Rutledge-Prior, 'Young people and intentional informal voting in Australia', p.400-417
Martin, Young people and political engagement, p.76 & 78/79

[194] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.187

[195] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.46

[196] Spies-Butcher, Ben. (2012) 'Voter behaviour', in Smith, Rodney., Vromen, Ariadne., and Cook, Ian., *Contemporary Politics in Australia: Theories, Practices and Issues,* Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, p.153 & 156

[197] Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.29, 116 & 117

stronger relative to the effect of education in raising the accessibility of party engagement. That is, there may be contextual reasons why the role of higher education in reducing party identification is strengthening relative to the role of higher education in providing the knowledge and skills necessary for party involvement.

Occupation Specialisation & Social Complexity

The third category of contemporary atomising developments identified by Inglehart and Welzel may provide some insight into why the influence of higher education on party engagement is changing. These trends heighten occupational specialisation and social complexity. Post-industrialisation, Inglehart and Welzel contend, diversifies economic activity and in turn knowledge and interests. This social complexity, they argue, provides individuals with a more diverse set of available persons with whom they can make connections. In their words "post-industrialisation de-standardizes economic activities and social life."[198] "Diversification ... frees people from prefixed social roles and social ties, making them autonomous in defining their social roles themselves and in shaping their social ties with other people."[199] Individuals may be using their enhanced social/relationship choices to forge and maintain more ideologically homogenous networks based on personal preferences.

Lack of intra-network ideological and political diversity to check and balance extreme views may allow networks to drift further from what was a more concentrated political centre. These trends could have been accelerated by the expansion of higher education. First, higher education provides greater intellectual independence from traditional sources of authority (including political parties). Second, a more diverse set of internally homogenous networks may be granting these educated and intellectually independent persons more, and more extreme, ideological choices. Where once parties (particularly major parties) could appeal to a large proportion of the electorate clumped more tightly around a common political centre, now those same parties struggle to maintain their core constituencies: a decline in party identification.[200] Hence, the capacity of education to raise party and formal

[198] Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.29
[199] Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.24
[200] Parliament of Australia. (viewed 6 Dec. 2016) 'Chapter one: Party voting and partisan decline in Australia', *Principle and pragmatism – a study of competition between Australia's major parties at the 2004 and other recent federal elections,*

political engagement may be losing ground to the role of that education in reducing party identification: usually a prerequisite for party involvement.

However, Inglehart and Welzel maintain that along with heightened material security, education attainment, occupational specialisation and social complexity post-industrialisation has brought about a values shift which, among other things, has made people more open to bridging connections.[201] They argue that as post-industrial societies have grown increasingly complex, social networks have become more heterogeneous.[202] Such views do not adequately explain why (despite being intellectually "liberated") evidence suggests that the growing educated and occupationally specialised class are still more inclined to participate in traditional/formal political organisations and parties than are the relatively uneducated and unskilled.[203] Neither does it explain why this disposition among the educated class has been in decline.[204] If, as Inglehart and Welzel contend, declining bonding is being replaced by rising bridging social capital in post-industrial societies[205] then presumably individuals should have greater exposure to a range of political attitudes. This should have increased opportunities to discuss and debate different political views. The exchange and melding of these ideas should bind a higher proportion of people more tightly around an ideological centre. Indeed, Bello and Rolfe's research suggests that people who encounter greater political disagreement within their social networks are more inclined to switch their party support even once their (the primary respondent's) political interest and identity strength is controlled.[206] This indicates that the respondents' views were influenced, and probably moderated, by their politically dissimilar discussants. In the words of Bello and Rolfe:

> On average across both decided and leaning voters, respondents who report high levels of disagreement with their discussants are significantly more likely to switch party choice in

http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/APF/monographs/Principle_and_Programatism/chapter1; Martin, Young people and political engagement, p.76

[201] Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.2-6, 19, 24, 29, 141, 142 & 294

[202] Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.24 & 29

[203] Vromen, 'New forms of participation and social movements', p.201; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, *Who votes?*; Verba., Schlozman and Brady, *Voice and equality: Civic voluntarism in American politics*; Downs, *An economic theory of democracy*; Lake and Huckfeldt, 'Social Capital, Social Networks, and Political Participation,' p.567-569, 576 & 579; Coleman, 'Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital', p.95-120; Vromen, 'Australian young people's participatory practices and internet use', p.61; Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.46 & 187

[204] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.46

[205] Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.141, 142 & 294

[206] Bello, Jason and Rolfe, Meredith. (2014) 'Is influence mightier than selection? Forging agreement in political discussion networks during a campaign', *Social Networks,* vol:36, p.143 & 144

> the following period than respondents who report no disagreement with their discussants. … [R]espondents with politically diverse discussion networks are more likely to change their vote choice … even after controlling for the primary respondent's political interest and political identity strength... [A]lthough committed partisans are far less likely to switch their vote choice than respondents who are only leaning towards a particular party.[207]

Accordingly, Inglehart and Welzel's argument that declining bonding is being replaced by rising bridging social capital is called into question. If social networks were ideologically diversifying political party platforms would probably be appealing to an increasing proportion of the electorate. Instead, evidence suggests that party identification and engagement has been eroding for decades.[208]

Inglehart and Welzel's Modernisationist arguments regarding the role of education in intellectually liberating people from traditional sources of authority, and consequently eroding party identification, have significant merit. Equally compelling is their contention that expanding accessibility and dissemination of education is a necessary consequence of economic development. However, their claim that widening educational attainment is an atomising trend contributing to a reduction in elite-led traditional and party engagement is found wanting. A myriad of academics, including Putnam, have found that across all forms the educated continue to engage politically at higher rates than the uneducated.[209] However, Putnam did not explain why declines in traditional forms of political engagement have been greatest among the educated.[210] Inglehart and Welzel's third identified category of atomising trends "occupation specialisation and social complexity" may provide the foundation for a Homogenisationist answer. Yet, their view that bonding is being replaced by bridging social capital precludes their development of this interpretation.[211] Both Putnam's Lamentationist and Inglehart and Welzel's Modernisationist views regarding the effects of higher education on political involvement have merits and shortcomings. Neither argument -- in describing the

[207] Bello and Rolfe, 'Is influence mightier than selection?', p.143 & 144
[208] Martin, Young people and political engagement, p.76 & 78-80
[209] Vromen, 'New forms of participation and social movements', p.201; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, *Who votes?*; Verba., Schlozman and Brady, *Voice and equality: Civic voluntarism in American politics*; Downs, *An economic theory of democracy*; Lake and Huckfeldt, 'Social Capital, Social Networks, and Political Participation,' p.567-569, 576 & 579; Coleman, 'Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital', p.95-120; Vromen, 'Australian young people's participatory practices and internet use', p.61; Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.46 & 187
[210] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.46
[211] Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.141, 142 & 294

role of education expansion in political engagement patterns -- is adequate, comprehensive enough or entirely compelling.

The Lure of Atomisation?

Unlike Inglehart and Welzel, Putnam considers social atomisation a trend toward less, not more, overall autonomy, social justice, happiness, life satisfaction/meaning, political engagement and government integrity, functionality and responsiveness.[212] Putnam associates atomisation with a myriad of developments diminishing all types of, rather than transforming, community and civic engagement.[213] Putnam admits that some of the atomising trends he identifies do enable greater autonomy in particular contexts. However, he is adamant that each acts to restrict overall levels of personal independence and empowerment by reducing the number of life opportunities one encounters and choices one has available.[214]

Putnam argues that socially atomising trends are eroding overall levels of social connectedness to the detriment, not empowerment, of individuals. According to Putnam's Lamentation theory greater access to, and changing usage of, television and other technologies have most severely and deleteriously effected community involvement.[215] Similarly, the evolution of society's religious demographics and decline in religiosity has harmed overall levels of structural social capital.[216] Economic changes such as industrial relations deregulation and corporate delocalisation have dampened social connectivity and community spirit and involvement.[217] Putnam holds that new patterns in where people live, with whom and the length of average commutes are eroding altruism, trust, trustworthiness and community engagement.[218] He also argues that declining marriage and fertility rates as

[212] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.34, 35, 40-47, 261-265, 346 & 358-360
[213] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.34, 35, 40-46, 66-78, 88-90, 138, 191, 194-196, 202, 205-207, 209, 210, 212, 213, 216-219, 221-223, 225, 228, 230, 231, 235-238, 242-244, 248, 278, 282 & 283
[214] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.22, 23, 74, 88, 90, 138, 209, 216 & 217
[215] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.216, 230, 231, 283 & 284
[216] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.66 & 67
[217] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.89, 90, 191, 282 & 283
[218] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.205-207, 209, 210 & 213

well as changing gender roles and a rise in two career families are affecting the number and strength of social bonds forged.[219]

Technology

Putnam describes television watching as the activity most lethal to community involvement as it, along with CDs, DVDs, the Internet, smartphones and ipods, has allowed for greater private consumption of entertainment.[220] He finds that, other factors being equal, each additional hour of television watching per day means roughly a 10% reduction in most forms of political engagement.[221] Putnam reports that although television viewing increases with age (particularly upon retirement), each successive generation since the introduction of television has begun the life-cycle at a higher point of viewing than their parents.[222] Studies suggest a causal link between television viewing and declining civic engagement rather than the already civically disengaged turning to television for substitute entertainment.[223]

Other concerning developments in the usage of television include the rise in the number of televisions per home during the second half of the twentieth century indicating that people are watching more television alone rather than in the company of family/others.[224] Putnam also reveals that people have become less selective about what they watch. They are more likely to turn on the television without knowing what they want to see in advance and to leave it on in the background when they are no longer watching.[225] He has found these trends to be largely generational.[226] A shift in 'what' is viewed is also worrying. Putnam reveals that controlling for other factors like education, income, sex, age, race, employment and marital status the more time spent watching news, the more likely one is to be active in the community. Contrastingly, the more time spent watching television series, soap operas, gameshows, and talk shows the less involved one is likely to be in the community.[227] He also reveals that the program types most closely associated with civic

[219] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.94, 95, 100 & 194-196
[220] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.216, 230, 231, 283 & 284
[221] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.228
[222] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.222
[223] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.235-238
[224] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.223
[225] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.225
[226] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.225
[227] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.243

isolation constitute an enormous and expanding share of television programming, indicating a growing demand for entertainment at the expense of news and informative programs.[228] In fact Putnam found that only 7% of Americans watched television primarily for information while 41% watched it primarily for entertainment.[229]

These results are largely supported by other research. Hoffman and Thomson's survey of 201 American public high school students established that the watching of both traditional news programming and political information from satire and comedy shows raise feelings of political efficacy among adolescents which in turn stimulates civic engagement.[230] Bankston's analysis of American 'General Social Survey' data also corroborates Putnam's findings by revealing negative correlations between the 'overall' hours spent watching television per week and both 'recreational activeness' and 'organisational membership.' These were maintained even after controlling for salient characteristics such as race, marital status and education.[231] Furthermore, Bankston found evidence that television watching may erode informal sociability.[232] Like Putnam, he argues that television viewing is most likely diminishing levels of social capital and civic engagement, rather than providing substitute entertainment for the already socially atomized, isolated and disengaged. In his words "Television may detract from civic participation not simply by privatizing leisure but by making leisure inactive and sapping the participatory ethos of everyday life."[233]

Television (which now includes cable television and internet streaming services), DVDs, radio, ipods and smartphones have in one sense empowered individuals to consume entertainment and knowledge when they please without the organisational and time costs of more collective activities. However, Putnam contends they have also had enormously damaging effects on the connectivity between people: reducing opportunities and options which are tied to strong networks underpinned by trust and reciprocities. Australia and America are both economically developed and have similar individualistic, anglosphere

[228] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.244
[229] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.230
[230] Hoffman, Lindsay, H and Thomson, Tiffany, L. (2009) 'The Effect of Television Viewing on Adolescents' Civic Participation: Political Efficacy as a Mediating Mechanism', *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media,* vol:53(1), p.11 & 16
[231] Bankston, Carl, L. (2003) 'No Bowling at all: Television, The Vita Inactiva, and Social Capital', *Sociological Focus,* vol:36(2), p.105
[232] Bankston, 'No Bowling at all', p.105
[233] Bankston, 'No Bowling at all', p.108

western cultures. It is arguable that, Australian television viewing trends over the last half century have probably mirrored those of the US. Though, there is some evidence suggesting that 'overall' rates of television watching per week (including broadcast, cable and internet subscription television) may have declined very slightly in recent years.[234] Still, Putnam's views regarding the effects of television and other technologies on social connectivity over the longer term appear to be sound.

Religion & Religiosity

Putnam identifies changing religious demographics and religiosity as a similar sacrifice in overall levels of social connectivity (and the opportunities and empowerment which flow from such bonds) for greater autonomy within a particular facet of one's life. He finds that churchgoers tend to:

- have stronger and larger networks (both formal and informal),
- be more politically active and engaged in secular non-political organisations/groups (especially volunteering/philanthropy),
- know and interact with more people, and
- have greater life satisfaction.[235]

Indeed Putnam found that those who attended church regularly reported talking with 40% more people in the course of a day than those who do not attend church.[236] By analysing data from the first wave of the Portraits of American Life Study Lewis, MacGregor and Putnam (2012) demonstrated that "religious attendance is positively associated with volunteering, charitable giving, attending public meetings, and political engagement, as well as informal pro-social activities such as helping, giving money, and giving advice to family,

[234] Edwards, Jim. (25 November 2013) 'TV Is Dying, And Here Are The Stats From The US That Prove It', *BUSINESS INSIDER AUSTRALIA,* viewed 9 December 2016, http://www.businessinsider.com.au/cord-cutters-and-the-death-of-tv-2013-11; Quinn, Karl. (30 July 2016) 'Australians now watch 14 per cent less TV than five years ago', *The Sydney Morning Herald,* viewed 9 December 2016, http://www.smh.com.au/entertainment/tv-and-radio/australian-tv-ratings-audience-is-more-fractured-than-humpty-dumpty-post-fall-20160726-gqe5bl.html

[235] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.66 & 67

[236] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.67; Lim, Chaeyoon and Putnam, Robert, D. (2010) 'Religion, Social Networks, and Life Satisfaction', *American Sociological Review,* vol:75(6), p.920-929

friends, and neighbors."[237] Putnam holds that "religiosity rivals education as a powerful correlate of most forms of civic engagement."[238] These results are supported by the investigations of Wilson (2000), Lam (2002), Park and Smith (2000), and Uslaner (2002) indicating that religiosity is associated with charitable giving and community and civic involvement.[239] They are also consistent with research conducted in central Queensland by Lauder, Mummery and Sharkey in 2006 revealing that "strong religious feelings are linked to less loneliness."[240]

Lim and Putnam's (2010) analysis of data collected from the same participants in both 2006 and 2007 waves of the Faith Matters Study suggests that by facilitating the building of friendship networks religious service attendance positively effects life satisfaction.[241] This research controlled for age, sex, race, income, education attainment and marital status.[242] It also indicates that a strong sense of religious belonging, or identification, can amplify the positive influence that congregational social networks have on life satisfaction.[243] Furthermore, Lim and Putnam find that once religious service attendance and congregational friendship are controlled for, private and subjective dimensions of religiosity are unlikely to have a significant impact on life satisfaction.[244] Regarding life satisfaction they state that "praying together seems to be better than either bowling together or praying alone."[245] These conclusions are supported by Witter et al. (1985) and Ellison, Gay and Glass (1989) who reveal that when compared with other positive correlates of subjective wellbeing,

[237] Lewis, Valerie, A., MacGregor, Carol, A and Putnam, Robert, D. (2012) 'Religion, networks, and neighbourliness: The impact of religious social networks on civic engagement', *Social Science Research,* vol:42, p.341 & 342
[238] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.67
[239] Wilson, John. (2000) 'Volunteering', *Annual Review of Sociology,* vol:26, p.215-240; Lam, Pui-Yan. (2002) 'As the flocks gather: how religion affects voluntary association participation', *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion,* vol:41(3), p.405-422; Park, Jerry, Z and Smith, Christian. (2000) ''To whom much has been given…': religious capital and community voluntarism among churchgoing protestants', *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion,* vol:39(3), p.272-286; Uslaner, Eric, M. (2002) 'Religion and civic engagement in Canada and the United States', *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion,* vol:41(2), p.239-254
[240] Lauder, William., Mummery, Kerry and Sharkey, Siobhan. (2006) 'Listening to Patients: Social capital, age and religiosity in people who are lonely', *Journal of Clinical Nursing,* vol:15, p.338
[241] Lim, and Putnam, 'Religion, Social Networks, and Life Satisfaction', p.920-927
[242] Lim, and Putnam, 'Religion, Social Networks, and Life Satisfaction', p.918
[243] Lim, and Putnam, 'Religion, Social Networks, and Life Satisfaction', p.923, 924, 927 & 929
[244] Lim, and Putnam, 'Religion, Social Networks, and Life Satisfaction', p.926 & 927
[245] Lim, and Putnam, 'Religion, Social Networks, and Life Satisfaction', p.927

religious involvement is stronger than either marital status or income.[246] Additionally, Krueger et al. (2009) found that those participating in a time-diary survey reported being most emotionally positive when they were involved in religious activities.[247]

Putnam presents statistics indicating declining church attendance and an increase in non-religious people: largely generational trends.[248] Beginning with the Baby Boomers, Americans began to increasingly privatise religion: deeming faith less as a catalyst for building community and more as an expression of autonomous moral judgement.[249] Campbell and Putnam find that the proportion of Americans who report no religious affiliation has been rising rapidly since the early 1990s and that this trend is heavily concentrated among Millennials.[250] Similar trends have been observed in Australia. According to census data, over the last half century there has been a sharp rise in the proportion of Australians who report having no religion: 0.8% in 1966 compared to 30.1% in 2016.[251] Data from the National Church Life Survey indicate that the proportion of Australians who frequently attend church services (i.e. at least once a month) has declined by more than 60% since the mid-twentieth century.[252] Declines in religiosity and church attendance in the western world is well established. In fact, research by Robert Barro and Rachel McCleary indicates that economic development is precipitating a decline in religiosity.[253] This would support Inglehart and Welzel's Modernisation theory. Although this is a trend toward enhanced autonomy over one

[246] Witter, Robert, A., Stock, William, A., Okun, Morris, A and Haring, Marilyn, J. (1985) 'Religion and Subjective Well-Being in Adulthood: A Quantitative Synthesis', *Review of Religious Research,* vol:26(4), p.332-342; Ellison, Christopher, G., Gay, David, A and Glass, Thomas, A. (1989) 'Does Religious Commitment Contribute to Individual Life Satisfaction?', *Social Forces,* vol:68(1), p.100-123

[247] Krueger, Alan, B., Kahneman, Daniel., Schkade, David., Schwarz, Nobert and Stone, Arthur, A. (2009) 'National Time Accounting: The Currency of Life', in Krueger, A, B, *Measuring the Subjective Well-Being of Nations: National Accounts of Time Use and Well-Being,* University of Chicago Press, Chicago Illinois, p.9-86

[248] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.70, 72 & 73

[249] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.74

[250] Campbell, David, E and Putnam, Robert, D. (2012) 'God and Caesar in America', *Foreign Affairs,* vol:91(2), p.34-43

[251] Australian Bureau of Statistics, (2008) 'Cultural Diversity', *Year Book Australia, 2008, 1301.0,* viewed 24 August 2018, http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/7d12b0f6763c78caca257061001cc588/636F496B2B943F12CA2573D200109DA9?opendocument; Australian Bureau of Statistics, (2017) 'Religion in Australia', *Census of Population and Housing: Reflecting Australia – Stories from the Census, 2016, 2071.0,* viewed 24 August 2018, http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/by%20Subject/2071.0~2016~Main%20Features~Religion%20Data%20Summary~70

[252] National Church Life Survey: NCLS Research Fact Sheet, (2006) 'Why Innovation is Needed in Church Life', viewed 24 August 2018, http://www.ncls.org.au/default.aspx?sitemapid=6516

[253] Barro, Robert, J and McCleary, Rachel, M. (2003) 'International Determinants of Religiosity', *NBER Working Paper No.10147,* National Bureau of Economic Research, p.34

aspect of life, it is perhaps an unwitting sacrifice of more significant autonomous choice and life opportunities as well as higher levels of life satisfaction associated with larger stronger networks. Thus, Putnam's ideas regarding the impact of waning religiosity on social capital have merit.

Industrial Relations & Workplace Practices

The abandonment of certain industrial relations regulations for greater workplace flexibility, productivity and in many instances autonomy, Putnam holds, has had analogous negative outcomes for levels of social connectivity and associated life choices and opportunities. Putnam admits industrial relations deregulation has economically benefited certain societies including America in terms of reducing unemployment (in particular youth unemployment), raising productivity and granting employers, and often employees, greater workplace flexibility.[254] However, Putnam is at pains to stress that these benefits have come at social costs. He argues that industrial relations deregulation has had negative consequences for trust, social connectedness and a team mindset between work colleagues. As non-standard, performance-based employment and pay have risen and the labour market has become increasingly competitive employees have come to view their co-workers more as threats to their job security and livelihood rather than teammates.[255] Michael O'Donnell of the School of Industrial Relations and Organisational Behaviour at the University of New South Wales conducted an examination of performance based pay in the Australian public service between 1992 and 1996. He found that "[l]inking pay to individual performance undermined teamwork and increased friction between those eligible for performance bonuses."[256] This, Putnam posits, has in some instances reduced job satisfaction, performance and productivity as well as eroded social bonds at the workplace.[257] Consistent with this position O'Donnell's research reveals that "a strong performance culture [had] ... not emerged within the APS in response to the introduction of performance-based pay."[258] Putnam also highlights the coordination problems faced by many employees with irregular

[254] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.88
[255] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.89 & 90
[256] O'Donnell, Michael. (1998) 'Creating a Performance Culture? Performance-based Pay in the Australian Public Service', *Australian Journal of Public Administration,* vol:57(3), p.28
[257] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.89 & 90
[258] O'Donnell, 'Creating a Performance Culture? Performance-based Pay in the Australian Public Service' p.38

work hours in organising social and community events with others.[259] Declining regular 9 to 5, Monday to Friday jobs have exacerbated these difficulties over the last several decades. Not only has social connectivity within the workplace reduced because of industrial relations deregulation so too have opportunities for network building in non-work hours. In a Belgian 1999 study analysing how irregular work schedules affect mental and physical health, Martens, Nijhuis, Boxtel and Knottnerus found that nonstandard/irregular working hours and participation in group leisure activities were negatively correlated. They established that this was having a detrimental impact on health and wellbeing.[260]

As industrial relations deregulation has raised the financial anxiety felt by many of those in contingent employment, social and political engagement has been further undermined. Putnam finds that those feeling financial anxiety regardless of their income, education, gender and similar factors become more socially and politically withdrawn.[261] Putnam argues that once the influence of financial anxiety is removed income levels and affluence have little effect on social connectivity.[262] He also finds that declines in engagement and social bonds are almost as great among the affluent as among those on middle incomes and the poor.[263] In fact, Lake and Huchfeldt (1998) established that "Income, when controlling for other personal characteristics such as education and age, does not produce a discernible effect [on one's structural social capital or level of formal organisational engagement]."[264]

Like Putnam, Eldin Fahmy (another Lamentationist) believes that social/political engagement is declining partly due to changes in the workplace. He contends that reductions in the demand for unskilled labour in manufacturing in England coupled with fragmentation of the apprenticeship system have decreased opportunities for those without tertiary education: forcing them into poorly paid and insecure service sector occupations.[265] This, Fahmy theorises, delays young people's exposure to the political climate of the workplace

[259] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.90 & 191
[260] Martens, M, F, J., Nijhuis, F, J, N., Boxtel, M, P, J and Knottnerus, J, A. (1999) 'Flexible work schedules and mental and physical health. A study of a working population with non-tradition working hours', *Journal of Organizational Behavior,* vol:20, p.43
[261] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.193
[262] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.193
[263] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.193
[264] Lake, Ronald and Huckfeldt, 'Social Capital, Social Networks, and Political Participation', p.579
[265] Fahmy, Young Citizens: Young people's involvement in Politics and Decision Making, p.31

until later in the life-cycle when they enter stable employment. Therefore, labour market changes maybe individualising young people's perceptions of the social world: failing to encourage them to engage in collective civic action either conventional or unconventional.[266]

Putnam's position that industrial relations deregulation and certain workplace practices are diminishing social connectivity, by raising financial stress, eroding workplace comradery and inflicting coordination difficulties on employees' social lives has been largely supported by other researchers. Hence, there is merit to the argument that social connectivity and associated life choices and opportunities have been sacrificed for more tangible and immediate workplace flexibility.

Moving to the Metropolis

Another socially atomising trend identified by Putnam is the decline in the proportion of Americans living in small towns and the increase in the proportion living in large metropolitan areas. Putnam presents statistics demonstrating that over the second half of the twentieth century there was:

- a massive reduction in the proportion of the American population who lived in small towns and rural areas,
- a slight decline in the proportion who lived in city centres, and
- an enormous increase in the proportion that lived in metropolitan areas outside city centres (the suburbs).[267]

The following graph from a report published by the *Regional Institute* indicates that similar demographic shifts have taken place in Australia.

Figure 2.1

[266] Fahmy, Young Citizens: Young people's involvement in Politics and Decision Making, p.40
[267] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.206 & 207



Hugo, Graeme. 'First National Conference on the Future of Australia's Country Towns', *The Regional Institute*, viewed 15 February 2015, http://www.regional.org.au/au/countrytowns/keynote/hugo.htm#P2652_67985

Putnam contends that altruism, trust and trustworthiness are much more common in American small towns than in cities and that residents of large American metropolitan areas are less involved than other Americans in community affairs. Furthermore, these comparisons hold even when other factors such as age, gender, education, race, financial circumstances, home ownership, region and parental, marital, and job status are held constant.[268] Putnam also finds that civic engagement is not correlated with whether one would prefer living in a big city, a suburb, or a small town. That is, "living in a major metropolitan agglomeration somehow weakens civic engagement and social capital."[269] Similarly, in a study employing data from a telephone survey with 1,402 urban and 611 rural South Australian respondents Ziersch, Baum, Darmawan, Kavanagh and Bentley revealed that in the Australian setting people in rural areas possessed greater structural social capital than urban residents. In their words "respondents from rural areas reported significantly higher

[268] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.138, 205 & 206
[269] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.206

levels of several elements of social capital, with higher levels of social networks, greater civic participation and more social cohesion."[270]

However, the study found no statistically significant differences between urban and rural residents regarding levels of generalised trust, size of support networks or a belief in reciprocity (that "by helping others you help yourself in the long run").[271] Support network size was defined by the number of people willing to help you at personal cost to themselves if you were in serious need.[272] Positive correlations were found between income and general trust and between educational attainment and a belief in reciprocity.[273] These findings support Inglehart and Welzel's position that social/general trust and civic values are linked to levels of existential security and individual empowering atomising factors such as wealth and education rather than the degree to which individuals are socially isolated.

Similarly, my own analysis of Australian WVS data, when controlling for other variables, reveals no clear significant correlations between town size and:

- interpersonal trust,
- trustworthiness,
- formal organisational involvement,
- unconventional political activity,
- political discussion,
- generosity,
- belief in the utility of government decision-making, or
- confidence in most significant civic and community institutions and organisations.[274]

[270] Ziersch, Anna, M., Baum, Fran., Darmawan, Gusti, Ngurah., Kavanagh, Anne, M and Bentley, Rebecca. (2009) 'Social capital and health in rural and urban communities in South Australia', *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health,* vol:33(1), p.14

[271] Ziersch., Baum., Darmawan., Kavanagh and Bentley, 'Social capital and health in rural and urban communities in South Australia', p.11

[272] Ziersch., Baum., Darmawan., Kavanagh and Bentley, 'Social capital and health in rural and urban communities in South Australia', p.9

[273] Ziersch., Baum., Darmawan., Kavanagh and Bentley, 'Social capital and health in rural and urban communities in South Australia', p.11

[274] See Chapter Five

Where clear and significant correlations were found between town size and measures of social capital larger cities/towns were associated with higher levels of social capital than small towns and rural communities. Larger cities were positively correlated with political interest and confidence in parliament, the civil service, political parties and the legal system.[275] My statistical analysis also suggests that rising incomes may aid interpersonal trust both independently and by supporting financial satisfaction which in turn also promotes interpersonal trust.[276] These findings, discussed in later chapters, largely support those articulated by Ziersch et al. and provide further evidence that interpersonal trust and civic values are tied to levels of existential security and individual empowering, rather than individual isolating, atomising factors. The ostensibly universal (not just American) applicability (and perhaps even validity) of Putnam's argument regarding the influence of declining rural and increasing metropolitan populations on measures of social connectivity, generalised trust and civic values conflicts with other research and my own analysis of Australian WVS data. This certainly weakens the suitability of Putnam's Lamentation thesis as an explanation for social capital and civic engagement trends in post-industrial democracies.

Putnam argues that the connection he found between residential mobility and civic disengagement could not have contributed to the decline in American community and political involvement between 1960 and 1996. This is because Americans became more, not less, residentially stable in that time.[277] Indeed Putnam writes that at the close of the twentieth century residential stability was higher than it was in the 1950s and possibly higher than it had been at any time in America's history.[278] Australians have also become less residentially mobile.[279] This trend has been primarily driven by greater residential stability among those in their late teens and early twenties since 1976.[280]

[275] See Chapter Five
[276] See Chapter Four
[277] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.205
[278] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.205
[279] Australian Bureau of Statistics, (2012), 'Still on the Move', *2071.0 – Reflecting a nation: Stories from the 2011 Census, 2012-2013,* viewed 8 December 2016, http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/2071.0main+features702012-2013
[280] Australian Bureau of Statistics, (2013) 'Young Adults: Then and now', *4102.0 – Australian Social Trends*, April 2013, viewed 8 December 2016, http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/Lookup/4102.0Main+Features40April+2013

Gender Roles & Modern Families

Changing gender roles and the rise in the proportion of two career families may have also affected the number and strength of social bonds forged. Putnam finds that women are better social capitalists than men when their employment status is held constant.[281] However, he also argues that employment can significantly and substantially enable or hinder these deft network builders. As more women have entered the workforce they have been presented with greater opportunities for making connections and involving themselves in the community. These women also have less time to explore these opportunities.[282] When he compared women of the same age, education, financial security and marital/parental status Putnam found that full-time employment reduces the involvement of both the women themselves and their husbands. When a woman works full-time she and her partner (if she has one) are likely to spend more time zoning out on movies and television or else shopping.[283] Putnam also reveals that the degree to which a woman 'chooses' to work (rather than must work due to financial or other circumstances) is closely associated with community engagement. The greatest community participation is found among women who work part-time by choice.[284]

My analysis of Australian WVS data largely contradicts Putnam's view that women are defter social capitalists than are men. When controlling for other variables no significant correlations were found between sex and formal organisational involvement, interpersonal trust, political discussion or generosity. The data provides no overwhelming evidence that women are intrinsically more disposed than men to unconventional forms of political engagement or being confident in society's institutions and organisations. The only social capital marker in which women resoundingly outperform men is trustworthiness. The data also indicates that young and middle-aged men tend to be more politically interested than women of the same age. However, the gender disparity in political interest appears non-existent among older Australians. These statistical findings are discussed in more detail in Chapter Five.

[281] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.94 & 95
[282] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.194
[283] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.195 & 196
[284] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.201

Using data from the 2000/2001 Social Capital Module of the British General Household Survey, Vivien Lowndes, also refutes Putnam's research. She concludes differences between levels of male and female social capital are, in fact, quite small.[285] However, she identifies greater gender differences in the forms of social capital building in which men and women are engaged. She argues that women are somewhat more involved in informal social capital building than are men and cites evidence indicating that gender differences in volunteering also exist. Men are more inclined to participate in those types of volunteering related to sports and recreation and women are more active in those associated with health, education and welfare.

> While gender differences in the survey responses are undoubtedly small, the GHS findings do reveal a tendency for men and women to have different *social capital profiles.* Women are slightly more likely than men to know and trust their neighbours, have more contact with friends and relatives, and have access to informal sources of social support. Women's social capital appears to be more strongly embedded in neighbourhood-specific networks of informal sociability. … more than twice as many men than women undertake activity related to sports and recreation (29 per cent compared with 13 per cent), while women are more active in the fields of health, education and social services. As for the specific roles undertaken, men are more likely to occupy committee posts, while women dominate in visiting and befriending activities[286]

This finding is supported by Hall (1999) who established that the focus of informal sociability is highly gendered with men spending three times as many hours as women in sports clubs, and twice as many in social clubs. Conversely women spend three times as many hours visiting friends than do men.[287] However Lowndes' research supports Putnam's evidence that women who work part-time have greater social capital than those who work full time or not at all. In Lowndes' words:

> part-time workers are more likely than full-time workers to see and speak to friends and relatives, and to have more close friends living nearby... part-time workers are richer in

[285] Lowndes, Vivien. (2004) 'Getting On or Getting By? Women, Social Capital and Political Participation', *British Journal of Politics and International Relations,* vol:6, p.49
[286] Lowndes, 'Getting On or Getting By? Women, Social Capital and Political Participation', p.52 & 53
[287] Hall, P. (1999) 'Social Capital in Britain', *British Journal of Political Science,* vol:29(3), p.426

> social capital than full-time workers, being more likely to have multiple sources of informal help[288]

Yet, this argument that part-time employment is more conducive to female social capital building than full-time employment appears to be contradicted by my own analysis of Australian WVS data. Neither does the data provide substantial support for Putnam's contention that part-time paid employment, as opposed to being a full-time homemaker, encourages women to become more socially involved and bonded. [These correlation statistics are discussed in detail in Chapter Five.] Hence, Putnam's views regarding the influence of sex and employment status on social capital measures are uncompelling.

Putnam examined patterns in the levels of divorce, female employment and community/civic involvement over the twentieth century. He found that generational declines in civic engagement cannot be attributed to whether a person's parents divorced during their childhood or whether their mother worked.[289] However, Putnam concludes that increased female full-time employment (brought about often by economic necessity) has contributed to declining community and civic engagement both among women themselves and their families in the more immediate term. Putnam also holds that the amount of free time people have on average has not decreased over the last 50 years, instead the distribution of free time between various demographics has changed. Women and well-educated professionals have less free time than they used to, while men and those less educated and less skilled have more.[290] This redistribution of free time Putnam argues has had socially atomising consequences.

> the working class has less work and leisure class less leisure. … dual-career families are more common and are spending more time at work than they used to: married couples average fourteen more hours at work each week in 1998 than 1969 … for that segment of society – well-educated middle-class parents - whose energies historically provided a disproportionate share of the community infrastructure, the time bind is real. Perhaps we've witnessed a redistribution of free time from people (mostly younger, more educated

[288] Lowndes, 'Getting On or Getting By? Women, Social Capital and Political Participation', p.51
[289] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.267
[290] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.267

> women) who would have invested it in community engagement, toward people (mostly older, less educated men) more likely to consume it privately.[291]

However, my own analysis of WVS data reveals that sex and employment status has little bearing on most measures of social capital in Australia.[292] This severely weakens the applicability of Putnam's argument to non-American post-industrial societies. Gershuny and Fisher's research also contradicts Putnam's findings. They reveal that the time spent by both British women and men on leisure activities outside the home actually increased between the years 1961 and 1995 (approx. 20mins more per day).[293] Their study also shows that in 1995 men still had 50 minutes more leisure time a day than women and that on average women spent nearly four times longer than men on housework and childcare (about 5 hours a day).[294] Although Putnam may be right in arguing that changes in leisure time have occurred on a class basis, the evidence supporting a reduction in female leisure time is less convincing.

Both men and women have been empowered by changing gender roles and the rise in the proportion of two career families. Both sexes can pursue certain kinds of goals and aspirations previously less accepted by society. These include women aspiring to have careers and be leaders and more men opting to be stay at home dads. However, based on the evidence presented in the previous paragraphs Putnam's argument that these social changes have greatly contributed to a reduction in the number and strength of social ties is found wanting (at least when applied universally across post-industrial democracies). These social changes have probably not underwritten a process of individual isolating atomisation to the extent assumed by Putnam.

Conversely, individuals are gaining certain kinds of independence and autonomy at the expense of connections facilitated by marriage/family formation and the empowerment that those connections provide. These trends are due to falling fertility rates and fewer people entering into lasting marriages and long-term partnerships. Potential ties between

[291] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.191
[292] See Chapter Five
[293] Gershuny and Fisher cited in Lowndes, Vivien. (2004) 'Getting On or Getting By? Women, Social Capital and Political Participation', *British Journal of Politics and International Relations,* vol:6, p.53
[294] Gershuny and Fisher cited in Lowndes, 'Getting On or Getting By? Women, Social Capital and Political Participation', p.53

parents of children who attend the same school and those forged between one's self and one's partner's/spouse's friends and family are left unforged.[295] Also, Putnam reveals that Americans who are married with children are more likely to be involved in religious activities and church related social engagements. As church and youth activities are the two most important forms of volunteering, parents are more likely to volunteer than people of the same age and social status who are single and childless.[296] Likewise, evidence from Friesen (2013) indicates a positive correlation between family size and religiosity. However, Friesen's study reveals that political participation (the form of social capital with which this thesis is most concerned) is negatively affected by the number of children in the home.

> Women with strong religious identities purposefully tend to have more children than their peers and may also be reaping the benefits of congregational as well as child-induced social networking."[297] "[Nevertheless] even when accounting for the powerful relationships between forms of political participation and age, income, education, and marital status, … the number of children in the home had consistent, negative effects on individuals' political engagement; and though this relationship held for men and women, women were slightly more affected.[298]

When controlling for other variables my analysis of Australian WVS data reveals a negative correlation exists, at least in the Australian context, between having more children and both political interest and joining in boycotts. Yet the results of my examination (discussed further in Chapter Five) suggests that, at least in Australia, having more children and being married has little impact on overall levels of social capital or political engagement. Again, this verdict undermines the applicability of Putnam's conclusions to non-American post-industrial democracies.

Suburbanisation

Putnam contends that although suburbanisation has enabled people to choose a home among a wider variety of residential areas this choice has produced more homogenous

[295] Offer, Shira and Schneider, Barbara. (2007) 'Children's Role in Generating Social Capital', *Social Forces,* vol:85(3), p.1137; Sapiro, Virginia. (2006) 'Gender, Social Capital, and Politics', *Gender and Social Capital,* edited O'Neill, Brenda and Gidengil, Elisabeth, Routledge, New York, p.151-183
[296] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.278
[297] Friensen, Amanda. (2013) 'Religion, Politics, and the Social Capital of Children', *Journal of Women, Politics & Policy,* vol:34(3), p.200
[298] Friensen, 'Religion, Politics, and the Social Capital of Children', p.210

"lifestyle enclaves" so as people with different views and interests live apart.[299] This position is supported by the works of Bishop (2009) and Sussell (2013) that demonstrated, using party registration and electoral data, that partisan preferences are becoming significantly more homogenous at county and microgeographic levels.[300] Galston and Nivola attribute this geographic partisan polarization to younger and more educated people moving to places that offer them the greatest career and financial opportunities, thereby amplifying the divide between the tastes and preferences of affluent and rural/struggling areas.

> [P]olitical polarization has become akin to political segregation. You are less likely to live near someone whose politics differ from your own. … young people have deserted rural and older manufacturing areas for cities like Austin and Portland. Places with higher densities of college graduates attract even more, so that the gap between such communities and less-educated areas widens further. Zones of higher education, in turn, produce more innovation and enjoy higher incomes, generating communities dominated by upper-middle-class tastes. Lower-educated regions, by contrast, tend to be more family-oriented and more faithful to traditional authority.[301]

Likewise, a tendency for politically right-of-centre persons to geographically self-sort has been uncovered. Schnieder (1992) and Walks (2006) argue that politically conservative people favouring small government tend to prefer localism, space and privacy, and are consequently more inclined, than are left-liberals, to move out of inner-city locations to the suburbs.[302]

Numerous scholars maintain this these trends have negative repercussions for the foundations of liberal democacy. Gimpel et al. argue in *Cultivating Democracy* that this "balkanization of neighborhoods" exacerbates political intolerance and polarization.[303] Putnam cites the research of political scientist Eric Oliver who believes geographic clustering

[299] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.209 & 210
[300] Bishop, Bill. (2009) *The Big Sort: Why the Clustering of Like-Minded America Is Tearing Us Apart,* Mariner Books, Boston; Sussell, Jesse. (2013) 'New Support for the Big Sort Hypothesis: An Assessment of Partisan Geographic Sorting in California, 1992-2010', in Htun, Mala and Powell, G, B, Jr, *American Political Science Association: Task Force Report on Electoral Rules and Democratic Government,* p.768-773
[301] Galston, William, A and Nivola, Pietro, S. (11 May 2008) 'Vote like thy neighbor', *The New York Times Magazine*, p.12
[302] Schneider, William. (1 July 1992) 'The Suburban Century Begins', *Atlantic Monthly*, vol:270(1), p.33-44; Walks, R, A. (2006) 'The Causes of City-Suburban Political Polarization? A Canadian Case Study', *Annals of the Association of American Geographers,* vol:96(2), p.410
[303] Gimpel, James, G., Lay, Celeste, J and Schuknecht, Jason, E. (2003) *Cultivating Democracy: civic environments and political socialization in America,* Brookings Institute Press, Washington, D.C., p.120

of like-minded individuals has probably diminished interaction between different types of people and consequently is likely to have contributed to a reduction in civic participation. This is because fewer stimulating/mobilising, and more reinforcing, conversations are being had between neighbours.[304] This conclusion is consistent with the research of David Campbell who finds that neighbourhood diversity raises political participation while also reducing social network building, trust and reciprocity.[305] Campbell argues that these seemingly contradictory patterns of social capital are due to different motivations than those identified by Putnam. Political heterogeneity increases awareness of possible political cleavages in the community and the importance of participation for securing self-interest outcomes.[306] Yet diversity also inhibits the development of cultural norms which underpin the trust and reciprocity which facilitate greater and stronger network formation.[307]

In contrast to Putnam's argument this is a somewhat more cynical interpretation as to why people who live in more heterogeneous areas (economically, socially, culturally and politically) tend to politically participate at higher rates. However, it is possible that both arguments are valid. Residents of more heterogeneous areas may have more bridging connections within their networks than residents of relatively homogenous neighbourhoods. Furthermore, these bridging connections may encourage them to think about political issues from multiple perspectives and in turn stimulate greater mental focus on, and engagement in, political matters. Still, residents of heterogenous areas with diverse networks may have greater concerns about the political ramifications of people like themselves not participating at rates matching others with antithetical interests. Therefore, evidence suggests that if Australian suburbs are becoming more homogenous (as Putnam claims is occurring across American metropolises) this would almost certainly be having negative consequences for political involvement. This is despite the effects of these patterns on other aspects of social capital.

[304] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.210
[305] Campbell, D, E. (2002) *Getting Along Versus Getting Ahead: Contextual Influences on Motivations for Collective Action,* Thesis, Government Department, Harvard University
[306] Campbell, *Getting Along Versus Getting Ahead: Contextual Influences on Motivations for Collective Action*
[307] Campbell, *Getting Along Versus Getting Ahead: Contextual Influences on Motivations for Collective Action*

Commuting Time

Putnam argues that suburbanisation has also increased people's time commuting to and from work. Putnam finds that between 1983 and 1995 the average American commuting trip travel time increased by 14%.[308] He reveals that each additional 10 minutes of commuting time cuts community involvement by 10% and has an even stronger negative effect on informal social interaction.[309] Commuting time is more important than most other influences on civic involvement and the more time spent commuting among the residents of a community the lower the average levels of civic involvement even among the non-commuters.[310] These correlations are supported by political scientist Thad Williamson. Using data from the 2000 Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey he finds that time spent commuting (particularly solo commutes) have a serious negative impact on group membership, civic involvement and social trust.[311] He suggests that community design should be focused on reducing commute times to raise levels of civic engagement and, like Putnam, finds that communities with higher proportions of commuters have lower levels of community and political engagement even among non-commuters.[312]

> Fewer solo commuters in one's zip code is a statistically significant predictor of membership in a political organisation, membership of a local reform organisation, attending a partisan political meeting, signing a petition, and attendance at public meetings – even when controlling for other community characteristics with which reduced auto dependence is highly correlated. In most cases, these relationships remain statistically significant after controlling for individual interest in politics.
>
> This preliminary analysis thus suggests that there is good reason, from a civic point of view, to encourage forms of community design that reduce commuting time and to encourage the preservation and increased liveability of both our older neighbourhoods and our central cities.[313]

[308] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.213
[309] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.213
[310] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.213
[311] Williamson, T. (2002) 'Sprawl, Politics, and Political Participation: A Preliminary Analysis', *National Civic Review,* vol:91(3), p.235-245
[312] Williamson, 'Sprawl, Politics, and Political Participation: A Preliminary Analysis', p.243
[313] Williamson, 'Sprawl, Politics, and Political Participation: A Preliminary Analysis', p.243

This supports Putnam's view that societal trends (including sprawl and longer commutes) are gradually and somewhat deceptively reducing our overall level of autonomy, by eroding society's social bonds, while providing individuals more easily identifiable advances in particular kinds of empowerment. The proportion of Australians commuting more than 90 minutes a day has increased substantially. Between 2002 and 2007 alone this proportion grew from 12.7 to 17.8% of the population.[314] The distance travelled by Sydney commuters has also increased particularly for those using public transport.[315] This would suggest that Putnam's concern regarding suburban sprawl, longer commutes and their impact on social activity and community involvement are also relevant to Australia.

Corporate Delocalisation

Finally, Putnam identifies 'corporate delocalisation' as an atomising trend. He posits that the replacement of local businesses with multinational empires often means a decline in civic and community spirit and involvement by business leaders.[316] In an article for the *American Behavioral Scientist,* Heying reports that these concerns have merit. Researching trends in the social networks of business leaders in Atlanta Georgia in the period 1931 to 1991, Heying found that:

> Delocalized corporations ... reduce their civic commitment and philanthropic largess … [and] direct it elsewhere, resulting in the demise of the local civic structure. The distancing of corporate elites from localities is likely to have a cascading effect on the ability of place-based and donation-dependent nonprofit organizations to carry out their philanthropic missions.[317]

Given how markedly globalisation and multinational corporations have affected the Australian economy over the last 30 years delocalisation has probably had a similar impact on levels of non-profit organisational and philanthropic engagement among corporate elites here.

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[314] *ABC NEWS,* (2016) 'Fact Check: Do nine in 10 Australians spend more than 90 minutes a day commuting?', viewed 8 December 2016, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-07-09/commuting-times-travel-shorten/6592510

[315] *ABC NEWS,* 'Fact Check: Do nine in 10 Australians spend more than 90 minutes a day commuting?'

[316] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.282 & 283

[317] Heying, Charles, H. (1997) 'Civic Elites and Corporate Delocalization: An Alternative Explanation for Declining Civic Engagement', *American Behavioral Scientist,* vol:40(5), p.663 & 664

Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that both Modernisation and Lamentation theories have merits and shortcomings. Inglehart and Welzel's Modernisation thesis is largely supported by other research and by my own analysis of Australian WVS data. They argue that social atomisation, precipitated by economic and technological development, facilitates human liberation and autonomy by transforming, rather than diminishing, social connections, cultural expectations and civil and political governing institutions and procedures. Thus, Putnam's thesis that almost all forms of social capital are (or were) in secular decline is reasoned overly pessimistic: focusing too heavily on traditional community and civic participation patterns and neglecting trends in more recent and informal modes of involvement. Still, Inglehart and Welzel fail to properly consider evidence suggesting that their identified instigators of modernisation and social atomisation maybe homogenising social networks and diversifying society's political ideas and preferences. These instigators include economic and technological development, higher levels of educational attainment and greater occupational specialisation and social complexity. Indeed, Inglehart and Welzel contend both that higher education attainment reduces traditional and formal political engagement (such as party involvement), and that bonding is being replaced by bridging social connections. The validity of these views has been contradicted by other research and my own analysis of Australian WVS data.

Putnam's Lamentation theory argues that, by embracing certain individual isolating atomising developments, people have unwittingly sacrificed the long-term integrity, functionality and responsiveness of democratic institutions and organisations for more tangible and immediate autonomy and convenience. Evidence supports Putnam's view that certain trends (applicable to many post-industrial democracies, including the United States and Australia) are having negative effects on measures of social capital including community and civic involvement. Putnam holds that these patterns (pertaining to television/other technology usage, religiosity, industrial relations deregulation, workplace practices, neighbourhood homogenisation, time spent commuting and corporate delocalisation) in turn harm democracy. Hence, Inglehart and Welzel's optimistic conviction that contemporary social capital trends are uniformly empowering individuals (including politically) has been deemed wanting. However, Putnam's contention regarding the contribution of particular

trends to the deterioration of social capital and community and political participation is refuted by other, and my own, research. These trends comprise a rise in the proportion of people living in metropolitan areas, changing gender roles (including an increase in the proportion of two full time career families), and declining marital and fertility rates. Chapter Three will investigate the degree to which Australian value, social capital and political engagement trends are accordant with Modernisation, Lamentation and Homogenisation theories by examining WVS percentage statistics.

CHAPTER THREE

--SOCIAL CAPITAL TRENDS--

Engagement, Trust, Interest, Values & Satisfaction

Chapters One and Two identified and examined sociological engagement theories that could potentially explain declines in rates of Australian party and electoral participation. Chapter Three considers the degree to which Australian value, social capital and political engagement trends are consistent with these theories. Statistics from the 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 World Values Surveys are presented and discussed. I have divided the survey statistics from each wave both into age groups/demographics 18 to 34, 35 to 49, 50 to 64 and 65+ and into generations/cohorts Greatest, Silent, Boomer, X and Millennial. Initial analysis focuses on changing education, employment and familial demographics, levels of subjectively sensed autonomy, value orientations and informal/unconventional political participation; areas of agreement between Modernisation and Homogenisation arguments. These trends are found to be consistent with Inglehart and Welzel's Modernisation (and therefore my Homogenisation) thesis. Contrastingly, statistics related to shifting value orientations and unconventional political involvement run counter to Putnam's Lamentation arguments, at least in the Australian context.

Subsequent exploration of trends in political interest levels as well as participation and confidence in formal organisations and institutions reveal patterns incongruous with Modernisation and Lamentation theses. However, a sociological context of ideologically and recreationally homogenising networks is shown to be compatible with this evidence. Finally, shifting levels of interpersonal trust, happiness and financial and life satisfaction are investigated. While these findings do not provide strong support for, they are reconcilable with my Homogenisation thesis. Combined, the statistics presented in this chapter weaken Modernisation and Lamentation theories necessitating a third explanation for historic and contemporary shifts in social capital, engagement and institutional/organisational confidence. The evidence instructs/informs my Homogenisationist interpretation.

Data Description

The below table describes when, how and by whom Australian WVS data was collected as well as the sample sizes and response rates. Data from respondents who returned incomplete surveys (i.e. surveys with missing data) was not used. Some questions were not asked in every survey wave, either because they were no longer deemed very useful or because new questions were added in later waves after consultation with researchers. Therefore, some of the charts and tables drawn from Australian WVS data within this thesis do not use all four waves.

Table 3.1

Data Description for Australian World Value Survey Waves

	1981 Wave	1995 Wave	2005 Wave	2012 Wave
Collection months	March – May	March - May	September - December	August - October
Fieldwork Institute	Roy Morgan Research Centre	Roy Morgan Research Centre	Australian Social Science Data Archive	The Social Research Centre for the Australian National University Research School of Social Sciences
Fieldwork Method	Personal face to face interviews	Personal face to face interviews	Self-completion, paper & pencil, mailed to, mailed back by respondents	Self-completion, paper & pencil, mailed to, mailed back by respondents
Participant Selection	Stratified representative sample	Stratified representative sample	3,500 randomly selected adults from the Australian Electoral Role	5,000 randomly selected adults from the Australian Electoral Role
Sample Size / Completed Surveys received	1,228	2,048	1,421	1,477
Completed Response Rate	N/A	N/A	40.6%	29.5%
Missing Data	N/A	N/A	The data from respondents	The data from respondents

			who returned incomplete surveys was not used	who returned incomplete surveys was not used
Weighting Data	N/A	N/A	A rim weighting approach was used to adjust the data for differential survey response rate across age groups and by educational attainment, gender and geographic location	A rim weighting approach was used to adjust the data for differential survey response rate across age groups and by educational attainment, gender and geographic location

Spheres of Agreement

The Australian WVS statistics discussed in this section relate to facets of Modernisation theory accordant with my Homogenisation arguments. Here, evidence corroborating Inglehart and Welzel's thesis also strengthened my own. Australian WVS statistical findings of rising feelings of autonomy (as shown in Figures 3.1 and 3.2) and rates of university degree attainment (as demonstrated by Figures 3.3 and 3.4) as well as declines in manual, as opposed to cognitive, employment (as illustrated by Figure 3.5), are consistent with Modernisation thesis. Inglehart and Welzel deem feelings of autonomy to be the primary driving force behind the survival-to-self-expression values transformation in post-industrial societies.[318] As a society's economy develops from industrial to post-industrial there are increased demands for a more skilled and educated workforce suitable for thinking professions, rather than manual jobs which become automated. Consequently, government and communities encourage individuals, particularly youth, to undergo higher education.[319] People with more economic opportunities, and stimulating/creative careers, and who have had longer formal education exposure, are likely to feel greater autonomy over their lives than those with fewer opportunities, blue-collar jobs and no university qualifications. Therefore, structural changes in the economy and rising levels of tertiary education

[318] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.24 & 28-30
[319] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.28 & 29

attainment have probably contributed to a rise in self-expression values. This will be tested and discussed in Chapters Four and Five.

[Responses to the following question were used to produce the graphs below.
"Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, while other people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them. Please use this scale where 1 means "none at all" and 10 means "a great deal" to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns out."]

Figure 3.1

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who rated their "feelings of autonomy" between 1 and 7 out of 10 i.e. feeling less autonomous



Figure 3.2

% of adult Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who rated their "feelings of autonomy" between 1 and 7 out of 10 i.e. feeling less autonomous. The X-axis indicates the average age of Australian WVS participants within generational cohorts.



[Responses to the following question were used to produce the graphs below.
What is the highest educational level that you have attained?
(use functional equivalent of the following, in given society;
IF STUDENT, CODE HIGHEST LEVEL HE/SHE EXPECTS TO COMPLETE):
1. No formal education
2. Incomplete primary school
3. Complete primary school
4. Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type
5. Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type
6. Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type
7. Complete secondary: university-preparatory type
8. Some university-level education, without degree
9. University-level education, with degree
0. DK/NA]

Figure 3.3

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who did not have a university degree.



Figure 3.4

% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who did not have a university degree. The X-axis indicates the average age of Australian WVS participants within generational cohorts.



[Responses to the following questions were used to produce the graphs below.
2005 Wave - Are the tasks you perform at work mostly manual or mostly cognitive? If you do not work currently, characterize your major work in the past. Use this scale where 1 means "mostly manual tasks" and 10 means "mostly cognitive tasks"

2012 Wave - Are the tasks you do at work mostly manual or mostly intellectual? If you do not work currently,
characterize your major work in the past. Use this scale where 1 means "mostly manual tasks" and 10 means "mostly intellectual tasks"
Answers of between 1 and 5 were deemed mainly manual.]

Figure 3.5

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups whose work required undertaking mainly manual (as opposed to cognitive/intellectual) type tasks.



Inglehart and Welzel argue that as post-industrial societies modernise they experience generational increases in liberal/autonomy and egalitarian "self-expression" values and a reduction in conservative, hierarchical, intolerant, tribal, conformity "survival" attitudes.[320] That is, preindustrial and industrial societies typically have rejected divorce, homosexuality and contraception and taken a pro-life stance on abortion, euthanasia and suicide.[321] They also tend to place greater emphasis on religion, the nation-state and respect for authority.[322] This is often manifested through intolerance towards other religious and national communities, an isolationist worldview, trade protectionism and unquestioning obedience to authority figures.[323] This is because conformity, hierarchy and the traditional

[320] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 25, 33, 45, 54, 95, 126, 142, 143, 152 & 273
[321] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.7, 8 & 52
[322] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.22, 27 & 52
[323] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.52 & 54

family is deemed crucial to survival in the early stages of modernisation.[324] Early stages are less conducive than later stages to 'human flourishing' which usually requires physical security, material well-being, intellectual stimulation and career and social opportunities.[325]

Those born into contexts more conducive to human flourishing than were their elders, will be keen to devote relatively more time and economic, intellectual and social resources to improving aspects of life not directly related to survival.[326] Thus, they will, relative to their elders, place greater emphasis on science, learning, egalitarianism and autonomy over theology, hierarchy and conformity.[327] They will tend to celebrate and embrace, rather than fear and reject, difference and individuality.[328] Still, Inglehart and Welzel maintain that major events that reduce living standards and raise uncertainty (such as war and economic recession) can induce modest temporary increases in the emphasis placed on survival (as opposed to self-expression) values.[329]

Contrastingly, Putnam holds that generational shifts toward greater liberalism, tolerance and egalitarianism have not occurred in the post-Baby Boomer generations. However, Putnam does not question that social attitudes have become more liberal since the post-war period. According to Putnam's thesis, the proportion of Americans with more liberal and egalitarian views has increased, as the more socially conservative pre-Boomer (Greatest and Silent) generations have become a smaller proportion of the public. He contends that where post-Boomer generational changes have occurred they have been modest and frequently in the direction of less tolerant and accepting social attitudes due to declines in overall levels of social capital.[330] In Putnam's words:

> Something in the first half of the twentieth century made successive cohorts of Americans more tolerant, but that generational engine failed to produce further increases in tolerance among those born in the second half of the century. The late X'ers are no more tolerant than the early boomers … By contrast, something happened in America in

[324] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.52
[325] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.1-4, 23-25, 28 & 29
[326] Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.33, 34 37, 52, 54, 104, 105 & 273
[327] Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.37, 126 & 137
[328] Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.2, 3, 7, 8, 34, 54, 126-130, 142, 143 & 273
[329] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.4 & 102
[330] Putnam, *Bowling Alone,* p.352 & 355-360

> the second half of the twentieth century to make people less civically engaged. The late X'ers are a lot less engaged than the early boomers.[331]

[Responses to the following question were used to produce the graphs below.
How proud are you to be Australian?
1 Very proud
2 Quite proud
3 Not very proud
4 Not at all proud
5 Don't know]

Figure 3.6

% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who indicated being "very proud" of their nationality (as opposed to "quite proud", "not very proud", "not proud at all" and N/A). The X-axis indicates the average age of Australian WVS participants within generational cohorts.



Figure 3.7

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who indicated being "very proud" of their nationality (as opposed to "quite proud", "not very proud", "not proud at all" and N/A).

[331] Putnam, *Bowling Alone,* p.355-357



Participant responses regarding tolerance, national pride and attitudes on social issues, tend to support Modernisation thesis over Lamentation theory. Figure 3.6 shows that (except for Millennials in their mid-20s) every generational cohort since the Greatest generation has expressed less national pride (which Inglehart and Welzel link to survival values)[332] than had the previous generation at the same age. Furthermore, Figure 3.7 indicates that in the waves between 1981 and 2005 there were consistent reductions in levels of national pride among all age groups. However, between 2005 and 2012 modest increases in levels of national pride were revealed among all age demographics. There are period specific reasons, unrelated to general shifts between survival and self-expression values, that may possibly explain this apparent anomaly. For example, the 2012 WVS wave was conducted in Australia between the months of August and October. That is, during and immediately following the summer Olympics. Given how integral sport is to Australian culture and identity it is plausible that the Olympics amplified Australian national consciousness during the period in which data was collected.

Likewise, period specific reasons that are unrelated to overall shifts between survival and self-expression values may account for a spike in anti-foreign worker sentiment between 2005 and 2012. The question assessing attitudes toward the employment of "local," rather than "foreign," workers when jobs are scarce was asked in all but the 1981 wave. Still, Figure

[332] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.52, 54, 142 & 143

3.8 indicates liberal and egalitarian attitude shifts among all but the 18 to 34 age demographic between 1995 and 2005. The rise of anti-foreign worker sentiment among youth during this period was very slim; only 1.3 percentage points. However, between 2005 and 2012 significant increases occurred in antiforeign worker sentiment among each age group: between 5.4 and 11 percentage points.

Australian unemployment and underemployment were higher in 2012 than they were in 2005.[333] In the twelve years prior to 2005 the Australian unemployment rate declined from 11% to 5% while the underemployment rate remained stable at 7%. However, since 2008 these rates have been trending upwards.[334] Youth have been severely affected by these patterns. Between 2008 and 2012 youth unemployment grew from 9% to 12% and youth underemployment increased from 12% to 16%.[335] Furthermore, the number of temporary foreign workers in Australia (on 457 visas) more than doubled between 2005 and 2012.[336] It is possible that trends in rates of unemployment and underemployment combined with more temporary foreign workers heightened levels of anti-foreign worker sentiment among Australian citizens who either were, or knew significant others, struggling to find enough work. Thus, despite an increase in national pride and anti-foreign worker sentiment between 2005 and 2012, these statistics may not reflect a general shift from self-expression to survival values. Consequently, they may be consistent with Modernisation theory.

[Responses to the following question were used to produce the graphs below.
When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to Australian people over immigrants.
1 Agree
2 Neither agree or disagree
3 Disagree]

[333] Swanger, Craig. (2015) 'Australia's underemployment rate at 8.4%', *The WIRE,* viewed 19 September 2018, http://thewire.fiig.com.au/article/2015/09/28/underemployment-rate-at-8.4
[334] Swanger, 'Australia's underemployment rate at 8.4%', http://thewire.fiig.com.au/article/2015/09/28/underemployment-rate-at-8.4
[335] Colgan, Paul. (2017) 'CHART: Youth underemployment is now at the highest level ever recorded in Australia', *BUSINESS INSIDER AUSTRALIA,* viewed 19 September 2018, https://www.businessinsider.com.au/chart-youth-underemployment-is-now-at-the-highest-level-ever-recorded-in-australia-2017-3; ABC NEWS, (2014) 'Youth unemployment rate', *RMIT ABC Fact Check,* viewed 19 September 2018, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-12-10/youth-unemployment-rate-chart/5956704
[336] Pash, Chris. (2017) 'CHART: Almost 1.3 million people have come to Australia on 457 work visas over the last 20 years', *BUSINESS INSIDER AUSTRALIA,* viewed 19 September 2018, https://www.businessinsider.com.au/chart-almost-1-3-million-people-have-come-to-australia-on-457-work-visas-over-the-last-20-years-2017-4

Figure 3.8

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who agreed that when jobs are scarce employers should employ people of local (not foreign) nationality.



Figure 3.9

% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who agreed that when jobs are scarce employers should employ people of local (not foreign) nationality.



Putnam's Lamentation thesis, in which generations are assumed to have been no more liberal than the early Boomers, is also supported by data relating to anti-foreign worker sentiment. As Figure 3.9 demonstrates Boomers have the greatest tolerance toward foreign workers, while Millennials are the least tolerant generation. However, the relative intolerance of Millennials may have more to do with their relative bargaining power in the workplace. The jobs, pay and conditions of younger workers in relatively unskilled employment are perhaps at greater risk from foreign workers than those of older people with more established careers.

Similarly, in 1995, 2005 and 2012, questions were asked assessing people's attitudes toward the right of women to work relative to men when jobs are scarce. Responses illustrated by Figures 3.10 and 3.11 demonstrate clear generational attitude shifts. That is, the older the age group/generation and the earlier the survey wave the more inclined participants were to believe women have less right to work, than men, when jobs are scarce. The one exception being that Millennials were slightly less egalitarian regarding this issue than were Xers in 2005. However, they became more egalitarian than Xers in 2012. Therefore, both generational replacement and intra-generational change appear to be significant drivers of more egalitarian gender workplace attitudes. These generational and period trends are stark with 56.5% of the Greatest Generation in 1995 believing that men had more right to work than women when jobs are scarce, compared to only 2.5% of Millennials in 2012. However, the inter-generational gap narrowed significantly between 2005 and 2012 due to rapid change in attitudes among older generations.

[Responses to the following question were used to produce the graphs below.
When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.
1 Agree
2 Neither agree or disagree
3 Disagree]

Figure 3.10

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who agreed that when jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.



Figure 3.11

% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who agreed that when jobs and scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.



These Australian-based statistics are consistent with Modernisation theory. That is, as people become increasingly educated and physically/financially secure during the post-industrial phase of modernisation they (but particularly younger generations) place more

emphasis on self-expression (as opposed to survival) values. Self-expression values include autonomy and egalitarianism whereas survival values require the fulfilment of familial and community obligations, procreation within an enduring nuclear family unit, as well as conformity to traditional gender roles and one's place within the social hierarchy. These statistics are at odds with Putnam's argument that generational value shifts toward greater liberalism, tolerance and egalitarianism have not taken place since the early Boomers.

Further evidence supporting Modernisation, but contradicting Lamentation, theses was found in the attitudes of Australians concerning, the traditional family, gender roles, and the justifiability of homosexuality and euthanasia. Views pertaining to 'whether children require both a mother and a father to grow up happy' and 'whether women need children to be fulfilled' were employed to assess attitudes regarding the 'traditional family' and 'gender roles'. The responses of younger age groups and generations tended to be more liberal and egalitarian than older age demographics and cohorts within each wave, and the responses within each age group and generation tended to become more liberal and egalitarian with each successive wave.

However, Figure 3.13 shows that between 1995 and 2005 there appears to have been little to no intra-generational change in attitudes toward children being raised without both a mother and father. This question was not asked in the 2012 wave. Also, Figure 3.19 indicates that Generation X tended to be more conservative regarding the issue of voluntary euthanasia than both the Silent generation in 1980 and Boomer generation in 1980 and 1995. Furthermore, this graph shows that in 2005 the Silent generation was more conservative than the Greatest generation, and Millennials were more conservative than Boomers and Xers. Still, these anomalies may be explained by life-cycle factors. Younger people are less likely than older persons to have been exposed to the harsh realities of aging and terminal illness. Being confronted by these realities and their own mortality may encourage persons previously opposed to voluntary euthanasia to reconsider their beliefs on this matter as they age.

Therefore, it is possible that an inter-generational shift toward more liberal attitudes on euthanasia may have occurred despite some younger cohorts being more conservative

than their elders at given points in time. Indeed, Figure 3.20 clearly shows that every cohort since the Greatest generation has expressed more liberal attitudes toward euthanasia than had the previous generation at a similar age. These results support the Modernisation thesis that as post-industrial societies technologically and economically advance there is a generational shift in emphasis from conservative survival to liberal and egalitarian self-expression values. Contrastingly, these statistics run counter to Putnam's Lamentation thesis which holds that Boomers are at least as liberal as successive generational cohorts.

[Responses to the following question were used to produce the graphs below.
If someone says children need a home with both a father and a mother to grow up happily, would you tend to agree or disagree?
1 Tend to agree
2 Tend to disagree
V Don't know]

Figure 3.12

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who tended to agree that children need both a mother and father to grow up happily.



Figure 3.13

% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who tended to agree that children need both a mother and father to grow up happily.



[Responses to the following question were used to produce the graphs below.
Do you think that a woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled or is this not necessary?
1 Needs children
2 Not necessary
V Don't know]

Figure 3.14

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who believed women need children to be fulfilled.



Figure 3.15

% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who believed women need children to be fulfilled.



[Responses to the following question were used to produce the graphs below.
Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified or something in between, where 1 is never justified and 10 is always justified.

- Claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled
- Avoiding a fare on public transport
- Stealing property
- Cheating on taxes if you have the chance
- Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties
- Homosexuality
- Prostitution
- Abortion
- Divorce
- Sex before marriage
- Suicide
- Euthanasia (terminating the life of the incurably sick)
- For a man to beat his wife
- Parents beating children
- Violence against other people]

Figure 3.16

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who tended to believe that homosexuality is unjustifiable (providing a justifiability rating of 1-5 out of 10).



Figure 3.17

% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who tended to believe that homosexuality is unjustifiable (providing a justifiability rating of 1-5 out of 10).



Figure 3.18

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who tended to believe that voluntary euthanasia is unjustifiable (providing a justifiability rating of 1-5 out of 10).



Figure 3.19

% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who tended to believe that voluntary euthanasia is unjustifiable (providing a justifiability rating of 1-5 out of 10).



Figure 3.20

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who tended to believe that voluntary euthanasia is unjustifiable (providing a justifiability rating of 1-5 out of 10). The X-axis indicates the average age of Australian WVS participants within generational cohorts.



Similar, but not entirely identical generational and period patterns can be found in attitudes toward abortion, divorce, and sex before marriage. However, the Silent generation was more conservative than the Greatest generation regarding the issues of abortion and divorce in the 2005 and 2012 waves. Additionally, Millennials were more conservative than Boomers and Xers in 2005 and became more conservative than all other generations tested in 2012 on the issue of Divorce. Figure 3.21 suggests that every generation except Millennials became slightly more conservative regarding abortion between 2005 and 2012 and Figure 3.23 indicates that the Greatest and Millennial generations became more conservative on the issue of divorce during that same period. Despite these anomalies generational value shifts toward greater liberalism have undoubtedly occurred before and since the Boomers. Indeed, Figures 3.21 and 3.23 show that not only have the Silent and Greatest generations been consistently more conservative regarding the issues of abortion and divorce than the Boomers, the Boomers have been consistently more conservative than Xers. Furthermore, Figures 3.22 and 3.24 illustrate that each cohort has been more liberal regarding the issues of

abortion and divorce than was the previous generation at a similar age. This is relevant because abortion and divorce are largely undertaken by certain age demographics.

Figure 3.21

% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who tended to believe that abortion is unjustifiable (providing a justifiability rating of 1-5 out of 10).



Figure 3.22

% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who tended to believe that abortion is unjustifiable (providing a justifiability rating of 1-5 out of 10). The X-axis indicates the average age of Australian WVS participants within generational cohorts.



Figure 3.23

% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who tended to believe that divorce is unjustifiable (providing a justifiability rating of 1-5 out of 10).



Figure 3.24

% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who tended to believe that divorce is unjustifiable (providing a justifiability rating of 1-5 out of 10). The

X-axis indicates the average age of Australian WVS participants within generational cohorts.



Although participants were asked about the justifiability of sex before marriage only in the 2012 wave, younger people and generations tended to be more liberal on this issue than older people and cohorts. However, there was no significant difference between the attitudes of the 18 to 34 and 35 to 49 demographics, nor between the X and Millennial generations. Still, both Millennials and Xers, located predominantly in the 18 to 34 and 35 to 49 demographics respectively, reported more liberal attitudes on the issue of sex before marriage than the Boomers: mainly in the 50 to 64 age group. This may be due to either age or generational effects. However, it is consistent with other previously discussed statistics indicating that generational value shifts toward greater liberalism have occurred in the generations following the Boomers, thereby undermining Putnam's Lamentation theory.

Figure 3.25

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who tended to believe that sex before marriage is unjustifiable (providing a justifiability rating of 1-5 out of 10).



Figure 3.26

% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who tended to believe that sex before marriage is unjustifiable (providing a justifiability rating of 1-5 out of 10).



The values participants thought most important for children to learn also largely support Modernisation theory. Statistics drawn from the Australian WVS data indicate that the level of importance placed on children learning independence, imagination and tolerance

and respect for others, rose within each age demographic and generational cohort both between the 1981 and 1995, and between 1995 and 2005 waves. However, the graphs below demonstrate that there was a slowing or slight reversal of this shift in value emphases between the 2005 and 2012 waves within both age demographics and generational cohorts. Additionally, Figures 3.28, 3.30 and 3.32 clearly show that each generation has tended to place greater importance on children learning independence, imagination and tolerance and respect for others than had previous cohorts at a similar age; indicating a possible generational shift in value emphases. Controlling for age is salient because the degree of importance that a person places on children learning specific lessons and values may be significantly influenced by life-cycle factors such as parenthood and grandparenthood.

[Responses to the following questions were used to produce the graphs below.
Here is a list of qualities which children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important? Please choose up to five.

- Independence
- Hard work
- Feeling of responsibility
- Imagination
- Tolerance and respect for other people
- Thrift, saving money and things
- Determination, perseverance
- Religious faith
- Unselfishness
- Obedience
- Self-expression]

Figure 3.27

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who believed it was important for children to learn independence.



Figure 3.28

% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who believed it was important for children to learn independence. The X-axis indicates the average age of Australian WVS participants within generational cohorts.



Figure 3.29

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who believed it was important for children to learn imagination.



Figure 3.30

% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who believed it was important for children to learn imagination. The X-axis indicates the average age of Australian WVS participants within generational cohorts.



Figure 3.31

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who believed it was important for children to learn tolerance and respect for others.



Figure 3.32

% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who believed it was important for children to learn tolerance and respect for others. The X-axis indicates the average age of Australian WVS participants within generational cohorts.



Emphasis on the importance of children learning independence, imagination and tolerance and respect for others is associated with self-expression values. Familial and community obligations are less essential for survival and well-being in contexts conducive to

human flourishing than they are in relatively harsh technological, physical, political, social and economic environments. Consequently, Modernisation theory contends that when conditions become more conducive to human flourishing societies experience a shift away from survival and toward self-expression values. These self-expression values emphasise:

- independence over obligations and inter-dependence,
- imagination over intolerance and conformity, and
- tolerance and respect for members of out-groups over strict loyalty to, and enforcement of, gender, religious, ethnic and national norms and customs.

Hence, the statistics described in the previous paragraph are consistent with the Modernisation thesis. They suggest that between 1981 and 2005, during a period of rising living standards and educational attainment, the emphasis on instilling self-expression values in children (and thus on self-expression values) increased dramatically. However, (as previously mentioned) between 2008 and when Australian 2012 WVS data was collected general and youth unemployment and underemployment rose significantly.[337] This may explain the rise in emphasis placed on certain survival values between the 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves. This rise in certain survival values was particularly acute among the young. These results are consistent with the Modernisation thesis. That is, while generally self-expression values rise and survival values fall in advancing post-industrial societies, adverse changes in social, political and economic context can precipitate a temporary increase/spike in survival values.

These statistics also support the Modernisationist argument that the value orientations of young people, are particularly sensitive to changing contextual environments, and that value orientations solidify during, and remained relatively constant post, one's formative years. Indeed, the statistics assessing the level of importance placed on children

[337] Swanger, Craig. (2015) 'Australia's underemployment rate at 8.4%', *The WIRE,* viewed 19 September 2018, http://thewire.fiig.com.au/article/2015/09/28/underemployment-rate-at-8.4; Colgan, Paul. (2017) 'CHART: Youth underemployment is now at the highest level ever recorded in Australia', *BUSINESS INSIDER AUSTRALIA,* viewed 19 September 2018, https://www.businessinsider.com.au/chart-youth-underemployment-is-now-at-the-highest-level-ever-recorded-in-australia-2017-3; ABC NEWS, (2014) 'Youth unemployment rate', *RMIT ABC Fact Check,* viewed 19 September 2018, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-12-10/youth-unemployment-rate-chart/5956704

learning imagination are evidence of generational replacement playing a particularly significant role in value change.

Figure 3.33

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who believed it was important for children to learn self-expression.



Figure 3.34

% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who believed it was important for children to learn self-expression.



The question assessing the level of importance placed by participants on children learning self-expression was asked only in the 2012 wave. Still, the statistics generated from responses to this question reveal that participants within younger age groups and generations tended to place more importance on children learning self-expression than did those in older age demographics and cohorts. This is consistent with, but not necessarily indicative of, survival-to-self-expression value change through generational replacement. Furthermore, Figure 3.32 showing that each generation has placed greater importance on children learning tolerance and respect for others than has the previous cohort at a similar age conflicts with Putnam's Lamentation theory, in which he maintains that there have been no post-Baby Boomer generational increases in liberal and egalitarian attitudes.

Statistics revealing levels of importance placed by participants on children learning religious faith across the five generational cohorts and four survey waves, also indicate generational declines. While these results do not weaken any, they are consistent with each of the three theories being critically examined and assessed in this work. Consequently, they help erode the argument that a fourth yet to be articulated thesis is necessary.

Within waves younger generations placed less importance on children learning religious faith than did older demographics with one exception. Millennials in 2005 tended to place significantly more importance on children learning religious faith than did Xers. Figure

3.35 indicates that intra-generational change has not been a factor driving Australian secularisation. Instead, these statistics suggest that declining religiosity in Australia is a generational rather than period trend. Although Figures 3.35 and 3.36 may initially appear to suggest that religiosity among Millennials is in decline, these statistics can be explained by the survey responses of younger Millennials (who were not yet 18 in 2005) being used from the 2012 wave. Only Reponses from persons 18 years and older were considered. Additionally, Figure 3.36 reveals that the importance place on children learning religious faith among each generation was significantly less than that placed by the previous cohort at a similar age. Therefore, the common finding that people become more religious as they age[338] cannot explain the generational variation in survey responses regarding this matter. These statistics suggest that, every generational cohort surveyed has placed less importance on children learning religious faith and therefore probably less importance on religious faith, than did the cohort immediately preceding them.

Figure 3.35

% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who believed it was important for children to learn religious faith.

[338] Bengtson, Vern, L., Putney, Norella, M., Silverstein, Merril and Harris, Susan, C. (2015) 'Does Religiousness Increase with Age? Age Changes and Generational Differences Over 35 Years', *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion,* vol:54(2), p.375; Argue, Amy., Johnson, David, R and White, Lynn, K. (1999) 'Age and religiosity: Evidence from a three – wave panel analysis', *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion,* vol:38(3), p.423-435; Krause, Neal. (2008) *Aging in the religious: How social relationships affect health,* Templeton Foundation Press, Conshohocken, Pennsylvania



Figure 3.36

% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who believed it was important for children to learn religious faith. The X-axis indicates the average age of Australian WVS participants within generational cohorts.



Inglehart and Welzel argue that when living standards, life expectancy and access to adequate welfare and health-care provision improve, emphasis on survival values wane,

particularly through generational replacement.[339] Consequently, people are less concerned with having children and large families to care for them in old age, and are less inclined to view marriage as a necessary agreement entered primarily for mutual support and protection. Instead, family structures are increasingly considered a matter of choice, and marriage is deemed an expression of personal sentiment. Hence, declining fertility rates and a rise in the average age at which people are married are consistent with Modernisation theory.

These patterns are revealed in statistics drawn from Australian WVS data. When controlling for age these statistics indicate that since the Silent generation there have been generational increases in both the proportion of Australians who had two or fewer children and the proportion of Australians under 60 who were childless. Additionally, there was a continual rise in the proportion of childless people across each wave among all but the 65+ age demographic. There was a decline among this age group between 1981 and 1995 and between the 1995 and 2005 waves.

[Responses to the following question were used to produce the graphs below.
Have you had any children?
0 No children
1 One child
2 Two children
3 Three children
4 Four children
5 Five children
6 Six children
7 Seven children
8 Eight or more children]

Figure 3.37

% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who indicated having two or fewer children. The X-axis indicates the average age of Australian WVS participants within generational cohorts.

[339] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.5-7, 24, 25, 28, 29, 34, 52, 54, 98, 99, 118, 126, 138 & 273



Figure 3.38

% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who indicated having no children. The X-axis indicates the average age of Australian WVS participants within generational cohorts.



Figure 3.39

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who indicated having no children.



These statistics would suggest that the Silent generation tended to have more children (the Baby Boomers) than did their parents and descendants. The harsh economic and physical reality and insecurity of the years following the great depression and during the Second World War would have left an indelible mark on this cohort in youth. According to Modernisation theory, these events would have inflated the emphasis on survival values during the Silent generation's formative years. As survival values are associated with having larger families Australian WVS statistics are consistent with the arguments of Inglehart and Welzel. Each successive generation born during the near continuous rise in Australian living standards since World War II, have probably placed greater emphasis on self-expression, and less on survival values than the previous cohort. These trends are reflected in changing fertility rates.

Similar trends are evident in secular declines in the proportion of 18 to 34-year-olds married or living together in a defacto marriage, since the young Boomers in the 1981 wave. However, young Australians are merely delaying, not abandoning, the institution of marriage. Figure 3.40 illustrates that the proportion of 35 to 49-year-olds married or in de facto relationships rose by 5.5 percentage points between the 2005 and 2012 waves from 73.9 to 79.4%. Figure 3.41 shows that every cohort since the Silent generation has been delaying the age at which they marry. However, by their early to mid-40s slightly more Gen Xers were married or in defacto marriages than were Boomers at the same age. Additionally, Figure

3.41 reveals that since the Greatest generation there have been generational increases in the proportion of older Australians (past the age of 55) who are married or in defacto marriages. This suggests that marriages are lasting further into old age as the proportion of widows and widowers has shrunk due to increases in health and life expectancy. These statistics are consistent with the Modernisation argument that social and familial connections are becoming increasingly driven by choice, not necessity and obligation. That is, young people today have more time to search for 'true love' than did young people decades ago who tended to face greater pressure by family, community and economic circumstance to commit to a life partner at a younger age.

[Responses to the following question were used to produce the graphs below.
Are you currently:
1 Married
2 Living together as married
3 Divorced
4 Separated
5 Widowed
6 Single]

Figure 3.40

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who indicated being either "married" or "living together as married".



Figure 3.41

% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who indicated being either "married" or "living together as married". The X-axis indicates the average age of Australian WVS participants within generational cohorts.



Inglehart and Welzel contend that rates of informal/unconventional political engagement are rising, whereas Putnam holds that all forms of involvement (including atomised activity such as participating in boycotts,[340] petition signing and writing letters to politicians) are in secular decline.[341] The Australian WVS statistics consistently uncover rising rates of unconventional political activity between 2005 and 2012. These include petition signing, joining boycotts and attending peaceful/lawful demonstrations in the previous five years. Unfortunately, these questions concerning recent unconventional political activity were not asked in the 1981 and 1995 waves. This places limitations on what informal political engagement trends can be surmised. However, the results clearly disprove Putnam's argument that rates of informal political activity are in secular decline.

Rates of participation in boycotts in the previous five years grew from 13.4% to 90.3% among 18 to 34-year-olds, 15.9% to 47.4% among 35 to 49-year-olds, 10.2% to 49.4% among

[340] Smith, Mark, K. (2001, 2007) 'Robert Putnam, social capital and civic community', *the encyclopaedia of informal education,* viewed 21 September 2018, http://infed.org/mobi/robert-putnam-social-capital-and-civic-community/

[341] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.44, 116, 117 & 294; Putnam, *Bowling Alone,* p.27, 41-46, 55, 60-63, 80-86, 115 & 264-266

50 to 64-year-olds, and 7.3% to 60.0% among the 65+ age demographic. They also rose among each generational cohort, from 8.5% to 100% among the Greatest generation, 7.1% to 76.5% among the Silent generation, 12.3% to 47.3% among Boomers, 15.2% to 52.6% among Xers and 11% to 91.3% among Millennials. The rates of those who attended peaceful lawful demonstrations grew from 17.8% to 62.1% among 18 to 34-year-olds, 17.1% to 48.5% among 35 to 49-year-olds, 14.3% to 52.6% among 50 to 64-year-olds and 11.3% to 51.6% among those aged 65+. They also rose from 14.9% to 50% among the Greatest generation, 10.9% to 51.4% among the Silent generation, 15.8% to 53.6% among Boomers, 16.9% to 45.6% among Xers and 17.6% to 73.9% among Millennials. The rise in rates of petition signing were less dramatic but still significant. They increased from 74.7% to 89.3% among 18 to 34-year-olds, 75.4% to 76.4% among both 35 to 49 and 50 to 64-year-olds and 62.6% to 75.2% among those 65+. They also rose from 47.1% to 66.7% among the Greatest generation, 65.5% to 74.8% among the Silent generation, 74.2% to 77.9% among Xers and 72.5% to 92.9% among Millennials. However, rates of petition signing among Boomers fell slightly between 2005 and 2012 from 77.7% to 75.7%.

[Responses to the following question were used to produce the graphs below.
Have you or have you not done any of these activities in the last five years?
Signing a petition
Joining in boycotts
Attending peaceful demonstrations]

Figure 3.42

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who had joined in a boycott in previous 5 years.



Figure 3.43

% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who had joined in a boycott in previous 5 years.



Figure 3.44

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who had attended a peaceful/lawful demonstration in the previous 5 years.



Figure 3.45

% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who had attended a peaceful/lawful demonstration in the previous 5 years.



Figure 3.46

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who had signed a petition in the previous 5 years.



Figure 3.47

% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who had signed a petition in the previous 5 years.



Significantly, rates of informal political engagement grew more sharply among the young than other demographics. This indicates that these trends may be in part generational: consistent with Modernisation theory. The results also reveal that unconventional political activity rose within generational cohorts, not just between them.

Although the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were more politically charged in 2005 than they were in 2012, there were several period specific reasons why individuals engaged more in unconventional political activity in the years prior to 2012 than prior to 2005. In the five years prior to 2012 Australians faced massive declines in their retirement savings, unpopular Mining Tax policies and unkept promises from what many considered to be an unstable Rudd/Gillard/Rudd government.[342] Notably, the promise to forgo introducing a carbon tax was abandoned.[343] These and other events and threats may have motivated unconventional political action among those previously politically passive and disengaged. Furthermore, evidence suggests that increased social media and internet usage across all age demographics, may have contributed to the dramatic rise in political consumerism and demonstrations by enabling faster dissemination of news content and easier coordination of activities.[344]

Divergence from Modernization

Australian WVS data pertaining to components of Modernisation theory that are harmonious with my Homogenisation arguments were examined in the previous section. These included shifting education, employment and familial demographics, levels of subjectively sensed autonomy, value orientations and informal/unconventional political engagement. This evidence bolstered both theses. Additionally, the statistics concerning shifting value orientations and unconventional political participation weakened Lamentation arguments, at least in the Australian context.

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[342] Financial Services Council (2009), *Superannuation in the context of the global financial crises: Superannuation Stakeholder Joint Communique 3rd February 2009,* viewed 9 February 2017, http://www.fsc.org.au/downloads/uploaded/2009_0119_SuperannuationStakeholder_CommuniqueFINAL_93ad.pdf; Shanahan, Dennis. (2010) 'Kevin Rudd to backflip on mining tax rate', *The Australian,* viewed 9 February 2017, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/in-depth/kevin-rudd-to-backflip-on-mining-tax-rate/news-story/8530ecc0ca967915f3bf890a70ecf467

[343] Alexander, Cathey. (2014) 'Porkies: the biggest broken promises in Australian politics', *Crikey,* viewed 9 February 2017, https://www.crikey.com.au/2014/05/21/porkies-the-biggest-broken-promises-in-australian-politics/

[344] Gotlieb, Melissa, R and Cheema, Sadia, E. (2017) 'From consumer to producer: motivations, internet use, and political consumerism', *Information, Communication & Society,* vol:20(4), p.582; Enjolras, Bernard., Steen-Johnsen, Kari and Wollebaek, Dag. (2012) 'Social media and mobilization to offline demonstrations:Transcending participatory divides?', *New Media & Society,* vol:15(6), p.890-908; *Sensis* (2017) 'Sensis Social Media Report 2017: Chapter 1 – Australians and social media', viewed 11 March 2018, https://www.sensis.com.au/asset/PDFdirectory/Sensis_Social_Media_Report_2017-Chapter-1.pdf

This next portion of Chapter Three investigates trends in levels of political interest as well as participation and confidence in formal organisations and institutions. Patterns incompatible with Modernisation and Lamentation theses are unearthed. They indicate the existence of a sociological context of ideologically and recreationally homogenising networks; supporting my Homogenisation theory.

Both Modernisationists and Lamentationists argue that confidence in society's major institutions and organisations is in decline. Modernisationists suggest that these trends may place pressure on elites to govern in ways more representative of the people they serve, and are hence conducive to democracy.[345] Conversely, Lamentationists argue that these declines in confidence have a negative impact on rates of political participation and accountability.[346] Neither theoretical position is supported by the Australian WVS data. Indeed, the only institutions that have suffered consistent declines in confidence since 1981 across all age demographics were churches and religious institutions. The statistics also indicate that confidence in political parties may have declined generationally. However, these statistics (drawn from Australian WVS data) suggest no other secular or ongoing generational declines in formal group/organisational/institutional confidence.[347]

Figure 3.48 indicates that churches and religious organisations experienced secular declines in confidence among each of the four age groups over the four waves. Within each wave younger age groups tended to have less confidence in churches/religious organisations than older age demographics. The exceptions were the 18 to 34 and 35 to 49 age groups which had near identical levels of confidence in religious organisations in both the 2005 and 2012 waves. Figure 3.49 shows that within each wave younger generations have tended to have less confidence in churches and religious organisations than their more senior cohorts. Furthermore, Figure 3.50 illustrates how each successive generation has had less confidence in churches and religious organisations than the previous cohort had at a similar age. This is salient because attitudes toward religion are affected by life-cycle factors.[348] These statistics

[345] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.44, 116-118, 157, 158, 223, 251-253, 271 & 294
[346] Putnam, *Bowling Alone,* p.22, 47, 136, 137 & 347
[347] See Appendices 1-15
[348]

suggest that generational replacement has played a significant role in declining confidence in churches and religious organisations.

[Responses to the following question were used to produce the graphs below.
For each type of organisation, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?

- Churches
- The armed forces
- The press
- Television
- Labour unions
- The police
- The courts
- The government in Canberra
- Political parties
- Parliament
- The civil service
- Universities]

Figure 3.48

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who indicated having "a great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in churches/religious organisations.



Figure 3.49

% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who indicated having "a great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in churches/religious organisations.



Figure 3.50

% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who indicated having "a great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in churches/religious organisations. The X-axis indicates the average age of Australian WVS participants within generational cohorts.



Likewise, changes in levels of public confidence in political parties may well be indicative of generational shifts. Questions regarding confidence in political parties were not

asked in 1981. Figure 3.51 shows that in 2005 and 2012 Millennials had greater confidence in political parties than other cohorts. However, this does not mean that confidence in political parties has increased generationally. Figure 3.52 suggests that the initial confidence exhibited by Millennials in 2005 may be explained by their youth and lack of political knowledge. Indeed, by 2012 Millennials had the same level of confidence in political parties that Xers had at a similar age. However, Figure 3.52 does indicate that confidence in political parties may have declined generationally between the Greatest and Boomer generations. Furthermore, Boomers and Xers have a similar level of confidence in political parties that has remained low and relatively stable. Contrastingly, significant declines have occurred among the Greatest and Silent generations suggesting that declining confidence in political parties among older Australians is both an inter-and-intra-generational trend. Overall the statistics drawn from Australian WVS data suggest that the only major formal institutions/organisations to have suffered generational declines in confidence were religious institutions/organisations and political parties.

Figure 3.51

% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who indicated having "a great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in political parties.



Figure 3.52

% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who indicated having "a great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in political parties. The X-axis indicates the average age of Australian WVS participants within generational cohorts.



This evidence conflicts with Putnam's Lamentation and Inglehart and Welzel's Modernisation theories which contend that confidence in all, or most, formal groups/organisations should be in generational decline.[349] However, these survey findings may indicate a sociological context of ideologically and recreationally homogenising networks. Inglehart and Welzel identified a trend toward greater social modularity brought about by individual-empowering patterns. These include technological and economic advance, welfare-state development, rising levels of tertiary education attainment and a generational shift from survival to self-expression values orientation.[350] Consequently, people are at greater liberty to forge, maintain and sever interpersonal connections now, than in the past.[351] I argued in Chapter One, that these developments may be precipitating an homogenisation of social networks by enabling individuals to more easily find and connect with those with whom they share salient ideas, interests and attitudes. This hypothesis is in stark contrast to Modernisation theory and is based on research revealing that people are

[349] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.117 & 118; Putnam, *Bowling Alone,* p.47, 139-141, 265 & 347
[350] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.24, 28, 29, 257 & 262
[351] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.118

inclined to seek familiarity when establishing interpersonal relationships/friendships.[352] A generational trend toward greater homogeneity of views and interests within social networks may induce distrust of, and frustration and disillusionment with institutions and organisations that have diverse memberships or attempt to appeal to a heterogeneous population. This is because:

- the interests, views and beliefs held by members of these institutions and organisations often conflict, and
- younger people (with more ideologically homogenous networks) would tend to be less experienced in, and adverse to conflict, debate, negotiation and compromise than were their seniors at a similar age.

Furthermore, I concur with Inglehart and Welzel that younger generations are more disposed to distrusting, resenting and being suspicious of controlling and hierarchal/elite led institutions and organisations than are their elders.[353] This is due to younger generations in advancing post-industrial societies placing greater emphasis on self-expression and less weight on survival values than do their elders.[354] Though, I add that, groups with heterogeneous memberships probably tend to require more overt controls and management to maintain their functionality than do those with members sharing more (backgrounds, thoughts, concerns and priorities) in common.

These hypotheses would explain why the only institutions and organisations to suffer generational declines in confidence without recovery, according to the Australian WVS evidence, were churches/religious groups and political parties. This is because secular and non-political community, charitable and recreational formal organisations can more easily adapt their governing structure and membership compositions than can religious congregations/organisations or political parties. That is, they may have accommodated younger generations' self-expression (egalitarian and autonomy) value orientations and conflict, debate, negotiation and compromise aversion: a product of Social Network Homogenisation. This they may have achieved by multiplying into more groups with perhaps

[352] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.141, 142 & 294; Berschied, 'Interpersonal attraction'; Byrne, *The Attraction Paradigm*
[353] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.117, 118 & 250
[354] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.121-133

smaller but relatively more homogenous memberships and democratising their leadership selection and decision-making processes. I believe such adaptations can at least act as a tourniquet against further organisational confidence haemorrhaging, and may aid in the recovery of this formal group trust.

Conversely, religious organisations and political parties have greater difficulty making such reforms. The beliefs and practices and the leadership selection and decision-making processes of religious organisations, are usually steeped in traditions which many parishioners and clergy vigourously defend.[355] Consequently, most religious groups are resistant to democratisation and are unwilling to adapt to the modern liberal self-expression values held by a large and growing proportion of Australians and other post-industrial populations.[356] This disconnect between the teachings and governing practices of established religions and the values emphasised in post-industrial societies, has probably contributed to the escalating rise in distrust of religious institutions and organisations evidenced by Australian WVS data.

Leaders and governing bodies of political parties, fearing a loss of power and influence, are also resistant to democratisation of their party organisations.[357] However, unlike religious organisations, political parties are frequently willing to change, and adapt their policy positions, to maintain or secure office.[358] In contexts in which majoritarian rather

[355] Stewart, Cynthia. 'Leadership' in *Religion Library: Roman Catholicism,* on the Patheos Library Website, viewed 19 February 2017, http://www.patheos.com/Library/Roman-Catholicism/Ethics-Morality-Community/LeadershipClergy; *Anglican Church of Australia*, 'How is the Anglican Church Organised?', viewed 19 February 2017, http://www.anglican.org.au/home/about/students/Pages/how_is_the_anglican_church_organised.aspx

[356] Lisak, Marcin. (2012) 'Democratisation of a Hierarchical Religion: the Roman Catholic Church in the Time of a Credibility Crisis Caused by Sexual Abuse Misconduct', *Studia Religiologica,* vol:45(1), p.7-19; Haynes, Jeffrey. (2016). 'Religion and democratisation: what do we now know?', *Journal of Religious and Political Practice,* vol:2(2), p.267-272; Masci, David and Lipka, Michael. (2015) 'Where Christian Churches, other religions stand on gay marriage', *PewResearchCenter: FACTANK*, viewed 19 February 2017, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/12/21/where-christian-churches-stand-on-gay-marriage/; Masci, David. (2016) 'Where major religious groups stand on abortion', *PewResearchCenter: FACTANK*, viewed 19 February 2017, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/06/21/where-major-religious-groups-stand-on-abortion/

[357] Massola, James. (2015) 'Labor national conference: bid to let ALP members select senators fails', *The Sydney Morning Herald*, viewed 19 February 2017, http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/labor-national-conference-bid-to-let-alp-members-select-senators-fails-20150726-gikpuo.html; Albrechtsen, Janet. (2016) 'NSW Liberal Party membership lags world on democratisation', *The Weekend Australian* website, viewed 19 February 2017, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/inquirer/nsw-liberal-party-membership-lags-world-on-democratisation/news-story/81ddadce6351c277e7fb98e5d5e3caea

[358] Sheehan, Paul. (2013) 'Another backflip for Rudd, another win for Labor's whatever-it-takes ethos', *The Sydney Morning Herald*, viewed 19 February 2017, http://www.smh.com.au/comment/another-backflip-for-

than proportional electoral regimes are employed (such as Australian House of Representatives elections), this means attempting to appeal to a broad coalition of voters. In a societal context which is becoming both increasingly ideologically diverse (as argued in Chapter One) and more inexperienced with, and averse to, conflict and compromise (in large part due to generational network homogenisation), this is extraordinarily difficult. Consequently, confidence and willingness to identify with (much less join) political parties are waning generationally. These trends pertain particularly to traditional major parties which many believe are not sufficiently aligned with their own political views/persuasions to warrant their support.[359] Hence, my Homogenisation thesis holds that trust and confidence in religious organisations and political parties (rather than in formal organisations more generally) have greatly and generationally eroded without recovery.

Similar patterns to those influencing formal group 'confidence' have arguably affected rates of religious, political, recreational and other formal group 'involvement'. According to Homogenisation theory, rates of active engagement in all, or most, formal group types likely experienced an initial decline during the mid to late twentieth century. This was due to younger generations encountering pre-existing organisations that had not yet adapted to their desires and expectations. However, eventually these newer generations became a critical proportion of the adult population. In response secular and non-political formal organisations began to multiply into groups with perhaps smaller but relatively more homogenous memberships, and democratise their leadership selection and decision-making processes. These organisations included those focused on volunteering and recreational activities: sports, literature, music, art, drama and card, board, and computer games.

Numerous studies have indicated that in the United States (a post-industrial anglosphere democracy with which Australia shares many similarities) people have become less likely to encounter and interact with those whose ideological dispositions are

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rudd-another-win-for-labors-whateverittakes-ethos-20130724-2qjjn.html; Hutchens, Gareth. (2016) 'Superannuation backflip on $500,000 cap wins over coalition conservatives', *The Guardian*, viewed 19 February 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2016/sep/15/superannuation-backflip-on-500000-cap-wins-over-coalition-conservatives

[359] Martin, *Young people and political engagement,* p.8, 17, 71, 74-76, 84 & 85

substantially different from their own.[360] Dellaposta, Shi and Macy argue that Americans with similar political persuasions are increasingly inclined to engage in the same groups, attend the same events and frequent the same establishments. They maintain that Americans are also less willing to engage in, attend and frequent groups, events and establishments at, and in which they are likely to meet and mingle with persons who have different/opposing political perspectives.[361] Research suggests that these group and network homogenising trends have been compounded by the internet and social media.[362] Furthermore, since at least 2003, annual growth rates in the number of Australian Not-for-Profit organisations (which include charitable, sports, cultural, health, educational and religious groups) have tended to exceed Australian population growth rates. 2008 and 2009 were the only exceptions.[363] This evidence supports my theory that organisations are splintering into more groups with relatively homogenous memberships.

Likewise, research conducted by Gregory Saxton in his previous role as an Assistant Professor of Public Administration at the State University of New York, supports my Homogenisation thesis by revealing that organisations in the United States are becoming increasingly democratic. That is, organisations are allowing members and stakeholders a greater say in decision-making.[364] Saxton argues that this democratisation has been precipitated by "expanding education," the spread and increased use of advanced

[360] Evans and Fu, 'Opinion formation on dynamic networks', p.9; Dellaposta, Shi, and Macy, 'Why Do Liberals Drink Lattes?', p.1473-1511; Gillani, Yuan, Saveski, Vosovghi and Roy, 'Me, My Echo Chamber, and I', p.1
[361] Dellaposta, Shi, and Macy, 'Why Do Liberals Drink Lattes?', p.1473-1511
[362] Halbertam and Kight, 'Homophily, group size and the diffusion of political information in social networks', p.73-88; Sunstein, 'The Law of Group Polarization', p.175-195; Batorski, and Grzywinska, 'Three dimensions of the public sphere on Facebook', p.356-374; Groshek, and Koc-Michalska, 'Helping populism win?', p.1389-1407; Flaxman, Goal and Rao, 'Filter Bubbles, Echo Chambers, and Online News Consumption', p.298-320; Dahlberg, 'Rethinking the fragmentation of the cyberpublic', p.827-847; Pariser, *The filter bubble*; Brossard, and Scheufele, 'Science, new media, and the public', p.40 & 41; Bakshy, Messing, and Adamic, 'Exposure to ideologically diverse news and opinion on Facebook', p.1130-1132; Yardi, and Boyd, 'Dynamic debates', p.316-327; Gillani, Yuan, Saveski, Vosovghi and Roy, 'Me, My Echo Chamber, and I', p.2; Davis, 'The Web of Politics', p.361-364; Hill and Hughes, *Cyberpolitics*; Wilhelm, 'Virtual sounding boards', p.313-338; Huber, and Malhotra, 'Political Homophily in Social Relationships', p.270, 271 & 282
[363] Shulman, Craig. (2012, updated 2017) 'IBISWorld Industry Report X0021: Charities & Not-for-Profit Organisations in Australia', p.32, *EthicalJobs: Australia,* viewed 25 September 2018, http://www.ethicaljobs.com.au/files/2012_NFP_report.pdf; *THE WORLD BANK,* (last updated 2017) 'Population growth (annual %): Australia, viewed 25 September 2018, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW?locations=AU
[364] Saxton, Gregory, D. (2005) 'The Participatory Revolution in Nonprofit Management', *The Public Manager,* vol:34(1), p.34-39

communications technology and "intergenerational value shifts".[365] He holds that these trends have motivated and empowered group members and individuals to demand greater influence and to form new groups that have more egalitarian structures and processes.[366] In his words:

> Organizational structures have flattened; and … [these developments] point to a generalized surge in participatory practices and values throughout society. Thanks to an array of ongoing large-scale social changes, stakeholders now increasing possess the capacity, interest, and opportunity to play a key role in decision making at the individual, organizational, and community levels alike. This growing propensity for participation has, in turn, begun to change prevailing non-profit structures and management practices. … [These changes include] the widening and deepening of the organizational "selectorate," or the set of people who have the right to participate in strategic decisions.[367]

> Consumers flock to those organizations that allow them to assume a greater role in making strategic decisions. Organizations and venues without satisfactory, genuine, participatory processes … see their market share, participation rates, and customer satisfaction levels decline. … Participatory segments of society … [form new organizations when existing ones do] not adequately respond to their desire for input or whenever they want complete control over strategic decision making.[368]

Governing structures adapted to reflect self-expression (egalitarian and autonomy) value orientations. Membership compositions changed to accommodate inexperience with, and aversion to, conflict, debate, negotiation and compromise; a consequence of Social Network Homogenisation. This multiplication and democratisation, I maintain, has precipitated a slow, early twenty-first century, generational recovery in secular and non-political active formal group engagement. [Evidence of this recovery is presented after the next paragraph.] Arguably, this recovery occurs as more young adults discover pre-existing organisations with both governing structures and memberships that reflect and suit their values, skills and preferences.

[365] Saxton, 'The Participatory Revolution in Nonprofit Management', p.35
[366] Saxton, 'The Participatory Revolution in Nonprofit Management', p.38
[367] Saxton, 'The Participatory Revolution in Nonprofit Management', p.34 & 35
[368] Saxton, 'The Participatory Revolution in Nonprofit Management', p.38

Contrastingly, (for reasons also discussed earlier) political parties and religious congregations have greater difficulty adapting to accommodate the value orientations and conflict and compromise aversion of younger generations. Additionally, religiosity continues to wane in post-industrial societies, albeit at a slower rate than during the industrial stage of Modernisation.[369] Consequently, consistent with my Homogenisation thesis, political party involvement and religious congregation attendance have not experienced any recovery.

Australian statistics published by official sources, as well as those drawn from WVS data, relating to formal group engagement indicate the relative superiority of my Homogenisation, over Inglehart and Welzel's Modernisation and Putnam's Lamentation arguments. Modernisation and Lamentation theories contend that involvement in all, or most, formal group types have experienced, or are in secular, decline without foreseeable recovery.[370] However, statistics drawn from Australian WVS data indicate few consistent patterns in rates of active participation in secular and non-political formal organisations between 1981 and 2012.[371] Additionally, early 21st century statistics published by the Australian Sports Commission, Volunteering Australia and the Australian Council of the Arts suggest that far from being in secular decline, engagement in non-religious and non-political formal organisations is rising. This trend is particularly acute among the young;[372] consistent with my Homogenisationist arguments regarding generational recovery. Together, these statistics contradict both Modernisation and Lamentation theories. Both theses contend that active involvement in most, or all, formal voluntary organisations (including those that are

[369] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.20 & 23; Pew Research Center. (2015) *Wealthier Nations Less Religious; U.S. an Exception,* viewed 29th December 2017, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/03/12/how-do-americans-stand-out-from-the-rest-of-the-world/ft_15-03-10_religiousgdpscatter/

[370] Putnam, *Bowling Alone,* p.41, 42, 46, 55 & 60-62; Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.117, 142 & 294

[371] See Appendices 18-25

[372] Australian Sports Commission. (2010) *Participating in Exercise, Recreation and Sport, Annual Report 2010,* viewed 9 February 2017, p.39 http://www.ausport.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0018/436122/ERASS_Report_2010.PDF; Volunteering Australia. (2012) *State of Volunteering in Australia: 2012,* viewed 9 February 2017, p.7-9, https://www.volunteeringaustralia.org/wp-content/uploads/State-of-Volunteering-in-Australia-2012.pdf; Australian Council of the Arts (2014) *Arts in Daily Life: Australian Participation in the Arts, Report May 2014,* viewed 9 February 2017, p.12 http://www.australiacouncil.gov.au/workspace/uploads/files/research/arts-in-daily-life-australian-5432524d0f2f0.pdf

secular and non-political) should be, or at least should have been (between 1981 and the early 2000s), in secular decline.[373]

Australian WVS statistics do reveal a secular decline among the 65+ demographic in rates of active political party engagement. The rate fell from 8.1% in 1981, to 4.5% in 1995, to 3.5% in 2005 and to 3.4% in 2012. Among other age demographics there were no consistent trends in rates of active political party engagement between waves. All rates of active political party participation across the four waves among the 18 to 34, 35 to 49 and 50 to 64 demographics were below 3% and varied by little more than 2 percentage points (statistically insignificant).

Life-cycle factors mean that those of retirement age invest more time in political activity (including political party engagement) than younger age groups.[374] However, a narrowing of this gap in participation rates due to declining active involvement among those of retirement age (particularly between the first and second waves of an ongoing survey) would suggest that a generational reduction in active engagement has occurred. WVS statistics would indicate that those who were aged 65 and over in 1981, and were therefore born in, or prior to, 1916, were significantly more involved in political parties than later generations.

[Responses to the following question were used to produce the graph below.
For each organization, could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of organization?

- Church and religious organisation
- Sport and recreational organisation
- Art, music and educational organisation
- Labour union
- Political party
- Environmental organisation
- Professional association
- Humanitarian and charitable organisation
- Consumer organisation

[373] Putnam, *Bowling Alone,* p.41, 42, 46, 55 & 60-62; Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.2, 3, 117, 142 & 294

[374] Sabbath, E, L., Lubben, J., Goldberg, M., Zins, M., and Berkman, L, F. (2015) 'Social engagement across the retirement transition among "young-old" adults in the French GAZEL cohort', *European Journal of Aging,* vol:12(4), p.317; *FORS: Social report 2016,* 'Political Shaping: Proximity to political parties and party membership', viewed 30th December 2017, http://socialreport.ch/?page_id=1402

- Self-help group, mutual aid group
- Other organisation]

Figure 3.53

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who indicated being active members of political parties.



According to Modernisation and Homogenisation theories, a generational transition in emphasis from survival to self-expression values began when life started becoming significantly more secure. This would have occurred over a century ago. Indeed, Australian life expectancy has been increasing rapidly since the latter half of the 19th century.

Figure 3.54



These statistics may suggest that those generations born post 1916 tended to place sufficient emphasis on self-expression values to raise their suspicion and dislike of, and consequently reduce their participation in certain, hierarchical organisational structures; including political parties. I argue that because political parties and religious communities have greater difficulty adjusting to the value orientations and expectations of more recent cohorts than do other formal groups, these lower rates of involvement have continued largely unabated.

However, the degree of emphasis necessary to reduce rates of involvement in hierarchical organisations would most likely differ according to organisation type. Religious people probably place more importance on involvement in their religious communities than people generally place on participation in many other formal group types, such as those focused on politics and recreation: sports, art, literature, music, drama and card, board and computer game organisations. There is a balance between the importance placed on the subject matter/purpose/meaning of formal groups and the dislike of these groups enduring leadership selection and decision-making processes. This balance probably remained weighted in favour of continued participation relatively longer for religious communities than for active political party membership. This is supported by Australian WVS statistics.

[Responses to the following question were used to produce the graphs below.
Apart from weddings and funerals, about how often do you attend religious services these days?
1 More than once a week

[375] Australian Bureau of Statistics, (2011) 'Life Expectancy Trends – Australia', *4102.0 – Australian Social Trends,* viewed 9 February 2017, http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/Lookup/4102.0Main+Features10Mar+2011

2 Once a week
3 Once a month
4 Only on special holy days
5 Once a year
6 Less often
7 Never, practically never]

Figure 3.55

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who attended religious/church services at least once a month.



Figure 3.56

% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who attended religious/church services at least once a month.



They indicate that in 1981 a high proportion of each age demographic (35.9% to 41.4%) attended church services at least once a month. However, the survey waves post 1981 reveal substantial declines in church attendance; falling particularly rapidly among younger age demographics. Between 1981 and 2005 the percentage of survey participants who reported attending church services at least once a month fell 29 percentage points among the 18 to 34 age demographic but declined only 3 percentage points among the 65 and over age group. Between 2005 and 2012 the attendance rate:

- rose slightly from 12.4 to 16.7% among the youngest age demographic,
- declined by a meagre 0.4 percentage points (from 15 to 14.6%) among the 35 to 49 age group,
- continued a sharp decline from 20 to 15.4% among the 50 to 64 demographic, and
- fell from 36.8 to 29.1% among those of retirement age.

Furthermore, Figure 3.56 shows that in 1981 the Greatest, Silent and Boomer generations had similar levels of religious service attendance. Gen X had a significantly higher level of religious service attendance, but this can be explained by life cycle factors. Adult Gen X Australian WVS participants in 1981 had an average age of 19.04 years. Therefore, it is likely that many of them were 18 and possibly still in high school. Most private high schools are

religious and require regular religious service attendance. Therefore, the young Xers were possibly no more religious than other cohorts in 1981. Indeed, by 1995 the Silent, Boomer and X generations each had lower rates of attendance than the cohort immediately preceding them, and this remained so for each successive survey wave. However, adult Millennials in 2005 and 2012 had slightly higher rates of religious service attendance than did Xers. This may be explained by a significant proportion of 18-year-old Millennials in 2005 and 2012 attending religious high schools.

These statistics suggest generational declines in religious service attendance, consistent with Lamentation, Modernisation and Homogenisation theories. However, that the statistics only reveal generational declines in two varieties of formal group, political parties and religious communities, is evidence of my Homogenisation thesis' relatively higher credibility. The results also suggest religious service attendance declined significantly within the Boomer and X generational cohorts; not just between them. There are many possible reasons for why individuals began to stray from religious congregations, including the on-going shift from a traditional/religious to secular/rational value orientation and the revealing of widespread child-sex-abuse within religious institutions. Still, the patterns of declining religious service attendance indicate that generational replacement played a substantial role.

The slight rise in the rate of religious service attendance among the youngest age demographic (Figure 3.55) between 2005 and 2012 maybe at least partly explained by the growing proportion of Australian high school students attending private (mostly religious) schools.[376] These schools often require regular religious service attendance. Thus, rising rates of religious service attendance among youth probably does not indicate increasing religiosity among this demographic. Hence, these patterns are arguably consistent with both Modernisation and Homogenisation theories.

Interest in politics is a prerequisite for a healthy democracy. Without sufficient political interest, citizens are unlikely to consume enough political news and information to

[376] Lang, Jennifer. (2016) 'The latest statistics on public and private schools', *Actuarial Eye,* viewed 20 September 2018, http://actuarialeye.com/2016/02/07/the-latest-statistics-on-public-and-private-schools/; Row, Emma. (2017) 'Religion in Australian Schools: an historical and contemporary debate', *THE CONVERSATION,* viewed 20 September 2018, https://theconversation.com/religion-in-australian-schools-an-historical-and-contemporary-debate-82439

make informed electoral decisions.[377] Inglehart and Welzel suggest that a generationally rising emphasis on self-expression values is precipitating corresponding increases in political interest. That is, as greater emphasis is placed on self-expression values such as autonomy and egalitarianism, people become more inclined to scrutinise and challenge authority, including political authority.[378] This scrutiny requires information and knowledge which, in turn, galvanises political interest. They imply that this generational rise in political interest may be reinforced by bridging connections (those between people of different faith, socio-economic strata, education, interests, views, political persuasions, culture and lifestyle backgrounds) increasing generationally.[379] People who have more and stronger relationships with those holding different political concerns and priorities to themselves are perhaps, relative to those with fewer and weaker bridging ties, more likely to develop deeper political interest in government policies not directly affecting them. That is, empathy with those with whom one shares bridging connections, motivates more and broader political interest and scrutiny.[380]

Putnam's American-focused investigation found that there have been enormous generational declines in political knowledge and interest since the late-1960s/early-1970s. His research suggests that between 1965 and 1990, daily newspaper readership among under 35s dropped from two thirds to one third while television news viewership among the same demographic fell from 52% to 41%.[381] Putnam revealed that under 30s in the late 1990s were less knowledgeable and interested in election campaigns than youth several decades earlier and that despite improved levels of formal education attainment, Americans had become 15 to 20% less interested in politics and public affairs.[382] He uses these statistics to bolster his argument that political interest, along with civic orientated values, empathy, generosity and interpersonal and institutional trust, are in generational decline. He maintains that this decline is due mainly to waning formal and informal structural social capital (the

[377] Lecheler, Sophie and Vreese, C, H. (2017) 'News Media, Knowledge, and Political Interest: Evidence of a Duel Role from a Field Experiment' in *Journal of Communication,* vol:67(4), p.557 & 558
[378] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.7, 21, 29, 30, 42, 43, 44, 116, 120-122, 124, 164, 262 & 294
[379] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.142-143, 293 & 294
[380] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.142, 143 & 293
[381] Putnam, *Bowling Alone,* p.36
[382] Putnam, *Bowling Alone,* p.37 & 46

degree to which, and intensity with which, people interact and forge/maintain meaningful relationships).[383]

Statistics drawn from Australian WVS data contradict Modernisation and Lamentation theses. Questions regarding political interest were not asked in the 1981 wave, and so the statistics presented below begin in 1995. Between 1995 and 2012 the proportion of 18 to 34-year-olds who reported being either "very interested" or "somewhat interested" in politics (not necessarily engaged in party or electoral politics) declined by a meagre 3.2 percentage points (hardly statistically significant). This is contrary to both Modernisation and Lamentation theories which allege that there has been significant generational change in political interest. In 1995 the 65+ demographic were 13.4 percentage points more politically interested than the 18 to 34-year-olds surveyed. By 2012 that gap had widened to 28.4 percentage points. The statistics also reveal that those born around the close of the Second World War have been consistently more politically interested than previous and successive generations. These statistics are consistent with my Homogenisation theory.

[Responses to the following question were used to produce the graph below.
How interested would you say you are in politics? Are you (*read out and code one answer*):
1 Very interested
2 Somewhat interested
3 Not very interested
4 Not at all interested]

Figure 3.57

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who indicated being either "very interested" or "somewhat interested" in politics.

[383] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.19, 25, 36, 37, 46, 47, 138-141, 193 & 219



According to both Homogenisation and Modernisation theories, there have been generational increases in the emphasis placed on self-expression values, which encourage greater political interest and engagement. However, unlike Inglehart and Welzel, I contend that ideologically, philosophically and recreationally homogenising social networks may be hampering or mitigating higher rates of political interest. [The influence of these opposing forces on political interest levels is discussed in the next paragraph.] Indeed, other scholars have found that greater diversity within local communities can instigate heightened and enduring political interest and efficacy among adolescents.[384] People who have fewer and weaker bridging connections with those holding different political concerns and priorities to themselves are perhaps, relative to those with more and stronger bridging ties, less inclined to develop deep political interest in government policies not directly affecting them. I reason that declining empathy with those unlike oneself, probably precipitates a reduction and narrowing of political interest and scrutiny.

Arguably, the rise in emphasis placed on self-expression values and declines in bridging connections which push political interest in opposing directions, are unlikely to have gained pace simultaneously. Baby Boomers' emphasis on self-expression values most

[384] Campbell, David, E. (2013) 'Social Networks and Political Participation', *Annual Review of Political Science,* vol:16(1), p.42

profoundly surpassed their parents' relative to other living generations.[385] Yet, they were not equipped with the technological resources (such as the Internet and social media) that presented successive generations (Xers and Millennials) with greater opportunities to find and connect with people who share and reflect their ideas, interests and priorities. Additionally, the social capital structures, institutions and organisations established and maintained when survival values were dominant had not yet been adapted (in the ways previously described) by the Boomers or successive generations who desired more of these opportunities. Hence, there was probably a lag between when self-expression values generationally spiked with the arrival of adolescent Boomers and when Social Network Homogenisation hastened with the coming of Xers and Millennial's. Consequently, according to my Homogenisation theory, there should have been a highly significant generational spike in political interest among Boomers followed by either relatively modest generational declines in, a halt to, or slower rise in, political interest among Xers and Gen Y. This is consistent with the Australian WVS statistics presented.

Other statistical evidence supports this thesis. Aaron Martin's comprehensive study of the political engagement of young people in Anglo American democracies reveals that political interest (rather than electoral and party engagement) among British and Australian young people has slowly risen since the 1960s.[386] Using data from the American National, Canadian, British and Australian Election Studies, Martin finds that the gap in political interest between young and old Australians has widened; the result of older generations becoming more politically interested as they have aged.[387] That is, older people today are more politically interested than were older people decades ago.

> In Britain and Australia political interest among the young has actually increased. In the US young people today are not particularly less interested than were young people at the beginning of the time series. However, in regards to whether young people have become less interested in politics as compared to older people over time the answer is yes. We see an increased age gap between the young and old in the US, Canada and Australia. … While, there is little support for the argument that political interest is in secular decline among

[385] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.100
[386] Martin, *Young people and political engagement,* p.61 & 62
[387] Martin, *Young people and political engagement,* p.61 & 62

> the young (as suggested by the likes of Putnam) the young have become less interested in politics as compared to their elders over time.[388]

Martin's finding that the gap in political interest between young and old has been rising over the last half century, is evidence of a combination of age and generational factors supporting my Homogenisation theory. It is possible that older age people have been significantly more interested in politics than younger people. However, due to the sudden generational spike in self-expression values among the Baby Boomer generation the young Boomers may have been almost as interested in politics as their elders at the beginning of Martin's time series. As the Boomers matured, it is possible that age effects further increased their political interest. That is, age differences in political interest may have returned to historically normal and more significant levels. A compelling explanation for these trends is that due to their relatively more philosophically, ideologically and recreationally homogenised social networks, Gens X and Y in youth may not continue the young Boomers' sharp generational rise in political interest.

Reconcilable Findings

The previous section explored changes in levels of political interest as well as confidence and involvement in formal organisations and institutions. Patterns inconsistent with Modernisation and Lamentation theses were uncovered. However, they are arguably consistent with social networks becoming increasingly ideologically and recreationally homogenous. This final portion of Chapter Three examines shifting levels of interpersonal trust, happiness and financial and life satisfaction. Although not offering strong evidence for, these results are reconcilable with my Homogenisation theory.

Changes in rates of interpersonal trust over the four waves and among the four age groupings were revealed by Australian WVS results. They can be interpreted as consistent with Modernisation and Homogenisation, as well as aspects of Putnam's Lamentation, theories; despite these theses apparent radical divergence. WVS statistics show a dramatic decline in interpersonal trust among each age group between 1981 and 1995. Subsequently, interpersonal trust among each age demographic rose between 1995 and 2005 such that the

[388] Martin, *Young people and political engagement,* p.63

rates were almost at, and among the 18 to 34 demographic had exceeded, the 1981 levels. Between 2005 and 2012, levels of interpersonal trust continued to increase significantly among each age group.

[Responses to the following question were used to produce the graphs below.
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?
1 Most people can be trusted.
2 Need to be very careful.]

Figure 3.58

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who believed that most people can be trusted.



These findings are consistent with Putnam's argument that measures of interpersonal trust declined in the late twentieth century.[389] However, they indicate that interpersonal trust rose following the publication of *Bowling Alone* in 2000. This may suggest that the individual isolating atomising trends (causing declines in social and political trust and engagement) with which Putnam was concerned (and which were described in preceding chapters), may have reversed in the ensuing years. Though, if Putnam correctly identified the causes of declining interpersonal trust in the late twentieth century, then interpersonal trust would appear to change mainly across time periods rather than between generations. This is

[389] Putnam, *Bowling Alone,* p.139-141

at odds with Putnam's contention that social capital and trust change mainly through generational replacement.[390] When change occurs generationally the young are affected first followed by older age groups in latter waves. The Australian WVS results clearly show that rates of interpersonal trust across all age demographics declined between 1981 and 1995 and subsequently rose between 1995 and 2005.

However, these statistics may still indicate Modernisation and Homogenisation (rather than Lamentation) generational trends in interpersonal trust. Inglehart and Welzel found that individual empowering technological and economic trends and value shifts are associated with generationally rising levels of interpersonal trust in post-industrial societies.[391] Indeed, Figure 3.59 clearly shows that each successive generation of Australians has tended to express greater levels of interpersonal trust than the previous generation had when they were a similar age. I reason that this may be explained by those generations who tended to experience more secure child-and-young-adult-hoods having greater confidence that they will recover relatively unscathed from betrayal, theft or attack. The WVS results illustrated in Figure 3.59 could suggest that levels of interpersonal trust in post-industrial Australia have tended to rise for reasons consistent with both Modernisation and Homogenisation theories. Yet, perhaps due to period specific events (such as the early 1990s recession) these levels briefly fell prior to the 1995 wave. These patterns do not rule out the possibility of generational change particularly if interpersonal trust had been rising prior to, and including, 1981. Unfortunately, this is when WVS data collection began.

Figure 3.59

% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who believed that most people can be trusted.

[390] Putnam, *Bowling Alone,* p.62, 72, 140, 141, 265, 267, 283, 356 & 357
[391] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.121-133, 138-141 & 271



Australian WVS statistics reveal trends in financial satisfaction, life satisfaction and happiness that initially appear to contradict my Homogenisation argument. Like Inglehart and Welzel, I reason that as societies develop technologically, economically, educationally and culturally people feel increasingly autonomous (in control of their lives).[392] This rise in feelings of autonomy precipitates a shift from survival to self-expression values.[393] Many, including Inglehart and Welzel, maintain that rising happiness, and life and financial satisfaction are by-products of increased feelings of autonomy.[394] Yet Figures 3.60 and 3.62 reveal that over the 31 years between 1981 and 2012 the proportion of participants who indicated having life and financial satisfaction ratings of between one and seven out of ten has grown among each of the four age demographics. Figures 3.61 and 3.63 confirm the common finding that older people tend to have greater financial and life satisfaction than younger people.[395] That is, these graphs show that older cohorts tend to have greater financial and life satisfaction than younger cohorts within each wave. The WVS statistics

[392] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.2, 3, 15, 16, 24, 25, 28 & 29
[393] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.5 & 6
[394] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.130, 139 & 140
[395] La Barbera, Priscilla, A and Gurhan, Zeynep. (1997) 'The Role of Materialism, Religiosity, and Demographics in Subjective Well-Being', *Psychology & Marketing,* vol:14(1), p.89; Plagnol, Anke, C. (2011) 'Financial Satisfaction over the life course: The influence of assets and liabilities', *Journal of Economic Psychology,* vol:32(1), p.53

appear to suggest that levels of happiness are more a consequence of periodic events rather than systemic or generational rises and falls associated with stages of modernisation.

[Responses to the following question were used to produce the graphs below.
On a scale of 1 to 10 where 1 is extremely dissatisfied and 10 is extremely satisfied, how satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household?]

Figure 3.60

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who rated their financial satisfaction between 1 and 7 out of 10 i.e. feel less financially satisfied.



Figure 3.61

% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who rated their financial satisfaction between 1 and 7 out of 10 i.e. feel less financially satisfied.



[Responses to the following question were used to produce the graphs below.
On a scale of 1 to 10 where 1 is extremely dissatisfied and 10 is extremely satisfied, all thing considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?]

Figure 3.62

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who rated their life satisfaction between 1 and 7 out of 10 i.e. feel less satisfied.



Figure 3.63

% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who rated their life satisfaction between 1 and 7 out of 10 i.e. feel less satisfied.



[Responses to the following question were used to produce the graphs below.
Taking all things together, would you say you are:
1 Very happy
2 Quite happy
3 Not very happy
4 Not at all happy
V Don't know]

Figure 3.64

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who indicated feeling "very happy" (as opposed to "quite happy", "not very happy", "not at all happy" and "Don't know").



Figure 3.65

% of Australian WVS participants within different generational cohorts who indicated feeling "very happy" (as opposed to "quite happy", "not very happy", "not at all happy" and "Don't know").



Figures 3.60 and 3.62 reveal that levels of financial and life satisfaction tended to decline over the 1981, 1995 and 2005 waves but then rose between 2005 and 2012 among the four age groups with one exception. There was an insignificant increase of 1.1 percentage

points between 1995 and 2005 followed by a slight decline of 1.9 percentage points between 2005 and 2012 in financial satisfaction among the 50 to 64 age demographic. These statistics may seem curious. If feelings of autonomy really precipitate feelings of happiness and satisfaction, then overall these results are the opposite of what would be expected. That is, increased happiness, and life and financial satisfaction during the general rise in living standards between 1981 and 2005 would have been expected. This would have been followed by a slowing in, or slight reversal of, that incline between the 2005 and 2012 waves, due to global economic uncertainty, falling share prices and a waning mining boom in the wake of the GFC.[396]

Research conducted by Harvard professor of psychology, and author of the New York Times bestseller *Stumbling on Happiness* Dan Gilbert may offer an explanation for this apparent paradox. It suggests that the impact of seemingly significant and traumatic life events on happiness is not as intense, or enduring, as what our prefrontal cortices "experience simulators", have us believe. This is described as the "impact bias."[397] In fact, three months following a major life event, such as winning the lottery or becoming paraplegic, a person's level of happiness tends to return to where it was prior to the life changing experience. Gilbert distinguishes between two varieties of happiness: "natural happiness" (that which we experience when our desires are fulfilled) and "synthetic happiness" (satisfaction we create when our desires go unfulfilled). Gilbert reasons that humans have a "psychological immune system" that enables us to synthesise happiness, so that we feel better about our world and circumstances.[398] In his words "synthetic happiness is every bit as real and enduring as the happiness you stumble upon and, when you get exactly what you were aiming for."[399] He argues that while freedom to choose and change one's mind (autonomy) enables "natural happiness", it can also harm "synthetic happiness". That is, under conditions of autonomy many allow their experience simulators, which are prone to "impact bias," to weigh their current circumstances against seemingly preferable

[396] Financial Services Council, *Superannuation in the context of the global financial crises*; Martin, 'Mining boom forecast to end in two years'; Parkinson, Martin. (2012) 'Macroeconomic Policy for changing circumstances'
[397] Gilbert, Dan. (2004) 'The Surprising Science of Happiness', *Ted Talks,* viewed 10 March 2017, https://www.ted.com/talks/dan_gilbert_asks_why_are_we_happy#t-1029045
[398] Gilbert, 'The Surprising Science of Happiness'
[399] Gilbert, 'The Surprising Science of Happiness'

possibilities. Consequently, many become deeply dissatisfied when empowered with choice.[400]

This is not an argument for deliberately reducing autonomy, only for consciously changing the way in which we consider alternative futures under conditions of autonomy. I have reasoned based on correlation statistics presented in Chapter Four, that those with a conservative disposition are less susceptible to the erosion of synthetic satisfaction under conditions of autonomy, than are ideological progressives. This, I surmise, is because conservatives more readily accept the establishment and status quo than do progressives. Declining satisfaction among progressives is likely to reduce overall levels of satisfaction (both life and financial) during periods of rising autonomy. I do not contend that happiness and satisfaction are necessarily by-products of freedom to choose, and therefore my views are entirely consistent with the statistics presented. Although feelings of autonomy among each age group were higher in 2012 than they were in 2005, people were probably less certain about the durability of their autonomy (financial situation) in 2012 than in 2005. Consequently, they were possibly less inclined to consider alternative futures and life changing decisions, which usually entail significant risk. This may have raised general levels of synthetic satisfaction with current life-circumstances.

Conclusion

This third chapter has examined Australian value, social capital and political participation patterns by presenting and discussing age-group percentage statistics from the 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 World Value Surveys. The exploration of these statistics has supplemented the previous chapter by uncovering merits and shortcomings of, and necessitating an alternative to, Modernisationists and Lamentationist interpretations of historic and contemporary trends on social capital, trust, involvement and institutional/organisational confidence. Australian WVS statistics indicate post-Boomer generational increases in liberal and egalitarian social attitudes as well as rising levels of informal/unconventional political engagement. These trends contradict Putnam's Lamentation arguments, at least in the Australian context. Additionally, the statistics reveal

[400] Gilbert, 'The Surprising Science of Happiness'

Australian trends in political interest as well as confidence and participation in formal organisations and institutions that weaken Inglehart and Welzel's Modernisationist views regarding social patterns in post-industrial democracies, like Australia. These and other findings discussed in this chapter have informed and instructed my Homogenisationist explanation. Chapter Four will present and discuss statistics assessing the degree to which feelings of autonomy, financial satisfaction and income are correlated with value orientations, levels of social capital and political engagement, to further consolidate my Homogenisation theory.

CHAPTER FOUR

--EMPOWERMENT & SOCIAL CAPITAL--

A subjective sense of autonomy, Financial Satisfaction, Income & Industrial Relations

The first three chapters of this thesis discussed trends in Australian party identification and engagement and their potential for eroding the health of our democracy. They also articulated an argument to explain these patterns, that is Homogenisation theory. This Homogenisation thesis was compared with the two dominant and most persuasive alternative arguments for modern/contemporary engagement trends: Inglehart and Welzel's Modernisation and Putnam's Lamentation theories. Chapter Three provided an overview of Australian value, social capital and political engagement trends by presenting percentage statistics collated from 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 World Values Survey data. These statistics were divided into age groups/demographics 18 to 34, 35 to 49, 50 to 64 and 65+ as well as generational cohorts Greatest generation, Silent generation, Boomer generation, Generation X and Millennials, and were found to be consistent with my Homogenisation theory. In this, and the following, chapter correlation statistics collated from WVS waves are analysed. Conflicting positions regarding the direction of generational shifts between bonding and bridging social capital are the ultimate differences between Modernisation and Homogenisation theories. WVS questions do not enquire about the degree of ideological/political commonality between participants and their social network members (friends, work colleagues and family members). Therefore, conclusions in these chapters tend to buttress both Modernisation and Homogenisation theses but soundly weaken Putnam's Lamentation theory.

Social scientists cannot definitively prove (and correlation does not necessarily mean), causation. However, by controlling for salient variables many otherwise plausible explanations of correlation statistics can be discounted, and by employing educated

reasoning the nature of the relationships between variables can be inferred while acknowledging alternative yet less convincing interpretations of statistical data.

Evidence is accrued to support my Homogenisation theory by examining the degree to which value orientations, social capital measures and rates of political engagement are correlated with both a subjective sense of autonomy and factors potentially affecting actual levels of autonomy. Other variables are controlled using SPSS statistics software. Significant positive correlations have previously been found between a subjective sense of autonomy and self-expression values. However, there has been uncertainty regarding whether this correlation holds when measures of, and factors influencing, autonomy are controlled. My statistical analysis suggests that both a subjective sense of autonomy and variables affecting actual levels of autonomy have great influence over generational shifts in values and social/political engagement patterns.

This chapter also considers the effect of income, financial satisfaction and economic context/policy on social and political values, trust and involvement. I argue that high incomes and financial satisfaction (two measures of autonomy), as well as levels of inequality, appear to significantly influence social/political values, trust and engagement in ways very consistent with my Homogenisation theory. When other variables are held constant inconsistencies can reasonably be attributed to those with conservative personality types tending to have both greater financial satisfaction and more traditional views than those with personality types more accepting of change. Therefore, when income and other factors are controlled personality types can arguably have a relatively greater impact on correlations between financial satisfaction and certain dependent variables than the effect of financial satisfaction as an independent variable. Additionally, Putnam's Lamentationist arguments concerning the role of labour market deregulation in social capital and political involvement patterns (related to employee financial 'security' and 'autonomy') are found not to apply in the Australian context.

Only moderately significant correlations with p values 0.1 or less, highly significant correlations with p values of less than 0.05 and extremely significant correlations with p values of less than 0.01 are presented. The letter 'x' in correlation tables (located in the

appendices) indicates a p value of more than 0.1. Correlations with r values of -1.0 to -0.5 or 0.5 to 1.0 are considered strong. Correlations with r values of -0.5 to -0.3 or 0.3 to 0.5 are referred to as moderate. Correlations with r values of -0.3 to -0.1 or 0.1 to 0.3 are weak, and those with r values between -0.1 and 0.1 are very weak. The control variables for these statistics are age, sex, employment status, marital status, satisfaction with the financial situation of one's household, scale of incomes, highest level of education attained (or for the 1981 wave - the age at which participants completed or were due to complete their full-time education),[401] frequency of religious service attendance, how many children one has, and the size of one's town/city (the question regarding town size was not asked in the 1981 wave of the WVS). Many, if not all, of these variables have a significant bearing on real levels of autonomy. Therefore, by controlling for these variables the influence of autonomy on correlations between a subjective sense of autonomy and responses to questions assessing value orientations and social/political trust and engagement is mitigated. This aids the reader in making a reasoned assessment of the impact of a subjective sense of autonomy.

Through this and the next chapter graphs are presented illustrating the degree to which correlations are strong and significant. A 'Strength and Significance Score' was determined for each correlation using the following method. Correlations with p values greater than 0.1 were given significance scores of 0. Correlations with p values of, or less than 0.1 were given significance scores of 1. To determine the 'Strength and Significance Score' of a correlation, the correlation's r value was multiplied by its significance score and then the result was multiplied by 1000. To determine the average strength and significance score of a correlation within an age group, the strength and significance scores of that correlation for that age group within individual survey waves (in which there was data regarding the variables tested) were calculated. These scores were then added together, and the result was divided by the relevant number of survey waves.

[401] The question regarding participants' highest level of education attained was not asked in the 1981 wave of the WVS.

Subjective Sense of Autonomy

The significance of correlations between a subjective sense of autonomy and both value orientations, and social/political trust and participation (when controlling for other variables) will now be discussed. Consistent with both Inglehart and Welzel's Modernisation and my Homogenisation theories, **a greater subjective sense of (as opposed to actual and objective) autonomy was positively correlated with more liberal social views and greater inclusiveness of women and minorities**. As shown in Figure 4.1, there were positive correlations between a greater subjective sense of autonomy and the degree to which participants thought voluntary euthanasia, abortion, prostitution, homosexuality and sex before marriage were justifiable.[402] As illustrated by Figure 4.2, a greater subjective sense of autonomy was positively correlated with the degree to which participants believed that women, older people and immigrants should have just as much right to work when jobs are scarce as other employees and job seekers.[403] Additionally, negative correlations were found between levels of subjectively sensed autonomy, and a belief that traditional families (consisting of both a mother and father) are necessary for the well-being of children.[404] This is demonstrated by Figure 4.3.

Figure 4.1

Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations collated from 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves, between a greater subjective sense of autonomy and more liberal attitudes regarding voluntary euthanasia, abortion, prostitution, homosexuality and sex before marriage (appendices 26-30).

[402] See Appendices 26-30
[403] See Appendices 31-33
[404] See Appendix 34



Figure 4.2

Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations collated from 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves, between a greater subjective sense of autonomy and the degree to which participants believe that women, older people and immigrants should have just as much right to work when jobs are scarce as other employees and job seekers (appendices 31-33).



Figure 4.3

Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations collated from 1981, 1995 and 2005 Australian WVS waves, between a greater subjective sense of autonomy and believing that children do 'not' need both a mother and a father to grow up happily (appendix 34).



These findings tend to support Modernisation and my own Homogenisation arguments that those who feel less autonomy are more likely to emphasise survival values and therefore:

- traditional gender roles,
- conservative positions on subjects related to life and sex, and
- greater priority on the well-being of one's own race, kin, or religious, national, cultural, or linguistic community over others.[405]

These results also indicate that a subjective sense of autonomy, not just actual autonomy, plays a significant role in driving the survival to self-expression values transition. That is, rising levels of individual empowerment/autonomy (the possession of the capacity to act upon one's free will) brought about by scientific, technological, economic, social and educational advance not only drive cultural change directly (as later evidence suggests) but also

[405] Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.52 & 54

indirectly. Empowerment lifts individuals' subjective sense of autonomy which in turn precipitate greater emphasis on self-expression values.

Perhaps unexpectedly, Figure 4.4 and Table 4.1 demonstrate that **a greater subjective sense of autonomy was positively correlated with a greater sense of national pride**, particularly among the 18 to 34 age group. No significant correlations were found between these variables amongst the 65+ demographic.[406] This peculiar finding does not support the Modernisationist contention that greater autonomy is positively correlated with a more cosmopolitan, less nationalistic, world view.[407] However, this result may still be consistent with my Homogenisation argument that people who are, and/or feel, greater autonomy will forge relatively more 'bonding' and fewer 'bridging' connections than those who are, and/or feel, less empowered.[408] Although crosscutting cleavages/similarities in values and interests exist between different countries, they are mainly found between societies of common civilisational origins and socio-economic development. Furthermore, Social Network Homogenisation (SNH) driven by a greater subjective sense of, and actual, autonomy diminishes both opportunities to encounter, and tolerance for, different political/cultural beliefs and interests which are often founded on divergent value emphases. Therefore, while modern communications technology can facilitate cross-national connections the clear majority of these relationships are probably between members of societies sharing a common language as well as similar beliefs, values, interests, norms and traditions (e.g. between citizens of Anglosphere nations). Consequently, per my Homogenisation theory SNH precipitated by a greater subjective sense of, and actual, autonomy may be reducing people's willingness (and certain social skills necessary) to engage with those of foreign cultural heritage. This is despite technological advances enabling long-distance connections.

Figure 4.4

Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations collated from 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves, between a greater subjective sense of autonomy and being less proud to be Australian (appendix 35).

[406] See Appendix 35
[407] Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.52, 54 & 143
[408] Correlations between objective measures of autonomy (such as income and education attainment) and social and political capital and engagement are discussed later in this as well as in the next, chapter.



Table 4.1

Correlations between "A subjective sense of autonomy" and "Being less proud to be Australian"

	Age Groups				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981 wave	r= -.105, p= .021	x	r= -.182, p= .045	X	x
1995 wave	r= -.086, p= .000	r= -.174, p= .000	x	X	x
2005 wave	r= -.092, p= .002	r= -.217, p= .001	x	X	x
2012 wave	r= -.091, p= .005	x	r= -.152, p= .022	r= -.116, p= .029	x

Correlations between a greater subjective sense of autonomy and greater national pride had higher P values (indicating less significance) among older, than among younger, demographics. This may suggest that many of those who feel less autonomous tend to become more nationalistic as they age. Indeed, statistics presented in the previous chapter show that (regardless of possible generational trends) levels of national pride tend to increase within generational cohorts as they age. That is, there may be a narrowing of the gap between levels of national pride felt by those who indicate feeling more and less autonomy within any cohort as they mature. Still, other correlations between measures of 'actual' autonomy and national pride may reveal different results. It is possible that overall

direct and indirect effects of modernisation and individual empowerment (such as rising levels of higher education attainment – Figure 4.5)[409] act to reduce national pride.

Figure 4.5

Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations collated from 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves, between having a higher level of formal education and being less proud to be Australian (appendix 526).



A greater subjective sense of autonomy was found to be positively correlated with both social trust and measures of trustworthiness.[410] These statistics (illustrated by Figures 4.6 and 4.7) are consistent with both Modernisation and my Homogenisation theories. As are crosstabulation statistics shown in Table 4.2 indicating that those who have a greater subjective sense of autonomy are more likely to trust others than are persons who deem themselves relatively less empowered. According to these theories social trust and trustworthiness are associated with self-expression and post material values. As people become and/or feel more autonomous they are less concerned about accumulating material wealth and financial security. Thus, they can, and/or believe they can, better afford to both trust others and prioritise honouring others' trust over their own immediate needs.

[409] See Appendix 526
[410] See Appendices 36-40

Figure 4.6

Average strength and significance scores within 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves of correlations between a greater subjective sense of autonomy and believing that most people 'cannot' be trusted (appendix 36).



Figure 4.7

Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations collated from 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves, between a greater subjective sense of autonomy and measures of untrustworthiness (appendices 37 - 40).



Table 4.2

% of people that reported the lowest and highest levels of subjectively sensed autonomy who believed that most people can be trusted.

Year	Participants who indicated feeling no choice at all over the way their lives turn out (i.e. 1 out of 10 on the autonomy scale).	Participants who indicated feeling a great deal of choice and control over the way their lives turn out (i.e. 10 out of 10 on the autonomy scale).
1981	40%	57.9%
1995	26.3%	41.1%
2005	18.8%	47.7%
2012	27.3%	54.9%

Individual empowering atomising trends raise actual (and consequently subjective sense of) autonomy. As explained in the previous chapter, according to my Homogenisation theory rising actual, and a subjective sense of autonomy probably contributed to a generational spike in political interest among Boomers.[411] I argued that this rise in (actual and a subjective sense of) autonomy and self-expression values enabled greater social modularity based on individual preference. However, new (contemporary) patterns of social interaction (greater social network homogeneity) have taken a couple of generations to become

[411] Boomers placed significantly greater emphasis on self-expression values than did their parents. Yet their social networks were not as homogenised as would be those of successive generations.

established. I reasoned that more homogenous social networks among Gens X and Y probably acted to slow, mitigate or reverse the generational increase in political interest. Consequently, there should have been positive correlations between a greater subjective sense of autonomy and greater political interest in earlier waves, particularly among Boomers, followed by waves in which the strength and significance of this relationship waned. WVS statistics largely support my hypothesis. They also suggest that the significance of the correlation between a subjective sense of autonomy and political interest may have declined among Boomers as they aged.[412] Boomers who felt particularly autonomous may have homogenised their social networks in later life, once they had access to the pre-existing more homogenous formal and informal groups which Gen X and Y took for granted. These more homogenous social networks may have acted to reduce or mitigate the greater political interest of particularly autonomous Boomers.

A greater subjective sense of autonomy was both:

- positively correlated with a stronger belief in the importance of children learning to "express themselves",[413] and
- negatively correlated with a stronger belief in the importance of children learning "good manners" and "thrift".[414]

Again, these findings are consistent with Modernisation and Homogenisation arguments that those who are more autonomous will tend, relative to those who are less autonomous, to place:

- greater emphasis on the importance of individual empowering self-expression values,[415] and
- less emphasis on the importance of conformity and individual sacrificing survival values.[416]

[412] See Appendix 41
[413] See Appendix 42
[414] See Appendices 43 & 44
[415] Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.2, 3, 28, 126, 164 & 212
[416] Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.4, 52, 54, 111, 142 & 143

Although there was a general negative correlation between subjectively sensed autonomy and a belief in the importance of children learning "thrift," positive correlations were observed among the 65+ demographic in the years 2005 and 2012. This may have been related to the experiences of those generations during the great depression and World War II when rationing was essential for survival. Alternatively, it may indicate that those who place greater value on thrift have tended to save more for their retirement and consequently feel a greater sense of autonomy than those who do not value thrift, and have not saved, to the same extent.

The negative correlation between a subjective sense of autonomy and the belief in the importance of children learning "thrift" may support my Homogenisation theory, but it also suggests that the degree to which people 'feel' autonomous is not the supreme catalyst for value change. While there was near universal and consistent increases in subjectively sensed autonomy among each age group across the four waves as shown by Figure 4.8, Figure 4.9 demonstrates that the belief in the importance of children learning 'thrift' rose steadily, and near consistently (among each age group) between 1981 and 2005.[417]

Figure 4.8

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who rated their "feelings of autonomy" between 1 and 7 out of 10 i.e. feeling less autonomous (appendix 563).

[417] See Appendices 563 & 564



Figure 4.9

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who believed it was important for children to learn thrift (appendix 564).



Similarly, WVS correlation statistics seem to support my Homogenisation arguments regarding **subjectively sensed autonomy and involvement in voluntary organisations**. Per Homogenisation and Modernisation theories, beyond a certain stage of society's

modernisation greater subjective sense, and levels of autonomy are associated with significantly more emphasis on egalitarian and self-expression values.[418] This value shift precipitates heightened political interest, and withdrawal from formal organisations with hierarchical structures.[419] According to Homogenisation theory participation in formal/voluntary organisations may experience some recovery. This may occur as the governing structures, processes and membership compositions (homogenisation) of these groups adapt to the expectations of more autonomous, egalitarian and conflict averse generations (see Chapter Three). Still, people who place greater, rather than less, emphasis on self-expression values may, even in the contemporary period, be less inclined to engage in formal groups. This is because formal organisations still tend to require more rules and official decision-making and are probably more ideologically diverse than loose informal friendship groups. Self-expression values are driven by a subjective sense of, and actual, security and autonomy when controlling for other variables. Consequently, those who feel and/or are more autonomous are less disposed to participating in formal organisations than those who feel and/or are less autonomous.

However, in the past greater autonomy may have been associated with heavier involvement in formal organisations. This is because those who are and feel greater autonomy probably have more time, and feel at liberty, to pursue their interests. These interests may precipitate engagement in sport and recreational clubs and societies, professional associations, labour unions, political parties and religious, educational, art and music organisations. Indeed, Australian WVS statistics indicate that a greater subjective sense of autonomy was associated with more (or had no correlation with) involvement in formal organisations in the past, but became (and is now) correlated with less engagement in these groups.[420] This is illustrated by Figure 4.10. An exception was involvement in labour unions which has had no discernible pattern of correlation with subjectively sensed autonomy across the various survey waves and age demographics.[421]

Figure 4.10

[418] Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.1-3, 5 & 6
[419] Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.44, 116, 117, 126, 293 & 294
[420] See Appendices 45-50
[421] See Appendix 51

Average strength and significance scores within 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves of correlations between a greater subjective sense of autonomy and being less involved in formal organisations. These formal groups include charitable, environmental, sport/recreational, church/religious, art, music and educational organisations as well as professional associations (appendices 45-50).



These findings have some consistency with the rates of active engagement in formal voluntary organisations over time as depicted by Figure 4.11. Australian WVS statistics indicate that between 1995 and 2005 there were declines in active engagement in most voluntary organisations among the 18 to 34, 35 to 49 and 50 to 64 demographics.[422] However, rates of formal organisational engagement tended to increase between 2005 and 2012 particularly among younger demographics;[423] perhaps due to formal groups adapting to the expectations, values and characteristics of younger generations.

Figure 4.11

Average rates (as percentages) of active engagement within voluntary organisations by Australian WVS participants within different age groups. These organisations include church/religious, sports/recreational, political party, environmental, charitable, consumer, art, music, educational and other organisations as well as labour unions and professional associations (appendices 16-25).

[422] See Appendices 16-25
[423] See Appendices 16-25



Some statistics collated from Australian WVS data may initially appear to contradict my Homogenisation theory. However, when considering variables that were, and were not, controlled less obvious but perhaps more compelling interpretations of these results, are revealed. Per Homogenisation theory those who are and/or feel greater autonomy will tend to emphasise self-expression values (autonomy and egalitarianism) more than those who feel less autonomous. Consequently, those who are and/or feel greater autonomy will tend to be more sceptical of, and therefore have less confidence in, major formal institutions and organisations than those who are and/or feel relatively less empowered. Adaptations to and by the governing structures and memberships of secular and non-political formal organisations (discussed in Chapter Three) may have diminished the effect of people's subjective sense of autonomy in reducing confidence in certain formal groups/institutions. However, people's subjective sense of autonomy should never act to lift organisational/institutional confidence according to my Homogenisation theory. Yet, Australian WVS statistics reveal positive, not negative, **correlations between a greater subjective sense of autonomy and confidence in most major public and private institutions and organisations** (shown in Figure 4.12). These institutions and organisations include the UN, parliament, political parties, the national government, the police, the press, the legal system, the armed forces, major companies, charitable/humanitarian organisations, the

environmental movement and banks.[424] However, a clear and consistent positive relationship was not found between confidence in labour unions and a subjective sense of autonomy.[425]

Figure 4.12

Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations between a greater subjective sense of autonomy and having less confidence in major public and private institutions and organisations collated from 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves (appendices 52-63).



These statistics measured correlations between participants' subjective sense of (as opposed to actual) autonomy and organisational/institutional confidence by controlling for variables listed earlier in this chapter; many included factors influencing actual levels of autonomy. Note that one of the variables that were not, and could not, be controlled for was the degree to which participants were already predisposed to being positive and optimistic. Therefore, the positive correlations found between a greater subjective sense of autonomy and more formal organisational/institutional confidence may not reflect a causal relationship. They could potentially be indicative of an uncontrolled factor "personal positivity" influencing both these variables being tested, thereby producing this correlation.

[424] See Appendices 52-63
[425] See Appendix 64

Many correlations found between levels of subjectively sensed autonomy and social capital measures have been revealed as consistent with both Modernisation and Homogenisation theories. These correlations include those between subjectively sensed autonomy and social attitudes/inclusion, trust, trustworthiness and the degree of importance people place on children learning self-expression, good manners and thrift. Additionally, the correlations found between subjectively sensed autonomy and national pride, political interest and formal group involvement across survey waves and age demographics appear to be more consistent with my Homogenisation than Inglehart and Welzel's Modernisation thesis. The correlations found between a greater subjective sense of autonomy and confidence in formal organisations/institutions support neither Modernisation nor Homogenisation theories. However, these inconsistencies may be explained by an uncontrolled factor (the degree to which individuals have positive personalities), inducing these results by obscuring the possible causal relationship between the variables tested. Together, these findings suggest that a subjective sense of (as opposed to actual), autonomy significantly influence shifts in values, levels of trust and trustworthiness and social/political engagement patterns.

Income and Financial Satisfaction

The next section of this fourth chapter analyses correlation statistics between two measures of existential security/autonomy (income and financial satisfaction) and value orientations, trust and engagement. These correlations will control for other salient variables to assist in the interpretation of these relationships using educated reasoning. These control variables are identical to those employed when analysing correlations between levels of subjectively sensed autonomy and other measures. Obviously when analysing possible relationships between two particular variables, these specific variables cannot be controlled. For example, when discussing correlations between greater financial satisfaction and other variables, financial satisfaction (although listed as one of the control variables) is not controlled, whereas income (also listed as a control variable) is controlled. Even when income is controlled financial satisfaction remains a measure of actual autonomy. Those who are relatively more financially satisfied at any given income level probably tend to invest more of their time and energy pursuing their life goals than those who are relatively less financially

satisfied and consequently preoccupied with accumulating material wealth. Therefore, greater financial satisfaction at any given income level will tend to empower one to fulfil their dreams.

In this section the degree to which financial satisfaction and income are correlated with each other, and the degree to which each are correlated with a subjective sense of autonomy and social and political trust, values and engagement will be revealed and discussed. As illustrated by Figures 4.13 and 4.14 and Tables to 4.3 and 4.4 correlations between higher income and greater financial satisfaction and between greater financial satisfaction and a greater subjective sense of autonomy are positive, very consistent and usually extremely significant regardless of wave or age group.[426] However, the correlations between a greater subjective sense of autonomy and income are much weaker and are inconsistent within waves and among age groups. The significant correlations found between these variables were evenly split between those that were positive and negative.[427] This suggests that income can have an impact on a subjective sense of autonomy only by influencing financial satisfaction. Correlations found between income and social and political trust, values and engagement can usually be attributed to income alone. However, any impact financial satisfaction might have on civic trust, values and involvement may well be amplified or reduced by rising or falling income levels. This is because higher incomes have a consistent positive correlation (very likely to be causal) with financial satisfaction. A rise in incomes is likely to raise financial satisfaction which is in turn likely to influence other dependent variables.

Figure 4.13

Strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations between higher income and greater financial satisfaction collated from 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves (appendix 65).

[426] See Appendices 65 & 66
[427] See Appendix 67



Table 4.3

Correlations between "Income" and "Financial Satisfaction"

	Age groups				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981 wave	r= .256, p= .000	r= .242, p= .000	r= .348, p= .000	r= .190, p= .080	r= .303, p= .041
1995 wave	r= .093, p= .000	r= .077, p= .046	r= .075, p= .084	x	x
2005 wave	r= .326, p= .000	r= .453, p= .000	r= .323, p= .000	r= .259, p= .000	r= .325, p= .000
2012 wave	r= .360, p= .000	r= .499, p= .000	r= .315, p= .000	r= .371, p= .000	r= .280, p= .000

Figure 4.14

Strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations between greater financial satisfaction and a greater subjective sense of autonomy collated from 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves (appendix 66).



Table 4.4

Correlations between "Financial Satisfaction" and "A subjective sense of autonomy"

	Age groups				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981 wave	r= .209, p= .000	r= .210, p= .002	r= .260, p= .002	x	r= .396, p= .008
1995 wave	r= .284, p= .000	r= .257, p= .000	r= .279, p= .000	r= .356, p= .000	r= .226, p= .000
2005 wave	r= .308, p= .000	r= .318, p= .000	r= .300, p= .000	r= .361, p= .000	r= .191, p= .005
2012 wave	r= .312, p= .000	r= .168, p= .024	r= .408, p= .000	r= .243, p= .000	r= .349, p= .000

Clear and significant positive correlations were found between **greater financial satisfaction and interpersonal trust**. This relationship is consistent among the 18 to 34 demographic across all but the 2012 waves. However, no significant correlations between levels of financial satisfaction and interpersonal trust were found among the 35 to 49 age group in any wave.[428] In the 1981, 2005, and 2012 waves **higher incomes and interpersonal trust** were positively correlated.[429] The positive correlations found between interpersonal trust and greater financial satisfaction and income are corroborated by crosstabulation statistics (demonstrated by Tables 4.5 and 4.6) showing that persons with greater financial

[428] See Appendix 68
[429] However, in 1995 higher incomes and interpersonal trust were negatively correlated; See Appendix 69

satisfaction and higher incomes tend to be more trusting of others than those with relatively less financial satisfaction and lower incomes. Australian real median incomes have risen between each wave.[430] Thus, rising incomes may act to lift interpersonal trust directly as well as indirectly by influencing financial satisfaction which subsequently acts to lift interpersonal trust.

Table 4.5

% of people that reported the lowest and highest levels of financial satisfaction who believed that most people can be trusted.

Year	Lowest level of financial satisfaction (i.e. 1 out of 10 on the financial satisfaction scale)	Highest level of financial satisfaction (i.e. 10 out of 10 on the financial satisfaction scale)
1981	44.7%	51.1%
1995	25.6%	32.8%
2005	16.2%	44.8%
2012	28.9%	59.1%

Table 4.6

% of people in the lowest and highest income deciles who believed that most people can be trusted.

Year	Lowest income decile.	Highest income decile.
1981	44%	60%
1995	40%	40.1%
2005	33.2%	62.9%
2012	41.9%	62.5%

These relationships are consistent with both Modernisation and Homogenisation arguments that greater existential security increases social trust.[431] However, among each age group financial satisfaction was lower in 1995, 2005 and 2012 than it was in 1981. Therefore, modernisation and real incomes may not be the only, or even main, factors influencing financial satisfaction. Other such factors will be explored later. These may include changing levels of wealth and living standard inequality. Wealth and living standard inequality may be influencing the relative strength of certain independent variables (including income and financial satisfaction) on social and political values and engagement.

[430] Onselen, Leith. (2013) 'Australian income inequality worsens', *The Australian,* viewed 20 October 2015, http://www.macrobusiness.com.au/2013/01/australian-income-inequality-worsens/
[431] Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.52 & 54

Relationships between greater financial satisfaction and involvement in formal voluntary organisations have tended to either weaken or reverse over time. The correlations between greater financial satisfaction and participation in sports, art, music, and educational organisations were positive and more significant in the past but have weakened or disappeared in more recent waves.[432] The correlations between greater financial satisfaction and involvement in political parties and religious organisations (when religious attendance was not controlled) were positive in 1981 and 1995 but became negative in the 2005 and 2012 waves.[433] A similar pattern can be identified in the evolving relationship between involvement in some voluntary organisations and income. The significant correlations between higher income and engagement in charitable and professional organisations among various age groups were positive in the 1981 wave but were negative in 2005 and 2012.[434] These trends may indicate that existential security has risen to such a point that additional units of financial satisfaction and income are now reducing rather than increasing the likelihood that people will engage in certain voluntary organisations. Additionally, higher incomes appear to be negatively correlated with involvement in sport and recreational organisations (although no correlation of this sort was found among the 18 to 34 demographic).[435]

Figure 4.15

Average strength and significance scores within 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves of correlations between greater financial satisfaction and being less involved in sports, art, music and educational organisations (appendices 70 & 71).

[432] See Appendices 70 & 71
[433] See Appendices 72 & 73
[434] See Appendices 74 & 75
[435] See Appendix 76



These results are consistent with both Modernisation and Homogenisation arguments that greater existential security and autonomy precipitate a rising emphasis on elite-challenging egalitarian self-expression values. While initially, additional units of security and autonomy may act to raise formal group engagement, beyond a certain stage of modernisation self-expression values are emphasised to such a degree that additional units reduce formal group participation. This is because formal organisations tend to have hierarchal structures and consequently people who place greater emphasis on egalitarian self-expression values are less inclined to participate in these groups.

Other correlations between income and formal group involvement initially appear at odds with both Modernisation and Homogenisation theses. Higher incomes were positively correlated with political party engagement particularly among the 35 to 49 age group.[436] Likewise, when religious attendance was not controlled higher incomes were positively correlated with greater involvement in church/religious organisations.[437] However, when religious attendance was controlled these correlations disappeared.[438] This would indicate that when other variables (including financial satisfaction) are controlled persons with higher incomes are more inclined to be heavily religious than those who have lower incomes.

[436] See Appendix 77
[437] See Appendix 78
[438] See Appendix 79

According to Modernisation and Homogenisation theses those with greater wealth and existential security tend to be relatively less religious than those poorer and with less existential security.[439] Yet, the strong significant positive correlation between higher income and greater financial satisfaction suggests that rising incomes act to lift financial satisfaction. As greater financial satisfaction has tended to be negatively correlated with formal group engagement in more recent waves, higher income may still have an overall negative impact on political party and religious organisation engagement. This would be consistent with both Modernisation and Homogenisation theories.

The relationships between informal/unconventional political engagement and financial satisfaction and income were mixed. According to Inglehart and Welzel people with greater financial satisfaction and incomes are more inclined to participate in peaceful demonstrations, boycotts and petition signing than those less financially satisfied and relatively impoverished.[440] A positive correlation was indeed found between higher incomes and petition signing among the 50 to 64 age group in 2005.[441] However, a negative correlation was discovered between financial satisfaction and petition signing among the 50 to 64 age group in 2005.[442] Existential security (in the form of higher income and financial satisfaction) appears to have contributed little to the significant increases in unconventional political action observed between the 2005 and 2012 waves. Other factors (that contribute to autonomy) potentially influencing levels of unconventional political action (including the effects of rising levels of tertiary education), are explored in the next chapter.

The ways in which higher income and greater financial satisfaction are correlated with levels of political interest and discussion appear to broadly support Modernisation and Homogenisation theories despite several inconsistencies. As shown in Figure 4.16 positive correlations were found between greater financial satisfaction and more political interest and between greater financial satisfaction and frequency of discussing politics with friends and work colleagues.[443] As demonstrated by Figure 4.17, higher incomes were also positively

[439] Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.20 & 29-31
[440] Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.5, 6, 42-44, 52, 116-118, 121 & 122
[441] See Appendix 81
[442] See Appendix 83
[443] See Appendices 84 & 85

correlated with political interest in 2005 and 2012; particularly in 2012.[444] However, higher incomes were negatively correlated with political interest in 1995.[445] No consistent significant correlations were found between higher income and political discussion.[446] Still, the bulk of the collated survey statistics support Modernisation and Homogenisation theories. Greater existential security, it would seem, tends to encourage more political interest and discussion in post-industrial societies.

Figure 4.16

Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations collated from 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves, between greater financial satisfaction and being uninterested in politics and not discussing politics with friends and work colleagues (appendices 84-85).



Figure 4.17

Strength and significance scores within 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves of correlations between higher incomes and being uninterested in politics (appendix 86).

[444] See Appendix 86
[445] See Appendix 86
[446] See Appendix 87



The Modernisation and Homogenisation argument that **greater financial satisfaction and higher income** act to reduce **confidence in major hierarchal institutions** in post-industrial societies initially appears inconsistent with Australian WVS statistics. Greater financial satisfaction is positively correlated with more confidence in all major institutions tested as shown in Figure 4.18. These included the press, major companies, charitable/humanitarian organisations, the environmental movement, banks, the UN, the civil service, Parliament, political parties, the national government, police, labour unions, the legal system, the Armed Forces and churches.[447] Greater financial satisfaction was also found to be positively correlated with a belief that one's country was run for the benefit of all people rather than a few big interests.[448] Conversely, higher incomes were found to be negatively correlated with confidence in the UN, the civil service, the police, labour unions, television, the press and churches and a belief that one's country is run for the benefit of all rather than a few big interests.[449] This is shown in Figure 4.19.

Figure 4.18

Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations collated from 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves, between greater

[447] See Appendices 88-102
[448] See Appendix 103
[449] See Appendices 104-111

financial satisfaction and having less confidence in major public and private institutions and organisations (appendices 88-102).



Figure 4.19

Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations collated from 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves, between higher incomes and having less confidence in the UN, the civil service, the police, labour unions, television, the press and churches and a belief that one's country is run for the benefit of all rather than a few big interests (appendices 104-111).



Together, these statistics suggest that the positive correlation between greater financial satisfaction and institutional/organisational confidence may not be caused by financial satisfaction as an independent variable. Instead, this correlation may be explained by those with conservative personality types tending to be both more confident in their society's major institutions and more accepting of their lot in life (including their financial situation), than those who are relatively more open minded. This interpretation is consistent with Modernisation and Homogenisation theories which argue that measures of security and autonomy (such as financial satisfaction and income) act to raise egalitarian self-expression values diminishing institutional/organisational confidence. While higher incomes were positively correlated with confidence in Parliament, major companies, charitable/humanitarian organisations and banks[450] (as illustrated by Figure 4.20), evidence suggests that higher incomes raise financial satisfaction which may reduce institutional/organisational confidence.

Figure 4.20

Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations collated from 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves, between higher incomes and having less confidence in Parliament, major companies, charitable/humanitarian organisations and banks (appendices 112-115).



[450] See Appendices 112-115

Correlations between income and measures of generosity and trustworthiness appear to be weak and inconsistent.[451] Conversely, correlations between greater financial satisfaction and measures of generosity and trustworthiness are positive and fairly consistent, as depicted by Figures 4.21 and 4.22.[452] These results are further evidence that financial satisfaction has a greater direct influence on more measures of social capital than does income. However, income may still have an indirect effect on these dependent variables through its impact on financial satisfaction. Therefore, these statistics tend to support both Modernisation and Homogenisation theories. Crosstabulation statistics, which do not control for extraneous variables, corroborate the relationship between financial satisfaction and generosity. This can be observed in Table 4.7. The question assessing participants generosity was only asked in the 2005 wave of the WVS.

Figure 4.21

Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations collated from 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves, between greater financial satisfaction and being less willing to pay higher taxes to help poorer countries (appendix 122).



Figure 4.22

[451] See Appendices 116-121
[452] See Appendices 122-127

Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations collated from 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves, between greater financial satisfaction and measures of untrustworthiness (appendices 123-127).



Table 4.7

% of people that reported the lowest and highest levels of financial satisfaction who would be willing to pay higher taxes to increase foreign aid to poor countries.

Year	Lowest level of financial satisfaction (i.e. 1 out of 10 on the financial satisfaction scale)	Highest level of financial satisfaction (i.e. 10 out of 10 on the financial satisfaction scale)
2005	25.4%	40.9%

Similarly, Australian WVS statistics reveal that when other variables (including financial satisfaction) are controlled, **income has no correlation with national pride, happiness or life satisfaction**.[453] However, when other variables (including income) are controlled, **greater financial satisfaction is positively correlated with greater national pride (particularly among younger demographics), and consistently and positively correlated with greater happiness and life satisfaction** among all age groups and waves.[454] This is demonstrated by Figures 4.23 through to 4.25 and Tables 4.8 through to 4.10. These statistics may indicate that people with more conservative and unimaginative personality types are also happier,

[453] See Appendices 128-130
[454] See Appendices 131-133

more satisfied and proud of their nation than those who are relatively more radical/progressive. That is, conservatives are perhaps more inclined to be satisfied with their lot in life (including their financial situation) than are progressives who consider preferable futures relatively more frequently.

Figure 4.23

Strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations collated from 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves, between greater financial satisfaction and being less proud to be Australian (appendix 131).



Table 4.8

Correlations between "Financial Satisfaction" and "Being less proud to be Australian"

	Age Groups				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981 wave	X	x	x	x	x
1995 wave	r= -.076, p= .001	r= -.167, p= .000	x	x	x
2005 wave	r= -.091, p= .002	x	x	r= -.105, p= .047	x
2012 wave	r= -.077, p= .016	r= -.160, p= .032	r= -.150, p= .023	x	x

Figure 4.24

Strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations between greater financial satisfaction and being less happy collated from 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves (appendix 132).



Table 4.9

Correlations between "Financial Satisfaction" and "Unhappiness"

	Age Groups				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981 wave	r= -.293, p= .000	r= -.172, p= .012	r= -.328, p= .000	r= -.475, p= .000	r= -.450, p= .002
1995 wave	r= -.245, p= .000	r= -.185, p= .000	r= -.210, p= .000	r= -.310, p= .000	r= -.222, p= .000
2005 wave	r= -.359, p= .000	r= -.314, p= .000	r= -.413, p= .000	r= -.364, p= .000	r= -.200, p= .004
2012 wave	r= -.272, p= .000	r= -.211, p= .004	r= -.320, p= .000	r= -.237, p= .000	r= -.233, p= .001

Figure 4.25

Strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations between greater financial satisfaction and more life satisfaction collated from 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves (appendix 133).



Table 4.10

Correlations between "Financial Satisfaction" and "Life Satisfaction"

	Age groups				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981 wave	r= .351, p= .000	r= .298, p= .000	r= .344, p= .000	r= .498, p= .000	r= .428, p= .003
1995 wave	r= .470, p= .000	r= .400, p= .000	r= .443, p= .000	r= .576, p= .000	r= .445, p= .000
2005 wave	r= .422, p= .000	r= .388, p= .000	r= .395, p= .000	r= .455, p= .000	r= .346, p= .000
2012 wave	r= .515, p= .000	r= .501, p= .000	r= .582, p= .000	r= .512, p= .000	r= .440, p= .000

Alternatively, these findings may suggest that greater financial satisfaction does encourage and help precipitate directly, or indirectly, higher levels of national pride, happiness and life satisfaction. The interpretation that greater financial satisfaction (a measure of autonomy) acts to raise happiness and life satisfaction is consistent with Modernisation and Homogenisation theories. However, the interpretation that greater financial satisfaction acts to raise national pride is in total contradiction of Modernisation theory. The Modernisation thesis holds that greater existential security, autonomy, and life and financial satisfaction in post-industrial societies is positively correlated with liberal,

egalitarian and post material self-expression values.[455] Inglehart and Welzel contend that these values act to reduce national pride in lieu of a more cosmopolitan worldview.[456]

However, this interpretation may be consistent with my Homogenisation theory. As was discussed previously, financial satisfaction is a measure of actual autonomy. According to my Homogenisation thesis, those who are, and/or feel, greater autonomy will forge relatively more bonding and fewer bridging connections than those who are, and/or feel, less empowered. Arguably, this SNH (evidence for which is explored in Chapters Six, Seven and Eight) is driven by a greater subjective sense of, and/or actual autonomy (measured by variables including financial satisfaction) and diminishes both opportunities to encounter, and tolerance for, different political and cultural beliefs and interests. Consequently, SNH may be reducing people's willingness (and certain social skills necessary) to engage with those of foreign cultural heritage (raising national pride), despite technological advances enabling long-distance connections. That is, the clear majority of cross-national connections facilitated by greater access to communications technology are likely to be between members of societies sharing a common language as well is similar beliefs, values, interests, norms and traditions. This interpretation is reinforced by previously discussed positive correlations between a subjective sense of autonomy and national pride.

Greater financial satisfaction (controlling for other significant variables) is positively correlated with more conservative views on issues such as euthanasia, divorce, abortion, prostitution, homosexuality and sex before marriage.[457] Contrastingly, higher income (when controlling for other significant variables) is as equally and positively correlated with more liberal attitudes on the same issues.[458] These relationships are illustrated by Figures 4.26 through to 4.28. While rising income may act to lift financial satisfaction, raised financial satisfaction is unlikely to instil or encourage conservative attitudes on social and moral issues. Rather, the correlation between financial satisfaction and conservatism may be explained by those with already conservative personality types also tending to be more financially

[455] Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.138-143 & 294
[456] Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.52 & 54
[457] See Appendices 134-139
[458] See Appendices 140-145

satisfied, at any given income level, than those with more liberal/radical/progressive/imaginative personality types.

Figure 4.26

Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations collated from 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves, between greater financial satisfaction and more liberal attitudes regarding voluntary euthanasia, divorce, abortion, prostitution, homosexuality and sex before marriage (appendices 134-139).



Figure 4.27

Average strength and significance scores within 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves of correlations between greater financial satisfaction and more liberal attitudes regarding voluntary euthanasia, divorce, abortion, prostitution, homosexuality and sex before marriage (appendices 134-139).



Figure 4.28

Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations collated from 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves, between higher income and more liberal attitudes regarding voluntary euthanasia, divorce, abortion, prostitution, homosexuality and sex before marriage (appendices 140-145).



The data may also indicate that people with liberal attitudes are more likely to work in creative and innovative ways than are conservatives. That is, rising income itself possibly has

no effect on social attitudes. However, nations with higher median incomes and living standards tend to have more liberal attitudes on social issues than nations with lower median incomes and living standards.[459] Therefore, the correlations presented are more likely to indicate that income, or another variable highly correlated with income (such as education attainment), is contributing to the rise of liberal attitudes in post-industrial societies, like Australia, over time.

Similarly, negative correlations were found between higher incomes and a belief in the importance of children learning obedience and religious faith.[460] That is, higher incomes were associated with greater self-expression and secular/rational values. Conversely, greater financial satisfaction was associated with either religious/survival values across all waves, or self-expression values in early waves followed by survival values in latter waves. Positive correlations were found between greater financial satisfaction and a belief in the importance of children learning religious faith and 'feelings' of responsibility.[461] Negative correlations were found between financial satisfaction and a belief in the importance of children learning both self-expression and to be imaginative.[462] Prior to 2012 financial satisfaction was negatively correlated with a belief in the importance of children learning obedience and positively correlated with a belief in the importance of children learning tolerance and respect for others. However, in the 2012 wave these correlations were reversed.[463] That is, only in the 2012 wave was greater financial satisfaction positively correlated with more survival/conservative attitudes.

These findings may be explained by the following developments/hypothesis. In advanced welfare state nations like Australia, median wealth, health care, welfare and education have risen. Therefore, the disparity between people's subjective sense of existential security may have diminished. This is because living standard (as opposed to wealth) inequality has probably decreased. That is, every additional unit of wealth has relatively less 'marginal utility' (impact on living standards) for the wealthy as compared to

[459] Toth and Kemmelmier, 'Divorce Attitudes Around the World', p.288 & 289; Merz and Liefbroer, 'The Attitude Toward Voluntary Childlessness in Europe: Cultural and Institutional Explanations', p.594 & 597
[460] See Appendices 146 & 147
[461] See Appendices 148 & 149
[462] See Appendices 150 & 151
[463] See Appendices 152 & 153

the poor.[464] As the wealth and existential security of most people, including the poor, has risen the disparity between the living standards of the wealthy and poor may have declined, while income inequality has actually risen. Consequently, the disparity between where the financially satisfied and the financially dissatisfied sit on the survival to self-expression values continuum may have also diminished. This could have allowed other influential factors including differing personality types to have a relatively greater impact on the relationship between financial satisfaction and views regarding what is important for children to learn than financial satisfaction's causal effect on such attitudes. That is, controlling for other variables those with more conservative, unimaginative dispositions are perhaps more inclined than those who have more creative, liberal personalities to both:

- hold conservative attitudes regarding what is important for children to learn, and
- be more satisfied with their lot in life (including their financial situation).

The influence of financial satisfaction on these attitudes has probably declined due to greater equality in living standards/existential security. Therefore, the effect personality types have on the correlations between beliefs concerning what is important for children to learn and financial satisfaction has possibly become relatively stronger. This may explain why greater financial satisfaction was positively correlated with more liberal attitudes prior to 2012 but has since become negatively correlated with those same views.

Contrastingly, higher income has been almost consistently and positively correlated with liberal attitudes regarding what is important for children to learn across all waves. This is possibly due to personality types having more of an influence on financial satisfaction than on income. When correlations between income and certain values are assessed while controlling for other variables (including financial satisfaction) the impact personality types (liberal or conservative dispositions) have on these relationships is almost eliminated. These interpretations of the correlations between attitudes toward the family unit and both financial satisfaction and income are consistent with Modernisation and Homogenisation theories.

[464] Layard, R., Mayraz, G., and Nickell, S. (2008) 'The marginal utility of income', *Journal of Public Economics,* vol:92, p.1856

However, correlations between financial satisfaction and various views and attitudes are probably affected by (conservative versus open-minded) personality types to different extents. The correlation (indicating a potential causal relationship) between **greater financial satisfaction and tolerance/acceptance of foreign workers** appears to be little affected by the relationship between each of these variables and conservative personality types. Contrastingly, the correlations between financial satisfaction and views regarding other social and moral issues appear to be relatively more affected by the relationships between these variables and conservative personality types. This may be because financial satisfaction has a stronger influence on attitudes toward foreign workers than on views regarding other social/moral matters. Alternatively, conservative dispositions may have relatively weaker influence on attitudes toward foreign workers than on views regarding other social/moral matters.

There were some significant negative correlations between financial satisfaction and more protectionist attitudes toward immigrant workers when jobs are scarce, particularly among the 18 to 34 demographic.[465] This is unsurprising from Modernisationist and Homogenisationist perspectives. People who are more financially satisfied feel greater existential security and autonomy than those who are relatively financially dissatisfied. They are therefore more inclined to emphasise liberal, cosmopolitan, egalitarian, self-expression values rather than conformity, nationalistic, survival values. Less financially satisfied younger people are more likely to be affected by recessions and joblessness than those with more established careers. Hence, younger people are probably inclined to have more protectionist attitudes toward foreign workers (particularly if they are filling low/unskilled jobs), than their elders.[466]

In 2012, the significant negative correlations between financial satisfaction and more protectionist attitudes to foreign workers had disappeared in each of the age groups and the wave overall.[467] This is probably due to a hardening of attitudes toward foreign workers, particularly among the financially satisfied. This is supported by the frequency statistics

[465] See Appendix 154
[466] Bell, David, N, F. and Blanchflower, David, G. (2011) 'Young people and the Great Recession', *Oxford Review of Economic Policy,* vol:27(2), p. 241-267
[467] See Appendix 154

explored in the previous chapter. This hardening of attitudes may be, at least partly, explained by Australian unemployment and underemployment increasing in the years following the GFC and the number of temporary foreign workers in Australia (on 457 visas) more than doubling between 2005 and 2012.[468] However, no consistent correlations were found between income and attitudes to foreign workers,[469] indicating that, once again, when controlling for other variables income has much less of an effect on many of the dependent variables considered in this thesis than financial satisfaction. However, income may still play a significant role in the shaping of outcomes by raising financial satisfaction.

Industrial Relations

From here I investigate whether Putnam's contention that industrial relations deregulation has acted to reduce job and existential security, and various indicators of social capital and civic engagement, applies in the Australian context.[470] I conclude that it does not. Putnam holds that the abandonment of certain industrial relations regulations for greater workplace flexibility, productivity and in many instances autonomy has had analogous negative outcomes for levels of social connectivity and associated life choices and opportunities.[471] While Putnam concedes that industrial relations deregulation can, in some contexts, be economically beneficial he stresses that these benefits come at social costs. He argues that performance-based pay has a detrimental effect on bonding between co-workers.[472] Michael O'Donnell has found that performance-based pay negatively impacts teamwork and cooperation in the workplace.[473] Other studies have revealed that even when teamwork is not especially required, performance-based pay can reduce productivity when the tasks set require even a basic level of cognitive consideration as opposed to repetitive manual labour.[474] Putnam also highlights the coordination problems faced by many

[468] Swanger, 'Australia's underemployment rate at 8.4%'; Colgan, 'CHART: Youth underemployment is now at the highest level ever recorded in Australia'; ABC NEWS, 'Youth unemployment rate'; Pash, 'CHART: Almost 1.3 million people have come to Australia on 457 work visas over the last 20 years'
[469] See Appendix 155
[470] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.87-91, 93, 94 & 191
[471] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.88-91 & 191
[472] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.89 & 90
[473] O'Donnell, 'Creating a Performance Culture? Performance-based Pay in the Australian Public Service' p.28 & 38
[474] Pink, Dan. (2009) 'The puzzle of motivation', *TEDGlobal,* viewed 21 October 2015, http://www.ted.com/talks/dan_pink_on_motivation?language=en

employees with irregular work hours in organising social and community events with others.[475] Declining regular 9 to 5, Monday to Friday jobs have been, and are, exacerbating these difficulties in many countries.[476] Increases in irregular work schedules have been linked to reduced participation in group leisure activities and to detrimental effects on mental and physical health and well-being.[477] Putnam also posits that industrial relations deregulation has raised the financial anxiety felt by many of those in contingent employment and that this increase in financial anxiety undermines social and political engagement.[478]

Other studies into the effects of IR deregulation on employee well-being and productivity in developed countries have largely supported Putnam's arguments. Sparks, Faragher and Cooper argue that advances in technology, particularly IT, and increasing globalisation have raised the competitiveness of international markets, encouraging many organisations to restructure and "de-layer" (cut out middle management) to survive.[479] They reveal that in many OECD countries there has been a growth in short term contracts "as a result, possibly, of the deregulation of fixed term contracts".[480] These trends have precipitated a rise in job insecurity in several OECD countries.[481] Not only has job insecurity been linked to poor physical and mental health but also to greater absenteeism and declines in work quality, social/civic engagement and organisational loyalty.[482] While younger workers (18 to 30) are more accepting of insecure work compared to older workers, this is only short-term. Long-term non-permanency is considered a major obstacle to engaging in certain activities later in the life-cycle such as buying property and starting a family.[483]

[475] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.191
[476] Sparks, Kate., Faragher, Brian and Cooper, Cary, L. (2001) 'Well-being and occupational health in the 21st century workplace', *Journal of Occupational and Organisational Psychology,* vol:74, p.492; Schawbel, Dan. (2011) 'The Beginning of the End of the 9-to-5 workday?', *TIME,* viewed 21 October 2015, http://business.time.com/2011/12/21/the-beginning-of-the-end-of-the-9-to-5-workday/
[477] Martens., Nijhuis., Boxtel., and Knottnerus. 'Flexible work schedules and mental and physical health', p.43
[478] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.193
[479] Sparks., Faragher., and Cooper. 'Well-being and occupational health in the 21st century workplace,' p.489 & 490
[480] Sparks., Faragher., and Cooper. 'Well-being and occupational health in the 21st century workplace,' p.489
[481] Sparks., Faragher., and Cooper. 'Well-being and occupational health in the 21st century workplace,' p.490-492
[482] Sparks., Faragher., and Cooper. 'Well-being and occupational health in the 21st century workplace,' p.491
[483] Sparks., Faragher., and Cooper. 'Well-being and occupational health in the 21st century workplace,' p.492

Australian Exceptionalism

However, many of the trends found in other advanced countries do not apply to Australia. Casual (as opposed to permanent) employees as a proportion of the workforce have remained fairly steady (at approximately 20%) for more than two decades.[484] A disproportional and growing share of casual employees are young people; those aged 15 to 24.[485] Casual employment reduces the risks of employment undertaken by employers; providing young people with greater opportunities to enter the workforce at an age when they are less concerned about job permanency.[486] Contrastingly, over the last two decades the percentage of casual workers aged 25+ has rarely nudged 15%.[487] The percentage of female workers of prime working age (25 to 54) who are casually employed (although higher than that of men) has been declining fairly steadily since 2000.[488] Therefore, the argument that the casualisation of the Australian workforce is raising job insecurity and financial anxiety is simply without any basis. Research by Edelman Berland also suggests that a large proportion of casuals are casual by choice for reasons of flexibility and skills development.[489]

Other causes of financial anxiety and distress in OECD countries according to Sparks, Faragher and Cooper include falling real minimum wages.[490] However, Australian real hourly average, median and minimum wages have been rising fairly consistently for almost three decades despite growing income inequality.[491] While rates of underemployment in Australia have increased since 1986, from 3.3% of those employed to 8.6% in 2014, rates of unemployment have swung dramatically in that time from less than 2% in 1970 to 11% in the

[484] Jericho, Greg. (2014) 'The Casualisation of Australia's workforce is nothing to panic about', *The Guardian,* viewed 22 October 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/business/grogonomics/2014/oct/17/the-casualisation-of-australias-workforce-is-nothing-to-panic-about
[485] Jericho, Greg. 'The Casualisation of Australia's workforce is nothing to panic about'
[486] Jericho, Greg. 'The Casualisation of Australia's workforce is nothing to panic about'; Sparks., Faragher., and Cooper. 'Well-being and occupational health in the 21st century workplace,' p.492
[487] Jericho, Greg. 'The Casualisation of Australia's workforce is nothing to panic about'
[488] Jericho, Greg. 'The Casualisation of Australia's workforce is nothing to panic about'
[489] Elance-oDesk. (2014) 'Freelancing in Australia: A National survey of the New Workforce', *Slideshare,* viewed 22 October 2015, http://www.slideshare.net/oDesk/freelancing-in-australia-a-national-survey-of-the-new-workforce-40284354
[490] Sparks., Faragher., and Cooper. 'Well-being and occupational health in the 21st century workplace,' p.491
[491] Onselen, Leith. 'Australian income inequality worsens'; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 'Average annual wages', *OECD.Stat,* viewed 22 October 2015, https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=TEMP_I#; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 'Real minimum wages', *OECD.Stat,* viewed 22 October 2015, https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=TEMP_I#

early 1990s to 4% in 2007 to 6.2% in July 2015.[492] This may indicate that rates of underemployment, like unemployment, may be due to short-term period effects such as recessions and the end of a resources boom rather than to long-term systemic changes.

Still, some fundamental restructuring of the workforce has been taking place. Since the 1970s the proportion of part-time workers has soared dramatically.[493] Equivalently dramatic increases in rates of underemployment or discouraged workers are not present in the data suggesting that attitudinal changes and greater employment flexibility or both are encouraging the growth of more part-time employment by choice, which Putnam has linked to higher rates of social and civic engagement particularly among women.[494] Indeed the percentage of total employed people working between 20 and 39 hours a week rose between 2001 and 2014 from 34.5 to 40.9% while the proportion who work less than 20 hours a week has only declined slightly from 14.4 to 14% and the proportion working 40 hours plus per week fell considerably from 51 to 45.1%.[495]

Inequality and Housing Affordability

Perhaps somewhat more worrying are rising levels of inequality and dwelling cost to income ratios as well as declines in minimum wages relative to average and median wages of full-time workers. Australia's inequality (Gini coefficient) in household incomes (after benefits and taxes) has been rising fairly steadily since the early 1980s.[496] During this time Australia's minimum wage fell relative to both the average wage (from 59% in 1985 to 44% in 2013) and the median wage (65% in 1985 to 54% in 2013) of full time workers.[497] Economists often argue that in places where there is little elasticity of housing supply (urban and suburban

[492] Lowe, Philip. (2012) 'The Labour Market, Structural Change and Recent Economic Developments', *Reserve Bank of Australia,* viewed 22 October 2015, http://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2012/sp-dg-091012.html; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 'incidence of involuntary part time workers', *OECD.Stat,* viewed 22 October 2015, https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=TEMP_I#
[493] Australian Bureau of Statistics, (2009) 'Patterns in work', *4102.0 - Australian Social Trends*, viewed 22 October 2015, http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/Lookup/4102.0Main+Features50Dec+2009; Jericho, Greg. 'The Casualisation of Australia's workforce is nothing to panic about'
[494] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.194 & 201
[495] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 'incidence of employment by usual weekly hours worked', *OECD.Stat,* viewed 22 October 2015, https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=TEMP_I#
[496] Whiteford, Peter. (2014) 'Income and wealth inequality: how is Australia faring?', *The Conversation,* viewed 22 October 2015, https://theconversation.com/income-and-wealth-inequality-how-is-australia-faring-23483
[497] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 'minimum relative to average wages of full-time workers', *OECD.Stat,* viewed 22 October 2015, https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=INVPT_I#

areas where most Australians live) housing affordability usually declines when inequality rises. They argue that this is due to wealthier individuals spending a higher proportion of their incomes on saving and investment (including property investment) than relatively poorer persons.[498] Consequently, rising inequality means more money being invested by fewer people. This drives up property prices and forces many to forgo their dream of home ownership while many others struggle with greater indebtedness and mortgage repayments in chasing their dream of home ownership.

In Australia the mean and median dwelling price to the mean and median household income ratios have followed an almost identical pattern to household inequality. Between the mid-1980s and the mid-2000s the average dwelling price rose from approximately twice to well beyond four times the average annual household income.[499] Over the same time frame the median dwelling price rose from slightly over three times to about seven times the median annual household income.[500] Greater inequality and reduced housing affordability would certainly affect levels of financial anxiety, despite rising real average, median and minimum wages as people (particularly young first home buyers) increasingly stretch their budgets to keep up with the Joneses. Indeed other studies have revealed a link between areas with greater income inequality and mental health disorders, particularly depression.[501] There is strong evidence to suggest that people who are more financially anxious/dissatisfied and those who are depressed are more likely to become socially isolated and less engaged in social and civic life.[502] Therefore, Putnam's view that changing economic environments may be contributing to a general increase in financial anxiety/dissatisfaction, which may, in turn, be contributing to reductions in social capital, are plausible arguments insofar as they apply to Australia.

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[498] Matlack, Janna, L and Vigdor, Jacob, L. (2008) 'Do rising tides lift all prices? Income inequality and housing affordability', *Journal of Housing Economics,* vol:17, p.224

[499] Fox, Ryan and Finlay, Richard. (2012) 'Dwelling Prices and Household Income', *Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin – December Quarter,* viewed 22 October 2015, http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/2012/dec/2.html

[500] Fox and Finlay. 'Dwelling Prices and Household Income'

[501] Filho, Alexandre, D, P, C., Kawachi, Ichiro., Wang, Yuan, P., Viana, Maria, C., and Andrade, Laura, H, S, G. (2013) 'Does income inequality get under the skin? A multilevel analysis of depression, anxiety and mental disorders in Sao Paulo, Brazil', *Epidemiol Community Health,* vol:67, p.966 & 972

[502] Achterberg, Wilco., Pot, Anne, M., Kerkstra, Ada., Ooms, Marcel., Muller, Martien and Ribbe, Miel. (2003) 'The Effect of Depression on Social Engagement in Newly Admitted Dutch Nursing Home Residents', *The Gerontologist,* vol:43(2), p.216 & 217; Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.193

Australian Industrial Relations

However, in Australia, rising financial inequality and house prices are not the product of industrial relations deregulation. Australia has been a pioneer of progressive IR regulations. In 1904 Australia became the first country to create a court of conciliation and arbitration to settle disputes between employees, unions and employers.[503] In 1907 the court established the principle that all unskilled labourers were entitled to a minimum wage which would allow a family of 5 to live in "frugal comfort".[504] Australia was also an early adopter of annual leave (1906), sick leave (1907), the standard working week (44 hours 1927, 40 hours 1947 and 38 hours 1983), equal pay for equal work (1972) and unpaid maternity leave (1979).[505] In 1993, the Keating government legislated both federal 'unfair dismissal laws' and the legal right to strike during bargaining for registered enterprise agreements.[506] 'Good faith bargaining' was introduced as part of the *Fair Work Act 2009* (Australia). Good faith bargaining obligations raised the power and influence of trade unions at the expense of employers.[507]

Admittedly, there have also been incremental industrial relations reform toward greater deregulation, productivity and flexibility. The Howard government's *Workplace Relations Act 1996* (Australia) reversed the onus of proof in unfair dismissal claims. Rather than employers being required to prove that there were valid reasons for dismissal, employees now must prove dismissal was either harsh, unjust or unreasonable.[508] The act also introduced registered individual agreements (Australian Workplace Agreements), which are an addition to registered collective agreements sanctioned in 1993. Both types of agreement have acted to raise flexibility and enhance the degree to which workers' pay and

[503] Australian Government: FairWork Ombudsman, 'Australia's industrial relations timeline', viewed 23 October 2015, https://www.fairwork.gov.au/about-us/the-fair-work-system/australias-industrial-relations-timeline
[504] Philips, Keri. (2015) 'The history of industrial relations in Australia', *ABC Radio National (Australian Broadcasting Corporation),* viewed 23 October 2015, http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/rearvision/bosses-and-workers-in-australia/6407092
[505] Australian Government: FairWork Ombudsman, 'Australia's industrial relations timeline'
[506] Philipatos, Alexander. (5th of June 2012). 'Back to the "Bad Old Days": IR Reform and the Fair Work Act' Lecture presented for *THE CENTRE FOR INDEPENDENT STUDIES,* viewed online 6 June 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UH2hXQfbfeg
[507] Philipatos, 'Back to the "Bad Old Days": IR Reform and the Fair Work Act'
[508] Philipatos, 'Back to the "Bad Old Days": IR Reform and the Fair Work Act'

conditions are subject to market forces.[509] Upwards of 80% of workers are now covered by agreements while the proportion covered by relatively inflexible awards has decreased from 45% of workers in 1990 to below 15% (in 2012).[510] The 2005 Work Choices reforms outlawed pattern bargaining,[511] mandated secret ballots for industrial action and formulated a list of prohibited content that restricted the grounds on which employees could legally strike. The *Fair Work Act 2009* maintained the ban on pattern bargaining and the requirement for secret ballots as well as most Work Choices restrictions on industrial action.[512] These reforms have contributed to a significant decline in the strike rate; measured by the number of working hours lost per 1,000 employees.[513]

However, overall these incremental industrial relations reforms toward greater deregulation, productivity and flexibility have not come at the expense of workers' pay, conditions and ability to secure redress for supposedly unfair dismissal. Evidence suggests that the move away from awards and toward collective and individual agreements have contributed significantly to rising productivity and wages.[514] Workers covered by individual agreements have higher average weekly earnings than those on collective agreements whose average weekly earnings are in turn significantly higher than those on awards.[515] While the onus of proof now falls on workers to prove the validity of their unfair dismissal claims more than 80% of these claims are settled during the conciliation stage in which no evidence can be presented and employers are pressured to pay 'go-away money.' That is, employers (rather than their former employees) must pay the cost of an expensive trial (possibly more than $30,000) if the dispute goes to arbitration.[516] Therefore, these reforms have not amounted to a sweeping attack on workers' rights and entitlements. They cannot reasonably be used to argue that the general trend in Australian IR law history has been anything other than toward greater protection and bargaining-power for workers and unions.

[509] Philipatos, 'Back to the "Bad Old Days": IR Reform and the Fair Work Act'
[510] Philipatos, 'Back to the "Bad Old Days": IR Reform and the Fair Work Act'
[511] A process where a trade union uses new and superior entitlements gained from one employer as a precedent to demand the same or superior entitlements from other employers.
[512] Philipatos, 'Back to the "Bad Old Days": IR Reform and the Fair Work Act'
[513] Philipatos, 'Back to the "Bad Old Days": IR Reform and the Fair Work Act'
[514] Philipatos, 'Back to the "Bad Old Days": IR Reform and the Fair Work Act'
[515] Philipatos, 'Back to the "Bad Old Days": IR Reform and the Fair Work Act'
[516] Philipatos, 'Back to the "Bad Old Days": IR Reform and the Fair Work Act'

Indeed, only twice in the nation's history have governments attempted serious IR deregulation and both those centre-right governments were voted out of office in landslide election victories for the left (1929 and 2007), bringing an end to their medium to long term deregulation agendas.[517] Rising inequality in Australia, and the financial anxiety that that may directly or indirectly cause, are not the product of governments deregulating employment laws. Instead, it is more attributable to globalisation and the dynamic and technologically disruptive times in which we live.[518]

Non-traditional and flexible Hours

The workforce being employed part-time nearly doubled from 16% in August 1979 to 30% in August 2009.[519] As previously argued, this has been largely driven by employee choice, which is associated with greater social involvement in formal and informal group/organisational activities.[520] Conversely, trading hour liberalisation and the increase in the proportion of people working non-traditional hours has arguably had negative impacts on such engagement.[521] Not only has the proportion of people working non-traditional hours grown, so too has the proportion who work variable days and hours. A study conducted in 2008 found that

- "14.7% of employed people worked on days of the week which varied from week to week,"
- 26% "did not usually work the same number of hours each week", 33.8% usually worked on weekends,
- 25.1% usually were required to be on call or standby, and
- 36% worked some or all of their hours between 7 PM and 7 AM.[522]

[517] Markey, Raymond. (2013) 'Tragedy or farce? The repetition of Australian industrial relations history, 1929 and 2007', *Labor History,* vol:54(4), p.355-367
[518] Sparks., Faragher., and Cooper. 'Well-being and occupational health in the 21st century workplace,' p.489-492; Betran, Concha and Pons, Maria, A. (2013) 'Comparing past and present wage inequality in two globalisation periods', *Scandinavian Economic History Review*, vol:61(2), p.158 & 159
[519] Australian Bureau of Statistics, 'Patterns in work'
[520] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.90 & 191
[521] Martens., Nijhuis., Boxtel, and Knottnerus. 'Flexible work schedules and mental and physical health', p.43
[522] Australian Bureau of Statistics, 'Patterns in work'

Therefore, a significant portion of the Australian public face difficulties in coordinating social, community and civic organisational involvement. This may preclude more people from participation now than in the past when a greater proportion of 9 to 5 Monday to Friday jobs were available.

Despite these negative trends there is a growing fraction of the Australian workforce who work flexible/family and community friendly hours. Although realistically there are limitations to the forms of work which can reasonably provide this greater autonomy, the development of new technologies and the automation of many routine manual jobs are raising the share of these types of careers.[523] Not only can flexible hours raise productivity by increasing workforce participation, female worker retention and recruitment while lowering absenteeism, flexible hours can also help to overcome some of the real coordination barriers to voluntary formal and informal group engagement. Potentially, the restructuring of the modern workforce and work schedules are not purely obstacles to social capital formation and maintenance as is emphasised by Putnam (2000) and Martens, Nijhuis, Boxtel and Knottnerus (1999). It can also empower individuals to pursue activities requiring, and associated with, greater structural social capital. In the Australian context the only near certain economic drag on social capital is growing inequality. This has likely raised the proportion (relative to the rate it would otherwise have been) of people experiencing mental health issues and financial anxiety; in part due to wealth inequality's significant and strong relationship with housing unaffordability. Overall, evidence suggests that Putnam's contention that industrial relations deregulation has acted to reduce job and existential security, and various indicators of social and civic engagement, does not apply in the Australian context.

Conclusion

This chapter has analysed correlation, and other statistics, to weigh the relative strengths/weaknesses of Homogenisation, Modernisation and Lamentation theories. It has

[523] Brown, Alan, S. (2012) 'Automation vs. Jobs', *Mechanical Engineering magazine,* April, p.22-27; Osborne, Martin. (2012) 'Australia: Technology and its impact on flexible work', *Mondaq: connecting knowledge and people,* viewed 23 October 2015, http://www.mondaq.com/australia/x/180208/Employee+Benefits+Compensation/Technology+and+its+impact+on+flexible+work

focused on the relationships between a subjective sense of autonomy as well as economic factors possibly influencing actual levels of autonomy, and social capital and political engagement measures. This investigation has largely supported my Homogenisation thesis. Additionally, Putnam's Lamentationist arguments concerning the role of labour market deregulation in social capital and political involvement patterns (related to employee financial security and autonomy) are found not to apply in the Australian context. Contrastingly, higher incomes and financial satisfaction (two measures of autonomy) as well as levels of inequality appear to significantly influence social/political values, trust and engagement in ways fairly consistent with my Homogenisation theory. Inconsistencies can reasonably be attributed to the influence of an uncontrolled variable (personality types/predispositions) on correlations between financial satisfaction and views on certain social/moral matters.

In the next chapter correlations between other supposed measures of individual isolating and empowering atomisation and social/political trust, capital and engagement are assessed. Putnam's argument that delayed marriage, rising divorce and falling fertility rates are acting to reduce the formation of certain types of social bonds and community/civic involvement is considered.[524] This theory is weighed against Inglehart and Welzel's thesis that both familial structures and community and civic participation are affected by the same values shift.[525]

[524] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.86, 94, 267 & 278
[525] Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.5-8, 39, 40, 42-44, 52, 54, 116-118, 121, 122 & 124-130

CHAPTER FIVE

--NON-ECONOMIC INFLUENCES?--

Familial Composition, Television, Residence, Religiosity, Sex & Occupation

The first two chapters of this thesis explored and compared competing social capital, values and engagement theories used by their authors and advocates to explain various statistics and research indicating differing value, social capital and political participation trends. Chapter Three provided an overview of these trends by presenting percentage statistics collated from 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 World Values Survey data. Chapter Four analysed correlation statistics from these survey waves to infer the likely nature of relationships between both feelings of, and economic factors possibly influencing actual, autonomy and value orientations, social capital measures and political involvement. These correlations controlled for salient variables including age, sex, employment status, marital status, financial satisfaction, income, highest level of education attained (or for the 1981 wave - the age at which participants completed or were due to complete their full-time education),[526] frequency of religious service attendance, number of children and the size of one's town/city (the question regarding town size was not asked in the 1981 wave of the WVS). The SPSS statistics software enabled the author of this thesis to find these correlations with relative ease by selecting independent and dependent variables and adding as many control variables as desired.

This chapter assesses correlation statistics from Australian WVS data to infer relationships between non-economic variables (that possibly impact on actual levels of autonomy) and values, social capital and political engagement patterns. Graphs used to illustrate these relationships present Strength and Significance Scores. The method of arriving at these scores was discussed in the previous chapter. The correlation statistics presented

[526] The question regarding participants' highest level of education attained was not asked in the 1981 wave of the WVS.

suggest that many of the variables Putnam deems to be significant factors, actually have little to no influence on, or relationship with, value orientations, social capital and political engagement. These variables include marital status, how many children one has, sex, female employment status, the time one devotes to television watching, frequency of religious service attendance and the size of one's town/city.[527] Contrastingly, other correlation WVS statistics support both Inglehart and Welzel's Modernisationist and my Homogenisationist position that education, and the degree to which one's job requires creativity significantly impacts on value orientations, social capital and political involvement.[528] That is, jobs requiring greater autonomy, creativity and critical thinking experience (e.g. formal education) can encourage more emphasis on self-expression values which in turn affects social capital and political participation. Although Putnam also holds that formal educational attainment is a salient factor, he does not attribute values, social capital and engagement measures to workplace autonomy and the requirement to work creatively.[529]

The controlled variables used in the previous chapter are also applied for this fifth chapter's correlation statistics so that the nature of relationships between tested variables can be more accurately inferred. These control variables include economic factors such as income and financial satisfaction. Therefore, while the variables tested in this chapter probably influence measures of economic empowerment, this impact is effectively mitigated by the control variables. Consequently, the statistics presented in this chapter reveal non-economic relationships including possible causal effects. The variables tested include marital status, number of children, sex, female employment status, highest level of education attained, the degree to which one's work requires creativity, hours of television viewing, frequency of religious service attendance and town/city size. Employment status may initially appear to be an economic variable. However, the statistics control for income and financial satisfaction. Therefore, correlation evidence between employment status and value orientations, social capital and political participation are more likely to uncover social (rather than economic) relationships between employment and other variables tested. For example,

[527] Putnam, *Bowling Alone,* p.63, 66, 67, 73, 77, 78, 86, 94, 95, 138, 191, 195, 196, 201, 202, 205, 206, 222-244, 278 & 283
[528] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.28-30, 33, 34, 37, 164, 220, 221 & 282
[529] Putnam, *Bowling Alone,* p.18, 46, 62, 94, 187, 218 & 228

the degree to which social interaction and hours spent at the workplace act to raise or inhibit social and political capital, trust and engagement during non-work hours.

Marriage & Fertility

In Putnam's Lamentation theory declining marriage and fertility rates are claimed to have some individual isolating effects: reducing certain types of social capital. Putnam contends that married people with children are more likely to attend religious services and participate in religious activities, social engagements and organisations than those who are single and childless.[530] However, he concedes that being married and having children are also negatively correlated with both membership of sports, political and cultural groups and spending time informally with friends and neighbours.[531] Putnam uses these correlations between measures of structural social capital and both marital and parental status to argue that marital and parental status are likely to cause certain patterns of engagement which, in turn, affects values, trust and interests. However, Inglehart and Welzel believe that such correlations between family compositions and measures of structural social capital do not indicate causal relationships. Instead, they contend that these correlations are produced by both family compositions and structural social capital measures being affected by an identical shift in values that is inextricably linked to modernisation.[532]

The median and average ages of Australian men and women at first marriage has been rising (almost consistently) since 1975.[533] Steep declines in Australia's fertility rate occurred earlier. Between 1960 and 1980 Australia's fertility rate dropped from above 3.4, to 1.9 children per woman. Since then the fertility rates have largely plateaued, fluctuating between only 1.8 and 2 children per woman.[534] Thus, since the mid-twentieth century

[530] Putnam, *Bowling Alone,* p.278
[531] Putnam, *Bowling Alone,* p.278
[532] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.7, 8, 29, 34, 39, 52, 54, 126-130 & 137
[533] Weston, Ruth and Qu, Lixia. (2013) 'Working out relationships', *Australian Institute of Family Studies*, viewed 20 September 2017, https://aifs.gov.au/publications/working-out-relationships; Australian Bureau of Statistics, (2016) 'Brides, grooms and divorcees have never been older', *3310.0 – Marriage and Divorces, Australia, 2015,* viewed 20 September 2017, http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/products/118F4A846EEB21F8CA2576200025DF55?OpenDocument
[534] Australian Bureau of Statistics, (2015) 'FERTILITY RATES', *3301.0 – Births, Australia, 2014,* viewed 20 September 2017,

Australian fertility rates and the proportion of married Australians have declined. Therefore, the ways in, and extent to which marriage and fertility influence social and political capital and engagement, is salient to my thesis.

Correlations drawn from Australian WVS data reveal that when significant variables were controlled marital status was not consistently or significantly correlated with:

- involvement in political party, environmental, religious (when religious attendance is not controlled), labour union, sports/recreational or consumer organisations,[535]
- interpersonal trust,[536]
- political interest,[537]
- political discussion among friends/work colleagues,[538]
- unconventional political participation,[539]
- believing that one's country is run for the benefit of all people rather than for the benefit of a few big interests,[540] or
- confidence in the legal system, civil service, parliament, political parties, the national government, television, the press, the armed forces, charitable/humanitarian organisations, the environmental protection movement, banks, churches, police and major companies.[541]

However, being married appears to be positively correlated with measures of trustworthiness.[542] Contrastingly, marriage seems to be negatively correlated with:

- being in favour of greater economic aid for poorer countries even if it means paying higher taxes.[543]

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http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Previousproducts/3301.0Main%20Features42014?opendocument&tabname=Summary&prodno=3301.0&issue=2014&num=&view=

[535] See Appendices 156-158, 175, 176 & 186
[536] See Appendix 159
[537] See Appendix 160
[538] See Appendix 161
[539] See Appendices 162-164
[540] See Appendix 189
[541] See Appendices 165-174, 177-179 & 187
[542] See Appendices 175-185
[543] See Appendix 188

These results tend to contradict Lamentation theory. According to Putnam marriage should have an overall positive correlation with involvement in religious organisations but should be negatively correlated with involvement in political parties and activities.[544] Yet, Australian WVS statistics reveal that marriage is not consistently and significantly correlated with either religious organisational engagement, nor involvement in political parties. Marriage has no significant relationship with participation in unconventional political activities. Furthermore, marriage was found to be positively correlated with trustworthiness. However, rather than the institution of marriage acting to raise trustworthiness, this correlation is more compellingly explained by trustworthy people making better life partners than untrustworthy people. Arguably trustworthy people can more easily find someone willing to marry them and have longer, more successful, marriages than untrustworthy individuals.[545]

Negative correlations were discovered in the early waves between marriage and involvement in art, music and educational organisations, and professional associations. However, these relationships became positive in latter waves.[546] This may suggest three things. First, that marriage has a negative impact on participation in these activities. Second, that those with personality types more inclined to marry and stay married may participate in these groups and activities at higher rates than other people. Third, as marriage rates have declined slightly and marriage has been delayed until later in the life-cycle, those who are now marrying early in life and staying married may well possess greater community and civic mindedness relative to others, now as compared to decades ago. Consequently, the influence of these personality and value traits may now exceed the negative impact marriage may potentially have on involvement. Hence, marriage probably has no great bearing on the development of social capital, values or trust. Conversely changing values may be contributing to the delaying of marriage. These statistics suggest that, Modernisation and Homogenisation are more compelling than Lamentation.

[544] Putnam, Bowling Alone, p.278
[545] Wicham, Robert, E. (2013) 'Perceived authenticity in romantic partners', *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,* vol:49, p.878-887; Dussault, Matthew., Hojjat, Mahzad and Boone, Thomas. (2013) 'Machiavellianism and Dating: Deception and Intimacy', *Social Behaviour and Personality,* vol:41(2), p.283-294
[546] See Appendices 191 & 192

The causes and effects of fertility rates are also areas of disagreement between Putnam, on the one hand and Modernisation and Homogenisation theses, on the other. Modernisation and my Homogenisation theory hold that declining fertility rates are caused by value emphases within post-industrial societies shifting from survival to self-expression values.[547] This shift is driven by individual empowering atomising trends in technology, the economy, education and occupational specialisation[548] and is responsible for reshaping social capital, trust, and behaviour.[549] Conversely, Putnam maintains that individual isolating atomising trends, including changed family structures (delayed marriage and fewer children), are responsible for declines in social capital, interpersonal trust and community and civic oriented values and behaviours.[550]

There appears to be no consistent significant correlations between having more children and:

- interpersonal trust,[551]
- involvement in political parties[552]
- discussing politics among friends and coworkers,[553]
- a belief that one's country is run for the benefit of all rather than just for a few big interests,[554] or
- a willingness to provide poorer countries with greater economic aid even if it means paying more tax.[555]

However, positive correlations were found between having more children and petition signing, and trustworthiness. Additionally, Figure 5.1 illustrates the strength and significance of positive correlations between having more children and confidence in police, television,

[547] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.28, 29, 52 & 54
[548] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.24, 28 & 29
[549] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.44, 52, 116-118, 130-133, 137, 157, 158, 223, 251-253, 262, 271 & 294
[550] Putnam, *Bowling Alone,* p. 19-21, 25, 47, 55, 60-63, 66-78, 80-86, 88-90, 115, 136, 138-141, 143, 144, 146, 147, 191, 194-196, 202, 205-207, 209, 210, 212, 213, 216-219, 221-223, 225, 228, 230, 231, 235-238, 242-244, 248, 264, 278, 282 & 283
[551] See Appendix 193
[552] See Appendix 213
[553] See Appendix 194
[554] See Appendix 195
[555] See Appendix 196

the legal system, the armed forces and churches.[556] Negative correlations were revealed between having more children and both joining in boycotts (2005) and (as shown in Figure 5.2) being politically interested.[557] Correlations between having more children and participation in peaceful demonstrations and environmental organisations were initially negative but became positive in latter waves.[558] Conversely, correlations found between the number of children a person has and involvement in sports/recreational organisations and church/religious organisations (both when church attendance is and is not controlled) were initially positive but became negative in later waves.[559]

Figure 5.1

Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations collated from 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves, between having more children and having less confidence in TV, churches, the police, legal system and armed forces (appendices 204-208).



Figure 5.2

[556] See Appendices 197-208
[557] See Appendices 209 & 210
[558] See Appendices 211 & 212
[559] See Appendices 214-216

Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations collated from 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves, between having more children and being less interested in politics (appendix 210).



These results suggest that the number of children a person has affects their social capital little, undermining Putnam's Lamentation theory. The positive correlations between having more children and being trustworthy probably indicates that trustworthy people are more likely to have successful romantic relationships that produce children than those who are less trustworthy. The mixed and changing correlations found between having more children and participation in formal organisations suggest no real systemic or causal relationship. Furthermore, the transforming relationship between having more children and participation in peaceful lawful demonstrations may not be causal or a product of systemic values change. Instead, these correlations may be due to period specific factors that have not yet been identified.

The positive correlations found between having more children and confidence in major institutions combined with the lack of any consistent significant correlation between having more children and interpersonal trust supports both Modernisation and Homogenisation theses. Inglehart, Welzel and I maintain that those who emphasise survival over self-expression values tend to have more children and be more prepared to trust hierarchal institutions and organisations than those emphasising self-expression over survival

values.[560] Had there been positive correlations between having more children and interpersonal trust, confidence in major institutions may have been deemed an extension of generalized trust. That is, the strong correlations between trust and trustworthiness and between trustworthiness and having more children, could have been interpreted as trusting/trustworthy people having more children than the relatively less trusting and less trustworthy. However, as there is no correlation between interpersonal trust and having more children, the link between family size and institutional confidence is most probably explained by a divergence in values between those who choose to have more, and those who decide to have fewer or no children. Perhaps interpersonal trust also positively affects fertility, reducing what would otherwise be (according to Modernisation and Homogenisation theories) an observable negative correlation between having more children and interpersonal trust. That is, Inglehart, Welzel and I argue that an emphasis on self-expression values is linked to both greater interpersonal trust, fewer children and less confidence in large powerful hierarchal institutions.[561]

A positive correlation was revealed between having more children and petition signing. Yet, Putnam argues that having children is negatively correlated with political participation.[562] The correlation found possibly suggests that Australians with larger families may be more concerned about particular single issues (which they perceive as impacting, or potentially impacting, their families) than those with fewer children/descendants. Hence, a greater number of familial bonds may drive people into political activity. There were negative correlations between having more children and both joining in boycotts and being politically interested.[563] These statistics suggest that the raised political concerns of Australians with larger families (relative to those with smaller families) tend to focus purely on those issues affecting their kin directly. Boycotts tend to focus on ethical concerns or protectionism. Boycotters are not usually attempting to better the lives of their families and loved ones in any direct or immediate sense. These statistics suggest that people with more children tend to have, relative to those with smaller families, more interests besides politics that are

[560] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.7, 8, 29, 34, 52, 54, 117, 126-130, 137 & 250-253
[561] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.7, 8, 29, 52, 54, 117, 138, 141 & 271
[562] Putnam, *Bowling Alone,* p.278
[563] See Appendix 210

meaningful to them. Thus, familial interests may distract from being more politically engaged. Alternatively, those who emphasise survival values may tend to have larger families and be less politically interested and less engaged in unconventional political activity than those who emphasise self-expression values. Hence, family size may affect political interest/engagement or different value orientations may affect both familial size and political interest/engagement. Either way the statistics presented thus far erode Putnam's Lamentation argument that declining fertility rates have an overall detrimental effect on social capital and civic orientated values and behaviours.

Television Viewing

Putnam finds that television viewing has a negative impact on most social capital indicators. He contends that the rise in both television viewership and hours spent watching television (over the last half century or so) has been a major contributing factor to social capital decline.[564] Contrastingly, Australian WVS statistics indicate time devoted to television watching has few negative effects on, social capital measures. The Australian WVS question regarding time participants spend watching television was only asked in the 1995 wave. Therefore, these statistics between television viewing and social capital indicators are perhaps not as reliable as other correlations discussed in this thesis. Still, they are worth considering.

Controlling for other variables there were no compelling relationships[565] between television viewing and most social capital measures. These measures include:

- political interest,[566]
- measures of trustworthiness,[567]
- interpersonal trust,[568]

[564] Putnam, *Bowling Alone,* p.63, 192, 221-223, 225, 228, 230, 231, 235-238, 242-244 & 283
[565] Compelling relationships I defined as having either the same significant correlations in at least three of the four age demographics or both a single significant overall correlation and at least one same significant age group correlation.
[566] See Appendix 217
[567] See Appendices 218-222
[568] See Appendix 565

- involvement in charitable, art, music, educational, sport/recreational organisations, labour unions,[569] or
- confidence in the National government, UN, civil service, parliament, political parties, labour unions, the press, legal system, Armed Forces, churches, major companies, and the way in which the country is run.[570]

However, compelling negative relationships were discovered between time devoted to television viewing and:

- generosity,[571]
- levels of political discussion with friends and co-workers,[572] and
- involvement in professional associations, political parties, and environmental and religious (when church/religious attendance is not a control variable) organisations.[573]

Conversely, marked positive relationships were revealed between time devoted to television viewing and having greater confidence in the police and television.[574]

These results would suggest that television viewing may erode generosity, political discussion and time spent being involved in 'some' formal organisations. However, contrary to Putnam's argument, the results indicate that television viewing may potentially act to raise confidence in some societal institutions particularly those related to law enforcement. Still, it is possible that television does not have these effects. That is, either these tendencies may encourage more television viewing or some other variable (uncontrolled) is influencing both patterns of television watching and behaviours and attitudes with which they are correlated. Arguably people with fewer friends have fewer political (and other) discussions with friends. Consequently, they may have more time to devote to television. Additionally, (as previously explained) many significant variables were controlled for in all correlations presented in this thesis unless otherwise indicated. These variables were listed earlier. Therefore, it is unlikely

[569] See Appendices 223-226
[570] See Appendices 227-237 & 244
[571] See Appendix 238
[572] See Appendix 239
[573] See Appendices 240-243
[574] See Appendices 245-246

that another uncontrolled variable is manipulating the results. Hence, I suspect that television viewing is affecting most variables with which it is correlated. Nevertheless, the positive correlation between confidence in and time spent viewing television may be explained by a kind of positive feedback loop. That is, people with greater confidence in, are motivated to view more, television and more hours spent viewing encourages greater confidence in, television. Clearly, the relatively few compelling relationships found between television viewing and social capital indicators suggests that television is unlikely to be the major factor in the erosion of social capital argued by Putnam. Overall, the effects of television viewing appear to be quite modest, at least in the Australian context.

Religious Service Attendance

Putnam also argued in *Bowling Alone* that people who more frequently attend religious services are more likely both to be engaged in non-religious formal and informal associations and to score higher on other measures of social capital such as interpersonal trust and generosity.[575] However, when controlling for other variables, the Australian WVS statistics indicate that religious attendance is not clearly, consistently and significantly correlated with:

- interpersonal trust,[576]
- formal organisational involvement,[577]
- political discussion or interest,[578]
- unconventional political activities,[579]
- measures of trustworthiness,[580] or
- confidence in the UN, civil service, labour unions, the press, legal system, Armed Forces, the environmental protection movement or the way in which the country is run.[581]

[575] Putnam, *Bowling Alone,* p.66, 67, 69 & 70
[576] See Appendix 247
[577] See Appendices 248-254
[578] See Appendices 255 & 256
[579] See Appendices 257-259
[580] See Appendices 260-265
[581] See Appendices 266, 267 & 269-274

The Australian data reflects fairly consistent significant positive relationships between religious attendance and generosity (as demonstrated by Figure 5.3) and confidence in political parties, the national government, the police, major companies and charitable/humanitarian organisations (as shown in Figure 5.4).[582] There was also a fairly consistent significant negative relationship between religious attendance and television viewing.[583] Where significant correlations between religious attendance and measures of trustworthiness were found they were negative in the 1981 wave but were positive in the three subsequent waves.

Figure 5.3

Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations collated from 1995 and 2005 Australian WVS waves, between attending religious services less frequently and not being willing to pay higher taxes to help poorer countries (appendix 275).



Figure 5.4

[582] See Appendices 275-280
[583] See Appendix 281

Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations collated from 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves, between attending religious services less frequently and having less confidence in political parties, the national government, police, major companies and humanitarian/charitable organisations (appendices 276-280).



These results would suggest that Putnam's arguments regarding the relationships between religiosity/religious service attendance and measures of social capital are largely incorrect. There were no clear consistent significant relationships between religiosity and formal organisational involvement or interpersonal trust. The very consistent significant positive relationships found between religious attendance and both generosity and confidence in a number of societies major institutions/organisations are not necessarily caused by religious attendance; as is implied by Putnam. Instead, people who have particular personality types may be both more generous and more inclined to become heavily religious than those with other personality traits. Also, people more willing to be led or to turn to authority figures for direction are perhaps predisposed to both being more religious and having greater confidence in their society's major institutions and organisations. Town size was not controlled for in the 1981 correlations but were for the subsequent waves. This was because participants were not asked how large their towns/cities were in the 1981 wave. This may explain the negative relationships found between religious attendance and measures of trustworthiness in the 1981 wave. Additionally, religious attendance probably has little or no

effect on other measures of social capital including, as previously discussed, generosity and institutional/organisational confidence. This is inconsistent with Putnam's Lamentation theory.

Town Size

Putnam maintains that social capital measures have eroded partly because of the declining proportion of Americans living in small towns and rural communities and the rising proportion residing in large metropolitan areas. These social capital measures include altruism, trust, trustworthiness and civic engagement.[584] Putnam argues that smaller towns are fertile locations for social capital generation and development.[585] Conversely, large city metropolises tend to produce isolation and alienation.[586] America's twentieth century demographic shift in the proportion of people living in small rural towns versus those living in metropolitan areas has been mirrored in Australia.[587] Consequently, any link between Australian town size and social capital would be relevant to my thesis. However, Putnam's arguments regarding the relationship between town size and social capital indicators are revealed to be baseless when collating Australian WVS data.

Where clear and significant correlations were found between social capital and town size, larger cities/towns tended to be associated with higher levels of social capital than smaller communities. Larger cities were positively correlated with political interest (particularly among the 18-34 age demographic), and confidence in parliament, the civil service, political parties and the legal system.[588] Figure 5.5 illustrates the strength and significance scores of the positive correlations between larger cities and political interest in each survey wave in which the question regarding town size was asked. However, larger cities were negatively correlated with interpersonal trust.[589] There were no other clear significant relationships found between town size and other social capital measures. But, contrary to

[584] Putnam, *Bowling Alone,* p.138 & 205-207
[585] Putnam, *Bowling Alone,* p.138
[586] Putnam, *Bowling Alone,* p.138, 205 & 206
[587] Hugo, Graeme. 'First National Conference on the Future of Australia's Country Towns', *The Regional Institute,* viewed 15 February 2015, http://www.regional.org.au/au/countrytowns/keynote/hugo.htm#P2652_67985
[588] See Appendices 282-286
[589] See Appendix 287

Lamentation theory, there were no clear significant correlations revealed between town size and:

- formal organisational involvement (charitable, environmental, art, music, educational, sport/recreational, consumer and religious organisations, professional associations, political parties and labour unions),[590]
- political discussion,[591]
- generosity,[592]
- trustworthiness,[593]
- belief in the utility of government decision-making,[594]
- unconventional political activity,[595] or
- confidence in major institutions/organisations (including the UN, national government, police, labour unions, television, the press, Armed Forces, churches, major companies, charitable/humanitarian organisations, and the environmental protection movement).[596]

Thus, WVS statistics would suggest that the effect of town size on social capital is quite small and that arguably larger towns/cities are conducive to greater political interest and confidence in political and state institutions. This evidence contradicts Putnam's Lamentation theory.

Figure 5.5

Average strength and significance scores within 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves of correlations between town/city size and being less interested in politics (appendix 282).

[590] See Appendices 288-297
[591] See Appendix 298
[592] See Appendix 299
[593] See Appendices 300-305
[594] See Appendix 306
[595] See Appendices 307-309
[596] See Appendices 310-320



Sex & Female Employment Status

Putnam argues that women are far more proficient social capitalists than men and that the rise in the number/proportion of two full-time career families is reducing opportunities for, and the motivation of, women to organise and pursue formal and informal social events and connections.[597] He claims that the husbands of these women are consequently less inclined to engage socially than those husbands who have a wife more socially involved.[598] Putnam contends that the amount of free time available to people has not declined overall but that the distribution of this free time has changed. Those who have traditionally been more inclined to use their free time to build networks and organise and participate in formal and informal social events -- women and the well-educated -- have less free time. Those who are less disposed to using free time to engage with others -- men and the less well educated -- have more free time available.[599] Furthermore, Putnam argues that people, and particularly women, who are part-time employed tend to be more socially engaged than either those who work full time or those who are unemployed/full-time "housewives".[600] He posits that part-timers are both presented with more opportunities to become engaged through

[597] Putnam, *Bowling Alone,* p.94, 95, 191, 194-196, 201 & 202
[598] Putnam, *Bowling Alone,* p.195 & 196
[599] Putnam, *Bowling Alone,* p.191
[600] Putnam, *Bowling Alone,* p.201

networking during work hours than the unemployed, and have relatively more time to act on these opportunities than full-time workers.[601]

According to Australian WVS statistics, when controlling for other variables[602] sex has no consistent correlation with involvement in most formal organisations.[603] However, the significant correlations found between being female and engagement in trade unions (within the various age groups within the various waves) were negative.[604] This indicates that being female (rather than male), particularly in the 1981 and 1995 waves, may have reduced one's inclination to participate in trade unions. Significant correlations found between being female and being involved in religious (when church/religious attendance was not a control variable) and charitable organisations were positive in 1981 and 1995 but tended to be negative in 2005 and 2012.[605] These correlations would indicate that being female (rather than male) perhaps raised the inclination of individuals to participate in these groups in the past but has since acted to reduce involvement. WVS statistics reveal few significant correlations between sex and involvement in professional associations. However, these indicate that being male (rather than female) raise the disposition of individuals to joining.[606] The significant correlations revealed between being female and involvement in environmental and art, music and educational organisations were positive in 1981 and 1995 but were negative in 2005 and 2012. However, no significant correlations were found in the 2005 wave between sex and participation in environmental organisations, nor in the 1981 wave between sex and involvement in art, music and educational organisations.[607] Of the five significant correlations found between sex and political party involvement two were positive and three negative indicating no consistent trend.[608] The significant correlations between sex and involvement in sport/recreational clubs and organisations suggest that being female (rather than male) acted to reduce participation in 1995, then acted to raise involvement in 2005. These

[601] Putnam, *Bowling Alone,* p.194
[602] Control variables include age, employment status, marital status, financial satisfaction, income, education, religious attendance, number of children and town size.
[603] See Appendices 321-330
[604] See Appendix 323
[605] See Appendices 324 & 325
[606] See Appendix 326
[607] See Appendices 327 & 328
[608] See Appendix 329

relationships were particularly significant among the 18-34 and 50-64 demographics. There were no significant correlations of this type found in the 2012 wave.[609]

Together this evidence casts considerable doubt on Putnam's view that women are (or are almost) comprehensively better social capitalists than men. My research supports other studies finding no significant difference in the extent to which males and females engage in formal and civic groups and organisations.[610] However, most investigations into the effect of sex and gender on social capital measures indicate that females tend to have stronger informal social networks than males. A study conducted by Fuhrer and Stansfeld (2002) found that:

- "Women nominate and report having more close persons, [and] report greater satisfaction with their personal relationships [than do men]"

and that

- "Men report higher levels of practical support from the person they identify as closest, while women report higher levels than men from the subsequent close persons."[611]

This finding is consistent with other research revealing that men tend to more heavily rely on their, and benefit more from having a, spouse (usually their closest person) than do women.[612] The strong informal social capital assets (support base) that women provide for their male partners may act to significantly raise the happiness, life satisfaction and mental health of these men.[613] As men tend to have relatively smaller and weaker informal networks than women their lack of informal social capital assets probably greatly contributes to the

[609] See Appendix 330
[610] Eriksson, Malin. and Ng, Nawi. (2015) 'Changes in access to structural social capital and its influence on self-rated health over time for middle-aged men and women: A longitudinal study from northern Sweden' in *Social Science & Medicine,* vol:130, p.255
[611] Fuhrer, R and Stansfeld, S A. (2002) 'How gender affects patterns of social relations and their impact on health: a comparison of one or multiple sources of support from "close persons"', *Social Science & Medicine,* vol:54, p.822
[612] Gove, Walter, R. and Shin, Hee-Choon. (1989) 'The Psychological Well-Being of Divorced and Widowed Men and Women: An Emirical Analysis', *JOURNAL OF FAMILY ISSUES,* Vol.10(1), p.126, 127 & 142
[613] Oygard, Lisbet. (2004) 'Divorce Support Groups: What Is the Role of the Participants' Personal Capital Regarding Adjustment to Divorce?', *the Journal of Divorce & Remarriage,* Vol.40(3/4), p.115

unequal distribution of marital benefits between the sexes. Thus, studies indicate that women do perform better according to measures assessing informal structural social capital than do men. However, WVS statistics do not support Putnam's argument that women are (or are almost) comprehensively (across all or most indicators) better social capitalists than men.

There were no consistent significant correlations between sex and interpersonal trust; another indicator of social capital. Five significant correlations were found between these variables: two were positive, and three negative.[614] The significant correlations that were found between sex and political discussion with friends and work colleagues indicate that in 1981 and 1995 (when controlling for other variables) women were less inclined to discuss politics than were men but by 2012 women were more likely to engage in political discussion than their male counterparts.[615] This is hardly overwhelming support for Putnam's contention that women are (or are almost) comprehensively more adept and proficient social capitalists than men. Significant correlations between sex and political interest suggests that men are predisposed to being more politically interested than are women. Figures 5.6 and 5.7 demonstrate that this relationship held for each wave tested and almost all age groups within each wave. Exceptions were the 65+ demographic in each wave and the 18 to 34 age group in 1995 and the 35-49 age group in 2012 in which there were no significant correlations.[616]

Figure 5.6

Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations collated from 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves, between being female and being less interested in politics (appendix 333).

[614] See Appendix 331
[615] See Appendix 332
[616] See Appendix 333



Figure 5.7

Average strength and significance scores within 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves of correlations between being female and being less interested in politics (appendix 333).



WVS statistics also reveal that women may (when controlling for other variables) be less inclined to have confidence in parliament than men,[617] but are predisposed to having more confidence in the UN, the police, churches, charitable and environmental organisations than are men.[618] There were no consistent significant trends found between sex and confidence in the civil service, national government, television, the legal system, major companies or the armed forces.[619] Evidence suggests that being female (rather than male) acted to raise confidence in political parties in 1995 and 2005 but that this effect disappeared by 2012.[620] The data also indicates that being female (rather than male) acted to reduce confidence in labour unions in 1981 and 1995. However, this situation had reversed in 2005 with significant positive correlations found among various age demographics between being female and having confidence in labour unions.[621] There is disagreement concerning whether confidence in society's major institutions and organisations should be deemed an indicator of social capital. Putnam contends that it should.[622] This is disputed by Inglehart and Welzel.[623] Regardless, Australian WVS data does not provide overwhelming evidence that women are predisposed to being more confident in society's institutions and organisations than are men.

When other variables are controlled there are few consistent significant correlations between sex and social capital indicators. Apart from 2005 WVS correlations suggesting that women were more inclined to sign petitions than were men,[624] statistics do not indicate any significant relationship between sex and unconventional political engagement. The forms of unconventional involvement tested were attending demonstrations, joining boycotts and strikes and petition signing (2012).[625] Sex also appears to have no impact on generosity as measured by the willingness to pay higher taxes to help poorer people in underdeveloped countries.[626] In the 1995 wave participants were asked to what extent they believed the country was run for the benefit of all people rather than just for big interests. The results indicate that (when controlling for other variables) women, were less inclined to believe

[617] See Appendix 334
[618] See Appendices 335-339
[619] See Appendices 340-345
[620] See Appendix 346
[621] See Appendix 347
[622] Putnam, *Bowling Alone,* p.47 & 347
[623] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.117, 118, 120, 150-157 & 262
[624] See Appendix 348
[625] See Appendices 348-350
[626] See Appendix 351

Australia was run for the benefit of all than were men.[627] This supports the finding that being female (rather than male) acts to reduce confidence in parliament. However, this question regarding the utility of government decision making and implementation was only asked in 1995. Hence, the value of these statistics is limited. Still, the evidence seems to suggest that being female (rather than male) acts to reduce confidence in the political process. Putnam (unlike Inglehart and Welzel) considers confidence, trust and support for society's institutions and organisations a key component of social capital and trust.[628] Therefore, these WVS statistics conflict with his argument that women are (or are almost) comprehensively more active and adept social capitalists than men.

The only marker of social capital in which women resoundingly outperform men is trustworthiness. As shown in Figures 5.8 and 5.9, when controlling for other variables women are less inclined to believe in the justifiability of:

- accepting a bribe in the course of their duties,[629]
- buying something one knew was stolen,[630]
- cheating on taxes if one had the chance,[631]
- avoiding a fare on public transport,[632] or
- claiming government benefits to which one is not entitled.[633]

Greater trustworthiness may indicate that women are perhaps more effective at forging long-term social connections (which often require trust) than are men. This is consistent with other research investigating the relationship between sex and social capital that has found women tend to be better informal social capitalists than men.[634] Informal social relationships are more heavily reliant on trust and trustworthiness than are formal connections which are largely maintained by adherence to formal rules and procedures. However, WVS statistics do

[627] See Appendix 352
[628] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.117, 118, 120, 150-157 & 262; Putnam, *Bowling Alone,* p.47 & 347
[629] See Appendix 353
[630] See Appendix 354
[631] See Appendix 355
[632] See Appendix 356
[633] See Appendix 357
[634] Oygard, 'Divorce Support Groups: What Is the Role of the Participants' Personal Capital Regarding Adjustment to Divorce?', p.115; Fuhrer and Stansfeld, 'How gender affects patterns of social relations and their impact on health', p.822

not support Putnam's argument that women are all-round more proficient social capitalists than men. Thus, the consequences (for levels of social capital) of any redistribution of free time between the sexes is unlikely to be as serious as Putnam argues in *Bowling Alone*.[635]

Figure 5.8

Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations collated from 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves, between being female and measures of untrustworthiness (appendices 353-358).



Figure 5.9

Average strength and significance scores within 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves of correlations between being female and measures of untrustworthiness (appendices 353-358).

[635] Putnam, *Bowling Alone,* p.94, 95, 191, 194-196, 201 & 202



The effects of part-time as opposed to full-time employment may be more salient in the Australian context than a redistribution of time between sexes. Indeed, part time employment has become, and is becoming, more common in the workforce and particularly in the female workforce.[636] However, the number of consistent significant correlations between women's employment status and social capital indicators (when controlling for other variables) were surprisingly few. There appears to be no definitive relationship between women working part (as opposed to full) time and:

- interpersonal trust,[637]
- involvement in political parties, labour unions, environmental, consumer or religious organisations,[638]
- participation in unconventional political activity (attending peaceful demonstrations, joining boycotts, and signing petitions),[639]
- political interest,[640]

[636] Scutt, David. (2016). 'CHARTS: The Changing nature of Australia's Workforce', *BUSINESS INSIDER,* viewed 26 June 2017, https://www.businessinsider.com.au/charts-the-changing-nature-of-australias-workforce-2016-2
[637] See Appendix 359
[638] See Appendices 360-365
[639] See Appendices 366-368
[640] See Appendix 369

- confidence in the UN, civil service, political parties, the police, labour unions, television, the press, the legal system, armed forces, churches, charitable/humanitarian organisations, banks, the environmental movement, or the way in which the country is run,[641] or
- measures of trustworthiness.[642]

Part-time female employees may be slightly more inclined to have confidence in major companies, the national government and the legal system but less disposed to discuss politics with friends/colleagues than full-time female employees.[643] The significant correlations which were found between part (as opposed to full) time female employment and involvement in charitable organisations indicate that younger part-time employed women were perhaps less inclined to participate than younger full-time employed women. However, older part-time employed women (50-64) may have been more inclined to be involved in charitable organisations in the past than were older full-time employed women.[644] The data also reveal that the relationship between part (as opposed to full) time employment status among women and:

- involvement in professional associations, art, music, educational and sport/recreational organisations, and
- confidence in parliament

varied between waves without any clear pattern.[645] WVS statistics may suggest that part, (as opposed to full), time, employment may encourage some young women to be more generous.[646] Overall, Putnam's argument that part-time employment is more conducive to female social capital building than full-time employment is not borne out of the Australian case as shown by WVS statistics.[647]

[641] See Appendices 370-383
[642] See Appendices 384-389
[643] See Appendix 390, 396, 397 & 585
[644] See Appendix 391
[645] See Appendices 392-395
[646] See Appendix 398
[647] Putnam, *Bowling Alone,* p.201

Similarly, Australian statistics provide little support for Putnam's contention that part-time employment, as opposed to being a "housewife", encourages women to become more socially involved and connected.[648] Indeed, the only statistics that support this theory are correlations between being a "housewife" as opposed to working part-time, and interpersonal trust and confidence in certain institutions and organisations. It appears that female part-timers are more inclined than "housewives" to be trusting and have confidence in the parliament, political parties, the national government, labour unions, the legal system and major companies.[649] However, no consistent definitive relationship could be discerned between being a "housewife" (as opposed to a female part-time employee) and:

- political interest,[650]
- confidence in the UN, civil service, police, television, the press, Armed Forces, churches, banks, or the environmental movement, charitable and humanitarian organisations, or the way in which one's country is run,[651]
- involvement in charitable, environmental, art, music, educational, sport/recreational, church/religious, or consumer organisations, political parties, or labour unions,[652]
- political discussion,[653]
- participation in unconventional political activity (peaceful demonstrations, boycotts, strikes or petition signing),[654]
- generosity,[655] or
- any indicator of trustworthiness measured.[656]

Hence, the WVS statistics presented in this chapter render Putnam's views regarding the influence of sex and employment status on social capital measures less than compelling for the Australian case.

[648] Putnam, *Bowling Alone,* p.94, 95, 194 & 201
[649] See Appendices 399 & 402-407
[650] See Appendix 409
[651] See Appendices 400, 401, 408, 410-416 & 567
[652] See Appendices 417-424
[653] See Appendix 425
[654] See Appendices 426-428
[655] See Appendix 429
[656] See Appendices 430-435

Occupational Creativity & Education Attainment

Post-industrial societies, like Australia, have experienced an expansion of tertiary sector (services) professions requiring greater autonomy, cognitive skills, higher levels of and greater access to communications/information technology.[657] Inglehart, Welzel and I argue that these economic transformations have mobilised people's intellectual independence; facilitating greater emphasis on self-expression (as opposed to survival) values. According to Inglehart and Welzel's Modernisation and my Homogenisation theories (when controlling for other variables) those with:

- higher formal educational attainment,
- greater workplace independence, and
- more creative and skill intensive careers

are more inclined to exhibit particular characteristics relative to individuals less well educated, with jobs that require routine and manual task completion often micromanaged by supervisors. These characteristics include greater: generosity, interpersonal trust, trustworthiness, political interest/discussion and engagement in unconventional political activity.[658] They also involve having more liberal views on family and morality and teaching children to heavily emphasise self-expression values.[659] The ways and/or extents to which work creativity and higher formal educational attainment are deemed to influence happiness/life satisfaction and confidence and involvement in formal institutions/organisations differ somewhat between Modernisation and Homogenisation theories. These differences have already been discussed in previous chapters and are reiterated later in this chapter. From here I assess the persuasiveness of these positions against Australian WVS statistics.

[657] Lowe, Philip. (Speech – Address to the Australian Industry Group 12th Annual Economic Forum – Sydney – 7 March 2012). 'The Changing Structure of the Australian Economy and Monetary Policy', *RESERVE BANK OF AUSTRALIA,* viewed 26 June 2017, http://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2012/sp-dg-070312.html; Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.24, 28, 29 & 138

[658] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.7, 8, 24, 25, 28, 29, 33, 37, 44, 104, 105, 116, 120, 126, 137, 138, 141, 142, 164, 220, 221, 256, 271, 280-283, 293 & 294

[659] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.7, 29, 34, 52, 54, 116, 126-130, 137, 273 & 274-283

WVS evidence seems to indicate that (when controlling for other variables) people who have occupations requiring creative thinking rather than routine task completion are happier (as shown in Figure 5.10) and are more, satisfied with their lives, politically interested (as illustrated in Figure 5.11), and inclusive of disadvantaged and out groups (as demonstrated by Figure 5.12).[660] WVS statistics also suggest that these people may place greater importance on children learning imagination and self-expression and have more modern liberal attitudes regarding morality (as shown in Figure 5.13), than those who perform less creative and more routine work.[661] Additionally, the statistics indicate that those with jobs requiring greater creativity are:

- less inclined to involve themselves in professional associations and artistic, music, educational, charitable and environmental organisations, and are
- less generous, and
- less confident in labour unions, major companies, television, the press, Armed Forces (particularly among the young), churches and banks,

than are people with less creative and more routine work.[662] Thus, these correlation statistics tend to support both Modernisation and Homogenisation theories. Still, the positive relationship between the requirement for work creativity and involvement in religious organisations is inconsistent with either thesis.[663]

Figure 5.10

Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations collated from 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves, between having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work and unhappiness (appendix 436).

[660] See Appendices 436-440
[661] See Appendices 441, 442 & 445-451
[662] See Appendices 452-462 & 488
[663] See Appendix 463



Figure 5.11

Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations collated from 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves, between having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work and being less interested in politics (appendix 438).



Figure 5.12

Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations collated from 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves, between having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work and disagreeing that when jobs are scarce men and Australians should have more right to a job than women and immigrants (appendices 439 & 440).



Figure 5.13

Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations collated from 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves, between having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work and more liberal attitudes regarding suicide, voluntary euthanasia, divorce, abortion, prostitution, homosexuality and sex before marriage (appendices 445 & 451).



No consistent significant correlations were found between the requirement to work creatively and:

- trustworthiness,[664]
- interpersonal trust,[665]
- national pride,[666]
- unconventional political activity,[667]
- attitudes to euthanasia or family unit compositions,[668] or
- involvement in political parties, labour unions or consumer, sport and recreational organisations.[669]

Similarly, no clear relationships were revealed between the requirement to work creatively and:

[664] See Appendices 464-468
[665] See Appendix 469
[666] See Appendix 470
[667] See Appendices 471-473
[668] See Appendices 474-476
[669] See Appendices 477-480

- having confidence in the UN, civil service, parliament, political parties, the national government, police, legal system, charitable/humanitarian organisations or the environmental protection movement,[670] or
- believing in the importance of children learning obedience, unselfishness, religious faith, determination/perseverance, thrift, tolerance, responsibility, hard work or independence.[671]

Hence, a large proportion of the correlation statistics that tested the possible relationships between the extent to which a person's occupation requires creative work and other variables returned mixed or no significant results. However, the clear relationships / consistent significant correlations that were uncovered overwhelmingly support Modernisation and Homogenisation theses.

Australian WVS statistics support the Modernisationist and Homogenisationist view that after controlling for other variables, higher levels of formal education tend to be positively correlated with:

- interpersonal trust (illustrated by Figure 5.14),[672]
- political interest and discussion (demonstrated by Figures 5.15 and 5.16),[673]
- generosity (shown in Figure 5.17),[674]
- more liberal views on family and morality,[675]
- acceptance and inclusion of disadvantaged or out groups (illustrated by Figure 5.18),[676]
- belief in egalitarian work procedures (demonstrated by Figure 5.19) and in the importance of children learning self-expression (as opposed to survival) values,[677] and
- less national pride (as shown in Figure 5.20).[678]

[670] See Appendices 481-487 & 489-490
[671] See Appendices 491-499
[672] See Appendix 500
[673] See Appendices 501 & 502
[674] See Appendix 503
[675] See Appendices 504-506 & 509-516
[676] See Appendices 517-519
[677] See Appendices 520-525
[678] See Appendix 526

Figure 5.14

Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations collated from 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves, between having a higher level of formal education and believing that most people 'cannot' be trusted (appendix 500).



Figure 5.15

Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations collated from 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves, between having a higher level of formal education and being less interested in politics (appendix 501).



Figure 5.16

Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations collated from 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves, between having a higher level of formal education and having fewer political discussions with friends and work colleagues (appendix 502).



Figure 5.17

Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations collated from 1995 and 2005 Australian WVS waves, between having a higher level

of formal education and not being willing to pay higher taxes to help poorer countries (appendix 503).



Figure 5.18

Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations collated from 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves, between having a higher level of formal education and disagreeing that when jobs are scarce men, Australians and younger people should have more right to a job than women, immigrants and older workers" (appendix 517-519).



Figure 5.19

Average strength and significance scores within age demographics of correlations collated from 1995 Australian WVS waves, between having a higher level of formal education and believing that one should follow one's superior's instructions only when one is convinced that they are right (appendix 520).



Figure 5.20

Average strength and significance scores within 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 Australian WVS waves of correlations between having a higher level of formal education and being less proud to be Australian (appendix 526).



In Chapter Four I argued that greater overall levels of individual autonomy precipitate social network homogenisation which can, in turn, raise levels of nationalist sentiment. However, education is probably one individual empowering factor likely to both homogenise social networks[679] and encourage a more cosmopolitan internationalist world view by familiarizing individuals with foreign cultures, practices and achievements. Mixed/inconsistent relationships were found between formal education attainment and trustworthiness, involvement in unconventional political activity and confidence and involvement in major institutions and organisations.[680] Contrary to what Inglehart and Welzel suggest there was no consistently significant relationship between education and happiness or life satisfaction.[681] However, the correlations between these variables, that were found within survey waves and age demographics, support the Modernisationist position that people with higher levels of formal education tend to be happier and more satisfied with their lives.

The clear significant relationships revealed between higher formal educational attainment and certain values and social capital measures appear to corroborate both

[679] Higher formal education attainment is likely to homogenise social networks by measures such as class, occupation and political persuasion.
[680] See Appendices 527-560
[681] See Appendices 561 & 562

Modernisation and Homogenisation theories. However, the mixed, inconsistent and non-existent relationships uncovered between formal education attainment and other variables tend to provide relatively greater support to my Homogenisation thesis. Like Modernisation theory, Homogenisation theory holds that those more empowered (by factors such as higher formal education attainment) will tend to place greater emphasis on self-expression values than those who are less empowered. Both theories maintain that when other variables are controlled, greater emphasis on self-expression values reduces confidence and involvement in formal institutions and organisations. However, unlike Modernisation, my Homogenisation thesis suggests (as discussed in Chapter Three and summarised in the next paragraph) that many formal organisations are likely to have adapted to the values and expectations of an increasingly self-expression values oriented public, with more homogenised social networks than in decades past. These adaptations may have diminished or mitigated the strength/significance of what would have otherwise been a negative relationship between higher formal education attainment and involvement and confidence in formal organisations.

Studies have found that, in advanced post-industrial countries like Australia, greater education attainment, advances in communications technology and intergenerational value shifts have empowered and motivated organisation members to demand, and individuals to form groups with, more egalitarian structures and procedures.[682] Furthermore, research suggests that Americans (who share many cultural, linguistic, historical and political similarities with Australians) are increasingly likely both; to involve themselves in the same on-and-offline groups, attend the same events and frequent the same establishments as people who hold political beliefs with which they agree, and; to avoid those at, and in which they are likely to encounter persons who have different/opposing political views.[683] Additionally, since at least 2003, annual growth rates in the number of Australian Not-for-

[682] Saxton, 'The Participatory Revolution in Nonprofit Management', p.34-39

[683] Evans and Fu, 'Opinion formation on dynamic networks', p.9; Dellaposta, Shi, and Macy, 'Why Do Liberals Drink Lattes?', p.1473-1511; Gillani, Yuan, Saveski, Vosovghi and Roy, 'Me, My Echo Chamber, and I', p.1 & 2; Halbertam and Kight, 'Homophily, group size and the diffusion of political information in social networks', p.73-88; Sunstein, 'The Law of Group Polarization', p.175-195; Batorski, and Grzywinska, 'Three dimensions of the public sphere on Facebook', p.356-374; Groshek, and Koc-Michalska, 'Helping populism win?', p.1389-1407; Flaxman, Goal and Rao, 'Filter Bubbles, Echo Chambers, and Online News Consumption', p.298-320; Dahlberg, 'Rethinking the fragmentation of the cyberpublic', p.827-847; Pariser, *The filter bubble*; Brossard, and Scheufele, 'Science, new media, and the public', p.40 & 41; Bakshy, Messing, and Adamic, 'Exposure to ideologically diverse news and opinion on Facebook', p.1130-1132; Yardi, and Boyd, 'Dynamic debates', p.316-327; Davis, 'The Web of Politics', p.361-364; Hill and Hughes, *Cyberpolitics*; Wilhelm, 'Virtual sounding boards', p.313-338; Huber, and Malhotra, 'Political Homophily in Social Relationships', p.270, 271 & 282

Profit organisations (which include charitable, sports, cultural, health, educational and religious groups) have tended to exceed Australian population growth rates.[684] This evidence supports my theory that organisations are both democratising and splintering into more groups with relatively homogenous memberships. These adaptations have (as argued in Chapter Three) helped to raise confidence and involvement in many types of groups and organisations, particularly among the self-expression oriented and conflict averse who, according to my Homogenisation theory, are disproportionally well-educated.

Additionally, Inglehart and Welzel suggest that happiness and life satisfaction are raised and strengthened by individual empowerment brought on by factors including higher educational attainment. However, I have presented evidence (in the latter part of Chapter Three) indicating that such contexts have little or no influence on long-term happiness. Synthetic happiness (that which we create for ourselves in our own minds) is far more potent and enduring than that received from improvements to the context in which we are embedded.[685] Furthermore, although there was no consistency in the significant correlations found between higher formal education attainment and either trustworthiness or unconventional political activity, formal education attainment is only one measure/indicator of individual empowerment. Overall levels of autonomy may still be positively correlated with both trustworthiness and unconventional political involvement, as is consistent with Modernisation and Homogenisation theories.

Conclusion

This chapter has assessed correlation statistics from Australian WVS data to infer relationships between non-economic variables and values, social capital and political engagement. The correlation statistics presented suggest that many of the variables Putnam deems to be significant factors, actually have little to no influence on, or relationship with, value orientations, social capital and political involvement. These variables include marital status, how many children one has, female employment status, the time one devotes to

[684] Shulman, 'IBISWorld Industry Report X0021: Charities & Not-for-Profit Organisations in Australia', p.32, *EthicalJobs: Australia,* viewed 25 September 2018, http://www.ethicaljobs.com.au/files/2012_NFP_report.pdf; *THE WORLD BANK,* (last updated 2017) 'Population growth (annual %): Australia', https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW?locations=AU
[685] Gilbert, 'The Surprising Science of Happiness'

television viewing, frequency of religious service attendance and the size of one's town/city. Contrastingly, other correlation statistics also drawn from Australian WVS data support both Inglehart and Welzel's Modernisation theory and my own Homogenisation thesis. That is, this evidence suggests that education and the degree to which one's occupation requires creativity significantly impacts on value orientations, social capital and political participation. Additionally, Putnam's position that women are (or are almost) comprehensively better social capitalists than men is contradicted by WVS statistics. While being female seems to raise trustworthiness, WVS evidence suggests that sex has little to no impact on overall levels of:

- involvement in formal organisations,
- interpersonal trust,
- political discussion,
- confidence in society's major institutions and organisations,
- unconventional political engagement, or
- generosity.

WVS statistics indicate that being male (rather than female) does raise one's likelihood of being politically interested and having greater confidence in Australia's parliament. However, other studies have found that women tend to have larger and stronger informal social networks than do men.

This chapter's findings are important as they corroborate statistics discussed in the previous chapter revealing that variables directly impacting on individual autonomy and empowerment[686] tend to effect:

- value orientations,
- social capital, and
- political participation

in ways consistent with both Modernisation and my own Homogenisation theory. They also suggest that alternative theoretical explanations for trends in social and political values, trust,

[686] Variables directly effecting individual autonomy and empowerment include subjective sense of autonomy, income, financial satisfaction, education attainment and the degree to which one's occupation requires creativity

capital and engagement (such as those expressed by Putnam) are relatively uncompelling. The next three chapters analyse statistics collated from my own "Political Participation and Conflict Avoidance" survey to evaluate the relationships between social network homogeneity and other relevant variables. They thereby test the relative credibility of Lamentation, but particularly Modernisation and Homogenisation theories.

CHAPTER SIX

--MAPPING A SOCIOLOGICAL NEXUS--

The Self-Expression Values Homogenous Social Network Complex

Chapter One presented an overview of Australia's waning rates of party and electoral participation. It also identified two main sociological engagement theories and provided evidence for why a third theory, warrants further investigation. Chapter Two compared conflicting Modernisationist and Lamentationist conceptions of social atomisation. After examining these theories in detail, both were found to have merits and shortcomings. Chapter Three provided an overview of trends in Australian social and political engagement, values, and trust/confidence as well as the factors driving them by presenting percentage statistics collated from 1981, 1995, 2005 and 2012 World Values Survey data.

Chapters Four and Five analysed correlation statistics from these survey waves to infer likely relationships between both a subjective sense of, and factors possibly influencing actual autonomy and value orientations, social capital measures and political involvement. These correlations 'controlled' for salient variables including age, sex, employment status, marital status, financial satisfaction, income, highest level of education attained, frequency of religious service attendance, number of children and the size of one's town/city. The correlation statistics presented possibly suggest that many variables Putnam deems to be significant factors have little to no influence on, or relationship with, value orientations, social capital and political engagement. These 'independent' variables include marital status, how many children one has, sex, female employment status, the time one devotes to television watching, frequency of religious service attendance and the size of one's town/city. Contrastingly, other correlation statistics also drawn from Australian WVS data have supported both Inglehart and Welzel's Modernisationist theory and my Homogenisationist thesis. Indeed, WVS statistics suggest that a subjective sense of empowerment as well as

factors influencing actual autonomy (including income, wealth, education and the degree to which one's job requires creativity) significantly impact on value orientations, social capital and political involvement.

Having crippled Putnam's Lamentation thesis in previous chapters (at least in the Australian context), Chapters Six and Seven focus on the divergence between my Homogenisation and Inglehart and Welzel's Modernisation theories. This thesis has so far considered few statistics that can potentially settle matters of disagreement between Homogenisation and Modernisation theories. These theories diverge in their account of how individual empowerment and social modularity influence structural social capital, and how different kinds of political engagement stem from these effects. According to my Homogenisation thesis structural social capital in post-industrial countries like Australia (where people are increasingly autonomous and socially modular)[687] is becoming less bridging and more bonding. Conversely, the Modernisationists Inglehart and Welzel hold that the opposite is true.[688]

Paradoxically, I contend that Social Network Homogenisation (SNH) precipitates ideological diversification. That is, as social networks politically/ideologically homogenise, their members encounter fewer (and have fewer meaningful interactions with) people holding opposing political views and attitudes. Thus, members of homogenised social networks have their own preferences and biases reinforced more, and challenged and moderated less, frequently. Ergo, homogenised networks (and their members) are inclined to drift further away from the ideological centre than are members of relatively more politically/ideologically diverse networks. Ideological diversification should not be conflated with ideological polarisation. The former is a movement away from the political centre and toward many ideological extremes. The latter is the sorting of political beliefs and attitudes into two distinct camps.[689]

I maintain that SNH and ideological diversification induce greater unwillingness to compromise and declines in the political trust, tolerance and efficacy of ordinary citizens.

[687] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.24, 29, 118, 262 & 294
[688] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.142 & 294
[689] Nivola, Pietro, S. (2005) 'Thinking About Political Polarization', *Brookings Institution,* viewed 23 October 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/research/thinking-about-political-polarization/

Consequently, people become more conflict-averse and avoid conflict-prone settings in which debate and/or compromise are necessary for meaningful involvement i.e. party/electoral participation. Lower levels of party membership and engagement erode democracy by leaving party policy formation and candidate selection to a narrow and unrepresentative sample beholden to sectional interests.[690] Contrastingly, Inglehart and Welzel maintain more bridging structural social capital is helping to facilitate elite challenging action and behaviour. Thus, enabling different groups of people to cooperate in pursuit of shared liberal and egalitarian goals renders political and other elites more accountable.[691]

The World Values Survey lacks questions regarding the characteristics of participants' social network members. Therefore, the survey does not allow for assessment of participants' social network compositions or the degree to which they reflect/reinforce participants' own characteristics, or social and political values and views. Hence, the remaining chapters of this thesis will rely on statistics collated from my own 'Political Participation and Conflict Avoidance Survey' of 36 participants to support my fundamental argument. Subjects were found using snowball sampling techniques in which existing survey participants recruit future participants from among their acquaintances. Initial participants were chosen from among my friends and family members. These initial participants selected had a diverse range of backgrounds. Once each had completed my survey they were instructed to ask their acquaintances whether they would be interested in participating. The contact information of those who were interested was then provided to me with their consent. Participants were asked to recruit a diverse range of subjects (if possible) and each participant was offered an honorarium of $25 for their involvement. This sixth chapter will establish connections between the extent to which participants' social networks are homogenous and measures of participants' value orientations, structural social capital (both formal and informal) and social and political trust.

Table 6.1

Socio-demographic profile of respondents (ignoring missing data)

Generations

[690] Katz and Mair. 'Changing Models of Party Organisation and Party Democracy', p.15, 16 & 21-23; Whiteley, 'Party membership and activism in comparative perspective', p.131

[691] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.43, 44, 142, 116, 223, 229 & 262

Baby Boomers	8
Gen Xers	7
Millennials	21
Sex	
Males	13
Females	12
Highest education qualification attained	
Year 12 High School	4
Diploma	1
Advanced Diploma or Associate Degree	3
Bachelor's degree	9
Bachelor Honours Degree or Graduate Certificate or Graduate Diploma	7
Master's Degree	1
Doctoral Degree	1

The Survey was extremely long and complex requiring approximately two hours to complete. This time requirement limited available participants. Having 36, rather than thousands of participants has meant that (unlike WVS statistics presented in the previous chapters) statistics drawn from my survey data do not control for extraneous variables. Still, my statistics (evaluated over Chapters Six, Seven and Eight) are highly useful in mapping the variables linked to a sociological nexus (the Self-Expression Values Homogenous Social Network Complex discussed later in this chapter). The most probable relationships underpinning these correlations are then surmised using critical thinking and educated reasoning. The correlations between the homogeneity of participants social networks and other variables were properly considered. Each participant's responses regarding the degree of difference between themselves and members of their close social network were first collated such that each participant was given scores indicating:

1. The degree of ideological difference that participants believe to exist between them and members of their close social network ('Ideological Social Network Difference'). This was determined by adding up the number of differences participants believe to exist between their political policy positions and those of their close social network members. This value for any given policy issue was weighted according to the importance placed on this public policy area by the participant. The sum of the values recorded for each question then became the participant's Ideological Social Network Difference Score (ISNDS).

Methodology for calculating participants' Ideological Social Network Difference Scores (ISNDSs).

Relevant survey questions: 117-146

- survey questions regarding economic policy issues: 120, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129 & 134
- survey questions regarding social policy issues: 117, 119, 121, 122, 131, 132, 133 & 138
- survey question regarding environmental issues: 123
- survey questions regarding national security and foreign affairs issues: 124, 135, 136 & 137
- survey questions regarding democracy and civil liberties issues: 118, 130 & 139
- survey questions regarding emphases placed on policy areas: 140-145
- survey question regarding party preferences: 146

Step 1 – counted were the number of members of a participant's close social network that the participant thought would have a different political party preference (question 146) to the participant.

Step 2 - this area of possible political disagreement suggests the likelihood of other areas of significant political difference. Additionally, views pertaining to electoral preferences and the reasons for them are particularly important because they influence electoral and policy outcomes. Consequently, discussion about different electoral preferences with members of one's close social network is likely to prompt more extensive discussion concerning values and policy. Hence, the numbers counted in Step 1 were multiplied by four. These numbers were added to participants' ISNDSs. More figures will be added to participants' ISNDSs in subsequent steps.

Step 3 – counted were the number of members of participants' close social networks that the participant thought would emphasise/prioritise policy areas differently to the participant. This was done for each policy area (questions 140-145) and the sums were added to participants' ISNDSs.

Step 4 – counted were the number of members of participants' close social network that the participant thought would have different views to the participant on economic policy issues. This was done for each economic policy issue (questions 120, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129 & 134).

These numbers were multiplied by the importance participants placed on economic policy issues (question 140). That is, if 'Extremely important' they were multiplied by three, if 'Quite important' they were multiplied by two and if 'Not very important' they were multiplied by one. These figures were added to participants' ISNDSs.

Step 5 - Step 4 was repeated for social, environmental, national security and foreign affairs and democracy and civil liberties issues (using relevant responses to relevant survey questions).

Below is a table of the Participation Code Numbers (PCNs) as well as the ISNDSs of the participants that answered the relevant questions and indicated positions they believed were held by members of their close social networks.

Table 6.2

Participation Code Numbers and Ideological Social Network Difference Scores.

PCNs	ISNDSs
0069	21
0074	43
0078	238
0073	281
0066	104
0083	238
0080	74
0068	65
0016	105
0042	105
0058	129
0054	0
0049	78
0037	119
0035	279
0024	222
0009	203

0017	417
0008	222
0007	87
0006	151
0001	127
0000	401

2. **The average degree of ideological difference that participants believe to exist between them and members of their close social network.** This was determined by dividing the participant's ISNDS by the number of members of their close social network whose supposed public policy positions were being recorded. Some participants did not record the policy positions of the same number of members of their close social network for each policy issue. Consequently, the number which was most frequently used was applied to determine the Average Ideological Social Network Difference Score (AISNDS).

Methodology for calculating participants' Average Ideological Social Network Difference Scores (AISNDSs).

Participants' AISNDSs were determined by dividing their ISNDSs (discussed in the previous appendix) by the number of close social network members whose positions participants indicated in their responses to questions 117-146. Participants were asked to consider the same close social network members when responding to each of these questions. If they did not know and could not guess the positions of one or more of their close social network members regarding an issue they were asked to place them in the 'Definitely do not know' category. However, not all participants indicated the same number of positions held by their close social network members from question to question. This variation was very minor for all but one of these participants. Their AISNDSs were determined by dividing their ISNDSs by the number of close social network members they considered in a 'majority' of the relevant questions (questions 117 to 146). The one participant who responded to the relevant questions but was extremely inconsistent regarding the number of close social network members they considered in each question was not given an AISNDS. Neither were those

participants who failed to indicate any policy position held by any member of their close social network.

Below is a table of participants' PCNs,[692] ISNDSs,[693] AISNDSs and number of close social network members.

Table 6.3

Participants' PCNs, ISNDSs, AISNDSs and number of close social network members.

PCNs	ISNDSs	Network Size	AISNDSs
0069	21	26	0.81
0074	43	17	2.53
0078	238	14	17
0073	281	No consistency	-
0066	104	11	9.45
0083	238	11	21.64
0080	74	15	4.93
0068	65	24	2.71
0016	105	19	5.53
0042	105	6	17.5
0058	129	13	9.92
0054	0	2	0.00
0049	78	6	13.00
0037	119	5	23.8
0035	279	15	18.6
0024	222	7	31.71
0009	203	17	11.94
0017	417	33	12.64
0008	222	7	31.71

[692] Defined in Appendix 569
[693] Defined in Appendix 569

0007	87	15	5.80
0006	151	15	10.07
0001	127	7	18.14
0000	401	8	50.13

3. The average degree of structural difference that participants believe to exist between them and members of their close social network. This was determined by first adding up the number of differences (other than political policy positions or value emphases) between the participant and members of the participant's social network. These differences included such characteristics as gender, sexual orientation, primary language, ethnicity, religion, religiosity, class, and education. Then, the sum of the values recorded for each of these areas of difference was divided by the number of members of the participant's close social network whose structural characteristics were being recorded. Some participants did not record the structural characteristics of the same number of members of their close social network for each type of structural characteristic. Therefore, the number which was most frequently used was applied to determine the Average Structural Social Network Difference Score (ASSNDS).

Methodology for calculating participants' Average Structural Social Network Difference Scores (ASSNDSs)

Relevant survey questions: 103 – 115.

Responses to these questions were used to assess the degree to which members of participants' networks were structurally (as opposed ideologically/politically) unlike the participant. Structural variables considered included age, gender, sexuality, country of birth, ethnicity, English/foreign language proficiency, education, socio-economic status, religion and religiosity.

Step 1 - For each of the relevant questions (questions 103 – 115) the number of members of participants' close social networks that the participant had indicated had different structural traits/characteristics to the participant were counted. The sum of these numbers became the participants' Structural Social Network Difference Scores (SSNDSs).

Step 2 – Participants' SSNDSs were divided by the number of close social network members whose structural traits/characteristics the participants indicated in their responses to questions 103 – 1115. Participants were asked to consider the same number of social network members when responding to each of these questions. If they did not know and could not guess the traits/characteristics of one or more of their close social network members regarding a structural variable they were asked to place them in the 'Definitely do not know' category. However, not all participants indicated the same number of mutually exclusive traits/characteristics for their close social network members from question to question. This variation was very minor for all but one of the participants. Their ASSNDSs were determined by dividing their SSNDSs by the number of close social network members they considered when responding to a majority of the relevant questions (questions 103-115). The one participant who responded to the relevant questions but was extremely inconsistent regarding the number of close social network members they considered when answering each question was not given an ASSNDS.

Below is a table of the Participants' PCNs,[694] SSNDSs, and ASSNDSs as well as the number of close social network members considered by participants.

Table 6.4

Participants' PCNs, SSNDSs and ASSNDSs and the number of close social network members.

PCNs	SSNDSs	Network Size	ASSNDSs
0069	64	26	2.46
0074	103	17	6.06
0078	84	14	6.00
0073	93	No consistency	-
0066	48	11	4.36
0083	51	11	4.64
0080	46	15	3.07

[694] Defined in Appendix 569

0084	69	24	2.88
0068	110	24	4.58
0016	36	19	1.89
0042	44	6	7.33
0058	54	13	4.15
0044	29	8	3.63
0054	7	2	3.50
0049	38	6	6.33
0045	15	4	3.75
0037	29	5	5.80
0035	92	15	6.13
0024	68	7	9.71
0009	53	18	2.94
0017	159	33	4.82
0008	26	7	3.71
0007	61	15	4.07
0006	76	15	5.07
0001	42	7	6.00
0000	34	8	4.25

4. The average degree of difference that participants believe exists between the emphasis they place on values and the emphasis placed on those same values by members of their close social network. This was determined by first adding up the various degrees of difference between the participant's self-placed emphasis (or lack thereof) on values and those of the members of their close social network. The sum of these recorded value differences was then divided by the number of members of the participant's close social network whose supposed value emphases were recorded. Some participants did not record the values emphases of the same number of members of their close social network for each value. Therefore, the number which was most frequently used was applied to determine the Average Values Social Network Difference Score (AVSNDS).

Methodology for calculating participants' Average Value Social Network Difference Scores (AVSNDSs)

Relevant survey questions: 151/152

Question 151 asked participants to distribute 40 points between 10 ultimate values (values that are not derived from other values); giving no one value more than seven points or less than one point. Participants were asked to distribute these points based on how many political contexts they, as individuals, tend to prioritise each of these values over others, relative to the average Australian. It was stated that the average Australian would distribute their 40 points by placing a 4 in each cell corresponding to each ultimate value.

Question 152 asked participants to indicate how they would distribute the 40 points of each member of their close network based on what they know of their politics (the same people they used to answer questions 103-146).

Step 1 - The difference between 'the number of points participants indicated represented their own overall level of emphasis on a value' and 'the numbers of points participants indicated was representative of the overall level of emphasis placed on this value by each member of their close social network' was added to participants' Value Social Network Difference Scores (VSNDSs).

Step 2 - This was repeated for each value.

Step 3 – Participants VSNDSs were divided by the number of close social network members whose value emphases the participants indicated in their responses to question 152. Participants were asked to consider the value emphases of the same close social network members per value. However, not all participants indicated the same number of value emphases per value. Therefore, AVSNDSs were determined by dividing VSNDSs by the number of value emphases considered for at least five of the 10 values. Again, as discussed in the previous two appendices one participant (with PCN 0073) who responded to the relevant questions but was extremely inconsistent regarding the number of close social network members they considered when answering questions 103 – 146, and 152 was not given an AVSNDS.

Below is a table of participants' PCNs,[695] VSNDSs and AVSNDSs of participants as well as the number of close social network members whose value emphases participants considered.

[695] Defined in Appendix 569

Table 6.5

Participants' PCNs, VSNDSs, AVSNDSs and number of close social network members whose value emphases participants considered.

PCN	VSNDSs	Network Size	AVSNDSs
0074	190	17	11.18
0078	179	14	12.79
0066	66	11	6.00
0080	64	15	4.27
0042	106	6	17.67
0044	77	10	7.70
0054	0	2	0.00
0049	0	6	0.00
0045	18	1	18.00
0037	0	5	0.00
0035	196	15	13.07
0024	161	7	23.00
0017	416	33	12.61
0008	72	7	10.29
0007	15	15	1.00
0006	234	13	18.00
0001	119	7	17.00
0000	124	8	15.50

Additionally, participants were asked four simple yes/no questions regarding structural characteristics of the people they had met and visited socially in the previous month. Were they mostly of a different: ethnic or linguistic group, economic status, social status, or religious group? Responses to these survey questions (all survey questions can be viewed in Appendix 568) were used to measure the following variables.

Table 6.6

Variables measured by, and wordings of survey questions 51 A to 51 D.

Variables/Question wordings	Survey questions assessing these variables
V: The extent to which participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) are ethnically/linguistically diverse Q: Were the people you met and visited with [in the last month – this is made clear by previous three questions] mostly of different ethnic or linguistic groups? Yes/No	51 A
V: The extent to which members of participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) have diverse economic status Q: Were the people you met and visited with [in the last month – this is made clear by previous three questions] mostly of different economic status? Yes/No	51 B
V: The extent to which members of participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) have diverse social status Q: Were the people you met and visited with [in the last month – this is made clear by previous three questions] mostly of different social status? Yes/No	51 C
V: The extent to which participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) are religiously diverse Q: Were the people you met and visited with [in the last month – this is made clear by previous three questions] mostly of different religious groups? Yes/No	51 D

Correlations between these responses and other variables were employed to generate a greater understanding of the diversity within informal networks and how this diversity may influence, or be affected by, other factors.

Binary yes/no questions regarding the structural characteristics of members of the most important formal organisations to which participants belonged were also asked to deduce the following variables.

Table 6.7

Variables measured by, and wordings of survey questions 95 A to 95 F, 96 A and 96 B.

Variables/Question wordings	Survey questions assessing these variables

V: Participants agreeing that most members of the most important formal group in which they are involved reside in the same neighbourhood/town Q: Thinking about the membership of your most important group [same group considered in the previous five questions], are most of them of the same neighbourhood/town? Yes/No	95 A
V: Participants agreeing that most members of the most important formal group in which they are involved are of the same family or kin group Q: Thinking about the membership of your most important group [same group considered in the previous five questions], are most of them of the same family or kin group? Yes/No	95B
V: Participants agreeing that most members of the most important formal group in which they are involved have the same religion Q: Thinking about the membership of your most important group [same group considered in the previous five questions], are most of them of the same religion? Yes/No	95C
V: Participants agreeing that most members of the most important formal group in which they are involved have the same gender Q: Thinking about the membership of your most important group [same group considered in the previous five questions], are most of them of the same gender? Yes/No	95 D
V: Participants agreeing that most members of the most important formal group in which they are involved are of the same age Q: Thinking about the membership of your most important group [same group considered in the previous five questions], are most of them of the same age? Yes/No	95 E
V: Participants agreeing that most members of the most important formal group in which they are involved are of the same ethnic/linguistic group Q: Thinking about the membership of your most important group [same group considered in the previous five questions], are most of them of the same ethnic/linguistic group? Yes/No	95 F
V: Participants agreeing that most members of the most important formal group in which they are involved have the same occupation Q: [Thinking about the membership of your most important group - same group considered in the previous six questions] Do members mostly have the same occupation? Yes/No	96 A
V: Participants agreeing that most members of the most important formal group in which they are involved have the same educational background/level Q: [Thinking about the membership of your most important group - same group	96 B

considered in the previous six questions] Do members mostly have the same educational background/level? Yes/No	

Responses to these questions were used to gauge the diversity within formal networks and how this diversity is related to informal social network diversity and other variables.

The variables below are among those considered/discussed over the final three chapters. I have formulated this table to clarify the survey questions from which these variables are gleaned.

Table 6.8

Variables measured by, and wordings of survey questions 37, 62 to 68, 71, 86 and 116.

Variables	Survey questions assessing these variables
V: The number of close friends that participants reported having. Q: Approximately how many close friends, close work colleagues, close family members and close others do you have these days? Write numbers, not names, in the boxes below. These are people with whom you feel comfortable talking to about serious and private matters and who you can call on for help. Indicate at least 3 but no more than 15 of these people in total. (Write the names of these people on a separate piece of paper. This is for your benefit only. Do not submit this piece of paper with the survey. This list will assist you to answer questions later in the survey) - Close friends - Close work colleagues - Close family members - Other	37
V: Believing society is ideologically homogenous. Q: Generally speaking most people and politicians know and agree what has to be done. Most political debate, negotiation and compromise are therefore unnecessary, distract people and politicians from the big picture and slows/waters down widely accepted policy positions. To what extent do you agree? 1. Strongly agree 2. Mildly agree 3. Depends 4. Mildly disagree 5. Strongly disagree	62

V: Believing there is little to be learnt from political discussion with those with whom one disagrees. Q: There is little to be learnt or achieved by discussing politics informally with people who strongly disagree with your views. It's unpleasant and neither side is likely to change their mind. To what extent do you agree? 1. Strongly agree 2. Mildly agree 3. Depends 4. Mildly disagree 5. Strongly disagree	63
V: An unwillingness to accept political compromise. Q: Formal politics is a win-lose zero-sum game between competing interests. Compromise is ultimately a loss for all parties involved. To what extent do you agree? 1. Strongly agree 2. Mildly agree 3. Depends 4. Mildly disagree 5. Strongly disagree	64
Believing in the effectiveness of voting. Q: Some people say that no matter who people vote for, it won't make any difference to what happens. Others say that who people vote for can make a big difference to what happens. Where would you place yourself? 1. Can make an enormous difference 2. Can make a significant difference 3. Can make some difference 4. Will make little difference 5. Won't make any difference	65
V: Having greater confidence in one's political debating skills. Q: To what extent are you able to persuade other people, with different political views from your own, of the merits of your political arguments? 1. A great extent 2. Some extent 3. Depends 4. Hardly ever 5. Never	66
V: Frequency of debating people with political views different from one's own. Q: How many times in the past month have you discussed and debated political issues with people who disagreed with your views regarding the issue(s) discussed?	67
V: Believing that voting is worthwhile. Q: Is voting at Federal and State elections worthwhile? - Yes definitely - Probably - Not Sure - Probably not - Not at all	68

Being politically involved in conflict prone settings or activities (such as attending a town/neighbourhood council meeting, public hearing or public discussion group; meeting with, calling or sending letters or emails to, politicians; and participating in information or election campaigns). Q71: In the past 12 months, how many times have you done the following? - Attended a town/neighbourhood council meeting, public hearing, or public discussion group - Organised or signed a written or online petition - Met with a politician, called him/her, or sent a letter/email - Participated in a protest or demonstration - Participated in an information or election campaign - Alerted newspaper, radio or TV to a local problem - Notified police or court about a local problem	71
V: Believing that political checks and compromise are beneficial. Q: Which do you think is better – when the Federal Government has a majority in both the House of Representatives and the Senate, OR when the Federal Government in the House of Representatives does not control the Senate? 1. Much better when Government controls *both* 2. Better when Government controls *both* 3. Neither / doesn't matter 4. Better when Government *does not* control the Senate 5. Much better when Government *does not* control the Senate	86
V: Being less conflict avoidant. Q: How prepared are you and members of your close social network to discuss politics with others? - Try to avoid getting into political discussions because they can be unpleasant. - Enjoy discussing politics even though it sometimes leads to arguments. - Somewhere in between previous two answers. - Definitely do not know	116

Furthermore, the methods by which the variables in the next table are derived are illuminated in their corresponding appendices.

Table 6.9

Variables measured by survey questions 573 to 583.

Variables	Appendices discussing how these variables were measured
Participants' frequency of meeting informally with members of their social networks	Appendix 573
Participants' Formal Organisational Engagement Score	Appendix 574
The relative membership growth of the two most important formal groups in which participants are involved	Appendix 575
The degree to which participants' most important formal groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian decision-making processes	Appendix 576
The degree to which participants' two most important formal groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian decision-making processes	Appendix 577
The degree to which participants' most important formal groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian leadership-selection processes	Appendix 578
The degree to which participants' two most important formal groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian leadership-selection processes	Appendix 579
The extent to which participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) are structurally (ethnically/linguistically, economically, socially and religiously) diverse	Appendix 580
Participants agreeing that most members of the most important formal groups in which they are involved have the same income/wealth	Appendix 581
Membership of / willingness to join, a political party	Appendix 582
Willingness of non-members to join a political party	Appendix 583

Given that my survey only had 36 participants, the significances of these results tend to be lower than the Australian WVS statistics which had thousands of participants. Consequently, the correlations deemed significant enough to discuss are those with (p) values below a higher threshold than what was used for the WVS. The correlation statistics produced from my survey data will be considered moderately significant if they have a (p) value of between 0.200 and 0.050, highly significant if they have a (p) value of between 0.050 and 0.010 and extremely significant if they have a (p) value of 0.010 or less. Most statisticians consider correlations to be significant if they have a (p) value of less than 0.1 or 0.05 i.e. statistics that have less than either a 10% or 5% chance of representing no real correlations

between variables. I acknowledge that a (p) value threshold of 0.2 (or a correlation with less than 20% chance of there not being any real relationship between tested variables) is not ideal. However, given the length of my survey and limits on financial resources/incentives only 36 people were willing and able to participate and not all of these participants completed the whole survey.

Positive correlations are found between social network homogeneity and indicators of egalitarian/self-expression values orientation: suggesting the existence of a Self-Expression Values/Homogenous Social Network (SEVHSN) Complex. Such a complex is consistent with Homogenisation, but is in stark contradiction to Modernisation theory. Other variables and trends related to formal and informal group engagement, and social/political trust and confidence are both found to be correlated with, and argued to be facets of, the SEVHSN Complex. These relationships support my Homogenisation theory.

Believing both that society is ideologically homogenous, and that there is little to be learnt from political debate with those with whom one disagrees, are linked to an unwillingness to accept political compromise as well as variables part of, or linked to, the SEVHSN Complex. These correlations may be explained by people with more homogenous networks over-estimating the degree to which society reflects their views and characteristics. Consequently, they may be less inclined to recognise the value of political discussion and political compromise with those with whom they disagree. This disincentive to engage constructively with those who hold alternative views potentially results in inexperience, discomfort and inefficacy when debating, negotiating and compromising; this, in turn possibly discourages meaningful conflict prone forms of political involvement. Politicians frequently fail to meet the expectations of citizens who overestimate the degree to which their own views and ideas are reflected by the public at large. It will be argued in Chapter Eight that these citizens are significantly more inclined to believe that politicians and the political establishment are corrupted by sectional/minority concerns. This further undermines the propensity for political party and electoral participation.

Chapters Seven and Eight will present and discuss correlations between the SEVHSN Complex and:

- time spent listening to personal devices, looking at screens and communicating online for non-work-related purposes,
- the proportion of participants' close friends they initially met online,
- the proportion of participants' online communication spent communicating with people they initially met online and/or who live far away,
- measures of previous and current socio-economic status,
- formal education attainment,
- familial patterns, and
- the ways in which news and political information are accessed.

Other discussed correlation statistics include those between measures of SEVHSN Complex immersion and:

- voting patterns,
- support for and willingness to accept political checks and compromise,
- frequency of debating people with different political beliefs, and tolerance of (and willingness to engage in debate with) people who hold different political views;
- confidence in one's own political debating skills,
- conflict avoidance,
- various kinds of political engagement and belief in the effectiveness of such engagement,
- satisfaction with the way democracy works in Australia, and
- support for electoral reform.

SEVHSN Complex

Responses to questions assessing the degree to which the decision-making and leadership selection processes of participants' most important formal groups are egalitarian can be used as an indicator of the extent to which participants emphasise self-expression over survival values. The most important formal groups in which some people are involved have egalitarian/democratic governance procedures (i.e. decision making and leadership selection processes that distribute power more evenly among group members). These people

are more likely to heavily emphasise autonomy and egalitarian self-expression values than those whose most important formal organisations are governed by hierarchies relatively unaccountable to their memberships. Undeniably, significant positive correlations were found between the degree to which participants' most important formal groups have egalitarian decision-making and leadership selection processes and the extent to which these participants have:

- structurally homogenous informal social networks, and
- structurally/ideologically reinforcing close social networks.

These statistics would indicate a strong relationship between a self-expression values orientation and social network homogeneity.

This finding is immensely important as it is consistent with this the fundamental premise of this thesis that greater emphasis on self-expression values raises social modularity which precipitates the homogenisation of social networks. This, in turn facilitates more bonding and less bridging social capital. Conversely, these results cast considerable doubt on Inglehart and Welzel's contention that a rising emphasis on self-expression values and social modularity causes the diversification of social networks: facilitating more bridging and less bonding social capital.[696]

Table 6.10

Correlations between the degree to which participants' two most important formal groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian decision-making processes and measures of the structural diversity within participants' informal social networks.

2015 Correlations between	The degree to which participants' two most important formal groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian decision-making processes.	Number of participants
The extent to which participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) are structurally (ethnically/linguistically, economically, socially and religiously) diverse	r= -.354, p= .027	22

[696] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.142, 143 & 294

The extent to which participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) are ethnically/linguistically diverse	r= -.411, p= .009	23

Table 6.11

The correlation between the degree to which participants' two most important formal groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian leadership-selection processes and the extent to which members of participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) have diverse social status.

2015 Correlations between	The degree to which participants' two most important formal groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian leadership-selection processes.	Number of participants
The extent to which members of participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) have diverse social status	R= -.260, p= .131	22

Table 6.12

Correlations between the degree to which participants' two most important formal groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian decision-making processes and measures of structural, ideological and values diversity within participants' social networks.

2015 Correlations between	The degree to which participants' two most important formal groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian decision-making processes.	Number of participants
ASSNDS	r= -.502, p= .002	21
AISNDS	r= -.323, p= .081	19
AVSNDS	r= -.468, p= .014	16

Table 6.13

Correlations between the degree to which participants' two most important formal groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian leadership-selection processes and measures of structural and ideological diversity within participants' social networks.

2015 Correlations between	The degree to which participants' two most important formal groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian leadership-selection processes.	Number of participants
ASSNDS	r= -.523, p= .055	21
ISNDS	r= -.491, p= .089	20

Ascendency of Homogenous Formal Groups

The link between self-expression values and social network homogeneity is one core component of a web of correlations indicating the existence of the SEVHSN Complex central to my argument. Certain other relationships between this core and variables/statistics related to group engagement, and social/political trust/confidence must be demonstrated to support both the existence of the complex and the validity of my thesis. According to my Homogenisation thesis a large majority of people in Australia (this thesis' case study) and other post-industrial societies (with high social modularity and individual empowerment) are immersed in the SEVHSN Complex and consequently prefer to participate in egalitarian over hierarchical formal organisations. They also have less contact, and feel less comfortable with people whose interests, values and beliefs are unlike their own than did/do persons several generations their senior. However, the degree to which formal groups have egalitarian decision-making processes and homogenous memberships tends to have a greater influence on whether the more Complex embedded participate than on whether the relatively less Complex immersed become involved.

Therefore, the early twenty-first century rise in secular and non-political-party formal group engagement may be primarily attributable to formal organisations adapting to the egalitarian preferences and conflict avoidant dispositions of the highly Complex immersed. That is, Australian formal structural social capital may be transitioning from fewer but larger diverse and hierarchical organisations to more but relatively smaller homogenous and democratic groups. Indeed, as discussed in Chapters Three and Five, research conducted by Gregory Saxton indicates that in the United States (an advanced post-industrial country with which Australia shares many cultural, linguistic, historical and political similarities) greater education attainment, advances in communications technology and intergenerational value

shifts have empowered and motivated organisation members to demand, and individuals to form groups with, more egalitarian structures and procedures.[697] Furthermore, research suggests that Americans are increasingly likely both; to involve themselves in the same on-and-offline groups, attend the same events and frequent the same establishments as people who hold political beliefs with which they agree, and; to avoid those at, and in which they are likely to encounter persons who have different/opposing political views.[698] Additionally, since at least 2003, annual growth rates in the number of Australian Not-for-Profit organisations (which include charitable, sports, cultural, health, educational and religious groups) have tended to exceed Australian population growth rates.[699] This evidence supports my theory that organisations are both democratising and splintering into more groups with relatively homogenous memberships. These adaptations have (as argued in Chapter Three) helped to raise confidence and involvement in many types of groups and organisations, particularly among the self-expression oriented and conflict averse.

In accordance with my previous conjecture, statistics produced from my survey data reveal positive correlations between measures of structural homogeneity within, and hours given by participants to, the formal organisations which participants indicated were most important to them. Additionally, positive correlations were found between measures of structural homogeneity within these groups and participants' formal organisational engagement score. This score is the degree to which participants are involved in, particularly the decision making of, formal groups.

Table 6.14

[697] Saxton, 'The Participatory Revolution in Nonprofit Management', p.34-39

[698] Evans and Fu, 'Opinion formation on dynamic networks', p.9; Dellaposta, Shi, and Macy, 'Why Do Liberals Drink Lattes?', p.1473-1511; Gillani, Yuan, Saveski, Vosovghi and Roy, 'Me, My Echo Chamber, and I', p.1 & 2; Halbertam and Kight, 'Homophily, group size and the diffusion of political information in social networks', p.73-88; Sunstein, 'The Law of Group Polarization', p.175-195; Batorski, and Grzywinska, 'Three dimensions of the public sphere on Facebook', p.356-374; Groshek, and Koc-Michalska, 'Helping populism win?', p.1389-1407; Flaxman, Goal and Rao, 'Filter Bubbles, Echo Chambers, and Online News Consumption', p.298-320; Dahlberg, 'Rethinking the fragmentation of the cyberpublic', p.827-847; Pariser, *The filter bubble*; Brossard, and Scheufele, 'Science, new media, and the public', p.40 & 41; Bakshy, Messing, and Adamic, 'Exposure to ideologically diverse news and opinion on Facebook', p.1130-1132; Yardi, and Boyd, 'Dynamic debates', p.316-327; Davis, 'The Web of Politics', p.361-364; Hill and Hughes, *Cyberpolitics*; Wilhelm, 'Virtual sounding boards', p.313-338; Huber, and Malhotra, 'Political Homophily in Social Relationships', p.270, 271 & 282

[699] Shulman, 'IBISWorld Industry Report X0021: Charities & Not-for-Profit Organisations in Australia', p.32, *EthicalJobs: Australia,* viewed 25 September 2018, http://www.ethicaljobs.com.au/files/2012_NFP_report.pdf; *THE WORLD BANK,* (last updated 2017) 'Population growth (annual %): Australia', https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW?locations=AU

Correlations between hours participants give to their two most important formal groups (in which they are involved) and measures of structural diversity within the most important formal groups in which participants are involved.

2015 Correlations between	Hours participants give to their two most important formal groups (in which they are involved).	Number of participants
Participants agreeing that most members of the most important formal group in which they are involved reside in the same neighbourhood/town	R= .298, p= .168	23
Participants agreeing that most members of the most important formal group in which they are involved have the same gender	R= .427, p= .042	23
Participants agreeing that most members of the two most important formal groups in which they are involved have the same wealth/income	R= .291, p= .167	24

Table 6.15

Correlations between participants' Formal Organisational Engagement Score and measures of structural diversity within the most important formal groups in which participants are involved.

2015 Correlations between	Participants' Formal Organisational Engagement Score	Number of participants
Participants agreeing that most members of the most important formal group in which they are involved have the same gender	r= .349, p= .103	23
Participants agreeing that most members of the two most important formal groups in which they are involved have the same wealth/income	r= .435, p= .034	24

These statistics are consistent with my Homogenisation theory. I maintain that most people (but particularly the Complex immersed) are more willing to involve themselves in

organisations if the memberships of these groups strongly reflect/reaffirm their own views and interests. Inglehart and Welzel hold those who place greater emphasis on survival values tend to invest more of their time and resources into formal groups than do those who place relatively more emphasis on self-expression values.[700] However, Inglehart and Welzel's Modernisation thesis cannot account for the increased engagement in sport, volunteering and art organisations during the early twenty-first century.[701] This was/is a period in which an increasing proportion of Australians placed greater emphasis on self-expression values (as illustrated in Chapter Three), which Inglehart and Welzel argue act to reduce formal group involvement.[702] Their thesis does not entertain the possibility of formal group decline being reversed by structural/procedural reform/adaptation.

Furthermore, my survey data reveals moderate significant positive correlations between measures of structural homogeneity within, and the membership growth of, the formal groups participants reported as most important to them.

Table 6.16

Correlations between the relative membership growth of the two most important formal groups in which participants are involved and measures of structural diversity within the most important formal groups in which participants are involved.

2015 Correlations between	The relative membership growth of the two most important formal groups in which participants are involved	Number of participants
Participants agreeing that most members of the most important formal group in which they are involved have the same gender	r= .305, p= .066	20
Participants agreeing that most members of the most important formal group in which they are involved have the same educational background/level	r= .366, p= .022	21
Participants agreeing that most members of the most important formal group in	r= .304, p= .060	21

[700] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.44, 116-118 & 294
[701] Australian Sports Commission, *Participating in Exercise, Recreation and Sport, Annual Report 2010*, p.39; Volunteering Australia, *State of Volunteering in Australia: 2012*, p.7-9; Australian Council of the Arts, *Arts in Daily Life: Australian Participation in the Arts, Report May 2014*, p.12
[702] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.262 & 294

which they are involved have the same occupation		
Participants agreeing that most members of the two most important formal groups in which they are involved have the same wealth/income	r= .307, p= .057	21

These statistics combined with evidence of rising early twenty-first century secular/non-political-party formal group engagement suggest that formal groups with structurally more homogenous memberships are becoming increasingly larger and more popular relative to those with structurally heterogeneous memberships. However, *overall* the size of formal group memberships is probably declining as more groups with more homogenous memberships are established. Consequently, these statistics appear to buttress my Homogenisation, while undermining Inglehart and Welzel's Modernisation, theory. Inglehart and Welzel stress that formal and bonding is replaced by informal and bridging social capital in advancing post-industrial societies.[703]

Link between Structural & Ideological Homogeneity

So far the statistics in this chapter have focused on the structural, rather than the ideological/political homogeneity of social networks. The structural homogeneity of social networks is measured by the degree to which members of these groups were mostly of the same age, religion, neighbourhood, ethnicity, gender, occupation, educational background/level and income/wealth. Still, (as shown in Figures 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 as well as the tables below) positive correlations were also found between measures of structural diversity within informal social networks and the degree to which participants encounter political values, views and attitudes different from their own within their close social networks. This may indicate that the structural composition of informal networks has a significant bearing on the ideological homogeneity of those networks.

Table 6.17

[703] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.294

Correlations between participants' AISNDSs and measures of structural diversity within participants' informal social networks.

2015 Correlations between	AISNDS	Number of participants
The extent to which participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) are ethnically/linguistically diverse	r= .617, p= .002	22
The extent to which members of participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) have diverse economic status	r= .430, p= .046	22
The extent to which participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) are structurally (ethnically/linguistically, economically, socially and religiously) diverse	r= .529, p= .011	22

Figure 6.1

The correlation between participants' AISNDSs and the degree to which their informal social networks are structurally diverse.



Table 6.18

Correlations between Participants ASSNDSs and measures of structural diversity within participants' informal social networks.

2015 Correlations between	ASSNDS	Number of participants
The extent to which participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) are ethnically/linguistically diverse	R= .422, p= .036	25
The extent to which members of participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) have diverse economic status	R= .290, p= .160	25
The extent to which participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) are structurally (ethnically/linguistically, economically, socially and religiously) diverse	R= .402, p= .046	25

Table 6.19

Correlations between participants' AVSNDSs and measures of structural diversity within participants' informal social networks.

2015 Correlations between	AVSNDS	Number of participants
The extent to which participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) are ethnically/linguistically diverse	R= .435, p= .071	18
The extent to which members of participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) have diverse economic status	R= .366, p= .135	18
The extent to which participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) are structurally (ethnically/linguistically, economically, socially and religiously) diverse	R= .467, p= .051	18

Figure 6.2

The correlation between participants' AVSNDSs and the degree to which their informal social networks are structurally diverse.



Table 6.20

Correlations between participants ISNDSs and measures of structural diversity within participants' informal social networks.

2015 Correlations between	ISNDS	Number of participants
The extent to which participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) are ethnically/linguistically diverse	r= .506, p= .014	23
The extent to which members of participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) have diverse economic status	r= .486, p= .019	23
The extent to which members of participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) have diverse social status	r= .531, p= .009	23
The extent to which participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) are structurally (ethnically/linguistically, economically, socially and religiously) diverse	r= .567, p= .005	23

Figure 6.3

The correlation between participants' ISNDSs and the degree to which their informal social networks are structurally diverse.



Although my survey does not ask questions regarding the political/ideological compositions/homogeneity of the formal organisations in which participants are involved and deem most important, these statistics suggest that the *structural* and *ideological* homogeneity of participants' informal social networks are positively linked. It is salient to consider this data, along with statistics indicating rising engagement in structurally homogenous organisations; raising overall formal group engagement. Together, they suggest that the *structural* homogeneity of formal groups may have little or no effect on the formal group engagement of citizens. Instead, they indicate that people may be more enticed to participate in formal organisations with *politically/ideologically/philosophically* homogenous (than heterogenous) memberships. The fact that those memberships also tend to be *structurally* homogenous could be coincidental.

Organisational Democratisation

Another reason for rising rates of formal group engagement in Australia, consistent with Homogenisation theory, is the increasing extent to which formal organisations are governed in an egalitarian/democratic manner compatible with autonomy/egalitarian self-expression values. This explanation is supported by my own survey statistics. Positive correlations were found between hours given to participants' most important organisations

and both the egalitarian decision-making and egalitarian leadership selection processes of these groups. Positive correlations were also revealed between the degree to which the decision-making processes of participants' most important groups are egalitarian and participants' formal organisational engagement score. Correlations found between the membership growth of participants' most important formal groups and the degree to which the leaders of these groups are chosen in an egalitarian manner also suggest a connection between egalitarian governance of, and involvement in, formal organisations. Contrastingly, the Modernisation theory that formal group participation declines in advancing post-industrial societies like Australia is not supported by my evidence.[704] Neither is the Modernisationist position that this process of decline cannot be reversed by reform of formal organisations' structures and governing processes. That is from fewer larger heterogenous hierarchical and elite-led to more but smaller homogenous egalitarian and democratic formal groups. As was surmised in Chapter Three, beyond a certain point during the post-industrial stage of modernisation formal organisations may begin adapting to new value emphases and preferences (particularly of younger generations). This may help lift rates of formal organisational engagement particularly among those heavily embedded in the SEVHSN Complex. Their formal group involvement rates are lower than those of people relatively less Complex immersed.

Table 6.21

Correlations between hours participants give to their two most important formal groups (in which they are involved) and the degree to which participants' two most important formal groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian decision-making and leadership-selection processes.

2015 Correlations between	Hours participants give to their two most important formal groups (in which they are involved).	Number of participants
The degree to which participants' two most important formal groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian decision-making processes.	r= .350, p= .029	23
The degree to which participants' two most important formal groups (in which	r= .240, p= .165	22

[704] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.294

they are involved) have egalitarian leadership-selection processes.		

Table 6.22

The correlation between participants' Formal Organisational Engagement Score and the degree to which participants' two most important formal groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian decision-making processes.

2015 Correlations between	Participants' Formal Organisational Engagement Score	Number of participants
The degree to which participants' two most important formal groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian decision-making processes.	r= .263, p= .106	23

Table 6.23

The correlation between the relative membership growth of the two most important formal groups in which participants are involved and the degree to which participants' most important formal groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian leadership-selection processes.

2015 Correlations between	The relative membership growth of the two most important formal groups in which participants are involved	Number of participants
The degree to which participants' most important formal groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian leadership-selection processes	r= .432, p= .084	19

Informal Structural Social Capital

Both Homogenisation and Modernisation theories maintain that greater emphasis on self-expression values is correlated with more involvement with, informal social networks. I contend that greater emphasis placed on self-expression values raises social modularity enabling individuals to more freely forge relationships, and associate, with others based on

their personal preferences. When social connections are based on egalitarian choice rather than community or familial obligation, there is greater incentive to forge more of, and invest more time in, these types of mutually beneficial and pleasurable relationships. In contexts in which social connections are more rigid and restricted (due in part to greater emphasis placed on survival values) social bonds are less likely to be considered mutually pleasurable and/or beneficial. Consequently, at least one of the parties to such social bonds may have relatively less incentive to invest time, and energy into the relationship. When social connections are restricted fewer mutually beneficial relationships are possible and people have less incentive to grow their social networks. Likewise, Inglehart and Welzel argue that self-expression values and social modularity encourage greater time and energy to be invested into strengthening and growing informal social networks.[705]

As anticipated, there were highly significant positive correlations found between:

- the frequency of participants informal social meetings (home visits and meeting people in public places either to talk or have food/drinks) with people outside their immediate family, and
- the degree to which their most important formal organisations have egalitarian decision-making and leadership selection processes.

Additionally, significant (one highly significant) positive correlations were discovered between the number of close friends that participants reported having and the extent to which their most important formal groups have egalitarian decision-making and leadership selection procedures. These statistics suggest the existence of a link between the strength/size of informal social networks/connections and indicators of a self-expression values orientation. This is consistent with both Homogenisation and Modernisation theses.

Table 6.24

Correlations between participants' frequency of meeting informally with members of their social networks and the degree to which participants' two most important formal groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian decision-making and leadership selection processes.

[705] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.117 & 118

2015 Correlations between	Participants' frequency of meeting informally with members of their social networks	Number of participants
The degree to which participants' two most important formal groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian decision-making processes	R= .487, p= .002	23
The degree to which participants' two most important formal groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian leadership-selection processes	R= .494, p= .003	22

Table 6.25

Correlations between the number of close friends that participants reported having and the degree to which participants' two most important formal groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian decision-making and leadership selection processes.

2015 Correlations between	The number of close friends that participants reported having	Number of participants
The degree to which participants' two most important formal groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian decision-making processes.	R= .466, p= .025	23
The degree to which participants' two most important formal groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian leadership-selection processes.	R= .335, p= .127	22

Social & Political Trust & Confidence

Like informal structural social capital, variables and patterns related to social/political trust/confidence are revealed to be correlated with, and may indeed be facets of, the SEVHSN Complex. According to Modernisation theory, a self-expression values orientation is linked to greater general interpersonal trust but less political trust and confidence.[706] Inglehart and Welzel maintain that self-expression value orientations contribute to a decline

[706] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.117, 118, 137, 250 & 271

in bonding and a rise in bridging social capital.[707] Therefore, negative correlations between social network homogeneity and general interpersonal trust on the one hand and positive correlations between social network homogeneity and political trust and confidence, on the other, would be consistent with the Modernisation thesis. Similarly, I contend that self-expression values are positively correlated with general interpersonal trust and negatively correlated with trust and confidence in the federal government. However, unlike Inglehart and Welzel, I maintain that a greater emphasis on self-expression values is compatible with the principle of subsidiarity and being more trusting/confident in local/state government than those who strongly emphasise survival values. Those who emphasise survival values are inclined to view difference in their society as weakness.[708] Therefore, powerful local/state authorities (which create inconsistencies between intra-national jurisdictions) are deemed potentially threatening, particularly if they undermine the platform/agenda of the national government.

Conversely, those who place greater emphasis on self-expression values (e.g. autonomy and egalitarianism) are more concerned with having governments listening to and acting on the views of the citizens they serve.[709] Combined statewide/local majorities are likely to be greater than a simple majority Australia wide. National policies and decisions may have greater majority support but are more prone to being supported by only a minority of voters in particular parts of the country. Additionally, those who emphasise self-expression, as opposed to survival values are relatively more inclined to view diversity as beneficial; that is, expressions of tastes and sources of learning, interests and new experiences.[710] Consequently, these citizens are more likely to both be satisfied with the way their local/state rather than the federal government is run, and believe they individually have greater and more successful influence over local/state, rather than federal, government decision-making.

As anticipated statistics collated from my survey data reveal that indicators of a self-expression values orientation are both positively correlated with measures of general interpersonal trust and negatively correlated with evidence of trust/confidence in the federal

[707] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.142 & 294
[708] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.52, 54, 142 & 143
[709] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.8, 9, 10, 157, 158, 209, 212, 223, 266 & 268
[710] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.54

government. These indicators include the degrees to which the most important formal organisations in which participants are involved have egalitarian decision-making and leadership-selection processes. Indeed, the degree to which participants' most important formal groups had egalitarian decision-making processes was revealed to be both:

- positively correlated with the belief that "most people can be trusted" and
- negatively correlated with the belief that "you can't be too careful in your dealings with others".

The extent to which participants' most important formal groups have egalitarian leadership selection procedures was found to be positively linked to trusting strangers and post-office staff. Also, the extent to which participants' most important formal groups have egalitarian decision-making processes was found to be negatively correlated with believing both:

- that the federal government was run for all (rather than just a few big interests), and
- that federal politicians take account of one's concerns and those of people like oneself.

These statistics are consistent with both Modernisation and my Homogenisation thesis. However, the degree to which participants' most important formal groups had egalitarian decision-making processes was found to be positively linked to:

- believing that local and state governments are run for all rather than just a few big interests,
- believing that local politicians take account of one's concerns and those of people like oneself, and
- trusting state government officials.

These statistics suggest a link between greater emphasis on self-expression values and more trust and confidence in local and state governments thereby buttressing my Homogenisation while undermining Inglehart and Welzel's Modernisation theses.

Table 6.26

Correlations between the degree to which participants' two most important formal groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian decision-making processes and measures of interpersonal trust.

2015 Correlations between	The degree to which participants' two most important formal groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian decision-making processes.	Number of participants
Believing that most people can be trusted	R= .346, p= .106	23
Believing that you can't be too careful in your dealings with others	R= -.375, p= .077	23

Table 6.27

Correlations between the degree to which participants' two most important formal groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian leadership-selection processes and measures of interpersonal and social trust.

2015 Correlations between	The degree to which participants' two most important formal groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian leadership-selection processes.	Number of participants
Trusting strangers	R= .356, p= .104	22
Trusting post office staff	R= .329, p= .135	22

Table 6.28

Correlations between the degree to which participants' two most important formal groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian decision-making processes and measures of trust and confidence in the federal government and federal politicians.

2015 Correlations between	The degree to which participants' two most important formal groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian decision-making processes.	Number of participants
Believing that the federal government is run for all, rather than just a few big interests	R= -.353, p= .098	23
Believing that federal politicians take account of one's concerns and those of	R= -.322, p= .134	23

people like oneself		

Table 6.29

Correlations between the degree to which participants' two most important formal groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian decision-making processes and measures of trust and confidence in state and local government and politicians.

2015 Correlations between	The degree to which participants' two most important formal groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian decision-making processes.	Number of participants
Believing that the local government is run for all, rather than just a few big interests	R= .467, p= .024	23
Believing that the state government is run for all, rather than just a few big interests	R= .287, p= .184	23
Believing that local politicians take account of one's concerns and those of people like oneself	R= .490, p= .018	23
Trusting state government officials	R= .338, p= .115	23

I have argued that self-expression values (and social modularity) contribute to a rise in bonding and a decline in bridging social capital: that there exists an SEVHSN Complex. Therefore, positive correlations between social network homogeneity and both general interpersonal trust and trust/confidence in local/state government are consistent with my Homogenisation thesis. Negative correlations between social network homogeneity and trust/confidence in the Australian federal government would also be consistent with my theory. Hence, Homogenisation and Modernisation theses differ regarding the ways in which social network homogeneity is correlated with general interpersonal trust and trust/confidence in distant central governments.

As predicted, my statistics reveal a link between social network homogeneity and trust/confidence in local/state government. Measures of structural homogeneity within

participants' most important formal groups were found to be positively correlated with believing both:

- that local and state politicians take account of one's concerns (and those of people like one's self), and
- that local and state governments are run for all (rather than just a few big interests).

Indeed, the degree to which participants' most important formal groups are age and ethnically/linguistically homogenous seems to be positively linked to the belief that state politicians take account of one's concerns and those of people like oneself. Additionally, participants whose most important formal groups have memberships with homogenous (rather than heterogenous) levels of income and wealth were more likely to believe that local and state governments are run for all people rather than just a few big interests. Those whose important formal groups have relatively socio-economically homogenous, rather than heterogenous memberships are also more inclined (than those whose most important formal groups have socio-economically heterogeneous memberships) to believe that local politicians take account of their concerns and those of people like themselves.

Positive correlations were found between overall levels of structural homogeneity within informal social networks and trusting local government officials. Additionally, the degree to which participants' informal social networks were ethnically/linguistically and/or overall structurally homogenous was found to be positively correlated with trusting state government officials. The degree to which participants' structural characteristics are reflected on average by members of their close social networks was found to be positively correlated with:

- believing that local and state governments are run for all, and
- state politicians take account of your concerns and those of people like you.

The degree to which participants' political views on policy matters are reflected on average by members of their close social networks was found to be positively correlated with both:

- the belief that state politicians take account of one's concerns and those of persons like oneself, and
- trust in state government officials.

Table 6.30

Correlations between believing that state politicians take account of one's concerns and those of people like oneself and measures of structural diversity within participants' social networks.

2015 Correlations between	Believing that state politicians take account of one's concerns and those of people like oneself	Number of participants
Participants agreeing that most members of the most important formal group in which they are involved are of the same ethnic/linguistic group	R= .316, p= .142	23
Participants agreeing that most members of the most important formal group in which they are involved are of the same age	R= .510, p= .013	23

Table 6.31

Correlations between participants agreeing that most members of the two most important formal groups in which they are involved have the same wealth/income and measures of trust and confidence in local and state governments and politicians.

2015 Correlations between	Participants agreeing that most members of the two most important formal groups in which they are involved have the same wealth/income	Number of participants
Believing that local government is run for all rather than just a few big interests	R= .489, p= .015	24
Believing that state government is run for all rather than just a few big interests	R= .366, p= .079	24
Believing that local politicians take	R= .534, p= .007	24

account of one's concerns and those of people like oneself		

Table 6.32

Correlations between structural diversity within participants' informal social networks and participants trusting local and state governments.

2015 Correlations between	The extent to which participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) are structurally (ethnically/linguistically, economically, socially and religiously) diverse	Number of participants
Trusting local government officials	R= -.275, p= .104	36
Trusting state government officials	R= -.252, p= .138	36

Table 6.33

The correlation between the extent to which participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) are ethnically/linguistically diverse and participants trusting state government officials.

2015 Correlations between	The extent to which participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) are ethnically/linguistically diverse	Number of participants
Trusting state government officials	R= -.275, p= .104	36

Table 6.34

Correlations between participants ASSNDSs and measures of trust and confidence in state and local government and politicians.

2015 Correlations between	ASSNDS	Number of participants
Believing that local government is run for all rather than just a few big interests	R= -.341, p= .096	25
Believing that state government is run for all rather than just a few big interests	R= -.498, p= .011	25
Believing that state politicians take account of one's concerns and those of	R= -.666, p= .000	25

people like oneself		

Table 6.35

Correlations between participants' AISNDSs and measures of trust and confidence in state politicians and officials.

2015 Correlations between	AISNDS	Number of participants
Believing that state politicians take account of one's concerns and those of people like oneself	R= -.300, p= .176	19
Trusting state government officials	R= -.337, p= .125	22

These statistics are consistent with the Modernisation thesis position that more bonding social capital is linked to a greater emphasis on survival values that raise confidence in hierarchical institutions/organisations including all levels of government.[711] The statistics are also consistent with my argument that more bonding social capital is connected to greater emphasis on self-expression values which encourage support for the principle of subsidiarity in government decision-making. Contrastingly, the statistics indicating that measures of social network homogeneity are:

- positively correlated with general interpersonal trust, and
- negatively correlated with trust/confidence in the federal government

are consistent with my Homogenisation, but contradict the Modernisation theory.

According to Modernisation theory, social network homogeneity is linked to survival values which raise suspicion of people unlike:

- oneself (in terms of demographics, interests, personal preferences, and political/philosophical views), and

[711] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.142, 143, 212, 250, 251 & 294

- members of one's family and immediate community (ethnic, religious and otherwise).[712]

In diverse and complex post-industrial societies like Australia this suspicion can inhibit the formation and undermine the strength of general interpersonal trust. Inglehart and Welzel hold that survival values raise confidence/trust in government, including the federal government.[713] Conversely, I maintain that social network homogeneity is linked to self-expression values which reduce suspicion of people who are unlike oneself or members of one's immediate community. These values thereby facilitate the generation of, and strengthen general, interpersonal trust within diverse societies. Additionally, I argue (for reasons previously explained) that a self-expression values orientation (part of a SEVHSN Complex and therefore connected to social network homogeneity) erodes trust/confidence in distant central/national governments.

My statistics uncover a positive correlation between reporting involvement in formal groups with ethnically/linguistically homogenous memberships and believing that most people can be trusted. This pattern appears to be replicated in informal social networks. Those with ethnically/linguistically homogenous informal social networks are more likely to trust teachers, nurses, doctors, shopkeepers, and NGO staff. Positive correlations were found between overall levels of structural homogeneity within informal social networks and trusting teachers, post office staff and judges/court staff. The degree to which participants' structural characteristics are reflected on average by members of their close social networks was found to be positively correlated with:

- trusting teachers, nurses, doctors, post office staff, judges/court staff, NGO staff, and
- believing that most people can be trusted (illustrated in Figure 6.4).

The extent to which participants' structural characteristics are reflected on average by members of their close social networks was also revealed to be negatively correlated with trust in federal government officials (as demonstrated by Figure 6.5).

[712] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.141-143
[713] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.117, 118, 212, 250 & 251

Table 6.36

The correlation between participants agreeing that most members of the most important formal group in which they are involved are of the same ethnic/linguistic group and participants believing that most people can be trusted.

2015 Correlations between	Participants agreeing that most members of the most important formal group in which they are involved are of the same ethnic/linguistic group	Number of participants
Believing that most people can be trusted	R= .337, p= .116	23

Table 6.37

Correlations between the extent to which participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) are ethnically/linguistically diverse and measures of social trust.

2015 Correlations between	The extent to which participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) are ethnically/linguistically diverse	Number of participants
Trusting teachers	R= -.396, p= .017	36
Trusting nurses/doctors	R= -.224, p= .190	36
Trusting shopkeepers	R= -.310, p= .065	36
Trusting NGO staff	R= -.343, p= .041	36

Table 6.38

Correlations between the extent to which participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) are structurally (ethnically/linguistically, economically, socially and religiously) diverse and measures of social trust.

2015 Correlations between	The extent to which participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) are structurally (ethnically/linguistically, economically, socially and religiously) diverse	Number of participants
Trusting teachers	R= -.448, p= .006	36
Trusting post office staff	R= -.258, p= .128	36
Trusting judges/court staff	R= -.234, p= .170	36

Table 6.39

Correlations between participants' ASSNDSs and measures of participants' social, interpersonal and political trust.

2015 Correlations between	ASSNDS	Number of participants
Trusting teachers	R= -.407, p= .044	25
Trusting nurses/doctors	R= -.325, p= .113	25
Trusting post office staff	R= -.556, p= .004	25
Trusting judges/court staff	R= -.310, p= .132	25
Trusting NGO staff	R= -.312, p= .128	25
Believing that most people can be trusted	R= -.494, p= .012	25
Trusting federal government officials	R= .450, p= .024	25

Figure 6.4

The correlation between participants' ASSNDSs and the extent to which participants agree that most people can be trusted.



Figure 6.5

The correlation between participants' ASSNDSs and the extent to which participants trust federal government officials.



Similar relationships were uncovered between the political/ideological/values homogeneity/reinforcement of close social networks and trust/confidence in the federal government and federal government officials. The degree to which participants' emphasis on values are reflected on average by members of their close social networks was found to be negatively correlated with both:

- the belief that the federal government is run for all rather than just a few big interests (shown in Figure 6.6), and
- a belief that federal politicians take account of one's concerns and the concerns of people like oneself (illustrated by Figure 6.7).

Participants who encounter fewer, rather than more, differences between their own political views on policy matters and those of their close social network members appear to be less convinced that the federal government is run for all and less trusting of federal government officials. These statistics support my Homogenisation argument that a SEVHSN Complex is linked to greater interpersonal trust and greater distrust of the federal government. Contrastingly, they are inconsistent with the Modernisation thesis in which greater social network homogeneity is tied to more emphasis on survival values. Survival values undermine

general interpersonal trust while consolidating trust and confidence in the national government and leadership.[714]

Table 6.40

Correlations between participants' AVSNDSs and measures of participants' trust and confidence in the federal government and in federal politicians.

2015 Correlations between	AVSNDS	Number of participants
Believing that the federal government is run for all rather than just a few big interests	r= .595, p= .009	18
Believing that federal politicians take account of one's concerns and those like oneself	r= .709, p= .001	18

Figure 6.6

The correlation between participants' AVSNDSs and the extent to which participants believe that the federal government is run for all (rather than big interests).



Figure 6.7

[714] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.117, 118, 141-143, 212, 250 & 251

The correlation between participants' AVSNDSs and the extent to which participants believe that federal politicians take into account their concerns and those voiced by people like them.



Table 6.41

Correlations between participants' ISNDSs and their trust in the federal government and in federal government officials.

2015 Correlations between	ISNDS	Number of participants
Believing that the federal government is run for all rather than just a few big interests	R= .288, p= .183	23
Trusting federal government officials	R= .308, p= .153	23

However, not all statistics indicate the relative explanatory superiority of Homogenisation over Modernisation theory. While structural measures of social network homogeneity were linked to greater general interpersonal trust, ideological/values homogeneity was not. The degree to which participants' political views on policy matters are reflected on average by their close social network members was found to be negatively correlated with trusting strangers. Participants who encounter fewer differences between their own political views on policy matters and those of their close social network members

also appear to have less trust in strangers than those participants who encounter relatively more such differences.

Table 6.42

Correlations between the degree to which participants' trust strangers and their AISNDSs and ISNDSs.

2015 Correlations between	Trusting strangers	Number of participants
AISNDS	R= .338, p= .123	22
ISNDS	R= .370, p= .082	23

These statistics expose a sharp contrast in the relationships between measures of social trust and structural versus political network reinforcement. Social trust is positively correlated with structural homogeneity and negatively correlated with political/ideological homogeneity within social networks. Initially these findings may appear to undermine my Homogenisation position that general interpersonal trust is linked to, and may be a facet of, the SEVHSN Complex. Alternatively, they could suggest that those with more politically/ideologically homogenous social networks tend to have less trusting personalities. They may, to a greater extent than those with more social trust, seek friendship and association with people with whom they share similar beliefs, values and views. This is because trust is more easily built between people who share common ideals, understandings and perspectives. This does not necessarily undermine my Homogenisationist contention that those who emphasise autonomy and egalitarian self-expression values tend to have both greater social trust and homogenous networks. Both greater emphasis on self-expression values and less trusting personality traits may influence levels of political homogeneity within social networks. That is, the effects of less trusting personality traits on network ideological homogeneity are possibly just stronger than the correlation self-expression values generate between network political/ideological homogeneity and social trust. The fact that so many measures of structural homogeneity/reinforcement within social networks were positively correlated with measures of social trust would suggest that social trust and social network homogeneity (of all kinds) are positively linked within a larger complex.

Trust, Confidence & Informal Structural Social Capital

Further evidence that interpersonal trust, trust/confidence in local/state government and distrust/less confidence in the federal government are intertwined with the SEVHSN Complex comprise correlations between these variables and informal structural social capital. Greater informal structural social capital was previously exposed as a facet of the Complex. More frequent informal meetings with members of one's social network was found to be positively correlated with trust in local and state government officials and believing that local and state governments were run for all rather than just a few big interests. More frequent informal meetings with members of one's social network was also found to be negatively correlated with the belief that federal politicians take account of one's concerns and those of people like oneself. Additionally, more frequent informal meetings with members of one's social network is positively correlated with trusting strangers (as demonstrated in Figure 6.8), members of other ethnic/linguistic groups, post-office staff, judges and court staff. These correlations uncover links between informal social network engagement (previously revealed as a probable facet of the SEVHSN Complex) and both social trust and a preference for, and greater trust in, decentralised government.

Table 6.43

Correlations between participants' frequency of meeting informally with members of their social networks and measures of social, interpersonal and political trust.

2015 Correlations between	Participants' frequency of meeting informally with members of their social networks	Number of participants
Trusting local government officials	R= .276, p= .103	36
Trusting state government officials	R= .270, p= .112	36
Believing that local government is run for all rather than just a few big interests	R= .235, p= .168	36
Believing that state government is run for all rather than just a few big interests	R= .285, p= .092	36
Believing that federal politicians take account of one's concerns and those of people like oneself	R= -.235, p= .167	36
Trusting members of other ethnic/linguistic groups	R= .308, p= .067	36

Trusting strangers	R= .510, p= .001	36
Trusting post-office staff	R= .252, p= .139	36
Trusting judges and court staff	R= .304, p= .071	36

Figure 6.8

The correlation between the extent to which participants trust strangers and participants' frequency of meeting informally with members of their social networks.



This chapter has thus far discussed correlation statistics indicating the existence of a SEVHSN Complex: a connection between autonomy/egalitarian self-expression values and social network homogeneity. Trends revealed by WVS data and previously discussed in Chapter Three demonstrate that an increasing proportion of the Australian population are greatly emphasising self-expression values. This would suggest that a growing proportion of Australians are becoming more heavily embedded in the Complex. Other variables and trends related to structural social capital and social/political trust/confidence were found to be correlated with, and argued to be facets of, the SEVHSN Complex. These relationships are consistent with my Homogenisation thesis. Conversely, rising involvement in formal organisations in this the early twenty-first century is inconsistent with Inglehart and Welzel's Modernisation theory as it pertains to prosperous and advancing post-industrial societies like Australia.[715] Many correlations revealed in this chapter are also inconsistent with Inglehart

[715] Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,* p.44 & 116-118

and Welzel's arguments. The most important of these correlations being those linking self-expression values with homogenous social networks.

Political Interest & Network Homogeneity

Now that I have provided evidence that a SEVHSN Complex exists and that the proportion of Australians embedded in this complex seems to be growing, the ways in which these patterns are influencing political engagement will be exposed and analysed. Political/ideological reinforcement/homogeneity within social networks is a salient facet of the SEVHSN Complex. Political interest was found to be positively correlated with participants reporting greater/stronger differences between their own views on political policy matters and those of their close social network members. This finding indicates that those whose political positions are reinforced by the members of their close social network are probably less likely to be interested in politics. This relationship would seem to support my argument that homogenisation of social networks has a negative impact on political engagement.

Table 6.44

The correlation between participants' ISNDSs and their level of political interest.

2015 Correlations between	ISNDS	Number of participants
Political interest	r= .320, p= .136	23

Contrastingly, those who encounter more rather than less significant political/values/ideological difference within their social networks are arguably likely to have more, and more interesting, political discussions and debates that raise political interest and understanding. They are also more likely to develop debating skills/experience and greater tolerance of others with different political views, thereby lowering the emotional, psychological and social costs of discussing political issues with those with whom they disagree. Indeed, according to my Homogenisation theory, there exists a causal relationship between social network homogeneity and believing both that society is ideologically homogenous and that there is little to be learnt from political discussion with those with

whom one disagrees. Furthermore, I contend that these patterns lead the members of individual social networks (whose political views increasingly go unchecked by those holding contrary beliefs) to drift further from the political/ideological centre. This, in turn, precipitates a diversification of political views, beliefs and attitudes within society.

Imagined Societal & Actual Network Homogeneity

Believing that society is ideologically homogenous was found to be positively correlated with both ethnic/linguistic and socio-economic homogeneity within informal networks and age homogeneity within participants most important formal groups. Additionally, those who encounter less political difference in their close social network, seem to be more inclined to believe that society is ideologically homogenous than those who encounter more ideological difference in their close social networks. As shown in Figure 6.9, those whose political views tend to be reinforced by a large proportion of their close social network members, seem more disposed to believing that society is ideologically homogenous than are those whose political views are contradicted by a relatively greater proportion of these members. These correlations suggest that structural and/or ideological homogeneity and reinforcement within social networks may raise the degree to which people believe society is ideologically homogenous. This would indicate that believing society is ideologically homogenous is perhaps linked to the SEVHSN Complex. Further evidence to that effect includes the positive correlation between:

- believing that society is ideologically homogenous, and
- the extent to which the most important formal groups in which participants are involved have egalitarian leadership selection processes (a measure of self-expression values emphasis).

Additionally, believing that society is more homogenous is positively correlated with other variables attached to the complex. These variables include believing that local politicians take account of one's concerns and those of people like oneself and "not" believing that the federal government is run for all, rather than just a few big interests.

Table 6.45

Correlations between believing society is ideologically homogenous and variables positively or negatively linked to the SEVHSN Complex.

2015 Correlations between	Believing society is ideologically homogenous	Number of participants
The extent to which participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) are ethnically/linguistically diverse	R= -.228, p= .181	36
The extent to which members of participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) have diverse economic status	R= -.335, p= .046	36
Participants agreeing that most members of the most important formal group in which they are involved have the same age	R= .555, p= .006	23
ISNDS	R= -.327, p= .128	23
AISNDS	R= -.472, p= .027	22
The degree to which participants' two most important formal groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian leadership-selection processes.	R= -.376, p= .102	22
Believing that local politicians take account of one's concerns and those of people like oneself	R= .265, p= .118	36
Believing that the federal government is run for all, rather than just a few big interests	R= -.400, p= .016	36

Figure 6.9

The correlation between participants' AISNDSs and the extent to which participants believe society is ideologically homogenous.



Believing that society is ideologically homogenous is also negatively correlated with trusting people from different ethnic/linguistic groups. This finding possibly indicates that those more heavily embedded in the SEVHSN Complex may be having their social trust moulded by two opposing forces. First, a self-expression values orientation may be acting to lift social trust. However, greater social network homogeneity is positively correlated with (and is likely to be instigating) both:

- a belief that society is ideologically homogenous, and
- a greater distrust of people whose appearance and language visibly and audibly set them apart from those who are considered normal by people situated in homogenous social networks.

Table 6.46

The correlation between believing society is ideologically homogenous and trusting members of other ethnic/linguistic groups.

2015 Correlations between	Believing society is ideologically homogenous	Number of participants
Trusting members of other ethnic/linguistic groups	R= -.270, p= .111	36

Political Debate, Compromise & Diversification

My statistics also indicate that believing there is little to be learnt from political discussion with those with whom one disagrees is:

- positively correlated with believing society is ideologically homogenous, and
- itself a consequence of entrenchment in the SEVHSN Complex.

Indeed, a belief there is little to be learnt from political discussion with those with whom one disagrees was positively correlated with measures of social network homogeneity. These measures include:

- the gender homogeneity of participants' most important formal groups,
- the degree to which participants' political views on policy matters tend to be reinforced by members of their close social networks, and
- participants encountering fewer political views on policy matters different from their own within their close social networks.

Table 6.47

Correlations between believing there is little to be learnt from political discussion with those with whom one disagrees and variables positively or negatively linked to the SEVHSN Complex.

2015 Correlations between	Believing there is little to be learnt from political discussion with those with whom one disagrees	Number of participants
Believing society is ideologically homogenous	R= .297, p= .078	36
Participants agreeing that most members of the most important formal group in which they are involved have the same gender	R= .313, p= .146	23
AISNDS	R= -.331, p= .133	22
ISNDS	R= -.451, p= .031	23

Believing that society is ideologically homogenous and believing there is little to be learnt from political discussion with those with whom one disagrees are both positively correlated with an unwillingness to accept political compromise. This is consistent with my Homogenisation argument that as social networks become increasingly homogenous their members (particularly younger members still in their formative years) become more prone to assuming that society as a whole is politically/ideologically homogenous. Consequently, these people develop greater indifference and resistance toward political views/opinions that are contrary to those held by their close social network members. Significantly, they assume, often wrongly, that these alternative views are held by only an insignificant minority. This, combined with their relative inexperience in discussing/debating political issues with those with whom they disagree, reduces their ability and willingness to politically debate, negotiate and compromise.

Table 6.48

Correlations between an unwillingness to accept political compromise and believing that society is highly ideologically homogenous and that there is little t be learnt from political discussion with those with whom one disagrees.

2015 Correlations between	An unwillingness to accept political compromise	Number of participants
Believing society is ideologically homogenous	R= .326, p= .052	36
Believing there is little to be learnt from political discussion with those with whom one disagrees	R= .424, p= .010	36

As explained earlier in this chapter, another of my Homogenisation arguments is that SNH is allowing each network to drift further from the ideological centre, thereby instigating ideological diversification. Greater ideological diversity among the young than among the old would be consistent with my Homogenisation theory because younger people are relatively more immersed in the SEVHSN Complex than are older generations. Indeed, according to the correlation statistics generated from my survey data, younger Australians are more inclined to vote for minor parties and independents in Senate elections then are older people. These

patterns are supported by other sources.[716] Furthermore, these trends cannot be solely attributed to a life-cycle phenomenon because the proportion of Australians voting for minor parties and independents has been rising almost consistently since 1975. In 1975 non-major parties received 4% of valid votes cast in the House of Representatives election and 7.5% of those cast in the Senate election. In 2016 non-major parties received 23.2% of the valid votes cast in the House of Representatives election and 35.0% of those cast in the Senate election.[717] These trends (greater ideological diversity among younger than among older people and a growing proportion of Australians voting for minor parties; which are often peculiar or extreme) may be indicative of a generational political diversification of Australian political views and attitudes.

Table 6.49

The correlation between age of participants and participants reporting that they normally vote for minor parties and/or independents in senate elections.

2015 Correlations between	Age of participants	Number of participants
Participants reporting that they normally vote for minor parties and/or independents in senate elections	R= -.348, p= .047	33

Ideological diversification may exacerbate political distrust and disengagement and further narrow the capacity of government to satisfactorily and effectively address issues of concern. Ideological diversification necessarily reduces the proportion of the public government can satisfy with their decision-making. By extension, it also limits the proportion of the population able to be recruited by major parties. Although minor party membership probably benefited from ideological diversification, the overall impact likely contributed to a

[716] *ABC NEWS,* (2016) 'Fact Check: Would a vote among under 30s possibly deliver a Greens PM?', viewed 2 August 2017, http://www.abc.net.au/news/factcheck/2016-06-10/fact-check-would-voters-aged-under-30-possible-elect-a-green-pm/7467068; Beaumont, Adrian. (2013) 'Making sense of the polls: Age Breakdowns show Huge Difference', *The Conversation*, viewed 2 August 2017, http://theconversation.com/age-breakdowns-show-huge-differences-17361

[717] Antony Green's Election Blog, 'Record Vote for Minor Parties at 2013 Federal Election'; Australian Electoral Commission, '2016 Federal Election: First preferences by Party'; Australian Electoral Commission, '2016 Federal Election: First preferences by Senate group'

decline in the proportion of the public involved in political parties during the latter twentieth-century (for reasons discussed over the next two paragraphs). Rates of engagement then plateaued and have not even begun to recover.

According to Gauja and Haute there are two main motives driving political party membership and participation. The first is conviction: belief in the party's platform, candidates, leadership and values. "[I]deological incentives dominate party members' reasons for joining."[718] The second is efficacy or means of influence: the possibility of the party influencing government decisions and individual members influencing party decisions. "Overall, process incentives take second place to ideology as a motivating factor."[719] Additionally, Gauja and Haute's research reveals that across all democracies material rewards and career advancement were insignificant motivations for joining political parties.[720]

Societal ideological diversification may mean more people supporting the values, platform, candidates and leadership of, as well as propensity to vote for, minor parties. However, minor party membership growth and engagement will always be inhibited by their relative lack of influence over government decision-making. Still, the potential influence individuals can wield through party membership and engagement would be significantly increased by:

- democratising the internal decision-making and leadership selection procedures of political parties,[721] and
- reforming Parliamentary electoral systems (in at least one chamber of any legislature) to grant minor parties power/influence more proportional to their electoral popularity.[722]

[718] Gauja, Anika and Haute, Emilie. (2015) 'Members and Activists of Political Parties in Comparative Perspective', a paper prepared for the IPSA World Congress of Political Science – Panel 'What is party membership?', p.8, viewed 12 September 2017, http://www.partirep.eu/sites/default/files/publication/file/IPSAPaper-Gauja-vanHaute.pdf
[719] Gauja, Anika and Haute, Emilie. 'Members and Activists of Political Parties in Comparative Perspective', p.8
[720] Gauja, Anika and Haute, Emilie. 'Members and Activists of Political Parties in Comparative Perspective', p.8
[721] Garland, Jessica. (2016) 'A Wider Range of Friends: Multi-speed Organising during the 2015 Labour Leadership Contest' in *The Political Quarterly,* vol:87(1), p.23-30
[722] Karp, Jeffrey, A and Banducci, Susan, A. (2008) 'Political Efficacy and Participation in Twenty-Seven Democracies: How Electoral Systems shape Political Behaviour', *the British Journal or Political Science,* vol:38(2), p.311-334

Admittedly, democratisation must be balanced against other often competing priorities including consistency of party message. This conflict between party democracy and unity is exemplified by the Australian Greens NSW branch using internal democratic procedures to pre-select candidates and bind them to motions at odds with the views of other Greens.[723] A more detailed and extensive discussion about how current rates of party membership can be raised by adapting internal party processes and electoral regimes to the values and conflict-aversion of contemporary Australians is presented later in this thesis.

The combination of societal diversification and social network homogenisation can also act to undermine levels of political trust/confidence. That is, people over estimate the degree to which their political views are held by society at large. Consequently, they are prone to believing that the political system, parties and leaders have become corrupted and beholden to minority interests when government fails to meet their expectations. This lack of trust and confidence in government can severely limit political capital and therefore the capacity of government to address significant problems and issues of concern.[724]

Community Cohesion, Social Capital, Generosity & Wellbeing

Yet, my statistics also suggest that immersion in the SEVHSN Complex has several positive effects on community cohesion, social capital, generosity and subjective sense of wellbeing. The degree to which participants' ideological/political views and structural characteristics tend to be reinforced/reflected by the members of their close social networks is positively correlated with their self-reported happiness. Self-reported happiness is also positively correlated with the degree to which participants' most important formal groups make decisions through egalitarian processes (a measure of self-expression values emphasis). A positive relationship was found between the socio-economic homogeneity of participants' informal social networks and the extent to which participants agreed that 'they lived in a

[723] Hunter, Fergus. (2017) "She is the odd person out': Greens senators hit out at Lee Rhiannon', *The Sydney Morning Herald*, viewed 12 September 2017, http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/she-is-the-odd-person-out-greens-senators-hit-out-at-lee-rhiannon-20170702-gx39bn.html

[724] Kaina, Viktoria. (2008) 'Declining Trust in Elites and Why We Should Worry About It – With Empirical Evidence from Germany' in *GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS,* vol:43(3), p.405-423

peaceful town/neighbourhood'. The degree to which participants agreed that 'they lived in a peaceful town/neighbourhood' was found to be positively correlated to both:

- a lack of encountering political/ideological views that differed from their own within their close social network, and
- the degrees to which the emphasis participants place on values tend to be reinforced by members of their close social networks.

These statistics indicate that greater immersion in the SEVHSN Complex may induce greater levels of a subjective sense of wellbeing and community cohesion.

Table 6.50

Correlations between participants' self-reported happiness and measures positively or negatively linked to the SEVHSN Complex.

2015 Correlations between	Participants' self-reported happiness	Number of participants
AISNDS	R= -.438, p= .041	22
ASSNDS	R= -.336, p= .101	25
The degree to which participants' two most important formal groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian decision-making processes.	R= .312, p= .147	23

Table 6.51

Correlations between the extent to which participants agree that they live in a peaceful town/neighbourhood and measures of the economic status, ideological and values diversity within participants' informal/close social networks.

2015 Correlations between	The extent to which participants agree that they live in a peaceful town/neighbourhood	Number of participants
The extent to which members of participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) have diverse economic status	R= -.236, p= .166	36

ISNDS	R= -.334, p= .119	23
AVSNDS	R= -.496, p= .036	18

Measures of social capital and generosity were also positively correlated with other variables linked to the Complex. Reporting that one could rely on their neighbours to care of their children (if they had children) for a few days if they suddenly/unexpectedly had to leave town was positively correlated with believing society is ideologically homogenous. The self-reported belief in the likelihood that 'one's neighbours would help a person in need' was found to be positively correlated with the degree to which the structural characteristics of participants' close-social-network-members tend to reflect participants' own. The extent to which the structural characteristics of participants' close-social-network-members tend to reflect participants' own is also positively linked to participants' financial donations to charity. This finding is reinforced by a positive relationship found between the degree to which participants' most important formal groups have ethnically/linguistically homogenous memberships and the extent to which participants donate both time and money to charity. Also, the overall structural homogeneity of participants' informal social networks was positively correlated with participants indicating/reporting that their neighbours were likely to help a person in need. 'Participants indicating that their neighbours were likely to assist a person in need' was also positively linked to the socio-economic homogeneity of participants' informal social network. The degrees to which the emphasis participants place on values tend to be reinforced by members of their close social networks was, in turn, positively linked to the number of people participants believed would provide (loan) them the equivalent of a week's wages if they suddenly required it.

Table 6.52

The correlation between participants reporting that they could rely on neighbours to care for their children (if they had children) for a few days if they suddenly/unexpectedly had to leave town, and believing society is ideologically homogenous.

2015 Correlations between	Participants reporting that they could rely on neighbours to care for their children (if they had children) for a few days if they suddenly/unexpectedly had to leave town.	Number of participants

Believing society is ideologically homogenous	R= .231, p= .176	36

Table 6.53

Correlations between participants' ASSNDSs and the generosity of participants themselves and their neighbours.

2015 Correlations between	ASSNDS	Number of participants
Participants' reported likelihood that their neighbours would help a person in need	R= -.377, p= .064	25
Participants' financial donations to charity	R= -.348, p= .088	25

Table 6.54

Correlations between Participants agreeing that most members of the most important formal group in which they are involved are of the same ethnic/linguistic group and their time and financial donations to charity.

2015 Correlations between	Participants agreeing that most members of the most important formal group in which they are involved are of the same ethnic/linguistic group	Number of participants
Participants' financial donations to charity	R= .344, p= .108	23
Participants' time donations to charity	R= .338, p= .115	23

Table 6.55

Correlations between Participants' reported likelihood that their neighbours would help a person in need and the extent to which participants' informal social networks are structurally and economically diverse.

2015 Correlations between	Participants' reported likelihood that their neighbours would help a person in need	Number of participants

The extent to which participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) are structurally (ethnically/linguistically, economically, socially and religiously) diverse	R= -.255, p= .134	36
The extent to which members of participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) have diverse economic status	R= -.229, p= .179	36

Table 6.56

The correlation between participants' AVSNDSs and number of people participants believe would provide (loan) them the equivalent of a week's wages if they suddenly required it.

2015 Correlations between	AVSNDS	Number of participants
Number of people participants believe would provide (loan) them the equivalent of a week's wages if they suddenly required it.	R= -.387, p= .113	18

The 'SEVHSN Complex' and 'Ascendency of Homogenous Formal Groups' sections of this chapter reveal a strong link between self-expression values and homogenous social networks and suggest that the former may precipitate the latter. As self-expression values have been rising generationally (discussed in Chapter Three), it is argued that the extent to which social networks are ideologically/recreationally homogenous may also be generationally rising. Indeed, this and previous chapters have discussed evidence from prior studies in the United States (an anglosphere country with strong similarities to Australia) that indicate similar trends as well as the adaptation of organisational governing processes to the values of younger generations; who desire a greater say in the decision-making of these groups. Furthermore, I have presented Australian statistics and research suggesting that formal organisations may be adapting to the preferences of the SEVHSN Complex immersed by splintering into more formal organisations with more homogenous memberships. This

adaptation may explain the early twenty-first century rise in the rates of secular and non-political formal organisational engagement in Australia.

Therefore, if a higher proportion of Australians are becoming more immersed in the SEVHSN Complex, then the correlations discussed in this chapter could indicate that this trend may be inducing greater social capital, subjective sense of wellbeing and community cohesion. However, my statistics also indicate that the socio-economic homogeneity of networks may be linked to less generosity and less generous networks. Indeed, socio-economic homogeneity within informal social networks was found to be negatively correlated with time donated to charity. Socio-economic homogeneity within formal organisations was found to be negatively correlated with the number of people participants indicated would be willing to assist them if they suddenly faced a long-term emergency. Examples provided of a long-term emergency included the death of a breadwinner, job loss [urban] or harvest failure [rural]. These statistics may indicate that those with more economically homogenous networks have had relatively few experiences encountering poverty among their friends/family and are therefore both:

- less sympathetic to the plight of those facing significant financial difficulties, and
- less confident that others (who are probably members of the same economically homogenous social networks) would assist them if they were suddenly plunged into financial hardship.

Table 6.57

The correlation between the extent to which members of participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) have diverse economic status and participants' time donations to charity.

2015 Correlations between	The extent to which members of participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) have diverse economic status	Number of participants
Participants' time donations to charity	R= .233, p= .172	36

Table 6.58

The correlation between participants agreeing that most members of the two most important formal groups in which they are involved have the same wealth/income and the number of people participants indicated would be willing to assist them if they suddenly faced a long-term emergency.

2015 Correlations between	Participants agreeing that most members of the two most important formal groups in which they are involved have the same wealth/income	Number of participants
Number of people participants indicated would be willing to assist them if they suddenly faced a long-term emergency	R= -.308, p= .143	24

Conclusion

Using statistics drawn from my own "Political Participation and Conflict Avoidance" Survey, this sixth chapter has highlighted significant differences between my Homogenisation and Inglehart and Welzel's Modernisation theses. Where there is disagreement, the statistics examined have almost consistently supported my argument. Initially, the chapter explored compelling evidence revealing the existence of a Self-Expression Values Homogenous Social Network (SEVHSN) Complex: consistent with Homogenisation, but in stark contradiction to Modernisation, theory. Consequently, other variables and trends pertaining to structural social capital and interpersonal/political trust/confidence were found to be correlated with, and held to be facets of, the SEVHSN Complex. These relationships, combined with previously analysed patterns regarding formal organisational involvement and the emphasis placed on self-expression values, demonstrates that a larger proportion of the Australian population are becoming more immersed in the complex.

Survey data statistics suggested that participants' involvement in formal organisations is positively correlated with the degree to which the formal groups in which they are involved have homogenous memberships and egalitarian governing processes. Additionally, the statistics demonstrated that Australian formal organisational participation is rising. That is, formal group involvement may be rising as organisations adapt to new societal value

emphases and homogenous group membership expectations of the SEVHSN Complex immersed. Secular and non-political-party formal organisations are likely to be democratising their governing structures/processes and proliferating into a greater number of formal groups with relatively smaller and homogenous memberships. These results are consistent with my Homogenisation thesis. Conversely, the statistics indicating rising formal group engagement are antithetical to Modernisation theory. Furthermore, my statistics suggest the existence of a link between the size/strength of participants' informal social networks/connections and measures of the participants' self-expression values emphasis. This is consistent with both Homogenisation and Modernisation theses which maintain that greater emphasis on self-expression values (and subsequent social modularity) acts to strengthen and enlarge informal networks.

The statistics generated by data from my 36-participant survey revealed that indicators of the degree of emphasis participants' place on self-expression values are both:

- positively correlated with measures of general interpersonal trust, and
- negatively correlated with measures of participants' trust/confidence in the federal government.

These findings are consistent with both Homogenisation and Modernisation theses. However, my statistics suggest a link between greater emphasis on self-expression values and more trust and confidence in local and state governments. These correlations conflict with the Modernisation argument that a self-expression values orientation weakens trust/confidence in hierarchal formal organisations and institutions at all levels of government. Conversely, they support my Homogenisation thesis that greater emphasis on self-expression values is compatible with the principal of subsidiarity and being more trusting/confident in local/state government than those who strongly emphasise survival values.

If an SEVHSN Complex exists, then 'having homogenous social networks' and 'emphasising self-expression values' should be correlated with social/political trust/confidence in identical ways. My statistics reveal positive correlations between social network homogeneity and trust/confidence in local/state government. This is consistent with

my Homogenisation argument that more bonding social capital is connected to a greater emphasis on self-expression values which encourage support for the principal of subsidiarity in government decision-making. They also support the Modernisation position that bonding social capital is linked to greater emphasis on survival values which raise confidence in hierarchal institutions/organisations (including all government levels).

However, my statistics indicate that measures of social network homogeneity are positively correlated with general interpersonal trust and negatively correlated with trust/confidence in the federal government. These statistics support my Homogenisation argument that a SEVHSN Complex is linked to greater interpersonal trust and distrust in the federal government. Conversely, they are inconsistent with the Modernisation thesis that greater social network homogeneity is tied to more emphasis on survival values which undermine general interpersonal trust while consolidating trust and confidence in the national government and leadership. A study of post-industrial western European democracies undertaken by Fitzgerald and Wolak establishes that citizens tend to trust their smaller scale local more than their larger scale national governments.[725] In the words of Fitzgerald and Wolak "federalism … is associated with higher trust in local authorities, and lower trust in central government. In countries where local governments hold more influence and authority, people also tend to be more trusting of local authorities."[726] Analysis of my own data suggests that greater immersion in the SEVHSN Complex may amplify these tendencies.

Additionally, my statistics uncovered links between informal social network engagement (revealed as a probable facet of the Complex) and general interpersonal trust, trust/confidence in local/state government as well as distrust/lack of confidence in the federal government. This is further evidence that greater embeddedness in the SEVHSN Complex amplifies a preference for decentralized government (well-established in advanced

[725] Fitzgerald, Jennifer and Wolak, Jennifer. (2016) 'The roots of trust in local government in western Europe', *International Political Science Review,* vol.37(1), p.135
[726] Fitzgerald and Wolak 'The roots of trust in local government in western Europe', p.141

post-industrial societies)[727] as well as for more autonomously forged and largely self-governed social connections.

Hence, this chapter has established that statistics collated from my survey are consistent with the Homogenisation arguments that:

1) an SEVHSN Complex exists,
2) a generationally growing proportion of Australians are immersed in it, and
3) it is linked to:
    a) more informal structural social capital,
    b) more general interpersonal trust,
    c) more trust/confidence in decentralise local/state government, and
    d) less trust/confidence in the centralised federal government.

From there the chapter explored more correlations buttressing my Homogenisation thesis that greater immersion in the SEVHSN Complex is undermining:

1) exposure to ideological diversity, and
2) willingness to debate, compromise and participate in conflict prone forms of engagement.

It was argued that many of these trends will have (and are having) an undermining influence on the effectiveness of, and support for, our political system. Still, I stressed that the data also indicate that greater immersion in the SEVHSN Complex probably acts to lift overall levels of community cohesion, social capital, generosity and a subjective sense of wellbeing.

The remaining chapters will present and discuss correlations between the SEVHSN Complex and:

1) patterns of political: a) engagement, b) efficacy, c) confidence, and d) tolerance,
2) support for and willingness to accept political checks and compromise, and
3) factors influencing social modularity and atomism.

[727] Denters, Bas. (2002) 'Size and political trust: evidence from Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom', *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy,* vol:20, p.793-812

There will also be a detailed and extensive discussion about how party democratisation and electoral reform can raise current rates of party membership.

CHAPTER SEVEN

--DRIVERS OF COMPLEX-IMMERSION--

Technology, Wealth, Education & Information Dissemination

The previous chapter discussed my own statistical evidence that measures of self-expression values orientation and social network homogeneity are positively correlated. That is, it was shown that there exists a Self-Expression Values Homogenous Social Network (SEVHSN) Complex. Interpersonal and political trust/confidence as well as community and political engagement were revealed to be correlated with the Complex in ways consistent with my Homogenisation thesis. Furthermore, statistics presented indicated that an increasing proportion of the Australian population is becoming more heavily immersed in the Complex. This seventh chapter investigates the validity of theorised drivers of SEVHSN Complex-immersion, including:

- use of technologies (such as online communication and audio and screen entertainment),
- economic development/degree of financial security,
- education attainment, and
- level and means of news/information dissemination.

It discusses how relationships between these 'potential/suggested' drivers and indicators of Complex-embeddedness support and/or contradict my Homogenisation theory.

Access to & Use of Technology

Links between the use of technology and SEVHSN Complex-immersion are the initial foci of this chapter. Measures of SEVHSN Complex-immersion were found to be positively correlated with indicators of greater access to, and use of, communications and personal

entertainment technologies (such as iPods and internet equipped PCs, tablets and smartphones). The degree to which the decision-making processes of participants' most important formal organisations were egalitarian (a measure of self-expression values orientation) was positively correlated with the time participants spent both:

- listening to personal devices, and
- communicating online for non-work-related purposes.

Hence, these correlations appear consistent with both my Homogenisation and Inglehart and Welzel's Modernisation arguments. That is, those who are relatively more empowered by, and prefer using and communicating with, contemporary/modern technologies are likely to place greater emphasis on self-expression values than are persons with less access to, and less inclination to utilise, such devices.

Table 7.1

Correlations between the degree to which participants' two most important formal groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian decision-making processes and the time participants spent listening to personal devices and communicating online for non-work-related purposes.

2015 Correlations between	The degree to which participants' two most important formal groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian decision-making processes.	Number of participants
Time participants spent listening to personal devices for non-work-related purposes	r= .341, p= .112	23
Time participants spent communicating online for non-work-related purposes	r= .318, p= .139	23

According to my Homogenisation theory those who place more (rather than less) emphasis on self-expression values have a greater propensity to use technology to find and connect to people with whom they share similar interests and values. These technologies include the Internet, social media, chat rooms and audio/video chat. Those who are self-expression values oriented tend to feel less bound by social conventions and obligations and

at greater liberty to forge, maintain and sever social connections based on their individual preferences than do those who place greater emphasis on survival values. Therefore, they may be more inclined to use advanced technologies to enhance their social modularity by overcoming geographic distance. Consequently, they may be prevailing over practical obstacles that previously limited opportunities for individuals with similar interests/ideas to form connections and discussion groups around these topics/themes. I contend that this contributes to the development of a SEVHSN Complex. Thus, positive correlations between measures of participants' Complex-immersion and both their use of communications technologies and the proportion of their friends met online would be consistent with my Homogenisation thesis.

The time participants spent communicating online for non-work-related purposes was indeed negatively correlated with the extent to which participants encounter political views on policy matters different from their own within their close social networks as well as positively correlated with:

1. the degree to which the most important formal groups in which they are involved have egalitarian decision-making processes, and
2. the ethnic/linguistic homogeneity of their informal social networks.

The proportion of participants' close friends whom they initially met online was also positively correlated with:

- the religious homogeneity of participants' informal social networks, and
- the degree to which members of participants' most important formal groups have a similar educational background/level.

Additionally, the time participants spent looking at screens for non-work-related purposes was positively correlated with:

- the ethnic/linguistic homogeneity of their informal social networks, and
- the extent to which their political values tended to be reinforced by the members of their close social networks (as shown in Figure 7.1).

These statistics suggest that spending more time using technology to maintain and forge more friendships and relationships over significant distances is linked to measures of SEVHSN Complex-immersion. Hence, they are consistent with my Homogenisation theory.

Table 7.2

Correlations between the time participants spent communicating online for non-work-related purposes and variables connected with the SEVHSN Complex.

2015 Correlations between	Time participants spent communicating online for non-work-related purposes	Number of participants
The degree to which participants' two most important formal groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian decision-making processes.	r= .318, p= .139	23
The extent to which participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) are ethnically/linguistically diverse	r= -.273, p= .107	36
ISNDS	r= -.330, p= .125	23

Table 7.3

Correlations between the proportion of participants' close friends initially met online and measures of structural diversity within participants social networks.

2015 Correlations between	Proportion of participants' close friends initially met online	Number of participants
The extent to which participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) are religiously diverse	r= -.284, p= .098	31
Participants agreeing that most members of the most important formal group in which they are involved have the same educational background/level	r= .290, p= .180	20

Table 7.4

Correlations between the time participants spent looking at screens for non-work-related purposes and measures of diversity within participants social networks.

2015 Correlations between	Time participants spent looking at screens for non-work-related purposes	Number of participants
The extent to which participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) are ethnically/linguistically diverse	r= -.273, p= .107	36
AVSNDS	r= -.486, p= .041	18

Figure 7.1

The correlation between participants' AVSNDSs and the time participants spent looking at screens for non-work-related purposes.



Furthermore, these positive correlations between indicators of participants' social network homogeneity and both the time they devote to using communications technology and the proportion of their close friends whom they initially met online are inconsistent with the Modernisation thesis. Modernisation theory maintains that having more homogenous social networks is linked to emphasising survival values and experiencing less secure and liberating economic/technological contexts.[728] That is, according to Inglehart and Welzel those with relatively homogenous social networks are less likely to have access to, or the

[728] Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.34, 52, 54, 141-143 & 294

inclination to use, technology to forge and maintain friendships outside their family and local community. Survival values raise feelings of obligation towards family and local community members thereby reducing opportunities to invest time and energy into social connections unlikely to be as helpful in a crisis.[729]

Correlations revealed between the proportion of online communication spent communicating with people who live far away and measures of SEVHSN Complex-immersion initially appear to undermine my Homogenisation theory. The proportion of participants' online communication spent communicating with people who live far away was found to be negatively correlated with:

- the degree to which participants' most important formal groups in which they are involved have egalitarian decision-making processes,
- the extent to which the political values of participants tended to be reinforced by members of their close social networks, and
- the degree to which members of participants' most important formal groups in which they are involved are of a similar age.

Additionally, the proportion of participants' online communication spent communicating with people they initially met online was negatively correlated with the degree to which participants' most important formal groups in which they are involved have egalitarian decision-making processes.

Table 7.5

Correlations between the proportion of participants' online communication spent communicating with people who live far away, and variables connected with the SEVHSN Complex.

2015 Correlations between	Proportion of participants' online communication spent communicating with people who live far away	Number of participants
The degree to which participants' two most important formal groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian	r= -.340, p= .113	23

[729] Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.141-142

decision-making processes.		
AVSNDS	r= .387, p= .113	18
Participants agreeing that most members of the most important formal group in which they are involved are of the same age	r= -.299, p= .166	23

Table 7.6

The correlation between the proportion of participants' online communication spent communicating with people they initially met online and the degree to which participants' two most important formal groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian decision-making processes.

2015 Correlations between	Proportion of participants' online communication spent communicating with people they initially met online	Number of participants
The degree to which participants' two most important formal groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian decision-making processes.	r= -.453, p= .045	20

However, these statistics may not suggest that SEVHSN Complex-embeddedness is negatively correlated with spending time communicating with persons met online and living far away. Instead, these correlations probably indicate that those deeply embedded in the SEVHSN Complex spend more time (than those less immersed) communicating online; with those whom they initially met in person and online, who are geographically close and distant. Those who are more (rather than less) embedded in the Complex may simply spend a greater proportion of their online communication communicating with locals. Previously discussed correlations linking greater immersion in the Complex with both more time spent communicating online and a higher proportion of close friends met online, support this conclusion. This is consistent with my Homogenisation arguments that those who place greater emphasis on self-expression values tend to be wealthier, more educated and have greater access to technology than those with a survival values orientation. They are also more inclined to act autonomously when forging, maintaining or severing social connections: considering familial and community obligations and expectations less than those who

emphasise hierarchal, conformity and survival values. The internet and particularly social media, chat rooms, blogs and video/audio chat provide these individuals with the means to easily connect with like-minded people and to maintain these connections over great distances. Consequently, more socially autonomous persons (usually heavily embedded in the SEVHSN Complex) are probably more inclined and more empowered to spend longer communicating online than those who are less socially autonomous and less immersed in the Complex.

Statistics presented in the previous chapter suggested that greater informal structural social capital is tied to (and is potentially a facet of) deeper embeddedness in the SEVHSN Complex. Therefore, informal structural social capital, according to Homogenisation theory, is correlated with certain measures of the extent to, and manner in, which technology and the Internet are used. These measures were previously linked to indicators of both self-expression values orientation and social network homogeneity. Indeed, participants' frequency of informal meetings with members of their close social networks was revealed to be:

- positively correlated with the time they spent communicating online for non-work-related purposes, and
- negatively correlated with the proportion of their online communication (for non-work-related purposes) communicating with people they initially met online.

These correlations between informal structural social capital (linked to the SEVHSN Complex) and previously discussed patterns of technology use are consistent with my Homogenisation arguments. Per my Homogenisation thesis, values change is being brought about by technological, economic and human capital advance. This is precipitating changing patterns of structural social capital which is resulting in homogenising social networks. These changing patterns of structural social capital probably include more time communicating online for non-work-related purposes. This would enable greater levels of contact between people who share similar beliefs, values, views and attitudes but who may be separated by significant, or even enormous, geographical distances.

Table 7.7

Correlations between participants' frequency of meeting informally with members of their social networks and measures of participants' online communication.

2015 Correlations between	Participants' frequency of meeting informally with members of their social networks	Number of participants
Time participants spent communicating online for non-work-related purposes	r= .382, p= .022	36
Proportion of participants' online communication spent communicating with people they initially met online	r= -.246, p= .182	31

Past & Present Socio-economic Status

Modernisation and Homogenisation theories are unanimous in their recognition of technological access and economic development as factors influencing the security and therefore the value orientations of individuals, generations and societies. Both theses maintain that as societies economically transition from industrial to post-industrial phases of modernisation citizens become increasingly:

- financially secure (particularly with the development of the welfare state),[730] and
- inclined to shift their emphasis from hierarchical, conformity survival to egalitarian, autonomy self-expression values.[731]

They maintain that a reduction in the emphasis placed on survival values (engendered by economic development and rising financial security) fray familial and community obligations. Lamentationists allege that such trends undermine positive liberty by eroding the social capital from which it is largely derived. Conversely, Modernisation and Homogenisation theses reason that these patterns amount to a reduction in neither social capital nor autonomy. Instead, they empower individuals to forge, maintain and sever social connections based on their own preferences.

[730] Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.2, 3, 29, 126, 134 & 138
[731] Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.2-6, 19, 21, 29, 30, 111, 126, 133, 134, 138, 164 & 278-280

However, unlike Modernisation, Homogenisation theory holds that this rising social modularity brought about by economic development and values reorientation indirectly facilitates both:

- the homogenisation of members within social networks, and
- the widening of (structural and ideological) differences between networks.

That is, social networks become increasingly ideologically homogenous as people are drawn to those with whom they share social values, beliefs and interests. Persons who have similar views and attitudes also often share structural characteristics. The ideological and structural homogenisation of social networks tend to unleash centrifugal forces which widen ideological differences between networks as network members have fewer interactions with those with whom they disagree and have little in common.

Contrastingly, Inglehart and Welzel claim that technological and economic development combined with the survival to self-expression values shift emancipate individuals from rigid and obligatory 'bonding' social capital.[732] They maintain that this enables the formation of more 'bridging' connections, friendships and relationships entered and maintained by choice.[733] Hence, these Modernisationists insist that far from homogenising, social network members are becoming increasingly diverse/heterogeneous because of empowering and modernising trends. Ergo, analysing correlations between participants' reported socio-economic status (both past and present) and measures of Complex-immersion will help ascertain the relative strength/validity of Homogenisation and Modernisation theories. These measures include value orientations and social network homogeneity.

However, prior to exploring these and other statistics, the method of assessing participants' reported past and present socio-economic status must be explained. My survey did not ask participants to divulge their personal/household income. Many participants may have been uncomfortable reporting their income even when assured that their personal responses would be kept confidential. Instead, class/socio-economic status was surmised by

[732] Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.2-6, 19, 34, 141, 142 & 294
[733] Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.142 & 294

participants' reported employment type. While relatively less precise than personal or household income, this measure of socio-economic status is still reasonably accurate for the purposes of this investigation. Below is a table showing each socio-economic score from 1 to 5 and a description of the categories they represent.

Table 7.8

Socio-economic categories

Socio-economic categories 1 – 5	
1	Unemployed or part-time-employed welfare recipient (includes students and stay-at-home-parents)
2	Working class (Factory workers, clerical workers, retail sales, low paid crafts people)
3	Lower middle class (Semi-professionals and lower managers, craftspeople)
4	Upper middle class (Professionals and upper managers)
5	Upper class (Executives of large corporations and very wealthy investors)

Stay at home parents, full-time students and both unemployed and part-time employed welfare recipients were assigned the lowest score of 1. Participants were categorised without consideration for the socio-economic status of their spouse or significant family members/others with whom they reside. This may have had some unintended effects on the results as a significant proportion of financially affluent people choose to be stay at home parents and full-time students often come from wealthy backgrounds.[734] However, the impact of these oversights would be small. The proportion of people who have chosen to be stay-at-home-parents past their children's early childhood has declined considerably over the last four decades.[735] Although there has always been a significant disparity between the socio-economic status of men and women, persons with high socio-economic status for their sex tend to partner persons with similarly high socio-economic status for their sex. The same is true for the lower and middle classes.[736] It is likely that only a small proportion of parents are full-time students when their children are 12 years old. Therefore, full-time students may

[734] Parker, Stephen. (2016) 'How universities make inequality worse', *THE CONVERSATION*, viewed 15 September 2017, https://theconversation.com/how-universities-make-inequality-worse-55155; Towers, Kathrine. (2016) 'University schemes 'a mystery' to poorer students', *THE AUSTRALIAN*, viewed 15 September 2017, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/higher-education/university-schemes-a-mystery-to-poorer-students/news-story/94b07946986dd6cdbed84548a75c1142; Australian Bureau of Statistics, (2013) 'Characteristics of higher education students', *4102.0 – Australian Social Trends,* viewed 15 September 2017, http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/Lookup/4102.0Main+Features20July+2013; *Times, (United Kingdom),* (2013) 'THE RISE OF THE CUPCAKE FEMINIST', p.26, 27, 29, 31, 32, Australia/New Zealand Reference Centre, EBSCO*host,* viewed 16 September 2017

[735] Hayes, Allan., Weston, Ruth., Qu, Lixia and Gray, Matthew. (2010) 'Families then and now: 1980 – 2010', *Australian Institute of Family Studies*, viewed 16 September 2017, https://aifs.gov.au/publications/families-then-and-now-1980-2010

[736] Maenpaa, E. and Jalovaara, M. (2014) 'Achievement Replacing Ascription? Changes in Homogamy in Education and Social Class Origins', *SOCIO-ECONOMIC HOMOGAMY AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE STABILITY OF COHABITING UNIONS – Finnish Yearbook of Population Research,* vol:50, p.93-124

only undermine results regarding measures of 'present socio-economic status' and 'socio-economic status seven years ago' not the 'socio-economic status of participants' parents when participants were 12 years old.' Also, I must acknowledge that some people may have difficulty recalling previous socioeconomic status. However, most would not find this task overly challenging.

As previously explained, positive correlations between indicators of self-expression values orientation and past and present socio-economic status would buttress both Homogenisation and Modernisation theses. This is because both theories hold that economic development and financial security act to raise the emphasis placed on self-expression values.[737] Furthermore, both theories maintain that these trends have a much greater impact on the value orientations of young people in their formative years than on adults.[738] Thus, societal value shifts tend to occur mainly, but not exclusively, through generational replacement. That is, within the same society the values of wealthy and poor individuals of similar age will tend to be closer than those shared by persons of similar socio-economic status but of different generations.[739] This is particularly true when there has been substantial economic, technological and educational development over the preceding decades.[740] Therefore, positive correlations between the current socio-economic status of participants (or their socio-economic status seven years ago) and self-expression values emphases support Modernisation and Homogenisation theories. Yet, so too would even stronger, and more significant positive correlations between the socio-economic status of participants' parents when participants were 12 years old and participants having a self-expression values orientation.

Indeed, the socio-economic status of participants 7 years prior to their undertaking the survey was found to be moderately, and highly significantly, correlated with the degree to which participants' most important formal organisations have egalitarian decision-making processes. A highly significant positive correlation was uncovered between participants' mothers' socio-economic status when participants were 12 years old and the extent to which

[737] Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.2-6, 19, 21, 29, 30, 111, 134 & 164
[738] Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.7, 99 & 128
[739] Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.121-133 & 273
[740] Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.95 & 113

participants' most important formal organisations have egalitarian leadership selection procedures. This correlation was strong rather than moderate. As previously explained, the degree to which participants' most important formal organisations have egalitarian decision-making and leadership selection processes can be used to measure the emphasis placed on self-expression values and therefore SEVHSN Complex-immersion. Hence, these correlation statistics provide evidence that socio-economic status (now and in one's formative years) is linked to SEVHSN Complex-embeddedness.

Table 7.9

The correlation between the degree to which participants' two most important formal groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian decision-making processes and participants socio-economic status 7 years ago.

2015 Correlations between	The degree to which participants' two most important formal groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian decision-making processes.	Number of participants
Participants socio-economic status 7 years ago	r= .460, p= .031	22

Table 7.10

The correlation between the degree to which participants' two most important formal groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian leadership-selection processes and participants' mothers' socio-economic status when participants were 12 years old.

2015 Correlations between	The degree to which participants' two most important formal groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian leadership-selection processes.	Number of participants
Participants' mothers' socio-economic status when participants were 12 years old	r= .505, p= .016	22

As previously explained, positive correlations between measures of social network homogeneity and present, but particularly past, socio-economic status would both support my Homogenisation and run counter to Inglehart and Welzel's Modernisation theories. Both

theories hold that individuals and generations raised in physically, financially and economically secure, rather than precarious conditions tend to place less emphasis on hierarchical, conformity survival values.[741] Hence, they maintain that these individuals and generations tend to place less priority on obligatory interpersonal, familial and community ties.[742] However, Homogenisation and Modernisation theses have opposing positions regarding the impact of these patterns on levels of bonding and bridging social capital. I argue that greater social modularity has been brought about by:

- rising economic/financial security,
- shifting values,
- demographic trends (such as a larger proportion of Australians living in metropolises),
- advances in communications technology, and
- increased social media engagement.

I contend that these developments have both:

- reduced costs (such as isolation and alienation) of discontinuing or leaving unforged older more traditional social bonds
  while
- empowering individuals to find and connect with those with whom they share more attitudes and interests.

Consequently, those who were raised in relatively secure economic environments and place less emphasis on survival values:

- tend to have (in the contemporary period) few experiences negotiating and compromising through difficult relationships, and
- are relatively more inclined to view such connections and bonds as too much trouble

[741] Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.2-8, 19, 21, 24, 29, 30, 52, 54, 111, 126, 134, 138, 164 & 273
[742] Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.3, 7, 8, 19, 24, 29, 52, 54 & 273

than are those who place greater emphasis on survival values. Additionally, I hold that those who have similar views and attitudes often share structural characteristics, and that consequently ideological and structural homogeneity usually rise and fall in tandem. Conversely, Inglehart and Welzel surmise that facets of modernisation including technological advancement, economic prosperity and value shifts free individuals from obligatory and 'bonding' familial and community ties and empower them to establish relatively more 'bridging' connections and heterogeneous social networks.[743] I contend that changes in social network homogeneity mainly occur through generational replacement.

Correlation statistics collated from my survey data support Homogenisation over Modernisation theory. Indeed, participants' socio-economic status was revealed to be negatively correlated with both:

- the extent to which participants encounter views on political policy matters different from their own within their close social networks, and
- the degree to which the members of participants' close social networks tend to have views on policy matters different from the participants'.

Furthermore, measures of past (participants in childhood and seven years prior to undertaking the survey)[744] and present socio-economic status were found to be positively correlated with structural homogeneity within social networks, indicating generational rather than period shifts. Participants' socio-economic status was positively correlated with:

- the economic and social status homogeneity of participants' informal social networks, and
- the degree to which the members of participants' social networks tend to reflect participants' structural characteristics (as illustrated by Figure 7.2).

Participants' socio-economic status seven years prior to undertaking the survey was found to be positively correlated with:

[743] Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.2-4, 52, 54, 141-143 & 294
[744] While not all participants' recollections of their past socioeconomic status are likely to be accurate this method of measuring past socioeconomic status is still worthwhile and relatively unchallenging for most.

- the economic status homogeneity of participants' informal social networks, and
- the extent to which the members of participants' social networks tended to reflect participants' structural characteristics (as demonstrated by Figure 7.3).

The socio-economic status of participants' mothers' when participants were 12 years old was positively correlated with:

- the ethnic/linguistic homogeneity, economic status homogeneity, social status homogeneity and the overall structural homogeneity of participants' informal social networks, and
- the gender and occupational homogeneity of members of participants' most important formal groups.

The socio-economic status of participants' fathers' when participants were 12 years old was positively correlated with the income/wealth and ethnic/linguistic background homogeneity of the members of participants' most important formal groups. Furthermore, the socio-economic status of participants' parents when participants were 12 years old was revealed to be positively correlated with the age and educational (background/level) homogeneity of members of participants' most important formal groups. Other evidence that socio-economic status is linked to SEVHSN Complex-immersion includes the positive correlations found between socio-economic status and:

- a subjective sense of autonomy, and
- believing that society is ideologically homogenous.

Statistics analysed previously indicated that the latter variables were tied to the Complex.

Table 7.11

Correlations between Participants socio-economic status and measures of the ideological and structural diversity within their social networks.

2015 Correlations between	Participants socio-economic status	Number of participants
ISNDS	r= -.310, p= .160	22

AISNDS	r= -.401, p= .072	21
The extent to which members of participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) have diverse economic status	r= -.371, p= .028	35
The extent to which members of participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) have diverse social status	r= -.223, p= .198	35
ASSNDS	r= -.443, p= .030	24

Figure 7.2

The correlation between participants' ASSNDSs and participants' socio-economic status.



Table 7.12

Correlations between participants' socio-economic status 7 years ago and measures of structural diversity within participants' informal and close social networks.

2015 Correlations between	Participants' socio-economic status 7 years ago	Number of participants
The extent to which members of participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) have	r= -.227, p= .190	35

diverse economic status		
ASSNDS	r= -.517, p= .010	24

Figure 7.3

The correlation between participants' ASSNDSs and participants' socio-economic status 7 years ago.



Table 7.13

Correlations between Participants' mothers' socio-economic status when participants were 12 years old and measures of structural diversity within participants' informal social networks and most important formal groups.

2015 Correlations between	Participants' mothers' socio-economic status when participants were 12 years old	Number of participants
The extent to which participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) are ethnically/linguistically diverse	r= -.225, p= .194	35
The extent to which members of participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) have diverse economic status	r= -.242, p= .161	35
The extent to which members of participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) have diverse	r= -.298, p= .082	35

social status		
The extent to which participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) are structurally (ethnically/linguistically, economically, socially and religiously) diverse	r= -.290, p= .092	35
Participants agreeing that most members of the most important formal group in which they are involved have the same gender	r= .307, p= .164	22
Participants agreeing that most members of the most important formal group in which they are involved have the same occupation	r= .278, p= .200	23
Participants agreeing that most members of the most important formal group in which they are involved are of the same age	r= .372, p= .088	22
Participants agreeing that most members of the most important formal group in which they are involved have the same educational background/level	r= .419, p= .052	22

Table 7.14

Correlations between participants' fathers' socio-economic status when participants were 12 years old and measures of structural diversity within participants' most important formal groups.

2015 Correlations between	Participants' fathers' socio-economic status when participants were 12 years old	Number of participants
Participants agreeing that most members of the most important formal groups in which they are involved have the same income/wealth	r= .366, p= .078	24
Participants agreeing that most members of the most important formal group in which they are involved have the same ethnic/linguistic background	r= .288, p= .182	23
Participants agreeing that most	r= .419, p= .047	23

members of the most important formal group in which they are involved are of the same age		
Participants agreeing that most members of the most important formal group in which they are involved have the same educational background/level	r= .395, p= .062	23

Table 7.15

Correlations between participants' socio-economic status and the extents to which they believe society is ideologically homogenous and that they have freedom and control of their own lives.

2015 Correlations between	Participants' socio-economic status	Number of participants
Participants' subjective sense of autonomy	r= .367, p= .078	24
Believing society is ideologically homogenous	r= .331, p= .052	35

There was only one significant negative correlation found between measures of socio-economic status and structural social network homogeneity. Participant' socio-economic status when they undertook the survey was revealed to be negatively correlated with the religious homogeneity of participants' informal social networks. This result may initially appear to support the Modernisationist argument that higher living standards precipitate a value shift that instigates greater diversity within social networks.[745] Yet, evidence overwhelmingly shows positive (rather than negative) correlations between socio-economic status and other measures of structural homogeneity within both formal and informal networks.

Table 7.16

[745] Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.2-4, 52, 54, 141-143 & 294

The correlation between participants' socio-economic status and the extent to which participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) are religiously diverse.

2015 Correlations between	Participants' socio-economic status	Number of participants
The extent to which participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) are religiously diverse	r= .244, p= .165	34

Previous studies have found that people with lower socio-economic status are more inclined to be heavily religious and to more regularly attend religious services.[746] People who are heavily religious probably associate more often with others of their religious denomination, even informally, than do people who are not so religious.[747] Moreover, age was negatively correlated with the socio-economic status of participants' parents when participants were 12 years old (evidenced by Figure 7.4) suggesting that a higher proportion of Australians are working in high skilled jobs now than in the past. Additionally, while statistics reveal recent increasing participation rates for many formal organisation types,[748] involvement in religious organisations continues to decline[749] and the decline in membership of, and engagement in, political parties has largely plateaued (see Chapter Three).

Table 7.17

Correlations between participants' age and participants' parents' socio-economic status when participants were 12 years old.

2015 Correlations between	Participants' age	Number of participants

[746] Flere, Sergei and Klanjsek, Rudi. (2009) 'SOCIAL STATUS AND RELIGIOSITY IN CHRISTIAN EUROPE', *European Societies,* vol:11(4), p.597-599
[747] Sahl, Allison, H and Batson, Christie, D. (2011) 'RACE AND RELIGION IN THE BIBLE BELT: PARENTAL ATTITUDES TOWARD INTERFAITH RELATIONSHIPS', *Sociological Spectrum,* vol:31(4), p.462
[748] Australian Sports Commission, *Participating in Exercise, Recreation and Sport, Annual Report 2010*, p.39; Volunteering Australia, *State of Volunteering in Australia: 2012*, p.7-9; Australian Council of the Arts, *Arts in Daily Life: Australian Participation in the Arts, Report May 2014*, p.12
[749] Brenner, Philips, S. (2016) 'RESEARCH SYNTHESIS: CROSS-NATIONAL TRENDS IN RELIGIOUS SERVICE ATTENDANCE', *Public Opinion Quarterly,* vol:80(2), p.571

Participants' mothers' socio-economic status when participants were 12 years old	r= -.227, p= .190	35
Participants' fathers' socio-economic status when participants were 12 years old	r= -.506, p= .002	36

Figure 7.4

The correlation between participants' age and participants' fathers' socio-economic status when participants were 12 years old.



Together this evidence may suggest that greater religious homogeneity within social networks is not a facet of modernisation. Wealthier individuals tend to be more heavily embedded in the SEVHSN Complex than are poorer persons. Consequently, they are empowered by their modern-values[750] and greater resources to find, forge and maintain social connections with people with whom they share important (or subjectively important) similarities. However, religious identity is not a significant factor for these wealthy people in determining with whom they forge and maintain social connections. This relationship was detected as early as 1967 when Christensen and Barber's study revealed that persons of higher socio-economic status were more inclined to have interfaith marriages than those of

[750] 'Modern values' are those associated with the latter stages of modernisation and human development.

lower socioeconomic status.[751] Thus, the negative correlation between participants' socio-economic status and the religious homogeneity within participants' informal social networks is consistent with my Homogenisation theory. So too the positive correlations between participants socio-economic status and other measures of social network homogeneity. As Australia continues to economically develop, religious identity is likely to become even less of the determinant of social connections, further diversifying religious identity and religious affiliation within social networks.

This seventh chapter has examined statistics revealing that financial/socio-economic prosperity and technology development, accessibility and usage patterns are probable drivers of SEVHSN Complex-immersion. This evidence supports my Homogenisation theory while contradicting parts of Inglehart and Welzel's Modernisation thesis. From here other variables connected to SEVHSN Complex-immersion are similarly investigated. These include education, knowledge attainment and spending less time reading traditional print media (including newspapers and political/news magazines and journals). Correlations between these variables and measures of Complex-embeddedness are revealed to be largely consistent with my Homogenisation arguments.

Education and Knowledge Attainment

Over the past 40 years the proportion of Australians with higher education qualifications has grown enormously; and generationally. Between 1976 and 2011 the proportion of young adults (18 to 34) who had obtained non-school qualifications grew from 30% to 52%. Additionally, the proportion of young adults who had obtained bachelor degrees

[751] Christensen, Harold, T and Barber, Kenneth, E. (1967) 'Interfaith versus Intrafaith Marriage in Indiana', *Journal of Marriage and Family,* vol:29(3), p.468

rose from 5% to 26% during that same period.[752]



753

Inglehart and Welzel argue that growing access to, and prevalence of, formal education has been the most important factor fuelling the survival-to-self-expression values transition and the consequent trends in structural social capital and political engagement since the mid-twentieth century.[754] That is, the impact of education and knowledge proliferation on such variables has far exceeded even that of greater material wealth and security.

WVS statistics discussed in Chapter Five indicate that when controlling for other salient variables higher levels of formal education attainment is positively correlated with patterns that are linked to the Complex. These patterns include greater interpersonal trust, more liberal views on family and morality and belief in egalitarian work procedures and in the importance of children learning self-expression (as opposed to survival) values. These statistics suggest that the generational growth in the proportion of Australians with higher education qualifications is not only contributing to an increase in Complex-immersion indirectly, but also directly. That is, education does not just indirectly raise Complex embeddedness by lifting incomes and financial security which in turn induce greater autonomy, self-expression values emphasis and social network homogeneity. Education also appears to have a direct influence on Complex-immersion.

[752] Australian Bureau of Statistics, 'Young adults: Then and now'
[753] Australian Bureau of Statistics, 'Young adults: Then and now'
[754] Inglehart, and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p.24, 28, 29, 44 & 45

Furthermore, rising levels of higher formal education attainment is not the only significant contemporary trend changing knowledge and information dissemination. Over the last decade there has been a significant acceleration in the shift from traditional news media consumption (including sales of newspapers, political/news journals and magazines) to new online sources.[755] This shift has been largely generational with Millennials relying more heavily on Internet sources for news content than older generations. According to Deloitte's Media Consumer Survey Report 2016, the proportion of younger and older Millennials who primarily used online sources to consume news was 53% and 58% respectively. Contrastingly, only 43% of Xers, 22% of Boomers and 9% of Silent and older generations primarily used online sources to access news content.[756] The shift has enabled a proliferation of online/political blogs and sites to contribute to social/political discourse (often disseminated through social media) without the same degree of fact-checking and scrutiny required of more traditional news media.[757] More contributors competing for readership and less fact checking/scrutiny has fuelled consumption of unbalanced and extreme sources feeding ideological and other biases of various kinds within sections of the community.[758] These patterns enhance autonomy by providing individuals with greater news source and content options. Consequently, they are helping to drive the ideological diversification of society and the survival to self-expression values transition, both of which are facilitated by individual empowerment.

Additionally, individuals empowered by technological advances such as the Internet and social media (as well as by rising wealth and value shifts) can more easily find and connect with people with whom they share views, attitudes and interests. The ideological homogeneity of social networks tends to be linked with both believing society is ideologically homogenous and the structural homogeneity of social networks (as shown by Figures 7.6 and

[755] McNair, Brian. (2015) 'Newspapers in decline, digital slowdown – what's new in the news?', *THE CONVERSATION*, viewed 20 September 2017, https://theconversation.com/newspapers-in-decline-digital-slowdown-whats-new-in-the-news-41364
[756] Alcorn, Niki., Harding, Clare and Johnston, Stuart. (2016) 'Media Consumer Survey 2016: Australian media and digital preferences, 5th edition', *Deloitte,* p.36, viewed 20 September 2017, http://landing.deloitte.com.au/rs/761-IBL-328/images/Media_Consumer_Survey_Report.pdf
[757] Orland, Joanne. (2017) 'How to help kids navigate fake news and misinformation online', *THE CONVERSATION*, viewed 20 September 2017, https://theconversation.com/how-to-help-kids-navigate-fake-news-and-misinformation-online-79342
[758] Beezley, Matt. (2016) 'THE PROLIFERATION OF FAKE NEWS', *RED FAN COMMUNICATIONS,* viewed 20 September 2017, http://redfancommunications.com/blog/the-proliferation-of-fake-news

7.5 respectively). Hence, according to my Homogenisation thesis, the frequency of consuming traditional news media is negatively correlated with the structural homogeneity of social networks and believing that society is ideologically homogenous. Statistics support these Homogenisation arguments (see below). Indeed, participants' frequency of reading newspapers, political/news journals and magazines were found to be negatively correlated with both the overall structural homogeneity of participants' informal social networks and the extent to which participants believe that their society is ideologically homogenous.

Table 7.18

Correlations between participants' AISNDSs and both their believing that society is ideologically homogenous and measures of structural diversity within their informal social networks.

2015 Correlations between	AISNDS	Number of participants
Believing society is ideologically homogenous	r= -.472, p= .027	22
The extent to which participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) are ethnically/linguistically diverse	r= .617, p= .002	22
The extent to which members of participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) have diverse economic status	r= .430, p= .046	22
The extent to which participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) are structurally (ethnically/linguistically, economically, socially and religiously) diverse	r= .529, p= .011	22

Figure 7.5

The correlation between participants' AISNDSs and the overall structural diversity within participants' informal social networks.



Table 7.19

Correlations between participants' ISNDSs and both their believing that society is ideologically homogenous and measures of structural diversity within their informal social networks.

2015 Correlations between	ISNDS	Number of participants
Believing society is ideologically homogenous	r= -.327, p= .128	23
The extent to which participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) are ethnically/linguistically diverse	r= .506, p= .014	23
The extent to which members of participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) have diverse economic status	r= .486, p= .019	23
The extent to which members of participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) have diverse social status	r= .531, p= .009	23
The extent to which participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) are structurally (ethnically/linguistically, economically, socially and religiously) diverse	r= .567, p= .005	23

Figure 7.6

The correlation between participants' ISNDSs and the extent to which participants believe that society is ideologically homogenous.



Table 7.20

Correlations between Participants' frequency of reading newspapers and political/news journals/magazines and both their believing that society is ideologically homogenous and the extent to which their informal social networks are structurally diverse.

2015 Correlations between	Participants' frequency of reading newspapers and political/news journals/magazines	Number of participants
The extent to which participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) are structurally (ethnically/linguistically, economically, socially and religiously) diverse	r= .233, p= .172	36
Believing society is ideologically homogenous	r= -.269, p= .113	36

Conclusion

This seventh chapter has examined the validity of theorised drivers of SEVHSN complex-immersion, including:

- use of technologies (such as online communication and audio and screen entertainment),
- financial security/economic development,
- educational attainment, and
- news/information dissemination.

It has explored the extent to which relationships between these 'potential/suggested' drivers and indicators of Complex-embeddedness buttress my Homogenisation thesis.

My statistics indicate that those who are relatively more empowered by, and prefer using and communicating with, contemporary/modern technologies tend to place greater emphasis on self-expression values than persons with less access to, and less inclination to utilise, such devices. This is consistent with both my Homogenisation and Inglehart and Welzel's Modernisation arguments. Contrastingly, positive correlations found between indicators of participants' social network homogeneity and both the time they devote to using online communications technology and the proportion of their close friends who they initially met online support my Homogenisation, while undermining Modernisation theses. This is because Modernisation (as opposed to Homogenisation) theory maintains that social network homogeneity is linked to survival values and less secure and liberating economic/technological contexts. Additionally, my data revealed links between variables and patterns shown to be connected to the SEVHSN complex; strengthening my argument. These variables include those related to informal structural social capital and patterns of technology use.

My survey data has provided evidence that formative, past and present socio-economic status are all linked to core components of the SEVHSN Complex. Core components of the Complex encompass self-expression value orientations and structural and ideological social network homogeneity. Furthermore, socio-economic status was found to

be positively correlated with variables previously connected to core components of the Complex. These variables include a subjective sense of autonomy and believing that society is ideologically homogenous. Socio-economic status was revealed to be negatively correlated with the religious homogeneity of participants' informal social networks. However, religious identity tends not to be a significant factor for wealthy people (typically more immersed in the Complex than the less wealthy) in determining with whom they forge and maintain social connections. Thus, greater religious homogeneity within social networks may not be a facet of modernisation. Wealthier individuals are typically less religious, more heavily embedded in the SEVHSN Complex and empowered by modern values and greater resources than are relatively less wealthy people. Therefore, they are probably finding, forging and maintaining social connections with people with whom they share subjectively more important similarities than religious identity.

Homogenisation and Modernisation theories maintain that growing access to, and prevalence of, formal education has been one of the most important factors fuelling the survival to self-expression values transition. WVS and other statistics support this position. However, the generational growth in the proportion of Australians with higher formal education qualifications is not the only significant contemporary knowledge dissemination trend precipitating greater SEVHSN Complex-immersion. Evidence analysed in this seventh chapter was found to corroborate my Homogenisation thesis positions that those younger, rather than older, tend to consume less traditional/reliable and more online/editorialised/biased news media. This is one reason why younger people are more heavily embedded in the SEVHSN Complex than are older persons. This media consumption pattern of the young and Complex-immersed potentially contributes to, and exacerbates:

a) greater structural and ideological homogenisation of social networks, and
b) the belief that society is ideologically homogenous.

I surmised that these possible trends are facilitated by enhanced individual empowerment (particularly in one's formative years), and are helping to drive societal ideological diversification.

CHAPTER EIGHT

--RAMIFICATIONS OF NETWORK HOMOGENISATION--

Conflict Avoidance, Party Disengagement & Political Intolerance, Distrust & Dissatisfaction

Chapter Six examined statistics drawn from my own survey data. Correlations between indicators/measures of the degree to which participants

- emphasise self-expression values, and
- have homogenous networks

supported my hypothesis that a Self-Expression Values Homogenous Social Network (SEVHSN) Complex exists. The statistics also showed that interpersonal and political trust/confidence as well as community and political involvement are correlated with the Complex in ways consistent with my Homogenisation thesis. Additionally, statistics presented suggested that an increasing proportion of the Australian population is becoming more heavily embedded in the Complex. The seventh chapter evaluated the validity of theorised drivers of SEVHSN Complex-immersion, including:

- use of technologies (such as online communication and audio and screen entertainment),
- economic development/financial security,
- education attainment, and
- news/information dissemination.

The relationships revealed between these 'potential/suggested' drivers and indicators of Complex-embeddedness were found to be consistent with my Homogenisation theory.

Some scholars like Joseph Schumpeter believe in an extremely limited decision-making role in public affairs for what they consider is a largely ignorant, superficial and irrational public. However, Chapter One reasoned that their assertions are based on a questionable "utilitarian" value-monist premise. Acceptance of this value-monist metaethical position renders political disagreements the product of ignorance, irrationality and/or the prioritisation of self-interest over the "Common Good". However, as ultimate values are incommensurable when devoid of context, there are often multiple rational ways to balance these frequently conflicting values within particular contexts.[759] Highly representative democracy is therefore the optimal and -- arguably -- most legitimate way to overcome disputes over equally rational policy positions advocated by rational individuals of equal moral worth. Therefore, I argued that high levels of civic involvement are necessary to sustain a thriving, representative and responsive democracy.

Hence, this eighth and final chapter investigates the ways in which Social Network Homogenisation or SNH (a core component of the SEVHSN Complex) influences political participation, revealing statistical relationships consistent with my Homogenisation thesis. The part of my Homogenisation theory relating to the influence of SNH on political engagement was summarised in Chapter One by referring to the Social Network Homogenisation and Political Engagement (SNHPE) Chart on page 48. To begin, this eighth chapter reiterates the limitations of my survey statistics (considered in previous chapters) as well as the most appropriate ways to utilise/interpret them. These statistics are then analysed to determine the *extent* to which they support (or contradict) my theory. Finally, the ways in which electoral and intra-party reforms may help to raise party participation, despite SNH and Societal Ideological Diversification (SID) are explored.

Limitations of My Survey Statistics

The survey, which was extremely complex and long (taking participants approximately 2 hours to complete), had 36 participants. As previously explained (in Chapters Six and Seven), none of the statistics drawn from my survey data controlled for extraneous variables as doing so would have meant relying too heavily on a handful of participant responses;

[759] Hardy, Henry, 'Taking Pluralism Seriously', p.283; Crowder, 'Value Pluralism and Communitarianism', p.417

raising p values above even moderate significance. Hence, the value of any single correlation statistic, or absence thereof in supporting or undermining theorised causal relationships between any two variables is limited. One must consider the general picture that the statistics (acting like brushstrokes) paint when evaluating the degree to which such evidence reinforces or contradicts a theory. All correlation statistics discussed in this thesis are at least moderately significant; having p. values of less than 0.2. While a (p) value of less than 0.1 is deemed significant by convention, the relatively few participants in this survey necessitated the consideration of statistics with higher (p) values. Hence, correlation statistics were deemed significant enough to warrant discussion if they had (p) values of less than 0.2 i.e. if there was a greater than 80% chance of there being a correlation between the relevant variables.

Statistical Analysis

Per Homogenisation theory, the SNHPE Chart (in Chapter One) illustrates how greater intolerance for (as well as of those holding/expressing) political views inconsistent with one's own is symptomatic of deeper SEVHSN Complex-embeddedness. Therefore, statistics indicating links between this intolerance and trends theoretically associated with SNH (as indicated by the Chart) would support my Homogenisation thesis. Indeed, greater intolerance of people holding political views with which one disagrees was found to be positively correlated with:

- measures of (i.e. overall structural and social status) informal social network homogeneity, and
- less willingness to become, and less likelihood of being, political party members.

Table 8.1

Correlations between participants' tolerance of those who hold political views with which they disagree and both measures of structural diversity within participants' informal social networks and participants' membership of, and willingness to join a political party.

2015 Correlations between	Tolerance of those who hold political views with which one disagrees	Number of participants
The extent to which participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) are structurally (ethnically/linguistically, economically, socially and religiously) diverse	r= .252, p= .139	36
The extent to which members of participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) have diverse economic status	r= .232, p= .174	36
Willingness of non-members to join a political party	r= .382, p= .087	21
Membership of / willingness to join, a political party	r= .290, p= .151	26

As discussed in previous chapters, personal structural characteristics are often highly correlated with political views, values, interests and ideas. Additionally, 'structural' is frequently/commonly linked with 'ideological' social network homogeneity. Hence, the positive correlations revealed between political intolerance and 'structural' social network homogeneity may suggest that a causal relationship possibly exists between 'ideological' social network homogeneity and political intolerance. That is, uncontrolled extraneous variables are masking a significant correlation between these (ideological network homogeneity and political intolerance) variables.

My Homogenisation theory is also supported by the statistics suggesting a negative correlation between political intolerance and both measures, and desirability of party engagement. Per Homogenisation theory, those more immersed in the SEVHSN Complex tend to be more conflict averse (and thus less inclined to participate in conflict-prone activities such as party activities) than those relatively less Complex-embedded. The theory maintains that this is because persons with relatively ideologically homogenous networks tend to have less confidence and less experience debating political issues than those with more diverse networks. Homogenisation theory contends that they are also more inclined to severely underestimate the prevalence of people who hold political views and weigh political

values in ways that are significantly different from their own. Consequently, those with ideologically homogenous networks are more inclined than those with relatively diverse networks to consider the potential (thought probable) costs of political debate greater than the possible (judged unlikely) benefits. That is, the emotional and social costs of debating those with whom they disagree (such as embarrassment, anxiety, fear and ridicule) is deemed to outweigh the possible benefits of convincing people (whom they estimate to be a small insignificant minority) of their mistaken opinions. Therefore, positive correlations between political 'tolerance' and both measures of social network diversity and political party engagement are entirely consistent with my Homogenisation theory.

Another symptom of greater Complex-immersion, according to my Homogenisation theory and the SNHPE Chart, is increased unwillingness to accept political compromise. The theory holds that the Complex-immersed are disposed to more acutely overestimate the prevalence of their own political beliefs within, and the ideological homogeneity of society than are those with relatively diverse networks. I theorise that this may be because their political perspectives tend to be greatly reinforced by their social network members. According to my Homogenisation theory, this overestimation may act to diminish the willingness of the Complex-embedded to accept political compromise. Thus, evidence suggesting ties between this unwillingness to accept political compromise and patterns theoretically associated with Complex-immersion and SNH (as indicated by the Chart) would buttress my Homogenisation thesis. Unwillingness to accept political compromise was measured by the degree to which participants agreed with the statement: "Formal politics is a win-lose zero-sum game between competing interests. Compromise is ultimately a loss for all parties involved."[760] Agreement with this statement was found to be positively correlated with two indicators of Complex-embeddedness discussed in previous chapters. These indicators were:

1. the degree to which participants' most important formal organisations have egalitarian decision-making processes (a strong indicator of self-expression values orientation) and

[760] My 'Political Participation and Conflict Avoidance Survey' - question number 64

2. the extent to which participants believe that society is ideologically homogenous (a signal of social network homogeneity).

Thus, an unwillingness to accept political compromise (which is positively linked to these variables) is probably a component or consequence of Complex-embeddedness. This is consistent with my Homogenisation theory.

Table 8.2

Correlations between participants' unwillingness to accept political compromise and variables connected to the SEVHSN Complex.

2015 Correlations between	An unwillingness to accept political compromise	Number of participants
The degree to which participants' two most important formal groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian decision-making processes	r= .279, p=. 198	23
Believing society is ideologically homogenous	r= .326, p=. 052	36

Likewise, not believing in political checks and compromise is (per my Homogenisation theory and the SNHPE Chart) a facet of greater Complex-embeddedness and SNH. According to my thesis, those with more ideologically homogenous networks are less inclined to regard political compromise as necessary or justified than are those with relatively ideologically heterogeneous networks. This, I contend, is explained by their propensity to more greatly overestimate the extent to which their own political views are shared by other citizens. Hence, statistics denoting connections between this antipathy toward political checks and compromise and trends theoretically associated with Complex-immersion and SNH (as illustrated by the SNHPE Chart) would reinforce my Homogenisation theory. Aversion to, and support for political checks and compromise were gauged by participants' answers to the question "Which do you think is better - when the Federal government has a majority in both the House of Representatives and the Senate, or when the Federal government in the House of Representatives does not controlled the Senate?" Disapproval of political checks and

compromise was revealed to be positively correlated with three previously discussed indicators/symptoms of Complex-immersion/SNH. These were:

1. believing that society is ideologically homogenous,
2. the extent to which participants' value emphases are reflected by members of their close social networks (as shown in Figure 8.1), and
3. doubting one's own political debating skills.

This evidence would appear to support my Homogenisation theory.

Table 8.3

Correlations between Believing that political checks and compromise are beneficial, and variables linked to the SEVHSN Complex.

2015 Correlations between	Believing that political checks and compromise are beneficial	Number of participants
Believing society is ideologically homogenous	r= -.307, p= .069	36
AVSNDS	r= .447, p= .063	18
Having greater confidence in one's political debating skills	r= .219, p= .200	36

Figure 8.1

The correlation between participants' AVSNDSs and the degree to which they disapprove of political checks and balances.



As discussed in the Introduction and Chapter One of this thesis, Aaron Martin has found that party identification in Australia is in generational decline. In 1990 only 5% of Australian young people did not identify with a party. By 2010 that figure had grown to 24%.[761] Per my Homogenisation thesis and the SNHPE Chart, this lower party identification is brought about by greater resistance to political parties moulding one's own attitudes and opinions and is yet another symptom of more intense Complex-immersion/SNH. According to my theory, those with more ideologically homogenous networks are less inclined to identify with political parties than are those with relatively ideologically diverse networks. This, I hold, is largely due to their tendency to be intolerant of persons/parties with political views different from their own.[762] Lower rates of party identification tend to produce higher levels of swing or 'softly committed' voting. Therefore, evidence signalling links between swing voting and patterns theoretically indicative of SNH (as shown by the SNHPE Chart) would corroborate my Homogenisation thesis.

The proclivity of participants to 'swing vote' was determined by their response to my eighty-second survey question "Have your voting patterns (the parties you've voted for) in House of Representatives elections changed over the last 10 years (for those younger than 28 since you began voting)?" Each participant was assigned a 'Swing Voting Score'. Those who answered "No, neither my two-party-preferred nor my primary vote has changed" were

[761] Martin, *Young people and political engagement,* p.76
[762] Political intolerance in turn is a product of the disposition of the Complex-embedded to severely overestimate the degree to which their own political convictions are shared by other citizens.

given a Swing Voting Score of 1. Those whose primary vote changed but whose two-party-preferred vote remained the same were assigned a Score of 2. Those whose two-party-preferred vote had changed but whose primary vote had remained the same received a Score of 3 and those whose primary and two-party-preferred votes had changed were conferred a Swing Voting Score of 4. Higher Swing Voting Scores were indeed found to be positively correlated with indicators of structural social network homogeneity. These include:

- the degree to which the structural characteristics of participants' close social network members tend to be shared by the participant, and
- the religious, social status and overall structural homogeneity of participants' informal social networks.

As previously discussed, 'structural' and 'ideological' social network homogeneity are commonly linked. Consequently, these positive correlations revealed between Swing Voting Scores and 'structural' social network homogeneity may denote that a causal relationship probably exists between 'ideological' social network homogeneity and proclivity towards swing voting. This is because uncontrolled extraneous variables could be masking a significant correlation between the (ideological network homogeneity and swing voting) variables. Hence, these statistics are consistent with my Homogenisation thesis.

Table 8.4

Correlations between participants' propensity to 'swing vote' and measures of structural diversity within participants' close and informal networks.

2015 Correlations between	Propensity to 'swing vote'	Number of participants
ASSNDS	r= -.290, p= .179	23
The extent to which participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) are religiously diverse	r= -.545, p= .002	31
The extent to which members of participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) have diverse social status	r= -.259, p= .152	32
The extent to which participants' informal	r= -.449, p= .010	32

social networks (outside the immediate family) are structurally (ethnically/linguistically, economically, socially and religiously) diverse		

Another consequence of greater Complex-embeddedness, according to my Homogenisation thesis and the SNHPE Chart, is a rise in the 'belief that there is little to be learnt from political discussion with those with whom one disagrees'. Per my theory, those with more ideologically homogenous networks are less disposed to believe that political debate is beneficial than are those with relatively ideologically heterogenous networks. This, I reason, is due to:

1. their tendency to more severely underestimate:

    a) the extent to which different political attitudes are held by other citizens, and
    b) the value of persuading what they deem to be an insignificant minority of their point of view and,

2. their relative lack of experience and skills in political debate rendering such discussions frustrating and unpleasant, and their contributions subjectively experienced as unconvincing and inadequate.

Hence, statistics suggesting relationships between 'believing that there is little to be learnt from political discussion with those with whom one disagrees' and trends theoretically associated with Complex-immersion and SNH (as illustrated by the Chart) would support my Homogenisation argument. Indeed, statistics collated from my survey data reveal that 'believing that there is little to be learnt from political discussion with those with whom one disagrees' was both positively correlated with:

1. believing that society is ideologically homogenous,
2. the extent to which the political views of participants' close social network members (on policy matters) tend to be shared by the participants

3. the degree to which the structural characteristics/traits of participants' close social network members tend to reflect those of the participants,
4. participants encountering fewer political views on policy matters within their close social networks that differ from their own (as illustrated by Figure 8.2), and
5. the extent to which participants' most important formal organisations have egalitarian decision-making processes (which is used statistically, rather than individually, as an indicator of participants' hierarchal to egalitarian values orientation)

and negatively correlated with:

1. a willingness to accept political compromise,
2. believing in the effectiveness of voting (a measure of external political efficacy),
3. believing that voting is worthwhile,
4. the frequency of debating people with political views different from one's own, and
5. having greater confidence in the effectiveness of one's own political debating skills.

This evidence would seem to bolster my Homogenisation thesis.

Table 8.5

Correlations between participants' believing there is little to be learnt from political discussion with those with whom one disagrees and variables linked to the SEVHSN Complex.

2015 Correlations between	Believing there is little to be learnt from political discussion with those with whom one disagrees	Number of participants
Believing society is ideologically homogenous	r= .297, p= .078	36
AISNDS	r= -.331, p= .133	22
ASSNDS	r= -.300, p= .146	25
ISNDS	r= -.451, p= .031	23
The degree to which participants' two most important formal groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian decision-making processes	r= .211, p= .197	23
The degree to which participants' most	r= .382, p= .072	23

important formal groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian decision-making processes		
An unwillingness to accept political compromise	r= .424, p= .010	36
Believing in the effectiveness of voting	r= -.396, p= .017	36
Believing that voting is worthwhile	r= -.360, p= .031	36
Frequency of debating people with political views different from one's own	r= -.226, p= .186	36
Having greater confidence in one's political debating skills	r= -.304, p= .072	36

Figure 8.2

The correlation between participants' ISNDSs and the extent to which participants believe there is little to be learnt from political discussion with those with whom they disagree.



An unwillingness to join political parties is deemed the most significant and consequential product of greater Complex-immersion according to my Homogenisation theory and the SNHPE Chart. Per my theory, those with more ideologically homogenous networks are less inclined to join political parties than those with relatively ideologically diverse networks. Thus, statistics denoting ties between unwillingness to join political parties and patterns theoretically connected to Complex-embeddedness and SNH (as shown in the

Chart) would bolster my Homogenisation thesis. Indeed, membership of / willingness to join, a political party was found to be negatively correlated with:

1. the degree to which the political views of participants' close social network members (on policy matters) tend to be shared by the participants (as demonstrated by Figure 8.3), and
2. the extent to which the structural characteristics/traits of participants' close social network members tend to reflect those of the participants (as shown in Figure 8.4).

Furthermore, membership of and willingness to join, a political party as well as the willingness of non-members to join a political party were revealed to be both negatively correlated with conflict avoidance and positively correlated with:

1. frequency of political discussion with those with whom one disagrees,
2. believing that there is much to be learnt from political discussion with those with whom one disagrees,
3. believing in the effectiveness of voting,
4. believing that voting is worthwhile,
5. confidence in one's own political debating skills, and
6. being politically involved in other conflict prone settings or activities such as attending a town/neighbourhood council meeting, public hearing or public discussion group; meeting with, calling or sending letters or emails to, politicians; and participating in information or election campaigns.

Additionally, the willingness of non-members to join political parties was revealed to be positively correlated with a willingness to accept political compromise. Therefore, party membership and the willingness of non-members to join a political party are revealed to be:

- negatively correlated with measures and indicators of SNH, and
- positively correlated with trends opposite to those hypothesised (per my Homogenisation theory) as connected to, SNH.

As political party membership and the willingness of non-members to join a party are patterns associated with less Complex-embeddedness and less SNH (according to my Homogenisation thesis) these statistics appear to support my Homogenisation theory.

Table 8.6

Correlations between participants' Membership of / willingness to join, a political party and variables linked to the SEVHSN Complex.

2015 Correlations between	Membership of / willingness to join, a political party	Number of participants
AISNDS	r= .356, p= .103	22
ASSNDS	r= .310, p= .132	25
Being less conflict avoidant	r= .493, p= .010	26
Frequency of debating people with political views different from one's own	r= .355, p= .075	26
Believing there is little to be learnt from political discussion with those with whom one disagrees	r= -.318, p= .113	26
Believing in the effectiveness of voting	r= .340, p= .089	26
Believing that voting is worthwhile	r= .424, p= .031	26
Having greater confidence in one's political debating skills	r= .353, p= .077	26
Being politically involved in conflict prone settings or activities (such as attending a town/neighbourhood council meeting, public hearing or public discussion group; meeting with, calling or sending letters or emails to, politicians; and participating in information or election campaigns)	r= .570, p= .002	26

Figure 8.3

The correlation between participants' AISNDSs and participants' membership of / willingness to join, a political party.



Figure 8.4

The correlation between participants' ASSNDSs and participants' membership of /willingness to join, a political party.



Table 8.7

Correlations between the willingness of non-members to join a political party and variables linked to the SEVHSN Complex.

2015 Correlations between	Willingness of non-members to join a political party	Number of participants
Being less conflict avoidant	r= .366, p= .103	21

Frequency of debating people with political views different from one's own	r= .467, p= .033	21
Believing there is little to be learnt from political discussion with those with whom one disagrees	r= -.360, p= .109	21
Believing in the effectiveness of voting	r= .327, p= .148	21
Believing that voting is worthwhile	r= .425, p= .055	21
Having greater confidence in one's political debating skills	r= .347, p= .123	21
Being politically involved in conflict prone settings or activities (such as attending a town/neighbourhood council meeting, public hearing or public discussion group; meeting with, calling or sending letters or emails to, politicians; and participating in information or election campaigns)	r= .332, p= .142	21
An unwillingness to accept political compromise	r= -.297, p= .191	21

Per my Homogenisation thesis and the SNHPE Chart, a decline in all (not just party) forms of conflict-prone political involvement is another consequence of greater Complex-embeddedness. According to my theory, those with more ideologically homogenous networks are less disposed to engage in conflict-prone activities than are those with relatively ideologically heterogeneous networks. Hence, evidence suggesting connections between less participation in conflict-prone activities and trends theoretically tied to Complex-immersion and SNH (as illustrated in the Chart) would strengthen my Homogenisation theory. As predicted, undertaking and being more engaged in conflict-prone political activities[763] was shown to be both negatively correlated with:

1. more severely overestimating the extent to which society is ideologically homogenous, and
2. believing that there is little to be learnt from political discussion with those with whom one disagrees

[763] Conflict-prone political activities include attending a town/neighbourhood council meeting, public hearing, or public discussion group; meeting with, calling or sending a letter/email to a politician; and participating in an information or election campaign.

as well as positively correlated with:

1. membership of / willingness to join, a political party,
2. willingness of non-members to join a political party,
3. believing in the effectiveness of voting,
4. the frequency of discussing politics with those with whom one disagrees, and
5. the degree to which participants believe that the value emphases of their close social network members tend to be 'dissimilar' to their own.

These correlations would seem to indicate that (like party membership/engagement) involvement in other forms of conflict-prone political activities is associated with less Complex-immersion/SNH. Thus, they bolster my Homogenisation argument.

The correlations revealed suggesting a negative relationship between network homogeneity and conflict prone political engagement cannot be explained by marriage or romantic partnerships acting to both ideologically homogenise networks and reduce conflict prone political activities/party involvement. In Chapter Five marriage was found not to be correlated with political engagement; neither conflict prone nor conflict free. Furthermore, indicators of network homogeneity are negatively and positively (discussed in the next paragraph) correlated with conflict prone and conflict free political engagement respectively. Therefore, political interest alone cannot explain these relationships because political interest on its own would act to raise both conflict prone and conflict free political involvement regardless of its possible influence on network homogeneity/diversity.

Table 8.8

Correlations between being politically involved in conflict prone settings or activities and variables connected to the SEVHSN Complex.

2015 Correlations between	Being politically involved in conflict prone settings or activities (such as attending a town/neighbourhood council meeting, public hearing or public discussion group; meeting with, calling or sending letters or emails to, politicians; and participating in information or election campaigns)	Number of participants
Believing society is ideologically	r= -.359, p= .032	36

homogenous		
Believing there is little to be learnt from political discussion with those with whom one disagrees	r= -.383, p= .021	36
Membership of / willingness to join, a political party	r= .570, p= .002	26
Willingness of non-members to join a political party	r= .332, p= .142	21
Believing in the effectiveness of voting	r= .327, p= .051	36
Frequency of debating people with political views different from one's own	r= .335, p= .046	36
AVSNDS	r= .354, p= .149	25

Contrastingly, increased engagement in activities that require, or are subject to, little or no conflict is deemed another corollary of Complex-embeddedness and SNH according to my Homogenisation thesis. That is, per my theory, those who are conflict averse tend to politically engage more in conflict-free settings and activities than those who are relatively less conflict avoidant. This is how conflict averse people (partly or wholly) compensate for being less involved in conflict-prone political activities than those who are less conflict avoidant. Perhaps the most common conflict free political activity is political consumerism: individually making decisions about one's (or one's family's) consumption based on political or ethical considerations to help bring about positive change.[764] Thus, statistics denoting ties between greater political consumerism and patterns theoretically bound to Complex-immersion and SNH (as shown in the Chart) would buttress my Homogenisation thesis. As anticipated, more political consumerism was found to be positively correlated with several other effects of greater SNH. These were:

1. greater conflict avoidance,
2. an unwillingness to accept political compromise, and
3. a belief that there is little to be learnt from political discussion with those with whom one disagrees.

[764] Micheletti, Michele and Stolle, Dietlind. (2005) 'Concept of Political Consumerism', *Youth Activism – An International Encyclopedia,* viewed 3 November 2017, http://bridgingdifferences.mcgill.ca/en/Youth.pdf

These statistics appear to signal that political consumerism (generally a conflict free form of engagement) is linked to greater Complex-embeddedness/SNH. Therefore, they corroborate my theory.

Table 8.9

Correlations between participants' engagement in political consumerism and variables linked to the SEVHSN Complex.

2015 Correlations between	Greater political consumerism	Number of participants
Being less conflict avoidant	r= -.347, p= .083	26
An unwillingness to accept political compromise	r= .286, p= .091	36
Believing there is little to be learnt from political discussion with those with whom one disagrees	r= .223, p= .192	36

According to my Homogenisation theory and the SNHPE Chart, believing that voting is ineffective and not worthwhile is a ramification of greater Complex-immersion and SNH. Per my Homogenisation thesis, those with more ideologically homogenous networks are more inclined to hold that the political system and parties are unrepresentative, unresponsive and possibly corrupt than are those with relatively ideologically diverse networks. Consequently, they are also relatively more disposed to thinking that they have low external political efficacy and thus voting is ineffective and not worthwhile. Hence, evidence suggesting links between believing that voting is ineffective and not worthwhile, and trends theoretically tied to Complex-embeddedness and SNH (as illustrated in the Chart) would help to validate my Homogenisation thesis. Indeed, statistics collated from my survey data reveal that believing that voting is 'effective' and 'worthwhile' are positively correlated with the degree to which participants believe that the value emphases of their close social network members tend to be 'dissimilar' to their own. They also indicate that believing in the 'effectiveness' of voting is both negatively correlated with the ethnic/linguistic homogeneity of one's informal social network and positively correlated with:

1. the frequency of debating political issues with those with whom one disagrees, and
2. having confidence in one's own political debating skills.

These correlations would appear to suggest that having more ideologically and structurally homogenous networks as well as other hypothesised corollaries of SNH (per my Homogenisation theory) are associated with being less convinced of the efficacy of voting. Hence, they strengthen my thesis.

Table 8.10

Correlations between participants' AVSNDSs and their believing that voting is effective and worthwhile.

2015 Correlations between	AVSNDS	Number of participants
Believing in the effectiveness of voting	r= .383, p= .117	18
Believing that voting is worthwhile	r= .350, p= .154	18

Table 8.11

Correlations between believing in the effectiveness of voting and variables connected with the SEVHSN Complex.

2015 Correlations between	Believing in the effectiveness of voting	Number of participants
The extent to which participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) are ethnically/linguistically diverse	r= .350, p= .036	36
Frequency of debating people with political views different from one's own	r= .312, p= .064	36
Having greater confidence in one's political debating skills	r= .421, p= .010	36

Finally, being less satisfied with the political system is (per my Homogenisation theory and the SNHPE Chart) a facet of greater Complex-immersion and SNH. According to my

thesis, those with more ideologically homogenous networks are less inclined to be satisfied with the political system (in their country) than are those with relatively ideologically heterogeneous networks. This, I contend, is explained by both:

- their tendency to be more intolerant of political compromise and persons/parties with different political attitudes/obligations, and
- the increasing inability of the political/electoral systems to satisfactorily represent a great majority of political persuasions.

This inability is largely due to an ideological diversification of society brought about by SNH. Thus, evidence signalling ties between this dissatisfaction with political and electoral arrangements and patterns/demographics theoretically linked to Complex-embeddedness and SNH (as shown by the SNHPE Chart) would reinforce my Homogenisation theory. Satisfaction/dissatisfaction with Australian political and electoral regimes were gauged by participants' answers to two questions.

1. "On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in Australia?"
2. "Would you support changing the electoral system for the House of Representatives from the Alternative Vote: … To the Hare-Clark system: …"

Greater sense of satisfaction with the way democracy works in Australia was revealed to be both positively correlated with older age and negatively correlated with the overall structural and social status homogeneity of one's informal social network. Furthermore, wanting the House of Representatives Alternative Vote electoral system to be reformed to Hare-Clark was found to be both negatively correlated with believing that voting is worthwhile as well as positively correlated with:

1. the economic status homogeneity of participants' informal social networks,
2. the educational background/level homogeneity of members of participants' most important formal groups,
3. the degree to which participants' most important formal groups have egalitarian decision-making procedures, and

4. the extent to which participants' most important formal organisations have egalitarian leadership selection processes.

Per my theory, older people are less likely to be as embedded in the Complex than are younger persons. Additionally, believing that voting is 'not' worthwhile and being more involved in formal groups with egalitarian decision-making/leadership-selection processes are corollaries of SNH and Complex-immersion respectively. Consequently, these statistics would buttress my Homogenisation argument. This completes the analysis/exploration of my survey statistics. The evidence largely supports, rather than contradicts, my thesis. How electoral and intra-party reforms may help to raise party engagement despite SNH and SID are now considered, before this eighth and final chapter is concluded.

Table 8.12

Correlations between having a greater sense of satisfaction with the way democracy works in Australia and both being older and having more structurally diverse informal social networks.

2015 Correlations between	Greater sense of satisfaction with the way democracy works in Australia	Number of participants
Being older	r= .252, p= .137	36
The extent to which participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) are structurally (ethnically/linguistically, economically, socially and religiously) diverse	r= .261, p= .125	36
The extent to which members of participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) have diverse social status	r= .267, p= .116	36

Table 8.13

Correlations between Wanting the Hare-Clark electoral system to be used in House of Representatives elections and variables connected with the SEVHSN Complex.

2015 Correlations between	Wanting the Hare-Clark electoral system to be used in House of	Number of

	Representatives elections	participants
Believing that voting is worthwhile	r= -229, p= .179	36
The extent to which members of participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) have diverse economic status	r= -.238, p= .163	36
Participants agreeing that most members of the most important formal group in which they are involved have the same educational background/level	r= .489, p= .018	23
The degree to which participants' two most important formal groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian decision-making processes	r= .286, p= .186	23
The degree to which participants' two most important formal groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian leadership-selection processes	r= .474, p= .026	22

Raising Party Engagement

Refer to the SNHPE Chart. Per my theory, SNH and greater SEVHSN Complex-immersion are inextricably tied to modernising trends such as technological advance, rising economic prosperity and greater knowledge accessibility and dissemination. Therefore, a reversal of SNH is both improbable and undesirable. However, the ways in which SNH affects variables of the Prime Circuit (previously discussed in Chapter One) may potentially be mitigated by electoral reforms and intra-party democratisation and conflict prevention. The mitigation of SNH's impact on Prime Circuit variables is not the focus of my thesis investigation. However, such possibilities are worth discussing as some may consider party disengagement a serious problem requiring solutions. Initially explored are the ways in which reform of Australian parliamentary electoral regimes may mitigate the extent to which SID diminishes the representativeness and responsiveness of the political system and parties.

Electoral Reform

Chapter Three argued that the ideological, philosophical and recreational diversification of society brought about by SNH is precipitating an increase in the number of formal groups. That is, those more Complex-immersed, with niche interests and intolerance toward philosophical and ideological difference, are more inclined to participate in organisations with relatively more homogenous memberships than are persons less embedded. Consequently, the formal group/organisational market has adapted to the preferences of the growing proportion of SEVHSN Complex-immersed people. A rising proportion of formal groups have democratised their decision-making and leadership selection processes to meet the egalitarian expectations of those with a self-expression values orientation. They have also been transitioning from fewer (but perhaps larger) organisations with heterogeneous memberships to more (but possibly smaller) groups with relatively homogenous memberships. This change to the structure of formal organisations has been in response to the expectations of those with relatively homogenous networks who tend to have relatively niche recreational interests and be relatively conflict averse and politically/philosophically intolerant.

Contrastingly, 'supply' of Parliamentary representation cannot respond to changing voter 'demand' as dynamically and efficaciously as supply responds to demand in the formal group market. The ability of Australian legislatures to provide fair and meaningful representation of political preferences/persuasions is restricted by electoral regimes. This is particularly true for single member district electoral systems such as the Alternative Vote used for House of Representatives elections. These regimes tend to exaggerate the representation of major parties and severely underrepresent minor parties relative to the proportion of votes they receive.[765] As Australia has become increasingly ideologically diverse (with a higher proportion of Australians voting for non-major party candidates) this disparity between House of Representatives votes and seats has (and will continue to) become more acute.

Table 8.14

Australian House of Representatives Election results (votes, seats and distortions).

[765] Karp and Banducci, 'Political Efficacy and Participation in Twenty-Seven Democracies', p.311-313

Election	% of first preference votes for major (Labor & Liberal/National Coalition) parties	% of seats won by major parties	% point distortion between the first preference votes received and seats won by major parties
2 July 2016	76.77	96.67	19.90
7 September 2013	78.90	96.68	17.78
21 August 2010	81.61	96.67	15.06
24 November 2007	85.47	98.67	13.20
9 October 2004	84.34	98.00	13.66
10 November 2001	80.85	98.00	17.15
3 October 1998	79.60	99.32	19.72
2 March 1996	86.00	96.62	10.62
13 March 1993	89.19	98.64	9.45
24 March 1990	82.90	99.32	16.42
11 July 1987	91.90	100.00	8.10
1 December 1984	92.55	100.00	7.45
5 March 1983	93.05	100.00	6.95
18 October 1980	91.44	100.00	8.56
10 December 1977	87.75	100.00	12.25
13 December 1975	95.89	100.00	4.11

[766]

Figure 8.5

% point distortion between votes received and seats won by major parties at Australian House of Representatives elections.



[766] The University of Western Australia, 'Australian Politics and Elections Database' viewed 7 November 2017, http://elections.uwa.edu.au/listelections.lasso?skiprecords=0

Furthermore, neither the Alternative Vote system (used for Federal and most State lower house elections), nor particular versions of Single Transferable Vote regimes (employed for Federal and most State upper chamber elections) generate significant intraparty competition.[767] This lack of intra-party competition encourages strong party discipline because party candidates are pre-selected by their party organisations which highly value overall party (rather than individual candidate) electoral success.[768] Party electoral success is largely dependent on candidates and members being more united than those of rival parties.[769] This strong party discipline acts to reduce the number of perspectives and attitudes expressed by parliamentarians in words and deeds, on the campaign trail and in legislative chambers. Hence, greater SID brought about by SNH raises the proportion of Australians whose political attitudes, views and ideas are unrepresented in Parliament due to suppression by Australia's present electoral regimes. This increasingly severe distortion precipitates decline in both satisfaction and identification with as well as belief in the effectiveness of engaging in, political parties.[770] These trends subsequently produce a corresponding erosion in party involvement which exacerbates the degree to which political parties become unrepresentative of, and unresponsive to the public.[771]

This thesis refrains from passing judgement on the desirability of SID and rising non-major-party voting. However, the ability of current electoral regimes to equitably/satisfactorily translate votes into seats is being undermined by this shifting paradigm. Arguably, the growing disconnect between voter preferences and parliamentary compositions is undermining party engagement. Such disincentives to party involvement can potentially weaken the representative character of parliament which (for reasons explored in

[767] Bennett, Scott and Lundie, Rob. (2007) 'Research Paper no.5 2007-08: Australian electoral systems', *PARLIAMENT OF AUSTRALIA*, viewed 6 November 2017, https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/RP0708/08rp05#polimpact; *PARLIAMENT of AUSTRALIA*, '3. The electoral and party systems', viewed 6 November 2017, https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Senate/Powers_practice_n_procedures/platparl/c03

[768] *PARLIAMENT of AUSTRALIA*, '3. The electoral and party systems'

[769] Rigby, Elizabeth and Wright, Gerald, C. (2013) 'Political Parties and Representation of the Poor in the American States', *American Journal of Political Science,* vol:57(3), p.553; *PARLIAMENT of AUSTRALIA*, '3. The electoral and party systems'

[770] Minta and Sinclair-Chapman. 'Diversity in Political Institutions and Congressional Responsiveness to Minority Interests', p.136 & 137; Esaiasson, Gilljain and Persson. 'Responsiveness Beyond Policy Satisfaction: Does It Matter to Citizens?', p.760 & 761

[771] Katz and Mair. 'Changing Models of Party Organisation and Party Democracy', p.15, 16 & 21-23; Selle and Svasand, 'Membership in Party Organisations and the Problem of Decline in Parties', p.463; Karp and Banducci 'Political Efficacy and Participation in Twenty-Seven Democracies', p.313

the first, and early in this chapter) is necessary to sustain a thriving democracy. For the foreseeable future, most parliamentary seats are likely to be filled by party members, rather than by independents. Consequently, reasonably high membership and participation rates are necessary to ensure parties represent, and are accountable to, their constituencies rather than just wealthy and connected elites.[772]

One possible method of revitalising party participation would be to reform present Australian electoral systems to those that more proportionally represent inter-and-intra-party preferences and produce significant intra-party competition. These reforms would not only reduce distortions between the proportion of 'votes' and 'seats' received by parties and candidates. They also would diminish the extent to which such distortions are affected by continued changes in voter-preference/ideological diversity. This relative absence of electoral distortion would ensure that more political views were meaningfully represented. This would raise both satisfaction/confidence with the political system as well as identification with Parliamentary (electorally viable) parties/candidates with significant (or the realistic potential for significant) legislative influence.[773] These trends may subsequently encourage a larger proportion of Australians to involve themselves in party activities, pre-selections and campaigning;[774] further raising the representativeness and responsiveness of parties and the political system.[775]

Hare-Clark (used to elect the Tasmanian House of Assembly)[776] is an example of an electoral system that meets the criteria of:

1. proportionally representing inter-and-intra-party political-preferences,[777] while

[772] Katz and Mair. 'Changing Models of Party Organisation and Party Democracy', p.15, 16 & 21-23
[773] Karp and Banducci, 'Political Efficacy and Participation in Twenty-Seven Democracies', p.314 & 331; Lamare, J, R and Lamare, J, W. (2015) 'Electoral reform, situational forces, and political confidence: Results from a multi-wave panel', *Electoral Studies,* vol:40, p.368
[774] Whiteley, Paul. (2009) 'Where Have All the Members Gone? The Dynamics of Party Membership in Britain', *Parliamentary Affairs,* vol:62(2), p.247; Whiteley, Paul. (2011) 'Is the party over? The decline of party activism and membership across the democratic world' in *Party Politics,* vol:17(1), p.29
[775] Katz and Mair. 'Changing Models of Party Organisation and Party Democracy', p.15, 16 & 21-23; Whiteley, 'Party membership and activism in comparative perspective', p.131
[776] Bennett and Lundie, 'Research Paper no.5 2007-08: Australian electoral systems,'

2. generating significant intra-party competition.[778]

Unlike the versions of STV employed to elect Federal at most State upper chambers Hare-Clark does not provide voters with 'above the line' group and party ticketing options, but instead requires voters to rank order a minimum number of individual candidates.[779] The order in which these candidates appear on ballots are randomised from ballot paper to ballot paper to ensure candidates are not advantaged or disadvantaged by what would otherwise be a set order.[780] Hence, the system avoids the influence of 'donkey voters' (those who rank order candidates or a party's candidates in the order they appear) and produces real intra-party competition.[781] Hare-Clark secures the proportional representation of inter-and-intra-party political-preferences by distributing and redistributing the accumulated and surplus votes and vote fractions of eliminated and elected candidates respectively.[782] Votes and vote fractions are distributed and redistributed according to voters' chosen individual candidate preferences so as to fill individual (rather than party) candidate election quotas (the Droop Quota).[783] This intra-party competition and proportional representation of inter-and-intra-party political/electoral-preferences are what position Hare-Clark as one of, and probably the most voter empowering, individual candidate oriented, and intra-party competitive proportional electoral systems.[784] Conversely, most electoral regimes used for Australian State and Federal elections are party empowering and party oriented; generating little intra-party competition.[785] The Alternative Vote system is not even party proportional.[786]

Hare-Clark would not only mitigate the eroding effects SID is having on Prime Circuit variables under present electoral regimes. Voter empowering, it would also better reflect the self-expression value of autonomy emphasised by the growing proportion of Australians

[777] Bennett, Scott. (2013) *Inglis Clark's other contribution – A critical analysis of the Hare-Clark Voting System,* Griffith University, p.39 & 40, viewed 25 September 2013, http://samuelgriffith.org.au/docs/vol23/vol23chap5.pdf
[778] Bennett and Lundie, 'Research Paper no.5 2007-08: Australian electoral systems,'
[779] Bennett and Lundie, 'Research Paper no.5 2007-08: Australian electoral systems,'
[780] Bennett, Scott. *Inglis Clark's other contribution – A critical analysis of the Hare-Clark Voting System,* p.38
[781] *ABC NEWS ONLINE* (2006) 'Tasmania Election 2006: Hare-Clark Explained', viewed 6 November 2017, http://www.abc.net.au/elections/tas/2006/guide/hareclark.htm
[782] *ABC NEWS ONLINE* 'Tasmania Election 2006: Hare-Clark Explained'
[783] *ABC NEWS ONLINE* 'Tasmania Election 2006: Hare-Clark Explained'
[784] *ABC NEWS ONLINE* 'Tasmania Election 2006: Hare-Clark Explained'
[785] Bennett and Lundie, 'Research Paper no.5 2007-08: Australian electoral systems,'; *PARLIAMENT of AUSTRALIA*, '3. The electoral and party systems'
[786] Bennett and Lundie, 'Research Paper no.5 2007-08: Australian electoral systems,'

heavily immersed in the Complex. This consistency between values orientation and electoral regime may help raise rates of voting participation. Electoral participation has declined (even under conditions of compulsory voting) because of the SID, lower party identification and self-expression values orientation of an increasing SEVHSN Complex-immersed public. Those heavily Complex-embedded want and need more electorally viable candidate and party options because they highly value choice and are, as a group, becoming increasingly ideologically diverse; with fewer identifying with major parties.

Furthermore, electoral systems that more proportionally translate votes into party seats provide citizens with more Parliamentary, and electorally viable parties with, or with realistic potential for significant legislative power.[787] Consequently, those interested in joining a party with political influence (to gain political influence), can choose among a larger and more diverse variety of options. As party platforms, policies and ideologies are likely to be either 'a' or 'the' major concern when making such decisions, more significant options will induce greater ideological homogeneity among the members of each party organisation. That is, more party proportional electoral regimes would probably precipitate a transformation of the Australian party system; from fewer significant parties with ideologically diverse memberships, to more numerous influential parties with relatively ideologically homogenous memberships.

Therefore, the chances and incidence of unpleasant disagreements/disputes between members of the same party would likely diminish when more party proportional Parliamentary electoral regimes are employed. This would reduce disincentives to party engagement experienced particularly strongly by conflict avoidant persons. As greater conflict aversion is a corollary of SNH, tempering these barriers with electoral reform may attenuate the adverse impact trends toward heavier and more widespread Complex-embeddedness are having on political party involvement. These reforms would require replacing majoritarian with proportional electoral regimes and increasing the number of members elected proportionally from each STV district (i.e. district magnitude).

[787] Karp and Banducci, 'Political Efficacy and Participation in Twenty-Seven Democracies', p.311-314

Intra-party Democracy

The electronic democratisation of internal party decision-making procedures (discussed below) is another possible means by which to spur greater party engagement among the Complex-immersed. It would be consistent with the value of egalitarianism which tends to be more heavily emphasised by those with a self-expression values orientation (due to greater Complex-embeddedness) than by those with a survival values orientation. As citizens become more Complex-embedded, they expect and demand a more equal distribution of political, institutional and organisational power. When institutions and organisations do not adapt to these changing expectations they risk having their memberships shrink. Thus, electronic democratisation may quell the extent to which SEVHSN Complex-immersion impedes party engagement.

However, democratisation often requires group deliberation which can precipitate combative debate/conflict, particularly when the issues concerned are political and the decisions made would/could have a consequential and/or enduring social/economic impact. Therefore, mechanisms/procedures to de-escalate the unpleasant tensions often associated with group deliberation are also required. Otherwise, the heavily Complex-immersed/conflict-averse will continue to be less inclined to join and engage in political parties than those relatively less complex-embedded. This is despite the inducement of an egalitarian distribution of decision-making power between party members. There may seem to be an incompatibility between the decision-making-process reform options that are congruous with the values espoused by the increasingly Complex-immersed and those that are pursuant to their conflict aversion. Yet, certain online discussion and voting procedures could potentially solve this dilemma.

For example, imagine an online method for nominating candidates, moving policy motions, scrutinising their strengths and weaknesses and submitting votes in which:

1. Any member may nominate themselves as a pre-selection candidate or anonymously move a policy motion; presenting their arguments in favour of the candidate or motion.

2. Other members may view and anonymously indicate approval for these policy motions and pre-selection nominees.
3. A minimum number of members indicating approval for, would initiate a discussion regarding these motions and nominations. Related policy motions and pre-selection nominees for the same electoral race may be grouped together for discussion.
4. Any member may anonymously contribute to these discussions by means of posting no more than one comment. Prior to their discussion page publication, these comments would require approval from selected party moderators (not to censor the expression of ideas but) to ensure discussion remains respectful.
5. Following a specified time, no further comments may be posted, and an online vote would be conducted. If there were only two options (i.e. to either except/approve the proposed policy or maintain the status quo) then members would be asked to select one or other position. If there were more than two options (i.e. multiple related policy proposals or a few or more pre-selection candidates to choose between) then members would be asked to rank order these options according to their preference. A preferential vote counting method (such as the Alternative Vote, Single Transferable Vote or Borda count) would be employed. The selection of these preferential vote counting regimes would be determined by context. That is, whether the count is to:

    a. pre-select, or determine a single 'candidate' or 'policy position', or
    b. pre-select multiple candidates; perhaps for a multi-membered electorate.

This system would be more democratic/egalitarian than most internal party-decision-making-procedures currently employed. Major party 'candidate pre-selection' and 'policy determination' processes used at present concentrate power in party elites and hierarchies comprising 'faction heavyweights' and 'party hacks' rather than in rank-and-file members.[788]

[788] Hutchinson, Samantha. (2017) 'ALP preselection brawls over Victorian candidates', *THE AUSTRALIAN,* viewed 7 November 2017, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/state-politics/alp-preselection-brawls-over-victorian-candidates/news-story/fc778de63b9607667d5c8f5e33ec3512; Hannan, Ewin. (5th September 2017) 'CFMEU blamed for ALP preselection split', *THE AUSTRALIAN,* p.2; STATE LIBRARY: NEW SOUTH WALES, 'Hot Topics 84: Voting and elections – Chapter 7b: How parties choose candidates', viewed 7 November 2017, http://legalanswers.sl.nsw.gov.au/hot-topics-84-voting-and-elections/how-parties-choose-candidates; Duffy, Conor. (2016) 'How democratic are these backroom pre-selection battles?', *ABC NEWS,* viewed 7 November 2017, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-02-09/duffy-how-democratic-are-these-backroom-pre-selection-battles/7152792; Langenberg, Adam. (2017) 'Unions elect AWU's Justin Hanson as Labor's new Upper House MP', *The Advertiser,* viewed 7 November 2017,

Contrastingly, my suggestions would empower the rank-and-file to make consequential decisions at electorate, state and national levels without approval from 'above'. Consequently, greater consistency between 'internal party government' and 'self-expression values' (emphasised by the growing proportion of citizens who are Complex-immersed) would be achieved by such a reform.

Besides being congruous with the values emphasised and cherished by the Complex-embedded, my candidate and policy selection procedure would probably reduce the conflict exposure experienced by engaged party members. The procedure does not require face-to-face communication. Thus, the identity of those involved (except the pre-selection candidates themselves) can remain concealed. Consequently, participants would no longer be concerned about their contributions fraying relationships, or provoking face-to-face hostility/unpleasantness, with other members. Hence, the anonymity may encourage more people (but particularly conflict averse members) to participate in salient party decision-making. In person contact between rank-and-file members would be reserved for activities relatively less conflict-prone such as campaigning and fund raising.

Elimination of non-linguistic expression as well as moderation of party discussion pages may also help assuage the anxieties and concerns of, and unpleasantness felt by, the conflict averse. Perhaps more unpleasant than words spoken, written or typed in acrimonious discussion, debate, or argument are virulent and cutting facial expressions and body language. By moving potentially fierce and impassioned debates online these forms of non-linguistic communication can be eliminated, particularly if emojis are blocked from party discussion boards/pages. Furthermore, by having moderators (perhaps aided by computer programs) check online discussion contributions before they are posted (to ensure the tone

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http://www.adelaidenow.com.au/news/south-australia/unions-nominate-candidate-for-legislative-council-preselection-at-last-minute-triggers-labor-vote/news-story/40813f4458cdcf89d74455598d00848b; Coorey, Phillip. (2011) 'Senator quits faction with blast at party hacks', *The Sydney Morning Herald,* viewed 7 November 2017, http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/senator-quits-faction-with-blast-at-party-hacks-20110523-1f10h.html; Richardson, Tom. (2017) '"The party needs to wake up": Labor at war over 'undemocratic' deals', *INDAILY,* viewed 7 November 2017, https://indaily.com.au/news/politics/2017/02/16/the-party-needs-to-wake-up-labor-at-war-over-undemocratic-deals/; Albrechtsen, Janet. (2009) 'Party hacks block clever candidates', *news.com.au,* viewed 7 November 2017, http://www.news.com.au/news/party-hacks-block-clever-candidates/news-story/e2cfd65ff5f1bcd303bc32ce6275e736; Wordsworth, Matt., Holman, Julia and Duffy, Conor. (2016) 'Liberal Party members Ross Cameron, Juris Laucis, Charlie Lynn suspended for appearing on 7.30 preselection program', *ABC NEWS,* viewed 7 November 2017, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-02-19/liberals-suspended-for-talking-preselection-to-abc-730/7185652

of contributors remains respectful) certain disincentives to, and anxieties discouraging, party engagement can be mitigated. These disincentives and anxieties are particularly effective in reducing participation among the growing proportion of citizens who are conflict-avoidant/Complex-embedded. The highly Complex-embedded with ideologically homogenous networks have fewer experiences than do the relatively less Complex-immersed debating politics with those with whom they disagree. Consequently, they are unlikely to have developed as competent debating skills as those with relatively heterogeneous networks. This lack of debating experience and prowess arguably tends to render a larger proportion of their debating involvement unpleasant and confronting and a considerable proportion of their arguments uncompelling. Hence, those heavily SEVHSN Complex-embedded tend to be relatively more conflict averse (and anxious about participation in conflict prone activities) than those relatively less Complex-immersed.

Finally, by allowing each member only one contribution per discussion, my suggested candidate pre-selection and policy determination procedure would probably lessen the potential for harsh, heated, non-constructive and thoughtless criticisms. It may also encourage contributors to be mindful of how their arguments/positions may be interpreted, and excoriated. When members are restricted to one comment per discussion-page they are motivated to make their contribution as persuasive as possible by leaving no (or little) room for misinterpretation. They are driven to fully articulate their position/reasoning, and pre-empt/address possible concerns and opposing arguments which may be expressed by other members. Persuasiveness requires civility, thought and empathy. By coaxing people to embrace these qualities/abilities my suggested procedure may not only help to maintain respectful discussion; thereby removing barriers to party engagement encountered by the conflict-averse/Complex-embedded. The procedure may also prompt more party members to view discussion topics from the perspectives of persons unlike themselves; something the Complex-immersed do less frequently than others. As previously argued, party involvement is deterred and/or reduced by the absence of encountering and considering views different from one's own.

Conclusion

This final chapter has examined the ways in which SNH (a fundamental component of the SEVHSN Complex) affects political participation according to my Homogenisation theory. The limitations of my survey statistics as well as the most appropriate manner of utilising/interpreting them (discussed in Chapters Six and Seven) were reiterated. Extraneous variables could not be controlled for because the survey had 36 participants. Hence, doing so would have meant relying too heavily on a handful of participant responses rather than the more robust number of 36 in depth and highly revealing sets of responses; raising p values above even moderate significance. Salient is the picture that the statistics paint (rather than any single correlation found) when evaluating the degree to which the data supports or challenges my theory. Indeed, statistics indicated ties between patterns symptomatic of deeper Complex-embeddedness and other trends theoretically associated with SNH. The patterns include:

- greater intolerance of people holding political views with which one disagrees
- unwillingness to accept political compromise
- doubting the benefit of political checks and compromise
- propensity to 'swing vote'
- believing that there is little to be learnt from political discussion with those with whom one disagrees
- unwillingness/disinclination to join political parties
- unwillingness/disinclination to engage in conflict-prone activities
- political consumerism
- believing that voting is not worthwhile
- doubting the effectiveness of voting, and
- dissatisfaction with the way democracy works in Australia

This evidence buttresses my Homogenisation thesis.

Finally, this chapter pondered how reform of Australian electoral regimes and intra-party decision making processes may mitigate the degree to which SNH impedes party membership and participation. The benefits of reforming Australian electoral systems to the

Hare-Clark version of the Single Transferable Vote and more equally distributing internal party decision making power among members were discussed. These reforms were found to be consistent with the self-expression values orientation of the increasing proportion of Australians heavily immersed in the SEVHSN Complex. Additionally, proportional electoral regimes such as Hare-Clark (as opposed to the Alternative Vote currently employed for Australian House of Representatives elections) were reasoned to reduce the ideological diversity (and therefore potential conflict) within political parties. SNH has likely contributed to raised SID and conflict aversion. Consequently, a reduction in intra-party ideological heterogeneity would probably diminish the potency of certain disincentives to party involvement to which the growing proportion of Complex-embedded are particularly sensitive. It was hypothesised that this potency may be further stemmed by providing party members with a moderated online space in which to submit and comment on policy proposals and pre-selection candidate nominations. This space would be relatively free from aggressive, unpleasant and non-constructive contributions and face-to-face expressions.

CONCLUSION

Over the last half century, a time of rising individual autonomy in post-industrial societies, numerous political scientists, sociologists and commentators have observed marked declines in satisfaction and identification with, and confidence and involvement in party political organisations.[789] Some have concluded that these trends are simply the consequence of social atomisation and/or value shifts.[790] However, these theories do not satisfactorily explain why levels of engagement in many other types of formal group declined in the late twentieth century but are slowly recovering in the early twenty-first.[791] By illustrating the underlying causes of these inconsistencies, this thesis offers an informed path to raising party participation. Reinvigorated levels of party involvement would increase the representativeness, responsiveness and efficacy of our democratic institutions: reinforcing/reasserting the connection between the political apparatus and majority will.

While some scholars believe in an extremely limited political decision-making role for the public, their beliefs are often based on the questionable premise that political disagreement usually stems from ignorance and/or irrationality.[792] Others argue that, more often political disagreements are between equally informed and rational people arriving at different balances between frequently conflicting incommensurable values within particular contexts.[793] Accordant with this value pluralist view, highly representative democracy is the only legitimate way to overcome disputes over equally rational policy positions advocated by rational and informed individuals of equal moral worth. Hence, declining party membership is genuinely troubling as it threatens the ability of political parties to effectively represent

[789] Martin, *Young people and political engagement,* p.76-79; *The Economist,* (1st of March 2014) 'What's gone wrong with democracy', p.47; Cousins, Adrian. (2011) 'The crisis of the British regime: democracy, protest and the unions', *Counterfire,* viewed 7 February 2018, http://www.counterfire.org/theory/37-theory/14906-the-crisis-of-the-british-regime-democracy-protest-and-the-unions; Belot, Henry. (2016) 'Confidence in democracy hits record low as Australians 'dissaffected with political class'', *ABC:NEWS,* viewed 7th of February 2018, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-12-20/2016-australian-election-disaffected-study/8134508

[790] Putnam, *Bowling Alone;* Inglehart, and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*

[791] Chapter Three

[792] Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy,* p.250-252

[793] Hardy, 'Taking Pluralism Seriously', p.283; Crowder, 'Value Pluralism and Communitarianism', p.417

constituencies and supporters by delegating the selection of candidates and adoption of policies to an increasingly narrow and unrepresentative sample.[794]

This thesis has also been concerned with political/ideological polarisation/diversification, and the fraying of connections between persons with different views, ideals and interests. As social modularity is amplified by individual empowerment, and people present greater liking for those who possess similar attitudes and value emphases to their own, I have reasoned that post-industrial technological advance as well as greater financial security and higher education attainment induce social network homogenisation. Ideologically homogenous social networks in which beliefs and opinions are strengthened and intensified are prone to drift further from the political centre than are relatively diverse networks in which views and ideals are more frequently challenged and reconsidered. Thus, network homogenisation precipitates societal ideological diversification. I have argued that these trends erode satisfaction and identification with and confidence, membership and involvement in political parties by decreasing personal experience in, and tolerance for, political disagreement; thereby reducing both preparedness to politically compromise and efficacy in political debate, deliberation and negotiation.

Robert Putnam's Lamentation and Inglehart and Welzel's Modernisation were identified as the dominant, best known and arguably most comprehensive sociological participation theories. While previous, and my own survey, research as well as Australian WVS trend and correlation statistics relating to social and political values, engagement and trust indicated that both theses have strengths, they also suggest that each is flawed. My data analysis contradicts the Modernisationist position that post-industrial development is replacing bonding with bridging connections. Indeed, evidence indicates that the Modernisation theorists identified instigators of social modularity maybe homogenising networks and diversifying societal attitudes and convictions. Similarly, not all the trends Putnam views as having an eroding influence on social capital and political involvement were corroborated by other, and my own statistics. Moreover, Putnam's contention that almost all forms of social capital are (or were) in secular decline was reasoned undeservedly bleak.

[794] Katz and Mair. 'Changing Models of Party Organisation and Party Democracy', p.15, 16 & 21-23; Whiteley. 'Party membership and activism in comparative perspective', p.131

Furthermore, shifts in value orientations and rates of unconventional political involvement were shown to weaken Putnam's Lamentation arguments. Trends in political interest levels as well as engagement and confidence in formal groups were inconsistent with Modernisation and Lamentation theories.

Instead, my investigation points to an Homogenisationist explanation. Post-industrial technological and economic development linked to a values shift is raising social modularity and network homogeneity. Evidence has indicated that these trends are eroding confidence and involvement in formal organisations and institutions that do not adapt to the desires and expectations of those (particularly younger) people/generations more heavily immersed in this new sociological context, i.e. the Self-Expression Values Homogenous Social Network Complex. Finally, this thesis reasoned that membership of and participation and confidence in political parties may be lifted by reforming Australian electoral systems and intraparty decision-making processes to accommodate the views and expectations of the Complex-embedded.

Low levels of membership, participation and confidence in political parties is reason for concern. Without widespread engagement in political parties, these critical mediums through which citizens connect with, and influence government and legislators become susceptible to hijacking by monied and sectional interests[795] whose ambitions and goals often run counter to those of the majority and the young/vulnerable. Examples of this rift between the views of typical citizens and the policy positions taken by political elites are displayed by the major parties' unresponsiveness to the plurality of Australians favouring free (tax payer funded) university education,[796] and large majorities of citizens supporting a moratorium on foreign ownership of farmland and gambling reform (more regulation of online gambling,

[795] Katz and Mair, 'Changing Models of Party Organisation and Party Democracy', p.15, 16 & 21-23; Whiteley, 'Party membership and activism in comparative perspective', p.131

[796] 45% of Australians surveyed in an Essential poll agreed with, 29% disagreed with and the rest either were ambivalent or unsure about the statement "University education should be free for all Australians, just like it is for primary and secondary school." Lewis, peter. (2017) 'Nearly half of Australians think university should be free – and that spells trouble for Turnbull', *The Guardian,* viewed 29 March 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/may/09/nearly-half-of-australians-think-university-should-be-free-and-that-spells-trouble-for-turnbull

poker machines and sports betting and mandatory pre-commitment technology).[797] Wealthy older Australians and foreign and gambling interests make significant contributions to major parties and benefit from the status quo.[798] Gambling reform (except for the Tasmanian Labor Party)[799] and overall reductions to levels of foreign ownership of agricultural land remains off major party platforms and policy agendas and the Australian government is pursuing university funding cuts and higher tuition fees.[800]

WVS statistics suggest that rates of party involvement in Australia declined to historical lows during the late twentieth century.[801] The country's leaders and major parties appear to lack a complete understanding about the sociological factors/trends that drove, and hinder recovery from party disengagement. Subjecting Australian social capital and political participation trends to thorough evaluation may help to remedy this situation. Ultimately, this thesis has sought to demonstrate how, contrary to the conventional wisdom, sociological patterns associated with post-industrial development erodes bridging while enabling more bonding ties. Evidence suggests that these patterns discourage both party involvement as well as confidence in democratic institutions. Importantly, this study offers possible electoral and internal party solutions to remove the barriers and disincentives to party participation faced by the likes of John Hyde Page (quoted at the beginning of Chapter One) and so many other members of conflict avoidant and politically disenchanted

[797] Cooke, Richard. (2014) 'The people versus the political class: The distance between us and our rulers is getting bigger', *The Monthly,* June edition, viewed 5 February 2018, https://www.themonthly.com.au/issue/2014/june/1401544800/richard-cooke/people-versus-political-class
[798] Trounson, Andrew. (2017) 'AUSTRALIA'S GENERATIONAL WEALTH DIVIDE IS BITING', *The University of Melbourne,* viewed 29 March 2018, https://pursuit.unimelb.edu.au/articles/australia-s-generational-wealth-divide-is-biting; Evershed, Nick. (2018) 'Australian political donations 2016-2017: who gave what to which parties', *The Guardian,* viewed 7 February 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/datablog/ng-interactive/2018/feb/02/australian-political-donations-2016-17-who-gave-what-to-which-parties#?entityID=6; Gray, Darren. (2017) 'Chinese ownership of Australian farmland rises, American ownership falls', *The Sydney Morning Herald,* viewed 7 February 2018, http://www.smh.com.au/business/chinese-ownership-of-australian-farmland-rises-american-ownership-falls-20170929-gyrmam.html; Greene, Andrew. (2017) 'Foreign spies and political donations crackdown long overdue, analysts warn', *ABC:NEWS,* viewed 7 February 2018, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-12-04/foreign-spies-political-donations-crackdown-long-overdue/9223854; Cooke. 'The people versus the political class'
[799] Gramenz, Emilie and Dunlevie, James. (2018) 'Tasmania rich pickings for gambling giant, Wilkie warns, following ALH Group allegations', *ABC News,* viewed 29 March 2018, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-02-28/woolworths-alh-group-gambling-tactics-in-tasmania-wilkie-says/9493376
[800] Livingstone, Charles. (2016) 'Is there any hope for gambling reform in a new parliament?', *THE CONVERSATION,* viewed 7 February 2018, https://theconversation.com/is-there-any-hope-for-gambling-reform-in-a-new-parliament-60638; Lewis, 'Nearly half of Australians think university should be free – and that spells trouble for Turnbull'
[801] See Chapter Three

generations. The wealth generated in the impending age of automation may, if distributed equitably, could act to further raise levels of individual empowerment. With greater empowerment comes increased social modularity and less permeable ideological bubbles. Without party and electoral reform these bubbles will continue to undermine representative democracy by hindering unwitting generations from an effective participation in the political process.

By focussing on the relationship between social network compositions and political engagement this thesis is a significant contribution to the emerging study of social networks and political behaviour. This area of research has mainly investigated the ways in which ideological bubbles, fuelled by contemporary communications technology, have brought about greater political polarisation; undermining the functionality of representative government. This thesis has sought to examine the distinct but related topic of whether ideological homogenisation within individual social networks has eroded participation in political parties, thereby undermining the representativeness of democratic organisations and institutions. I have concluded that this trend has indeed taken place and reform is needed to re-establish healthy levels of party trust, identification and involvement.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who had a "great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in churches					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	56.1	47.3	63.4	66.7	68.0
1995	42.5	36.9	42.1	43.1	52.4
2005	38.8	34.8	34.7	37.3	50.0
2012	34.5	28.4	28.2	31.3	46.5

Appendix 2

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who had a "great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in political parties					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	15.7	14.8	13.9	14.6	19.9
2005	14.3	17.4	12.9	12.4	16.0
2012	12.9	15.0	14.3	11.3	12.7

Appendix 3

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who had a "great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in the Armed Forces					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	66.9	58.9	66.0	78.6	78.3
1995	67.6	63.6	66.2	66.9	78.0
2005	82.6	78.3	80.2	86.0	84.8
2012	86.7	84.5	86.4	86.2	88.9

Appendix 4

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who had a "great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in the UN					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	50.4	56.4	46.6	47.6	46.1
2005	45.5	55.3	48.6	43.2	36.3
2012	54.9	63.7	58.6	54.9	47.4

Appendix 5

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who had a "great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in charitable/humanitarian organisations					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	69.0	70.3	69.5	68.5	68.6

2012	72.6	72.6	70.2	74.4	72.3

Appendix 6

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who had a "great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in Parliament					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	55.3	52.1	53.7	58.6	68.3
1995	30.5	28.0	30.6	28.9	36.7
2005	35.4	33.5	34.0	33.5	40.8
2012	31.5	33.3	31.1	30.3	32.4

Appendix 7

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who had a "great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in the Civil Service					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	47.3	43.2	41.5	51.4	66.1
1995	37.9	39.7	34.9	30.7	42.4
2005	40.1	52.7	38.4	33.6	40.5
2012	45.3	52.4	46.3	41.4	45.4

Appendix 8

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who had a "great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in labour unions					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	24.1	23.1	21.8	27.0	28.1
1995	25.7	27.9	25.3	20.3	24.5
2005	28.8	40.9	26.2	26.0	24.8
2012	27.3	29.9	28.6	28.4	23.1

Appendix 9

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who had a "great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in the police					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	80.4	74.9	82.0	88.4	91.7
1995	75.8	74.8	77.1	74.1	79.4
2005	82.7	80.1	77.7	85.3	88.2
2012	85.3	81.4	83.8	86.4	87.7

Appendix 10

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who had a "great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in the

national government					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	26.1	26.1	28.7	20.2	24.8
2005	40.1	42.0	37.3	39.5	42.5
2012	31.8	39.4	31.8	29.8	30.3

Appendix 11

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who had a "great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in the Justice/Legal System (the Courts)					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	60.5	55.2	60.4	67.1	65.5
1995	34.7	36.9	32.9	30.7	33.6
2005	53.8	62.0	52.6	53.8	46.8
2012	61.5	65.5	63.8	59.3	61.0

Appendix 12

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who had a "great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in the Press					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	28.7	25.9	27.2	30.7	38.5
1995	16.4	18.9	13.9	14.6	15.8
2005	11.5	14.9	10.2	9.1	13.6
2012	16.5	16.4	14.6	14.5	20.8

Appendix 13

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who had a "great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in the TV					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	25.3	26.3	20.3	22.7	28.0
2005	17.2	22.2	15.6	14.8	18.7
2012	18.0	19.0	14.9	17.5	20.6

Appendix 14

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who had a "great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in major companies					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	79.2	78.0	80.7	78.3	80.7
1995	58.6	61.1	57.4	53.1	56.9
2005	30.2	36.9	30.5	27.9	26.7
2012	48.7	55.6	51.1	45.7	47.1

Appendix 15

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who had a "great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in the Green/Ecology/Environmental movement					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	55.6	63.9	59.0	47.7	34.9
2005	60.0	65.9	59.5	60.0	55.3
2012	58.7	65.8	62.8	60.6	49.0

Appendix 16

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who indicated being active members of church/religious organisations					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	10.6	7.9	13.7	14.8	10.6
1995	21.0	16.1	20.0	23.2	29.5
2005	16.6	9.9	11.7	16.2	30.5
2012	17.0	14.0	14.3	13.4	25.3

Appendix 17

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who indicated being active members of a political party					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	1.2	1.3	2.1	0.9	8.1
1995	2.6	1.7	2.9	2.7	4.5
2005	2.1	1.8	0.8	2.7	3.5
2012	2.1	1.8	1.6	1.6	3.4

Appendix 18

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who indicated being active members of sport/recreational organisations					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	37.0	40.5	36.1	35.4	25.6
2005	33.3	33.6	35.9	30.1	34.2
2012	32.1	35.2	42.5	29.0	26.0

Appendix 19

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who indicated being active members of art, music or educational organisations					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	4.2	4.7	6.7	2.8	0.8
1995	25.0	26.0	29.0	18.8	14.4
2005	18.8	24.1	21.2	14.3	16.7

2012	18.7	24.6	19.9	18.2	15.0

Appendix 20

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who indicated being active members of labour unions					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	1.1	2.1	0.4	0.9	3.3
1995	11.9	13.5	15.2	13.6	2.6
2005	8.7	9.1	12.6	9.7	0.8
2012	9.0	8.3	12.1	12.1	2.4

Appendix 21

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who indicated being active members of environmental organisations					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	0.7	1.3	1.4	0.5	3.3
1995	6.7	7.2	7.3	6.8	3.2
2005	4.3	2.6	3.7	4.3	7.5
2012	5.0	4.4	5.9	5.1	4.5

Appendix 22

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who indicated being active members of professional associations					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	2.4	2.3	3.9	2.3	0.8
1995	20.0	22.8	25.8	21.3	7.4
2005	16.2	15.8	20.8	15.9	10.4
2012	16.2	15.9	24.1	18.2	7.4

Appendix 23

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who indicated being active members of charitable organisations					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	8.1	4.3	8.4	14.8	14.6
1995	17.6	12.5	18.3	22.4	24.4
2005	16.5	10.6	13.0	17.2	26.1
2012	19.2	18.0	16.0	17.2	25.7

Appendix 24

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who indicated being active members of consumer organisations

	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	3.0	5.2	2.6	2.8	1.6
2012	3.2	6.1	2.6	2.7	2.4

Appendix 25

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who indicated being active members of other voluntary organisations					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	16.1	11.9	18.4	15.9	21.6
2005	4.5	3.2	3.3	5.0	7.7
2012	7.1	3.4	6.5	5.7	12.7

Appendix 26

Correlations between "A subjective sense of autonomy" and "believing that Voluntary Euthanasia is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	r= .055, p= .016	r= .074, p= .058	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 27

Correlations between "A subjective sense of autonomy" and "believing that Abortion is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	X
1995	r= .047, p= .041	x	r= .084, p= .057	X	x
2005	x	x	x	x	X
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 28

Correlations between "A subjective sense of autonomy" and "believing that Prostitution is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	X	X	r= .162, p= .064	X	X
1995	X	X	X	X	X
2005	X	x	X	X	X
2012	X	r= .151, p= .044	x	X	X

Appendix 29

Correlations between "A subjective sense of autonomy" and "believing that Homosexuality is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	X
1995	x	x	x	x	X

2005	x	x	x	x	X
2012	r= .073, p= .023	r= .156, p= .038	x	r= .090, p= .093	x

Appendix 30

Correlations between "A subjective sense of autonomy" and "believing that Sex before Marriage is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2012	r= .078, p= .015	x	x	r= .097, p= .070	r= .135, p= .070

Appendix 31

Correlations between "A subjective sense of autonomy" and "Disagreeing that when jobs are scarce men should have more right to a job than women"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	r= .107, p= .048	x
2005	x	r= .137, p= .033	x	r= -.121, p= .023	x
2012	r= .097, p= .003	x	r= .189, p= .004	x	r= .142, p= .056

Appendix 32

Correlations between "A subjective sense of autonomy" and "Disagreeing that when jobs are scarce older people should be forced to retire from work early"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	r= .065, p= .004	x	x	r= .134, p= .013	r= .118, p= .048

Appendix 33

Correlations between "A subjective sense of autonomy" and "Disagreeing that when jobs are scarce employers should give priority to Australians over immigrants"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	X	x	x
2005	r= .063, p= .030	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 34

Correlations between "A subjective sense of autonomy" and "Believing that children do 'not' need both a mother and a father to grow up happily"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	r= .256, p= .009	x	x
1995	r= .059, p= .010	r= .073, p= .062	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 35

Correlations between "A subjective sense of autonomy" and "Not being proud to be Australian"

	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= -.105, p= .021	x	r= -.182, p= .045	x	x
1995	r= -.086, p= .000	r= -.174, p= .000	x	x	x
2005	r= -.092, p= .002	r= -.217, p= .001	x	x	x
2012	r= -.091, p= .005	x	r= -.152, p= .022	r= -.116, p= .029	x

Appendix 36

Correlations between "A subjective sense of autonomy" and "believing that most people 'cannot' be trusted"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= -.092, p= .039	x	x	x	x
1995	r= -.082, p= .000	x	r= -.079, p= .072	r= -.128, p= .017	x
2005	r= -.061, p= .035	x	r= -.196, p= .000	x	x
2012	r= -.133, p= .000	r= -.167, p= .026	r= -.211, p= .001	r= -.143, p= .007	x

Appendix 37

Correlations between "A subjective sense of autonomy" and "believing that accepting bribes in the course of one's duties is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	r= -.043, p= .059	x	r= -.085, p= .049	x	r= -.127, p= .031
2005	x	x	r= -.117, p= .028	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 38

Correlations between "A subjective sense of autonomy" and "believing that cheating on taxes if you had the chance is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	r= -.147, p= .032	r= .163, p= .061	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	r= -.083, p= .004	r= -.122, p= .061	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 39

Correlations between "A subjective sense of autonomy" and "believing that avoiding a fare on public transport is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	r= -.048, p= .100	x	r= -.104, p= .052	x	x
2012	x	r= -.150, p= .046	x	x	x

Appendix 40

Correlations between "A subjective sense of autonomy" and "believing that claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	r= -.172, p= .012	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	r= -.103, p= .001	r= -.138, p= .066	x	r= -.112, p= .036	r= -.171, p= .020

Appendix 41

Correlations between "A subjective sense of autonomy" and "being uninterested in politics"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	r= -.078, p= .074	x	X
2005	x	x	x	x	X
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 42

Correlations between "A subjective sense of autonomy" and "Not believing in the importance of children learning self-expression"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2012	r= -.069, p= .031	x	x	r= -.108, p= .042	x

Appendix 43

Correlations between "A subjective sense of autonomy" and "Not believing in the importance of children learning good manners"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	X	r= .333, p= .029
1995	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 44

Correlations between "A subjective sense of autonomy" and "Not believing in the importance of children learning thrift"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	r= .061, p= .007	r= .100, p= .010	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	r= .095, p= .074	r= -.133, p= .070

Appendix 45

Correlations between "A subjective sense of autonomy" and "being less involved in charitable organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	r= .081, p= .011	x	r= .124, p= .063	x	x

Appendix 46

Correlations between "A subjective sense of autonomy" and "being less involved in professional associations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	r= -.050, p= .027	x	r= -.123, p= .005	x	x
2005	r= .062, p= .038	x	x	x	x
2012	x	r= .152, p= .044	x	x	x

Appendix 47

Correlations between "A subjective sense of autonomy" and "being less involved in environmental organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	X
1995	x	x	x	x	X
2005	x	x	x	X	r= -.124, p= .098
2012	r= .116, p= .000	r= .288, p= .000	r= .173, p= .009	x	x

Appendix 48

Correlations between "A subjective sense of autonomy" and "being less involved in art, music and educational organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	r= -.041, p= .069	x	r= -.087, p= .046	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	r= .057, p= .075	r= .144, p= .054	x	x	x

Appendix 49

Correlations between "A subjective sense of autonomy" and "being less involved in sport/recreational organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	r= .124, p= .084
2012	r= .059, p= .068	r= .157, p= .037	r= .151, p= .023	x	x

Appendix 50

Correlations between "A subjective sense of autonomy" and "being less involved in church/religious organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x	r= .120, p= .042
2005	r= .066, p= .025	x	r= .078, p= .049	r= .113, p= .038	x
2012	r= .066, p= .041	r= .139, p= .063	x	x	x

Appendix 51

Correlations between "A subjective sense of autonomy" and "being less involved in labour unions"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	r= .044, p= .050	r= .086, p= .025	x	x	r= .119, p= .045
2005	r= -.076, p= .011	r= -.162, p= .013	r= -.119, p= .027	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 52

Correlations between "A subjective sense of autonomy" and "having less confidence in the UN"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	r= -.049, p= .032	x	x	r= -.127, p= .019	x
2005	r= -.134, p= .000	r= -.190, p= .003	r= -.088, p= .100	r= -.140, p= .008	r= -.155, p= .027
2012	r= -.124, p= .000	r= -.158, p= .036	r= -.139, p= .036	r= -.138, p= .010	x

Appendix 53

Correlations between "A subjective sense of autonomy" and "having less confidence in parliament"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	r= -.098, p= .001	r= -.139, p= .032	r= -.099, p= .065	r= -.105, p= .049	x
2012	r= -.075, p= .021	r= -.182, p= .015	r= -.121, p= .068	x	x

Appendix 54

Correlations between "A subjective sense of autonomy" and "having less confidence in political parties"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	r= -.051, p= .025	x	x	r= -.143, p= .008	x
2005	r= -.086, p= .003	r= -.147, p= .023	x	x	x
2012	r= -.072, p= .026	r= -.131, p= .082	x	x	x

Appendix 55

Correlations between "A subjective sense of autonomy" and "having less confidence in the national government"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+

1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	r= -.133, p= .000	r= -.170, p= .009	r= -.150, p= .005	r= -.126, p= .017	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 56

Correlations between "A subjective sense of autonomy" and "having less confidence in the police"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= -.079, p= .074	x	r= -.172, p= .046	r= -.184, p= .098	x
1995	r= -.097, p= .000	r= -.101, p= .009	r= -.093, p= .033	x	x
2005	r= -.092, p= .002	r= -.210, p= .001	r= -.125, p= .020	x	x
2012	r= -.118, p= .000	r= -.267, p= .000	x	r= -.115, p= .032	x

Appendix 57

Correlations between "A subjective sense of autonomy" and "having less confidence in the press"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	r= -.211, p= .059	x
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	r= -.163, p= .030	x	x	x

Appendix 58

Correlations between "A subjective sense of autonomy" and "having less confidence in the legal system"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= -.130, p= .003	x	x	r= -.263, p= .017	x
1995	r= -.047, p= .037	x	x	x	r= -.127, p= .035
2005	r= -.069, p= .019	r= -.182, p= .005	x	x	x
2012	r= -.101, p= .002	r= -.146, p= .052	x	r= -.101, p= .042	x

Appendix 59

Correlations between "A subjective sense of autonomy" and "having less confidence in the armed forces"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= -.080, p= .070	x	r= -.184, p= .033	x	x
1995	r= -.068, p= .003	r= -.082, p= .037	x	r= -.103, p= .057	x
2005	r= -.080, p= .006	r= -.137, p= .034	x	r= -.122, p= .022	x
2012	r= -.089, p= .006	r= -.144, p= .057	r= -.123, p= .064	r= -.096, p= .074	x

Appendix 60

Correlations between "A subjective sense of autonomy" and "having less confidence in major companies"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	r= -.148, p= .087	x	x

1995	r= -.073, p= .002	x	r= -.133, p= .003	x	x
2005	r= -.114, p= .000	x	r= -.200, p= .000	r= -.108, p= .042	X
2012	r= -.130, p= .000	x	x	r= -.145, p= .007	r= -.148, p= .047

Appendix 61

Correlations between "A subjective sense of autonomy" and "having less confidence in charitable/humanitarian organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	r= -.055, p= .059	x	x	x	r= -.160, p= .022
2012	r= -.094, p= .003	r= -.136, p= .071	x	r= -.091, p= .091	x

Appendix 62

Correlations between "A subjective sense of autonomy" and "having less confidence in the environmental protection movement"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	r= -.061, p= .037	r= -.147, p= .023	x	x	x
2012	r= -.088, p= .006	r= -.141, p= .062	x	x	r= -.142, p= .059

Appendix 63

Correlations between "A subjective sense of autonomy" and "having less confidence in banks"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2012	r= -.068, p= .034	r= -.141, p= .061	x	r= -.137, p= .011	x

Appendix 64

Correlations between "A subjective sense of autonomy" and "having less confidence in labour unions"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	r= .103, p= .054	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 65

Correlations between "Income" and "Financial Satisfaction"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= .256, p= .000	r= .242, p= .000	r= .348, p= .000	r= .190, p= .080	r= .303, p= .041
1995	r= .093, p= .000	r= .077, p= .046	r= .075, p= .084	x	x
2005	r= .326, p= .000	r= .453, p= .000	r= .323, p= .000	r= .259, p= .000	r= .325, p= .000
2012	r= .360, p= .000	r= .499, p= .000	r= .315, p= .000	r= .371, p= .000	r= .280, p= .000

Appendix 66

Correlations between "Financial Satisfaction" and "A subjective sense of autonomy"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= .209, p= .000	r= .210, p= .002	r= .260, p= .002	x	r= .396, p= .008
1995	r= .284, p= .000	r= .257, p= .000	r= .279, p= .000	r= .356, p= .000	r= .226, p= .000
2005	r= .308, p= .000	r= .318, p= .000	r= .300, p= .000	r= .361, p= .000	r= .191, p= .005
2012	r= .312, p= .000	r= .168, p= .024	r= .408, p= .000	r= .243, p= .000	r= .349, p= .000

Appendix 67

Correlations between "Income" and "A subjective sense of autonomy"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	r= -.312, p= .039
1995	r= -.046, p= .041	r= -.112, p= .004	x	x	x
2005	x	x	r= .093, p= .079	r= .104, p= .050	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 68

Correlations between "Financial Satisfaction" and "Not believing that most people can be trusted"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	r= -.138, p= .048	x	x	r= -.294, p= .050
1995	X	r= -.079, p= .042	x	x	x
2005	r= -.075, p= .009	r= -.122, p= .057	x	r= -.118, p= .026	x
2012	r= -.069, p= .031	x	x	r= -.109, p= .009	x

Appendix 69

Correlations between "Income" and "Not believing that most people can be trusted"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= -.107, p= .016	x	x	x	x
1995	r= .040, p= .077	x	x	x	x
2005	r= -.098, p= .001	x	x	r= -.160, p= .003	x
2012	r= -.084, p= .009	x	r= -.166, p= .012	x	r= -.131, p= .076

Appendix 70

Correlations between "Financial Satisfaction" and "being less involved in sports/recreational organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	r= -.121, p= .000	r= -.111, p= .004	r= -.172, p= .000	r= -.94, p= .078	x

2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	r= -.170, p= .023	x	x	x

Appendix 71

Correlations between "Financial Satisfaction" and "being less involved in art, music and educational organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	r= -.047, p= .038	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 72

Correlations between "Financial Satisfaction" and "being less involved in political parties"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	r= -.051, p= .023	x	x	r= -.091, p= .088	r= -.099, p= .092
2005	r= .061, p= .039	x	r= .094, p= .082	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 73

Correlations between "Financial Satisfaction" and "being less involved in church/religious organisations (when religious attendance was not controlled)"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= -.064, p= .067	x	x	x	x
1995	r= -.077, p= .001	x	x	r= -.153, p= .004	x
2005	r= .101, p= .001	r= .161, p= .013	x	x	r= .117, p= .094
2012	r= .054, p= .094	x	x	x	x

Appendix 74

Correlations between "Income" and "being less involved in charitable organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	r= .072, p= .015	x	r= .100, p= .062	x	x

2012	x	X	x	r= .108, p= .043	x

Appendix 75

Correlations between "Income" and "being less involved in professional associations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= -.111, p= .011	x	r= -.169, p= .046	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	r= .153, p= .000	x	r= .215, p= .000	r= .158, p= .004	x
2012	r= .106, p= .001	x	x	r= .187, p= .000	x

Appendix 76

Correlations between "Income" and "being less involved in sport/recreational organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	r= .139, p= .009	x
2005	r= .073, p= .014	x	r= .207, p= .000	r= .099, p= .065	x
2012	r= .082, p= .011	x	x	x	r= .164, p= .030

Appendix 77

Correlations between "Income" and "being less involved in political parties"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	r= -.055, p= .067	x	r= -.104, p= .054	x	x
2012	x	x	r= -.113, p= .090	x	r= .148, p= .052

Appendix 78

Correlations between "Income" and "being less involved in church/religious organisations (when religious attendance was not controlled)"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	r= -.064, p= .028	x	r= -.136, p= .011	x	x
2012	r= -.107, p= .001	r= -.131, p= .079	x	r= -.081, p= .029	r= -.159, p= .031

Appendix 79

Correlations between "Income" and "being less involved in church/religious organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 80

Correlations between "Financial Satisfaction" and "having joined in boycotts during the last five years"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	x	X	x	x
2012	x	x	X	x	x

Appendix 81

Correlations between "Income" and "having signed petitions during the last five years"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	r= .104, p= .000	x	x	r= .226, p= .000	x
2012	x	x	X	x	x

Appendix 82

Correlations between "Financial Satisfaction" and "having signed petitions during the last five years"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	r= -.090, p= .002	x	x	r= -.088, p= .097	x
2012	x	x	X	x	x

Appendix 83

Correlations between "Financial Satisfaction" and "having attended peaceful demonstrations during the last five years"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	x	X	x	x
2012	x	x	X	x	x

Appendix 84

Correlations between "Financial Satisfaction" and "being uninterested in politics"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+

1995	r= -.043, p= .056	x	x	r= -.124, p= .020	r= -.100, p= .088
2005	x	x	x	x	X
2012	x	x	x	r= -.100, p= .061	X

Appendix 85

Correlations between "Financial Satisfaction" and "Not discussing politics with friends and work colleagues"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	r= -.150, p= .028	x	x	x
1995	r= -.048, p= .034	x	r= -.089, p= .039	r= -.108, p= .043	X
2005	x	r= -.118, p= .068	x	x	X
2012	x	x	r= -.180, p= .006	x	x

Appendix 86

Correlations between "Income" and "being uninterested in politics"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	r= .038, p= .088	x	x	r= .128, p= .016	X
2005	r= -.050, p= .086	x	r= -.164, p= .002	x	X
2012	r= -.078, p= .014	r= -.157, p= .032	r= -.170, p= .010	x	r= -.157, p= .032

Appendix 87

Correlations between "Income" and "Not discussing politics with friends and work colleagues"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= -.086, p= .049	x	x	x	X
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	r= -.077, p= .008	x	x	x	X
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 88

Correlations between "Financial Satisfaction" and "having less confidence in the Press"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	X	x	x	X
1995	x	X	x	x	r= -.128, p= .031
2005	r= -.092, p= .001	r= -.119, p= .066	x	r= -.103, p= .052	x
2012	r= -.083, p= .010	X	x	x	r= -.199, p= .007

Appendix 89

Correlations between "Financial Satisfaction" and "having less confidence in major companies"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	X	x	x	X
1995	r= -.095, p= .000	X	r= -.100, p= .023	x	r= -.182, p= .003
2005	r= -.091, p= .002	r= -.196, p= .002	x	x	x
2012	x	X	x	x	x

Appendix 90

Correlations between "Financial Satisfaction" and "having less confidence in charitable/humanitarian organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	X	x	x	x
2012	r= -.083, p= .010	r= -.186, p= .013	x	x	x

Appendix 91

Correlations between "Financial Satisfaction" and "having less confidence in the environmental movement"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	x	x	r= -.093, p= .081	x
2012	r= -.060, p= .063	r= -.169, p= .024	x	x	x

Appendix 92

Correlations between "Financial Satisfaction" and "having less confidence in banks"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2012	r= -.140, p= .000	r= -.214, p= .004	x	r= -.200, p= .000	x

Appendix 93

Correlations between "Financial Satisfaction" and "having less confidence in the UN"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	r= -.039, p= .090	X	x	x	r= -.124, p= .040
2005	r= -.077, p= .008	r= -.147, p= .022	x	r= -.116, p= .029	x
2012	r= -.082, p= .010	x	x	x	x

Appendix 94

Correlations between "Financial Satisfaction" and "having less confidence in the civil service"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= -.100, p= .022	r= -.236, p= .001	x	x	x
1995	r= -.095, p= .000	X	r= -.084, p= .055	x	r= -.100, p= .092
2005	r= -.123, p= .000	r= -.178, p= .006	r= -.108, p= .042	r= -.104, p= .050	x
2012	r= -.105, p= .001	r= -.216, p= .004	x	r= -.114, p= .035	x

Appendix 95

Correlations between "Financial Satisfaction" and "having less confidence in Parliament"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	X	x	x	x
1995	r= -.107, p= .000	x	r= -.091, p= .038	r= -.169, p= .002	x
2005	r= -.079, p= .007	x	r= -.109, p= .042	x	x
2012	r= -.089, p= .006	r= -.223, p= .003	x	x	r= -.146, p= .047

Appendix 96

Correlations between "Financial Satisfaction" and "having less confidence in political parties"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	r= -.080, p= .000	x	r= -.085, p= .053	x	x
2005	r= -.101, p= 000	r= -.170, p= .008	x	x	x
2012	r= -.076, p= .018	r= -.160, p= .033	x	x	r= -.138, p= .062

Appendix 97

Correlations between "Financial Satisfaction" and "having less confidence in the national government"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	r= -.098, p= .000	r= -.079, p= .043	r= -.116, p= .008	x	r= -.103, p= .081
2005	r= -.110, p= .000	r= -.128, p= .046	r= -.108, p= .044	r= -.100, p= .058	x
2012	r= -.111, p= .001	r= -.193, p= .010	x	r= -.156, p= .004	r= -.132, p= .074

Appendix 98

Correlations between "Financial Satisfaction" and "having less confidence in the police"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= -.077, p= .077	x	x	x	x
1995	r= -.080, p= .000	r= -.095, p= .014	x	r= -.088, p= .100	r= -.116, p= .050
2005	r= -.115, p= .000	r= -.155, p= .016	r= -.131, p= .014	r= -.113, p= .033	x
2012	r= -.119, p= .000	r= -.189, p= .011	x	r= -.105, p= .051	r= -.136, p= .065

Appendix 99

Correlations between "Financial Satisfaction" and "having less confidence in labour unions"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= -.094, p= .031	X	x	x	x
1995	x	X	x	x	x
2005	x	X	r= -.089, p= .097	x	x
2012	r= -.083, p= .010	X	x	r= -.114, p= .034	r= -.202, p= .006

Appendix 100

Correlations between "Financial Satisfaction" and "having less confidence in the legal system"

	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	r= .199, p= .068	x
1995	r= -.107, p= .000	x	x	r= -.137, p= .011	x
2005	r= -.131, p= .000	r= -.188, p= .003	r= -.137, p= .010	r= -.139, p= .008	x
2012	r= -.109, p= .001	r= -.163, p= .029	x	x	r= -.148, p= .046

Appendix 101

Correlations between "Financial Satisfaction" and "having less confidence in the armed forces"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	X	x	r= .207, p= .059	x
1995	r= -.049, p= .032	X	x	x	x
2005	r= -.068, p= .019	r= -.123, p= .057	x	x	x
2012	r= -.107, p= .001	r= -.179, p= .017	x	r= -.104, p= .053	x

Appendix 102

Correlations between "Financial Satisfaction" and "having less confidence in churches"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	X	x	x	x
1995	r= -.041, p= .069	X	x	x	r= -.097, p= .099
2005	x	r= -.140, p= .030	x	x	r= -.190, p= .006
2012	r= -.061, p= .059	r= -.128, p= .088	x	x	x

Appendix 103

Correlations between "Financial Satisfaction" and "believing that one's country is run for the benefit of all people, rather than for a few big interests"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	r= .074, p= .001	X	x	x	r= .132, p= .029

Appendix 104

Correlations between "Income" and "having less confidence in the United Nations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	r= .046, p= .044	x	x	x	x
2005	r= .071, p= .015	x	x	x	r= .173, p= .013
2012	x	X	x	r= -.104, p= .053	x

Appendix 105

Correlations between "Income" and "having less confidence in the civil service"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	r= .154, p= .025	x	x	x
1995	r= .039, p= .083	X	r= .114, p= .009	x	x

2005	x	X	x	x	x
2012	r= .080, p= .013	r= .217, p= .004	x	x	x

Appendix 106

Correlations between "Income" and "having less confidence in the police"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	X	x	x	r= .249, p= .100
1995	r= .079, p= .000	r= .066, p= .089	r= .091, p= .035	r= .106, p= .047	x
2005	x	X	x	x	x
2012	x	X	x	x	x

Appendix 107

Correlations between "Income" and "having less confidence in labour unions"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	X	x	x	x
1995	r= .048, p= .037	X	x	x	r= .116, p= .057
2005	r= .081, p= .005	X	r= .135, p= .011	r= .111, p= .036	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 108

Correlations between "Income" and "having less confidence in TV"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	X	r= .074, p= .086	x	x
2005	r= .074, p= .011	X	x	x	r= .119, p= .087
2012	x	r= -.131, p= .080	x	x	x

Appendix 109

Correlations between "Income" and "having less confidence in the Press"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	X	x	x	x
1995	x	X	r= .092, p= .035	x	x
2005	r= .056, p= .054	X	x	x	r= .154, p= .025
2012	x	X	x	x	x

Appendix 110

Correlations between "Income" and "having less confidence in churches"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	X	x	x	x
1995	r= .049, p= .030	X	x	r= .098, p= .067	x
2005	x	X	x	r= -.092, p= .080	x

2012	x	r= .143, p= .057	x	x	x

Appendix 111

Correlations between "Income" and "believing that one's country is run for the benefit of all people, rather than for a few big interests"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	X	r= -.080, p= .070	x	x

Appendix 112

Correlations between "Income" and "having less confidence in parliament"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	r= -.157, p= .022	x	x	x
1995	x	X	r= .105, p= .016	x	x
2005	r= -.048, p= .096	X	r= -.110, p= .039	x	x
2012	x	r= .239, p= .001	x	r= -.160, p= .003	x

Appendix 113

Correlations between "Income" and "having less confidence in major companies"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	X	x	x	x
1995	x	X	x	x	x
2005	x	X	x	x	x
2012	r= -.086, p= .007	X	r= -.117, p= .078	r= -.192, p= .000	x

Appendix 114

Correlations between "Income" and "having less confidence in charitable/humanitarian organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	X	r= .091, p= .087	r= -.108, p= .042	x
2012	r= -.059, p= .066	X	x	r= -.157, p= .003	x

Appendix 115

Correlations between "Income" and "having less confidence in banks"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2012	x	X	r= -.116, p= .080	x	x

Appendix 116

Correlations between "Income" and "Not being willing to pay higher taxes to help poorer countries"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	X	r= .074, p= .088	x	X
2005	x	r= .183, p= .005	x	x	x

Appendix 117

Correlations between "Income" and "believing that accepting bribes in the course of one's duties is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	X	x	x	X
1995	x	X	r= .073, p= .091	x	X
2005	r= -.068, p= .020	X	r= -.101, p= .058	x	X
2012	r= -.065, p= .043	X	x	r= -.103, p= .053	X

Appendix 118

Correlations between "Income" and "believing that buying something you knew was stolen is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	X
1995	x	x	x	x	X

Appendix 119

Correlations between "Income" and "believing that cheating on taxes if you have a chance is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	r= .113, p= .099	x	x	X
1995	x	x	x	x	X
2005	x	x	x	x	X
2012	x	r= .218, p= .003	x	x	X

Appendix 120

Correlations between "Income" and "believing that avoiding a fare on public transport is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	r= .139, p= .043	x	x	X
1995	x	x	x	x	X
2005	x	r= -.130, p= .044	x	x	X
2012	x	x	x	x	X

Appendix 121

Correlations between "Income" and "believing that claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	r= -.185, p= .030	x	X
1995	x	x	x	x	X
2005	r= -.060, p= .037	x	r= -.145, p= .006	x	X
2012	x	x	x	x	X

Appendix 122

Correlations between "Financial Satisfaction" and "Not being willing to pay higher taxes to help poorer countries"

	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	r= -.079, p= .069	x	X
2005	x	r= -.191, p= .003	x	x	X

Appendix 123

Correlations between "Financial Satisfaction" and "believing that accepting bribes in the course of one's duties is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	X
1995	x	x	x	x	X
2005	r= -.053, p= .066	r= -.114, p= .077	x	x	X
2012	x	x	x	x	X

Appendix 124

Correlations between "Financial Satisfaction" and "believing that buying something you knew was stolen is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	X
1995	x	r= -.081, p= .037	x	x	X

Appendix 125

Correlations between "Financial Satisfaction" and "believing that cheating on taxes if you have a chance is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	r= -.119, p= .083	x	x	X
1995	r= -.086, p= .000	r= -.078, p= .042	r= -.114, p= .009	x	X
2005	r= -.087, p= .003	r= -.121, p= .060	x	r= -.104, p= .050	X
2012	r= -.053, p= .095	r= -.229, p= .002	x	x	X

Appendix 126

Correlations between "Financial Satisfaction" and "believing that avoiding a fare on public transport is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	r= .209, p= .055	X
1995	x	x	x	r= -.089, p= .097	X
2005	x	x	x	x	X
2012	r= -.079, p= .014	r= -.226, p= .002	x	x	X

Appendix 127

Correlations between "Financial Satisfaction" and "believing that claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	X
1995	r= -.084, p= .000	r= -.168, p= .000	x	r= -.137, p= .010	X

2005	r= -.069, p= .018	x	x	x	X
2012	r= -.060, p= .060	x	x	r= -.112, p= .035	X

Appendix 128

Correlations between "Income" and "Not being proud to be Australian"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	X
1995	x	x	x	x	X
2005	x	x	x	x	X
2012	x	x	r= .146, p= .028	x	X

Appendix 129

Correlations between "Income" and "Unhappiness"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	r= -.157, p= .065	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	r= .051, p= .076	x	r= .107, p= .045	x	x
2012	x	r= -.125, p= .094	x	x	x

Appendix 130

Correlations between "Income" and "Life Satisfaction"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 131

Correlations between "Financial Satisfaction" and "Not being proud to be Australian"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	r= -.076, p= .001	r= -.167, p= .000	x	x	x
2005	r= -.091, p= .002	x	x	r= -.105, p= .047	x
2012	r= -.077, p= .016	r= -.160, p= .032	r= -.150, p= .023	x	x

Appendix 132

Correlations between "Financial Satisfaction" and "Unhappiness"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= -.293, p= .000	r= -.172, p= .012	r= -.328, p= .000	r= -.475, p= .000	r= -.450, p= .002
1995	r= -.245, p= .000	r= -.185, p= .000	r= -.210, p= .000	r= -.310, p= .000	r= -.222, p= .000

2005	r= -.359, p= .000	r= -.314, p= .000	r= -.413, p= .000	r= -.364, p= .000	r= -.200, p= .004
2012	r= -.272, p= .000	r= -.211, p= .004	r= -.320, p= .000	r= -.237, p= .000	r= -.233, p= .001

Appendix 133

Correlations between "Financial Satisfaction" and "Life Satisfaction"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= .351, p= .000	r= .298, p= .000	r= .344, p= .000	r= .498, p= .000	r= .428, p= .003
1995	r= .470, p= .000	r= .400, p= .000	r= .443, p= .000	r= .576, p= .000	r= .445, p= .000
2005	r= .422, p= .000	r= .388, p= .000	r= .395, p= .000	r= .455, p= .000	r= .346, p= .000
2012	r= .515, p= .000	r= .501, p= .000	r= .582, p= .000	r= .512, p= .000	r= .440, p= .000

Appendix 134

Correlations between "Financial Satisfaction" and "believing that Voluntary Euthanasia is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	r= -.055, p= .017	r= -.091, p= .019	r= -.101, p= .021	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 135

Correlations between "Financial Satisfaction" and "believing that Divorce is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	x	r= -.066, p= .089	x	x	x
2005	r= -.106, p= .000	x	r= -.096, p= .072	x	r= -.222, p= .001
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 136

Correlations between "Financial Satisfaction" and "believing that Abortion is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	r= -.061, p= .035	r= -.153, p= .018	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 137

Correlations between "Financial Satisfaction" and "believing that Prostitution is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= -.074, p= .095	x	x	x	x
1995	r= -.045, p= .049	r= -.066, p= .090	x	x	x
2005	r= -.087, p= .003	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 138

Correlations between "Financial Satisfaction" and "believing that Homosexuality is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	r= .076, p= .009	x	x	x	r= -.152, p= .031
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 139

Correlations between "Financial Satisfaction" and "believing that sex before marriage is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2012	r= -.064, p= .046	x	x	x	x

Appendix 140

Correlations between "Income" and "believing that Voluntary Euthanasia is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	r= .279, p= .073
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	r= .053, p= .066	x	r= .092, p= .085	x	x

Appendix 141

Correlations between "Income" and "believing that Divorce is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	r= .250, p= .000	r= -.181, p= .034	r= -.199, p= .073	x
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	r= .082, p= .005	x	r= .142, p= .007	r= .093, p= .079	x
2012	r= .078, p= .015	r= .152, p= .041	x	r= .114, p= .032	x

Appendix 142

Correlations between "Income" and "believing that Abortion is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= .084, p= .055	r= .171, p= .013	x	x	x
1995	x	x	r= .074, p= .091	x	x
2005	r= .088, p= .002	r= .126, p= .052	r= .095, p= .073	r= .119, p= .025	x
2012	r= .103, p= .001	r= .168, p= .024	x	r= .131, p= .014	r= .127, p= .085

Appendix 143

Correlations between "Income" and "believing that Prostitution is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= .084, p= .058	r= .143, p= .038	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	r= .090, p= .002	x	x	r= .138, p= .009	x
2012	r= .065, p= .044	x	x	r= .144, p= .007	x

Appendix 144

Correlations between "Income" and "believing that Homosexuality is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= .085, p= .055	r= .159, p= .022	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	r= .134, p= .000	x	r= .149, p= .005	r= .181, p= .001	x
2012	r= .079, p= .015	r= .166, p= .026	x	r= .100, p= .061	x

Appendix 145

Correlations between "Income" and "believing that sex before marriage is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2012	= .056, p= .081	x	x	x	x

Appendix 146

Correlations between "Income" and "Not believing in the importance of children learning obedience"

	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= .081, p= .065	x	r= .140, p= .098	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	r= .109, p= .000	x	x	r= .118, p= .025	r= .130, p= .057
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 147

Correlations between "Income" and "Not believing in the importance of children learning religious faith"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	r= .088, p= .002	r= .210, p= .001	r= .197, p= .000	x	x
2012	x	r= .176, p= .018	r= -.193, p= .003	x	x

Appendix 148

Correlations between "Financial Satisfaction" and "Not believing in the importance of children learning religious faith"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= -.112, p= .010	r= -.151, p= .027	r= -.168, p= .047	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 149

Correlations between "Financial Satisfaction" and "Not believing in the importance of children learning feelings of responsibility"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	r= -.095, p= .072	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 150

Correlations between "Financial Satisfaction" and "Not believing in the importance of children learning imagination"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	r= .108, p= .094	x	x	x
2012	x	x	r= .130, p= .050	x	x

Appendix 151

Correlations between "Financial Satisfaction" and "Not believing in the importance of children learning self-expression"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2012	r= .063, p= .049	x	x	r= .104, p= .050	x

Appendix 152

Correlations between "Financial Satisfaction" and "Not believing in the importance of children learning obedience"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	r= .118, p= .085	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	r= -.054, p= .094	x	x	x	r= -.144, p= .050

Appendix 153

Correlations between "Financial Satisfaction" and "Not believing in the importance of children learning tolerance and respect for other"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	r= -.058, p= .044	x	x	x	x
2012	r= .075, p= .019	x	x	r= .125, p= .019	x

Appendix 154

Correlations between "Financial Satisfaction" and "Disagreeing that when jobs are scarce employers should give priority to Australians over immigrants"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	r= .052, p= .022	x	x	x	x
2005	x	r= .126, p= .051	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 155

Correlations between "Income" and "Disagreeing that when jobs are scarce employers should give priority to Australians over immigrants"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	r= -.089, p= .100	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 156

Correlations between "Not being Married" and "being less involved in labour unions"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	X
1995	x	x	r= -.106, p= .015	x	x
2005	x	x	r= .168, p= .002	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 157

Correlations between "Not being Married" and "being less involved in sport/recreational organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	r= .121, p= .024	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 158

Correlations between "Not being Married" and "being less involved in consumer organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 159

Correlations between "Not being Married" and "believing that most people 'cannot' be trusted"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	r= -.127, p= .069	x	r= -.195, p= .077	x
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 160

Correlations between "Not being Married" and "being uninterested in politics"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	r= .156, p= .024
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 161

Correlations between "Not being Married" and "Not discussing politics with friends and work colleagues"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	r= .044, p= .049	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	r= -.131, p= .014	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 162

Correlations between "Not being Married" and "having joined in boycotts during the last five years"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 163

Correlations between "Not being Married" and "having signed petitions during the last five years"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 164

Correlations between "Not being Married" and "having attended peaceful demonstrations during the last five years"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	r= .152, p= .018	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	r= .195, p= .050	r= -.399, p= .021

Appendix 165

Correlations between "Not being Married" and "having less confidence in the civil service"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	r= .082, p= .061	x	x

2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	r= -.070, p= .030	x	x	x	x

Appendix 166

Correlations between "Not being Married" and "having less confidence in parliament"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 167

Correlations between "Not being Married" and "having less confidence in political parties"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 168

Correlations between "Not being Married" and "having less confidence in the national government"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	r= -.088, p= .006	x	x	r= -.145, p= .007	x

Appendix 169

Correlations between "Not being Married" and "having less confidence in TV"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	r= -.072, p= .025	x	x	x	x

Appendix 170

Correlations between "Not being Married" and "having less confidence in the press"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	r= .150, p= .079	x	x
1995	r= -.042, p= .061	x	x	x	r= -.134, p= .024
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 171

Correlations between "Not being Married" and "having less confidence in the armed forces"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= -.107, p= .014	x	x	x	r= -.287, p= .059
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	r= .069, p= .018	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 172

Correlations between "Not being Married" and "having less confidence in charitable/humanitarian organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	x	r= .167, p= .002	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	r= .128, p= .083

Appendix 173

Correlations between "Not being Married" and "having less confidence in the environmental protection movement"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	x	r= .104, p= .051	x	r= -.126, p= .069
2012	x	x	x	r= -.104, p= .053	x

Appendix 174

Correlations between "Not being Married" and "having less confidence in Banks"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2012	r= -.060, p= .063	x	x	x	x

Appendix 175

Correlations between "Not being Married" and "being less involved in environmental organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= .090, p= .039	x	r= -.143, p= .091	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	r= .127, p= .017	r= .138, p= .068

Appendix 176

Correlations between "Not being Married" and "being less involved in political parties"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	r= .054, p= .068	x	x	r= .136, p= .013	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 177

Correlations between "Not being Married" and "having less confidence in the police"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	r= .162, p= .057	x	x
1995	x	x	r= .107, p= .013	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 178

Correlations between "Not being Married" and "having less confidence in churches"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	r= .192, p= .010	x	x	x

Appendix 179

Correlations between "Not being Married" and "having less confidence in major companies"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+

1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	r= .065, p= .026	x	r= .132, p= .013	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 180

Correlations between "Not being Married" and "believing that accepting bribes in the course of one's duties is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	r= .049, p= .031	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	r= .151, p= .028
2012	x	x	r= .113, p= .090	r= -.098, p= .064	x

Appendix 181

Correlations between "Not being Married" and "believing that buying something you knew was stolen is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	r= .091, p= .000	x	x	x	x

Appendix 182

Correlations between "Not being Married" and "believing that cheating on taxes if you had the chance is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	r= .049, p= .030	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	r= .110, p= .096	r= -.130, p= .014	r= .155, p= .035

Appendix 183

Correlations between "Not being Married" and "believing that avoiding a fare on public transport is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= .085, p= .054	x	x	x	x
1995	r= .085, p= .000	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	r= .085, p= .008	x	x	x	r= .135, p= .066

Appendix 184

Correlations between "Not being Married" and "believing that claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= .124, p= .004	r= .117, p= .087	x	x	x
1995	r= .080, p= .000	x	r= .083, p= .056	x	x
2005	x	x	x	r= .100, p= .060	x
2012	r= .108, p= .001	r= .166, p= .026	x	x	x

Appendix 185

Correlations between "Not being Married" and "believing that stealing property is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2012	x	x	x	x	r= .157, p= .034

Appendix 186

Correlations between "Not being Married" and "being less involved in church/religious organisations when religious service attendance is not a control variable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	r= -.043, p= .056	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	r= -.152, p= .004	x	r= .138, p= .047
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 187

Correlations between "Not being Married" and "having less confidence in the legal system"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	r= -.128, p= .054	r= -.114, p= .034	r= .132, p= .076

Appendix 188

Correlations between "Not being Married" and "Not being willing to pay higher taxes to help poorer countries"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	r= -.113, p= .004	x	x	x
2005	r= -.059, p= .045	x	x	x	x

Appendix 189

Correlations between "Not being Married" and "believing that one's country is run for the benefit of all people, rather than for a few big interests"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 190

Correlations between "Not being Married" and "being less involved in charitable organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	r= .059, p= .046	x	x	x	x
2012	r= .100, p= .002	x	x	x	r= .151, p= .044

Appendix 191

Correlations between "Not being Married" and "being less involved in art, music and educational organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	r= -.113, p= .100	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	r= .049, p= .097	x	x	x	r= .171, p= .021
2012	r= .065, p= .043	x	x	x	x

Appendix 192

Correlations between "Not being Married" and "being less involved in professional associations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	r= -.276, p= .011	x
1995	r= .062, p= .006	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 193

Correlations between "Having more children" and "believing that most people 'cannot' be trusted"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 194

Correlations between "Having more children" and "Not discussing politics with friends and work colleagues"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	r= -.092, p= .088	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 195

Correlations between "Having more children" and "believing that one's country is run for the benefit of all people, rather than for a few big interests"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 196

Correlations between "Having more children" and "Not being willing to pay higher taxes to help poorer countries"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	r= -.072, p= .063	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	r= .110, p= .038	x

Appendix 197

Correlations between "Having more children" and "having signed petitions during the last five years"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+

2005	r= .058, p= .044	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 198

Correlations between "Having more children" and "believing that accepting bribes in the course of one's duties is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	r= -.115, p= .094	x	x	x
1995	r= -.052, p= .021	r= -.087, p= .024	r= -.078, p= .073	x	x
2005	x	x	x	r= -.091, p= .087	x
2012	r= -.053, p= .100	x	r= -.139, p= .036	x	x

Appendix 199

Correlations between "Having more children" and "believing that buying something you knew was stolen is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	r= -.083, p= .055	r= -.089, p= .097	x

Appendix 200

Correlations between "Having more children" and "believing that cheating on taxes if you have the chance is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= -.083, p= .059	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 201

Correlations between "Having more children" and "believing that avoiding a fare on public transport is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= -.073, p= .095	x	x	x	x
1995	r= -.050, p= .027	x	r= -.112, p= .010	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 202

Correlations between "Having more children" and "believing that claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	r= -.043, p= .059	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	r= -.107, p= .044	x

Appendix 203

Correlations between "Having more children" and "believing that stealing property is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2012	x	x	r= -.115, p= .083	x	x

Appendix 204

Correlations between "Having more children" and "having less confidence in the police"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	r= .173, p= .042	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	r= -.122, p= .058	r= -.092, p= .083	x	x
2012	r= -.060, p= .062	x	r= -.200, p= .002	r= -.108, p= .044	x

Appendix 205

Correlations between "Having more children" and "having less confidence in TV"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	r= -.052, p= .071	r= -.136, p= .035	x	x	x
2012	x	x	r= -.114, p= .086	x	x

Appendix 206

Correlations between "Having more children" and "having less confidence in the legal system"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	r= -.161, p= .019	r= .231, p= .006	x	x

1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	r= -.061, p= .059	x	r= -.201, p= .002	x	x

Appendix 207

Correlations between "Having more children" and "having less confidence in the armed forces"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	r= -.149, p= .030	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	r= -.122, p= .058	x	x	x
2012	r= -.101, p= .002	x	r= -.179, p= .007	r= -.093, p= .083	x

Appendix 208

Correlations between "Having more children" and "having less confidence in churches"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= -.154, p= .000	r= -.169, p= .013	r= -.193, p= .023	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x	r= -.117, p= .048
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 209

Correlations between "Having more children" and "having joined in boycotts during the last five years"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	r= -.053, p= .070	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 210

Correlations between "Having more children" and "being uninterested in politics"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	r= .069, p= .072	x	x	x
2005	r= .067, p= .021	x	x	r= .116, p= .028	x
2012	x	x	x	x	r= .136, p= .064

Appendix 211

Correlations between "Having more children" and "having attended peaceful demonstrations during the last five years"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	r= -.051, p= .079	x	x	x	x
2012	r= .118, p= .079	x	x	r= .273, p= .005	x

Appendix 212

Correlations between "Having more children" and "being less involved in environmental organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	r= .038, p= .095	r= .101, p= .009	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	r= -.120, p= .029	r= .124, p= .093
2012	x	x	r= -.139, p= .037	x	x

Appendix 213

Correlations between "Having more children" and "being less involved in political parties"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	r= -.109, p= .043	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 214

Correlations between "Having more children" and "being less involved in sport/recreational organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	r= -.046, p= .043	x	r= -.112, p= .010	x	x
2005	r= .063, p= .033	x	r= .095, p= .078	r= .106, p= .049	x
2012	x	x	x	r= .090, p= .090	x

Appendix 215

Correlations between "Having more children" and "being less involved in church/religious organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= -.094, p= .032	x	x	r= -.253, p= .019	x

1995	r= -.042, p= .063	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	r= .107, p= .046	x
2012	r= .057, p= .077	x	x	x	x

Appendix 216

Correlations between "Having more children" and "being less involved in church/religious organisations when religious service attendance is not a control variable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= -.116, p= .001	x	x	r= -.204, p= .020	x
1995	r= -.097, p= .000	x	r= -.163, p= .000	r= -.090, p= .092	r= -.111, p= .058
2005	r= .102, p= .000	x	x	r= .150, p= .005	x
2012	r= .136, p= .000	r= .192, p= .009	x	r= .127, p= .017	r= .126, p= .088

Appendix 217

Correlations between "watching more TV" and "being uninterested in politics"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 218

Correlations between "watching more TV" and "believing that accepting bribes in the course of one's duties is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 219

Correlations between "watching more TV" and "believing that buying something you knew was stolen is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 220

Correlations between "watching more TV" and "believing that cheating on taxes if you have a chance is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	x	r= .116, p= .050

Appendix 221

Correlations between "watching more TV" and "believing that avoiding a fare on public transport is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 222

Correlations between "watching more TV" and "believing that claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	x	r= -.114, p= .053

Appendix 223

Correlations between "watching more TV" and "being less involved in charitable organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	r= .075, p= .051	x	x	x

Appendix 224

Correlations between "watching more TV" and "being less involved in art, music and educational organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 225

Correlations between "watching more TV" and "being less involved in sport/recreational organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	r= .077, p= .047	x	x	x

Appendix 226

Correlations between "watching more TV" and "being less involved in labour unions"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	r= .077, p= .047	x	x	x

Appendix 227

Correlations between "watching more TV" and "having less confidence in the UN"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 228

Correlations between "watching more TV" and "having less confidence in the civil service"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 229

Correlations between "watching more TV" and "having less confidence in parliament"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	r= .081, p= .037	x	x	x

Appendix 230

Correlations between "watching more TV" and "having less confidence in political parties"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 231

Correlations between "watching more TV" and "having less confidence in labour unions"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 232

Correlations between "watching more TV" and "having less confidence in the press"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	r= -.073, p= .093	x	x

Appendix 233

Correlations between "watching more TV" and "having less confidence in the legal system"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	r= -.075, p= .087	x	x

Appendix 234

Correlations between "watching more TV" and "having less confidence in the Armed Forces"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 235

Correlations between "watching more TV" and "having less confidence in churches"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 236

Correlations between "watching more TV" and "having less confidence in major companies"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 237

Correlations between "watching more TV" and "believing that the country is run for the benefit of all the people rather than by a few big interests looking out for themselves"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	x	r= .174, p= .004

Appendix 238

Correlations between "watching more TV" and "Not being willing to pay higher taxes to help poorer countries"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	r= .079, p= .001	x	x	r= .148, p= .006	x

Appendix 239

Correlations between "watching more TV" and "Not discussing politics with friends and work colleagues"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	r= .071, p= .002	r= .081, p= .035	x	x	r= .165, p= .005

Appendix 240

Correlations between "watching more TV" and "being less involved in professional associations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	r= .077, p= .001	x	r= .080, p= .066	r= .139, p= .009	x

Appendix 241

Correlations between "watching more TV" and "being less involved in political parties"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	r= .047, p= .036	x	x	x	x

Appendix 242

Correlations between "watching more TV" and "being less involved in environmental organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	r= .051, p= .024	r= .112, p= .004	x	x	x

Appendix 243

Correlations between "watching more TV" and "being less involved in religious organisations when church/religious attendance is not a control variable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	r= .103, p= .000	r= .138, p= .000	x	x	r= .126, p= .032

Appendix 244

Correlations between "watching more TV" and "having less confidence in the national government"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 245

Correlations between "watching more TV" and "having less confidence in the police"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	r= -.061, p= .006	x	x	x	r= -.105, p= .076

Appendix 246

Correlations between "watching more TV" and "having less confidence in TV"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	r= -.165, p= .000	r= -.212, p= .000	r= -.162, p= .000	r= -.128, p= .017	r= -.117, p= .048

Appendix 247

Correlations between "attending religious services less frequently" and "believing that most people 'cannot' be trusted"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= -.110, p= .013	x	r= -.191, p= .026	x	r= -.356, p= .016
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	r= .142, p= .039
2012	r= -.077, p= .016	x	r= -.212, p= .001	r= -.115, p= .031	x

Appendix 248

Correlations between "attending religious services less frequently" and "being less involved in charitable organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= -.121, p= .006	x	r= -.239, p= .004	x	x
1995	r= .185, p= .000	r= .189, p= .000	r= .173, p= .000	r= .215, p= .000	r= .151, p= .010
2005	r= -.161, p= .000	r= -.110, p= .092	r= -.107, p= .045	x	r= -.390, p= .000
2012	r= -.163, p= .000	r= -.188, p= .012	x	r= -.121, p= .023	r= -.286, p= .000

Appendix 249

Correlations between "attending religious services less frequently" and "being less involved in professional associations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	r= .060, p= .007	r= .077, p= .046	x	x	x
2005	r= -.076, p= .010	r= -.150, p= .021	x	r= -.093, p= .088	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 250

Correlations between "attending religious services less frequently" and "being less involved in environmental orgainsations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	r= .189, p= .084	x
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	r= .089, p= .093	x

Appendix 251

Correlations between "attending religious services less frequently" and "being less involved in political parties"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x	r= .107, p= .068
2005	r= -.049, p= .098	x	x	x	r= -.144, p= .049
2012	r= -.062, p= .055	x	x	x	r= -.219, p= .004

Appendix 252

Correlations between "attending religious services less frequently" and "being less involved in labour unions"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	r= -.136, p= .076

Appendix 253

Correlations between "attending religious services less frequently" and "being less involved in art, music and educational organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	r= .111, p= .000	r= .096, p= .012	r= .096, p= .027	r= .114, p= .033	r= .117, p= .047
2005	r= -.079, p= .008	x	x	x	r= -.265, p= .000
2012	x	x	x	x	r= -.194, p= .011

Appendix 254

Correlations between "attending religious services less frequently" and "being less involved in sport/recreational organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	r= .092, p= .082	x

Appendix 255

Correlations between "attending religious services less frequently" and "Not discussing politics with friends and work colleagues"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	r= -.148, p= .006	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 256

Correlations between "attending religious services less frequently" and "being uninterested in politics"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	r= .087, p= .024	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	r= .136, p= .070	x	x	x

Appendix 257

Correlations between "attending religious services less frequently" and "having attended peaceful demonstrations during the last five years"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	x	r= .088, p= .099	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 258

Correlations between "attending religious services less frequently" and "having joined in boycotts during the last five years"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	x	r= .089, p= .095	x	x
2012	r= -.186, p= .017	x	x	r= -.328, p= .007	x

Appendix 259

Correlations between "attending religious services less frequently" and "having signed petitions during the last five years"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	x	x	x	r= -.138, p= .044
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 260

Correlations between "attending religious services less frequently" and "believing that accepting bribes in the course of one's duties is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= -.119, p= .007	x	r= -.225, p= .008	r= -.202, p= .066	x
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	r= .092, p= .084	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 261

Correlations between "attending religious services less frequently" and "believing that buying something you knew was stolen is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= -.171, p= .000	r= -.139, p= .042	r= -.272, p= .001	x	r= -.259, p= .090
1995	r= .074, p= .001	r= .105, p= .006	x	r= .089, p= .096	x

Appendix 262

Correlations between "attending religious services less frequently" and "believing that cheating on taxes if you had a chance is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= -.149, p= .001	r= -.154, p= .025	r= -.220, p= .010	x	x
1995	r= .124, p= .000	r= .140, p= .000	r= .154, p= .000	r= .138, p= .010	x

2005	r= .092, p= .002	x	r= .150, p= .005	x	x
2012	r= .132, p= .000	x	r= .135, p= .042	r= .155, p= .004	r= .124, p= .092

Appendix 263

Correlations between "attending religious services less frequently" and "believing that avoiding a fare on public transport is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= -.200, p= .000	r= -.203, p= .003	r= -.170, p= .047	r= -.198, p= .069	x
1995	r= .056, p= .012	r= .118, p= .002	x	x	x
2005	r= .082, p= .005	x	r= .193, p= .000	x	x
2012	r= .087, p= .006	x	r= .131, p= .048	r= .127, p= .016	x

Appendix 264

Correlations between "attending religious services less frequently" and "believing that claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= -.085, p= .053	x	x	x	x
1995	x	r= .074, p= .055	x	x	x
2005	x	x	r= .102, p= .054	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 265

Correlations between "attending religious services less frequently" and "believing that stealing property is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2012	r= .055, p= .087	x	x	r= .094, p= .078	x

Appendix 266

Correlations between "attending religious services less frequently" and "having less confidence in the UN"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	r= .089, p= .099	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 267

Correlations between "attending religious services less frequently" and "having less confidence in the civil service"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	r= -.191, p= .005	x	x	x
1995	r= .054, p= .017	x	x	r= .106, p= .050	x
2005	r= .098, p= .001	x	r= .179, p= .001	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 268

Correlations between "attending religious services less frequently" and "having less confidence in parliament"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	r= .071, p= .002	r= .139, p= .000	x	x	x
2005	r= .100, p= .001	r= .149, p= .021	r= .144, p= .007	r= .100, p= .058	x
2012	x	r= .134, p= .074	x	x	x

Appendix 269

Correlations between "attending religious services less frequently" and "having less confidence in labour unions"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x	r= -.147, p= .016
2005	x	x	x	x	r= .156, p= .025
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 270

Correlations between "attending religious services less frequently" and "having less confidence in the press"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	r= -.117, p= .078	r= -.093, p= .082	x

Appendix 271

Correlations between "attending religious services less frequently" and "having less confidence in the legal system"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	r= .051, p= .025	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	r= .131, p= .014	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 272

Correlations between "attending religious services less frequently" and "having less confidence in the Armed forces"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	r= .058, p= .044	x	r= .134, p= .012	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 273

Correlations between "attending religious services less frequently" and "having less confidence in the environmental protection movement"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	r= -.205, p= .001	x	x	r= .122, p= .079
2012	r= -.061, p= .058	x	r= -.146, p= .027	x	x

Appendix 274

Correlations between "attending religious services less frequently" and "believing that one's country is run for the benefit of all people, rather than for a few big interests"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 275

Correlations between "attending religious services less frequently" and "Not being willing to pay higher taxes to help poorer countries"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	r= .106, p= .000	r= .067, p= .084	r= .105, p= .016	x	r= .265, p= .000
2005	r= .107, p= .000	x	x	r= .161, p= .002	r= .180, p= .010

Appendix 276

Correlations between "attending religious services less frequently" and "having less confidence in political parties"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	r= .062, p= .006	r= .114, p= .003	x	x	x
2005	r= .089, p= .002	x	r= .093, p= .082	r= .155, p= .003	x
2012	r= .055, p= .088	x	x	x	x

Appendix 277

Correlations between "attending religious services less frequently" and "having less confidence in the national government"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	r= .057, p= .012	r= .094, p= .016	x	x	x
2005	r= .110, p= .000	x	r= .167, p= .002	r= .140, p= .008	x
2012	r= .062, p= .055	x	x	x	r= .124, p= .093

Appendix 278

Correlations between "attending religious services less frequently" and "having less confidence in the police"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	r= .050, p= .028	x	r= .090, p= .037	r= .107, p= .045	x
2005	r= .063, p= .030	x	r= .145, p= .007	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 279

Correlations between "attending religious services less frequently" and "having less confidence in major companies"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	r= .046, p= .043	x	x	x	x
2005	r= .050, p= .085	x	r= .103, p= .054	x	x
2012	x	x	r= .142, p= .031	x	x

Appendix 280

Correlations between "attending religious services less frequently" and "having less confidence in humanitarian/charitable organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	r= .091, p= .002	x	x	r= .147, p= .005	r= .176, p= .011
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 281

Correlations between "attending religious services less frequently" and "watching more TV"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	r= .121, p= .000	r= .151, p= .000	r= .105, p= .016	x	r= .139, p= .017

Appendix 282

Correlations between "Town/City Size" and "being uninterested in politics"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	r= -.038, p= .095	r= -.065, p= .090	x	x	x
2005	r= -.073, p= .011	r= -.172, p= .007	x	x	x
2012	r= -.061, p= .059	r= -.133, p= .075	x	x	x

Appendix 283

Correlations between "Town/City Size" and "having less confidence in parliament"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	r= -.067, p= .003	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 284

Correlations between "Town/City Size" and "having less confidence in the civil service"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	r= -.042, p= .063	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	r= -.053, p= .099	x	x	x	x

Appendix 285

Correlations between "Town/City Size" and "having less confidence in political parties"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	r= -.058, p= .011	r= -.069, p= .075	x	x	r= -.123, p= .040
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 286

Correlations between "Town/City Size" and "having less confidence in the legal system"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	r= -.070, p= .030	x	x	x	x

Appendix 287

Correlations between "Town/City Size" and "believing that most people cannot be trusted"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	r= .049, p= .091	x	r= .102, p= .055	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 288

Correlations between "Town/City Size" and "being less involved in charitable organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	r= -.106, p= .047	x

Appendix 289

Correlations between "Town/City Size" and "being less involved in environmental organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	r= .153, p= .004	x
2005	r= -.065, p= .029	x	x	r= -.106, p= .053	x
2012	x	x	r= -.113, p= .088	x	x

Appendix 290

Correlations between "Town/City Size" and "being less involved in art, music and educational organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 291

Correlations between "Town/City Size" and "being less involved in sport/recreational organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	r= .091, p= .090	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 292

Correlations between "Town/City Size" and "being less involved in consumer organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	x	r= -.098, p= .070	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	r= -.184, p= .016

Appendix 293

Correlations between "Town/City Size" and "being less involved in religious organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	r= .055, p= .014	x	r= .086, p= .046	x	r= .160, p= .006
2005	x	x	x	r= -.124, p= .022	x
2012	x	x	x	x	r= -.124, p= .095

Appendix 294

Correlations between "Town/City Size" and "being less involved in religious organisations when religious service attendance is not a control variable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	x	r= .099, p= .091
2005	x	x	x	x	x

2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 295

Correlations between "Town/City Size" and "being less involved in professional associations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 296

Correlations between "Town/City Size" and "being less involved in political parties"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	r= .134, p= .012	x
2005	x	r= .131, p= .044	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 297

Correlations between "Town/City Size" and "being less involved in labour unions"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	r= .073, p= .092	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 298

Correlations between "Town/City Size" and "Not discussing politics with friends and work colleagues"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	r= -.056, p= .014	r= -.089, p= .021	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 299

Correlations between "Town/City Size" and "Not being willing to pay higher taxes to help poorer countries"

	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	r= -.051, p= .023	x	r= -.095, p= .029	x	r= -.142, p= .016
2005	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 300

Correlations between "Town/City Size" and "believing that accepting bribes in the course of one's duties is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	r= .103, p= .054	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 301

Correlations between "Town/City Size" and "believing that buying something you knew was stolen is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 302

Correlations between "Town/City Size" and "believing that cheating on taxes if you have a chance is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	r= -.091, p= .086	x
2012	x	x	x	r= -.104, p= .050	x

Appendix 303

Correlations between "Town/City Size" and "believing that avoiding a fare on public transport is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 304

Correlations between "Town/City Size" and "believing that claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled is

justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	r= .125, p= .019	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 305

Correlations between "Town/City Size" and "believing that stealing property is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2012	x	x	x	r= -.126, p= .018	x

Appendix 306

Correlations between "Town/City Size" and "believing that one's country is run for the benefit of all people, rather than for a few big interests"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	x	r= .147, p= .015

Appendix 307

Correlations between "Town/City Size" and "having attended peaceful demonstrations during the last five years"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	r= .437, p= .080	x	x	x

Appendix 308

Correlations between "Town/City Size" and "having joined in boycotts during the last five years"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	r= .298, p= .056	x	x

Appendix 309

Correlations between "Town/City Size" and "having signed petitions during the last five years"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+

2005	x	x	r= -.115, p= .030	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 310

Correlations between "Town/City Size" and "having less confidence in the UN"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	r= -.172, p= .021	x	r= .108, p= .044	x

Appendix 311

Correlations between "Town/City Size" and "having less confidence in the national government"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	r= -.107, p= .043	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 312

Correlations between "Town/City Size" and "having less confidence in police"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 313

Correlations between "Town/City Size" and "having less confidence in labour unions"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	r= -.180, p= .016	x	x	x

Appendix 314

Correlations between "Town/City Size" and "having less confidence in TV"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	r= -.132, p= .046	x	x

Appendix 315

Correlations between "Town/City Size" and "having less confidence in the press"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 316

Correlations between "Town/City Size" and "having less confidence in the Armed Forces"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	r= .106, p= .045	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 317

Correlations between "Town/City Size" and "having less confidence in Churches"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	r= .055, p= .015	r= .089, p= .021	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	r= -.111, p= .038	x

Appendix 318

Correlations between "Town/City Size" and "having less confidence in major companies"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	r= -.063, p= .052	x	x	x	x

Appendix 319

Correlations between "Town/City Size" and "having less confidence in charitable/humanitarian organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 320

Correlations between "Town/City Size" and "having less confidence in the environmental protection movement"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	r= -.085, p= .003	x	r= -.155, p= .004	x	r= -.140, p= .044
2012	x	r= -.125, p= .097	x	x	x

Appendix 321

Correlations between "being female" and "being less involved in church/religious organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	r= -.055, p= .015	r= -.114, p= .003	x	x	x
2005	r= .056, p= .057	r= .154, p= .018	x	x	x
2012	x	r= -.198, p= .008	x	x	x

Appendix 322

Correlations between "being female" and "being less involved in consumer organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	x	r= .137, p= .011	x	x
2012	x	r= -.178, p= .017	x	x	x

Appendix 323

Correlations between "being female" and "being less involved in labour unions"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= .099, p= .023	x	r= .153, p= .071	x	x
1995	r= .038, p= .093	r= .072, p= .060	x	x	r= .128, p= .029
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 324

Correlations between "being female" and "being less involved in charitable organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	r= -.139, p= .042	x	x	x
1995	r= -.066, p= .003	x	x	x	x
2005	r= .143, p= .000	r= .210, p= .001	r= .110, p= .040	r= .092, p= .090	r= .244, p= .001
2012	r= .091, p= .005	x	x	r= .122, p= .022	x

Appendix 325

Correlations between "being female" and "being less involved in church/religious organisations when frequency of religious attendance is not a control variable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= -.089, p= .011	x	x	r= -.200, p= .023	x
1995	r= -.111, p= .000	r= -.156, p= .000	x	r= -.119, p= .025	r= -.133, p= .023
2005	r= .092, p= .002	r= .156, p= .015	x	r= .130, p= .015	x
2012	x	r= -.193, p= .009	x	r= .119, p= .025	x

Appendix 326

Correlations between "being female" and "being less involved in professional associations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	r= .120, p= .079	x	x	x
1995	r= .037, p= .098	x	x	r= .110, p= .040	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 327

Correlations between "being female" and "being less involved in environmental organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	r= -.069, p= .002	r= -.082, p= .034	x	r= -.112, p= .036	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	r= .083, p= .010	x	r= .186, p= .005	r= .103, p= .054	x

Appendix 328

Correlations between "being female" and "being less involved in art, music and educational organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	r= -.125, p= .000	r= -.152, p= .000	r= -.111, p= .010	x	r= -.185, p= .001
2005	r= .167, p= .000	r= .155, p= .017	r= .198, p= .000	r= .173, p= .002	r= .165, p= .026
2012	r= .141, p= .000	x	x	r= .164, p= .002	r= .267, p= .000

Appendix 329

Correlations between "being female" and "being less involved in political parties"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= .080, p= .066	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x	r= .144, p= .014
2005	x	x	x	r= -.101, p= .063	x
2012	x	r= -.138, p= .065	r= .157, p= .018	x	x

Appendix 330

Correlations between "being female" and "being less involved in sport/recreational organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	r= .079, p= .000	r= .096, p= .012	x	x	x
2005	r= -.070, p= .000	r= -.125, p= .053	x	r= -.119, p= .027	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 331

Correlations between "being female" and "believing that most people 'cannot' be trusted"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	r= -.190, p= .027	x	x
1995	x	r= .081, p= .037	x	x	r= -.100, p= .090
2005	x	x	r= .096, p= .072	x	x
2012	x	r= .166, p= .027	x	x	x

Appendix 332

Correlations between "being female" and "Not discussing politics with friends and work colleagues"

	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= 101, p= .021	r= .179, p= .009	x	r= .200, p= .068	x
1995	r= .055, p= .014	x	r= .090, p= .038	r= .143, p= .007	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	r= -.074, p= .022	x	r= -.110, p= .097	x	x

Appendix 333

Correlations between "being female" and "being uninterested in politics"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	r= .078, p= .000	x	r= .116, p= .007	r= .118, p= .027	x
2005	r= .104, p= .000	r= .118, p= .067	r= .105, p= .049	r= .114, p= .032	x
2012	r= .130, p= .000	r= .212, p= .004	x	r= .137, p= .010	x

Appendix 334

Correlations between "being female" and "having less confidence in parliament"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= .140, p= .001	r= .126, p= .067	x	x	x
1995	r= .084, p= .000	r= .119, p= .002	r= .138, p= .001	x	x
2005	r= .080, p= .006	r= .108, p= .095	r= .128, p= .017	x	x
2012	r= .059, p= .065	x	x	x	x

Appendix 335

Correlations between "being female" and "having less confidence in the UN"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	r= -.133, p= .011	x
2012	r= -.125, p= .000	x	x	r= -.146, p= .006	r= -.153, p= .039

Appendix 336

Correlations between "being female" and "having less confidence in police"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	r= -.138, p= .044	x	x	x
1995	r= -.073, p= .001	x	x	r= -.126, p= .018	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x

2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 337

Correlations between "being female" and "having less confidence in churches"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	r= -.127, p= .063	x	x	x
1995	r= -.044, p= .051	x	x	x	r= -.107, p= .071
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 338

Correlations between "being female" and "having less confidence in charitable organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	r= -.056, p= .053	r= -.147, p= .023	x	x	x
2012	r= -.124, p= .000	x	r= -.145, p= .028	r= -.183, p= .001	x

Appendix 339

Correlations between "being female" and "having less confidence in environmental organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	r= -.131, p= .000	x	r= -.160, p= .016	r= -.153, p= .004	r= -.130, p= .085

Appendix 340

Correlations between "being female" and "having less confidence in the civil service"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	x	r= -.068, p= .081	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 341

Correlations between "being female" and "having less confidence in the national government"

	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	r= .066, p= .004	r= .080, p= .041	r= .104, p= .017	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	r= -.124, p= .074
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 342

Correlations between "being female" and "having less confidence in TV"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 343

Correlations between "being female" and "having less confidence in the legal system"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	r= -.103, p= .058	x
2005	r= .051, p= .080	x	x	r= .104, p= .050	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 344

Correlations between "being female" and "having less confidence in major companies"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	r= .051, p= .027	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 345

Correlations between "being female" and "having less confidence in the Armed Forces"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	r= -.098, p= .063	x

2012	x	x	x	x	r= .128, p= .086

Appendix 346

Correlations between "being female" and "having less confidence in political parties"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	r= .037, p= .100	x	x	x	x
2005	r= .052, p= .073	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	r= -.148, p= .025	x	x

Appendix 347

Correlations between "being female" and "having less confidence in labour unions"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= .098, p= .026	x	x	x	r= .346, p= .020
1995	r= .051, p= .026	x	r= .082, p= .062	x	x
2005	r= -.074, p= .011	r= -.171, p= .008	r= -.097, p= .068	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 348

Correlations between "being female" and "having signed petitions during the last five years"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	r= .146, p= .000	r= .262, p= .000	r= .112, p= .035	r= .111, p= .036	r= .167, p= .014
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 349

Correlations between "being female" and "having attended peaceful demonstrations during the last five years"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	r= .107, p= .097	r= -.090, p= .093	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 350

Correlations between "being female" and "having joined in boycotts during the last five years"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+

2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 351

Correlations between "being female" and "Not being willing to pay higher taxes to help poorer countries"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 352

Correlations between "being female" and "believing that one's country is run for the benefit of all people, rather than for a few big interests"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	r= -.064, p= .006	x	r= -.136, p= .002	x	x

Appendix 353

Correlations between "being female" and "believing that accepting bribes in the course of one's duties is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	r= -.052, p= .020	x	x	x	x
2005	r= -.080, p= .006	r= -.163, p= .012	x	r= -.087, p= .100	x
2012	r= -.073, p= .022	x	r= -.137, p= .039	x	x

Appendix 354

Correlations between "being female" and "believing that buying something you knew was stolen is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= -.116, p= .008	r= -.173, p= .011	x	x	r= -.279, p= .067
1995	r= -.091, p= .000	r= -.092, p= .018	r= -.116, p= .007	x	x

Appendix 355

Correlations between "being female" and "believing that cheating on taxes if you had the chance is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+

1981	r= -.190, p= .000	r= -.163, p= .017	x	r= -.360, p= .001	x
1995	r= -.116, p= .000	r= -.122, p= .002	r= -.088, p= .042	r= -.137, p= .010	x
2005	r= -.099, p= .001	r= -.130, p= .044	r= -.124, p= .020	r= -.093, p= .082	x
2012	r= -.123, p= .000	x	r= -.141, p= .034	x	r= -.250, p= .001

Appendix 356

Correlations between "being female" and "believing that avoiding a fare on public transport is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= -.119, p= .007	x	x	x	r= -.346, p= .021
1995	r= -.054, p= .016	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	r= -.224, p= .002

Appendix 357

Correlations between "being female" and "believing that claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	r= .189, p= .026	x	r= -.318, p= .036
1995	r= -.043, p= .058	x	x	x	x
2005	r= -.050, p= .083	r= -.152, p= .018	x	x	x
2012	r= -.073, p= .022	r= -.167, p= .025	x	x	r= -.155, p= .035

Appendix 358

Correlations between "being female" and "believing that stealing property is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 359

Correlations between "women being part (as opposed to full) time employed" and "believing that most people 'cannot' be trusted"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1981	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x

2012	x	x	x	x

Appendix 360

Correlations between "women being part (as opposed to full) time employed" and "being less involved in political parties"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1981	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	r= -.181, p= .043	x
2012	x	r= -.246, p= .034	x	r= .158, p= .076

Appendix 361

Correlations between "women being part (as opposed to full) time employed" and "being less involved in labour unions"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1981	x	x	r= .368, p= .035	x
1995	r= .079, p= .077	r= .114, p= .098	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x

Appendix 362

Correlations between "women being part (as opposed to full) time employed" and "being less involved in environmental organisations"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1981	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	r= .228, p= .072
2005	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	r= .165, p= .063

Appendix 363

Correlations between "women being part (as opposed to full) time employed" and "being less involved in consumer organisations"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
2005	x	r= .254, p= .008	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x

Appendix 364

Correlations between "women being part (as opposed to full) time employed" and "being less involved in religious organisations"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1981	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	r= -.284, p= .024
2005	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x

Appendix 365

Correlations between "women being part (as opposed to full) time employed" and "being less involved in religious organisations when religious service attendance is not a control variable"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1981	r= -.137, p= .099	x	x	r= -.915, p= .010
1995	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x
2012	r= .105, p= .068	x	x	x

Appendix 366

Correlations between "women being part (as opposed to full) time employed" and "having attended peaceful demonstrations during the last five years"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
2005	x	x	r= -.177, p= .048	x
2012	x	x	x	x

Appendix 367

Correlations between "women being part (as opposed to full) time employed" and "having joined in boycotts during the last five years"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
2005	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x

Appendix 368

Correlations between "women being part (as opposed to full) time employed" and "having signed petitions during the last five years"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
2005	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x

Appendix 369

Correlations between "women being part (as opposed to full) time employed" and "being uninterested in politics"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1995	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x

Appendix 370

Correlations between "women being part (as opposed to full) time employed" and "having less confidence in the UN"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1995	r= -.077, p= .092	x	x	x
2005	x	r= -.171, p= .072	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x

Appendix 371

Correlations between "women being part (as opposed to full) time employed" and "having less confidence in the civil service"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1981	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x

Appendix 372

Correlations between "women being part (as opposed to full) time employed" and "having less confidence in political parties"

	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1995	x	x	x	x
2005	r= -.128, p= .020	x	r= -.179, p= .044	x
2012	x	r= .207, p= .077	x	x

Appendix 373

Correlations between "women being part (as opposed to full) time employed" and "having less confidence in police"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1981	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	r= -.127, p= .080	x
2005	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x

Appendix 374

Correlations between "women being part (as opposed to full) time employed" and "having less confidence in labour unions"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1981	x	x	x	x
1995	r= -.080, p= .079	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x

Appendix 375

Correlations between "women being part (as opposed to full) time employed" and "having less confidence in TV"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1995	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x

Appendix 376

Correlations between "women being part (as opposed to full) time employed" and "having less confidence in the press"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1981	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	r= .248, p= .050

2005	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x

Appendix 377

Correlations between "women being part (as opposed to full) time employed" and "having less confidence in the legal system"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1981	x	x	x	x
1995	r= -.110, p= .015	x	r= -.134, p= .069	x
2005	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x

Appendix 378

Correlations between "women being part (as opposed to full) time employed" and "having less confidence in the Armed Forces"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1981	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	r= .204, p= .087
2012	x	x	x	x

Appendix 379

Correlations between "women being part (as opposed to full) time employed" and "having less confidence in churches"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1981	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x

Appendix 380

Correlations between "women being part (as opposed to full) time employed" and "having less confidence in charitable/humanitarian organisations"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
2005	x	x	x	x

2012	x	x	x	x

Appendix 381

Correlations between "women being part (as opposed to full) time employed" and "having less confidence in banks"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
2012	x	x	x	x

Appendix 382

Correlations between "women being part (as opposed to full) time employed" and "having less confidence in the environmental movement"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
2005	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x

Appendix 383

Correlations between "women being part (as opposed to full) time employed" and "believing that one's country is run for the benefit of all people, rather than for a few big interests"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1995	x	x	x	x

Appendix 384

Correlations between "women being part (as opposed to full) time employed" and "believing that accepting bribes in the course of one's duties is justifiable"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1981	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x
2012	r= .112, p= .050	x	x	r= .208, p= .019

Appendix 385

Correlations between "women being part (as opposed to full) time employed" and "believing that buying something you knew was stolen is justifiable"

	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1981	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x

Appendix 386

Correlations between "women being part (as opposed to full) time employed" and "believing that cheating on taxes if you have the chance is justifiable"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1981	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x

Appendix 387

Correlations between "women being part (as opposed to full) time employed" and "believing that avoiding fares on public transport is justifiable"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1981	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x
2012	r= .128, p= .026	x	r= .236, p= .034	r= .154, p= .084

Appendix 388

Correlations between "women being part (as opposed to full) time employed" and "believing that claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled is justifiable"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1981	x	x	x	x
1995	r= .079, p= .079	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x

Appendix 389

Correlations between "women being part (as opposed to full) time employed" and "believing that stealing property is justifiable"

	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
2012	x	x	x	r= .193, p= .030

Appendix 390

Correlations between "women being part (as opposed to full) time employed" and "having less confidence in major companies"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1981	x	x	x	r= -.998, p= .040
1995				
2005	r= -.108, p= .052	x	r= -.198, p= .026	x
2012	x	x	x	x

Appendix 391

Correlations between "women being part (as opposed to full) time employed" and "being less involved in charitable organisations"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1981	x	x	x	r= -1.000, p= .017
1995	x	r= .117, p= .091	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x

Appendix 392

Correlations between "women being part (as opposed to full) time employed" and "being less involved in professional associations"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1981	x	x	x	x
1995	r= .095, p= .034	x	x	r= .228, p= .078
2005	r= -.131, p= .019	x	r= -.177, p= .047	x
2012	x	x	x	x

Appendix 393

Correlations between "women being part (as opposed to full) time employed" and "being less involved in art, music and educational organisations"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64

1981	x	x	x	x
1995	r= -.083, p= .063	r= -.143, p= .038	x	x
2005	r= .145, p= .009	x	r= .197, p= .027	x
2012	r= .119, p= .038	x	r= .218, p= .051	x

Appendix 394

Correlations between "women being part (as opposed to full) time employed" and "being less involved in sport recreational organisations"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1995	x	x	x	x
2005	r= .143, p= .010	x	r= .187, p= .036	x
2012	r= -.122, p= .033	r= -.345, p= .003	x	x

Appendix 395

Correlations between "women being part (as opposed to full) time employed" and "having less confidence in parliament"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1981	x	x	x	x
1995	r= -.093, p= .041	x	x	x
2005	r= -.138, p= .012	x	r= -.210, p= .018	x
2012	x	r= .240, p= .039	x	x

Appendix 396

Correlations between "women being part (as opposed to full) time employed" and "having less confidence in the national government"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1995	r= -.107, p= .018	x	x	x
2005	r= -.157, p= .004	x	r= -.200, p= .023	x
2012	x	x	x	x

Appendix 397

Correlations between "women being part (as opposed to full) time employed" and "having less confidence in the legal system"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1981	x	x	x	x

1995	r= -.110, p= .015	x	r= -.134, p= .069	x
2005	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x

Appendix 398

Correlations between "women being part (as opposed to full) time employed" and "Not being willing to pay higher taxes to help poorer countries"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1995	x	r= -.122, p= .081	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x

Appendix 399

Correlations between "women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)" and "believing that most people 'cannot' be trusted"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1981	x	x	x	x
1995	r= .105, p= .024	x	r= .177, p= .027	x
2005	r= .171, p= .013	x	r= .289, p= .013	x
2012	x	x	x	r= .196, p= .068

Appendix 400

Correlations between "women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)" and "having less confidence in the UN"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1995	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x

Appendix 401

Correlations between "women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)" and "having less confidence in the civil service"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1981	x	x	x	r= .479, p= .006
1995	x	x	x	x

2005	r= .137, p= .050	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x

Appendix 402

Correlations between "women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)" and "having less confidence in parliament"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1981	x	x	x	r= .347, p= .048
1995	r= .156, p= .001	r= .143, p= .064	r= .269, p= .001	x
2005	r= .158, p= .023	x	r= .253, p= .031	x
2012	x	x	x	x

Appendix 403

Correlations between "women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)" and "having less confidence in political parties"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1995	x	x	r= .133, p= .100	x
2005	r= .146, p= .035	r= .261, p= .041	x	x
2012	r= .135, p= .096	x	x	r= .233, p= .032

Appendix 404

Correlations between "women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)" and "having less confidence in the national government"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1995	r= .108, p= .022	x	x	x
2005	r= .173, p= .013	x	r= .288, p= .013	x
2012	x	x	x	x

Appendix 405

Correlations between "women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)" and "having less confidence in labour unions"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1981	x	x	x	r= .375, p= .031
1995	x	x	x	x

2005	x	x	x	x
2012	r= .266, p= .001	x	x	r= .284, p= .009

Appendix 406

Correlations between "women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)" and "having less confidence in the legal system"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1981	x	x	x	r= .333, p= .059
1995	r= .097, p= .039	x	r= .140, p= .088	x
2005	x	x	r= .202, p= .086	x
2012	x	x	x	x

Appendix 407

Correlations between "women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)" and "having less confidence in major companies"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1981	r= .157, p= .035	x	x	r= .315, p= .079
1995				
2005	r= .135, p= .054	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x

Appendix 408

Correlations between "women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)" and "having less confidence in charitable/humanitarian organisations"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
2005	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x

Appendix 409

Correlations between "women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)" and "being uninterested in politics"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1995	r= .084, p= .071	x	x	x
2005	r= -.129, p= .063	x	r= -.197, p= .091	x
2012	x	r= -.381, p= .050	x	x

Appendix 410

Correlations between "women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)" and "having less confidence in the police"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1981	x	r= -.201, p= .088	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x

Appendix 411

Correlations between "women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)" and "having less confidence in TV"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1995	r= -.079, p= .090	x	x	r= -.286, p= .026
2005	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x

Appendix 412

Correlations between "women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)" and "having less confidence in the press"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1981	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x

Appendix 413

Correlations between "women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)" and "having less confidence in the Armed Forces"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1981	x	x	x	r= .319, p= .075
1995	x	x	r= .202, p= .013	x
2005	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x

Appendix 414

Correlations between "women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)" and "having less confidence in churches"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1981	x	x	r= -.231, p= .100	x
1995	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	r= -.242, p= .083
2012	x	x	x	x

Appendix 415

Correlations between "women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)" and "having less confidence in banks"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
2012	x	x	x	x

Appendix 416

Correlations between "women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)" and "having less confidence in the environmental movement"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
2005	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x

Appendix 417

Correlations between "women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)" and "being less involved in charitable organisations"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1981	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x

Appendix 418

Correlations between "women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)" and "being less involved in environmental organisations"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1981	x	x	r= -.293, p= .035	x
1995	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x
2012	r= -.155, p= .053	x	x	x

Appendix 419

Correlations between "women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)" and "being less involved in art, music and educational organisations"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1981	x	x	x	x
1995	r= .085, p= .066	r= .172, p= .023	x	x
2005	r= -.125, p= .079	x	r= -.217, p= .065	x
2012	x	x	x	x

Appendix 420

Correlations between "women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)" and "being less involved in sport/recreational organisations"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1995	x	x	x	x
2005	x	r= -.272, p= .032	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x

Appendix 421

Correlations between "women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)" and "being less involved in church/religious organisations"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1981	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	r= -.284, p= .015	x
2012	x	x	x	x

Appendix 422

Correlations between "women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)" and "being less involved in consumer organisations"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
2005	x	r= -.214, p= .097	x	x
2012	x	x	r= .302, p= .065	x

Appendix 423

Correlations between "women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)" and "being less involved in political parties"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1981	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x
2012	r= -.181, p= .023	x	x	x

Appendix 424

Correlations between "women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)" and "being less involved in labour unions"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1981	r= .201, p= .006	r= .390, p= .001	x	r= .504, p= .003
1995	r= .299, p= .000	r= .172, p= .023	r= .363, p= .000	r= .220, p= .088
2005	r= -.297, p= .000	r= -.235, p= .068	r= -.325, p= .005	r= -.345, p= .018
2012	r= -.274, p= .001	x	r= -.332, p= .042	r= -.242, p= .023

Appendix 425

Correlations between "women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)" and "Not discussing politics with friends and work colleagues"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1981	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x
2005	r= .125, p= .074	x	r= .325, p= .005	x
2012	x	x	x	x

Appendix 426

Correlations between "women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)" and "having attended peaceful demonstrations in the previous five years"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
2005	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x

Appendix 427

Correlations between "women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)" and "having joined boycotts in the previous five years"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
2005	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x

Appendix 428

Correlations between "women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)" and "having signed petitions in the previous five years"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
2005	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x

Appendix 429

Correlations between "women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)" and "Not being willing to pay higher taxes to help poorer countries"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1995	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x

Appendix 430

Correlations between "women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)" and "believing that accepting bribes in the course of one's duties in justifiable"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1981	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x

2012	x	x	r= .318, p= .051	x

Appendix 431

Correlations between "women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)" and "believing that buying something you knew was stolen is justifiable"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1981	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x

Appendix 432

Correlations between "women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)" and "believing that cheating on taxes if you have a chance is justifiable"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1981	x	x	x	x
1995	r= -.117, p= .011	x	x	r= -.233, p= .070
2005	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x

Appendix 433

Correlations between "women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)" and "believing that avoiding a fare on public transport is justifiable"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1981	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x

Appendix 434

Correlations between "women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)" and "believing that claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled is justifiable"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1981	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x

2012	x	x	x	x

Appendix 435

Correlations between "women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)" and "believing that stealing property is justifiable"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
2012	x	x	x	x

Appendix 436

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "unhappiness"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	r= -.086, p= .003	r= -.131, p= .045	r= -.135, p= .012	x	r= -.128, p= .074
2012	r= -.119, p= .000	r= -.171, p= .022	x	r= -.130, p= .015	r= -.167, p= .027

Appendix 437

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "Life Satisfaction"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	r= .131, p= .045	x	x	x
2012	r= .075, p= .020	x	x	r= .118, p= .028	x

Appendix 438

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "being uninterested in politics"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	r= -.069, p= .019	x	r= -.152, p= .005	x	x
2012	r= -.127, p= .000	r= -.214, p= .004	x	r= -.114, p= .033	x

Appendix 439

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "Disagreeing that when jobs are scarce men should have more right to a

job than women"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	x	r= .128, p= .018	x	x
2012	r= .093, p= .004	x	x	r= .100, p= .062	r= .140, p= .068

Appendix 440

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "Disagreeing that when jobs are scarce employers should give priority to Australians over immigrants"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	r= .065, p= .027	r= .128, p= .051	r= .139, p= .010	x	x
2012	r= .090, p= .006	r= .217, p= .004	x	x	x

Appendix 441

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "Not believing in the importance of children learning imagination"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	r= -.108, p= .000	x	r= -.144, p= .007	x	x
2012	r= -.054, p= .098	x	x	r= -.103, p= .054	x

Appendix 442

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "Not believing in the importance of children learning self-expression"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2012	r= -.077, p= .017	x	x	x	r= -.127, p= .093

Appendix 443

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "Believing that children do 'not' need both a mother and a father to grow up happily"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 444

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "disapproving of women wanting a child as a single parent without a stable relationship with a man"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	x	x	r= -.112, p= .039	x

Appendix 445

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "believing that suicide is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	r= .053, p= .072	x	x	r= .129, p= .017	x
2012	x	r= .153, p= .042	x	x	x

Appendix 446

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "believing that euthanasia is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 447

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "believing that divorce is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	r= .064, p= .049	x	x	r= .144, p= .007	x

Appendix 448

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "believing that abortion is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	r= .055, p= .061	x	r= .124, p= .022	x	x
2012	r= .066, p= .043	x	x	r= .091, p= .090	x

Appendix 449

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "believing that prostitution is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	r= .089, p= .002	r= .177, p= .007	r= .121, p= .025	x	x
2012	r= .105, p= .001	x	x	r= .147, p= .006	x

Appendix 450

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "believing that homosexuality is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	r= .098, p= .001	x	r= .155, p= .004	r= .156, p= .004	x
2012	r= .097, p= .003	x	r= .121, p= .072	r= .143, p= .008	x

Appendix 451

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "believing that sex before marriage is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2012	r= .091, p= .005	x	x	r= .135, p= .012	x

Appendix 452

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "being less involved in professional associations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	r= .138, p= .000	r= .126, p= .057	x	r= .197, p= .000	r= .168, p= .028
2012	r= .142, p= .000	x	r= .166, p= .013	r= .129, p= .017	r= .194, p= .013

Appendix 453

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "being less involved in art, music and educational organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+

2005	r= .136, p= .000	r= .127, p= .054	r= .130, p= .018	r= .158, p= .005	r= .133, p= .083
2012	r= .151, p= .000	r= .134, p= .074	r= .140, p= .036	r= .191, p= .000	r= .162, p= .039

Appendix 454

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "being less involved in charitable organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	r= .051, p= .091	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 455

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "being less involved in environmental organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	r= .067, p= .027	r= .120, p= .069	x	r= .121, p= .030	x
2012	r= .167, p= .000	r= .207, p= .006	r= .163, p= .015	r= .145, p= .007	x

Appendix 456

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "Not being willing to pay higher taxes to help poorer countries"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	r= -.051, p= .088	x	x	r= -.127, p= .018	x

Appendix 457

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "having less confidence in labour unions"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	r= .070, p= .032	x	x	x	x

Appendix 458

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if

currently not employed) or current work" and "having less confidence in TV"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	r= .070, p= .018	x	x	x	r= .188, p= .008
2012	r= .107, p= .001	x	x	r= .171, p= .002	x

Appendix 459

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "having less confidence in the press"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	r= .118, p= .071	x	x	r= .142, p= .046
2012	x	x	x	r= .101, p= .061	x

Appendix 460

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "having less confidence in Armed Forces"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	r= .063, p= .032	r= .134, p= .041	x	x	x
2012	r= .066, p= .042	r= .163, p= .031	x	x	x

Appendix 461

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "having less confidence in Churches					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	r= .055, p= .062	r= .150, p= .022	x	x	r= .177, p= .013
2012	r= .063, p= .052	x	x	x	r= .197, p= .009

Appendix 462

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "having less confidence in Banks"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2012	r= .081, p= .013	r= .156, p= .038	x	r= .099, p= .068	x

Appendix 463

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "being less involved in church/religious organisations when religious service attendance is not a control variable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	x	r= -.145, p= .008	x	x
2012	r= -.057, p= .076	x	x	x	x

Appendix 464

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "believing that accepting bribes in the course of one's duties is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	r= -.148, p= .049	r= .144, p= .032	x	r= .219, p= .004

Appendix 465

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "believing that cheating on taxes if you have a chance is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	x	x	x	r= -.195, p= .006
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 466

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "believing that avoiding a fare on public transport is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	x	r= .143, p= .008	x	r= -.137, p= .054
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 467

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "believing that claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	x	r= .117, p= .030	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 468

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "believing that stealing property is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2012	r= .066, p= .043	x	x	x	r= .127, p= .097

Appendix 469

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "believing that most people 'cannot' be trusted"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	r= -.095, p= .077	x

Appendix 470

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "Not being proud to be Australian"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	r= .086, p= .008	r= .187, p= .013	x	x	x

Appendix 471

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "having attended peaceful demonstrations in the previous five years"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	r= .631, p= .012	r= -.378, p= .010	r= -.180, p= .075	x

Appendix 472

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "having joined in boycotts in the previous five years"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	r= .086, p= .004	x	x	r= .150, p= .005	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 473

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "having signed petitions in the previous five years"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	r= .186, p= .052	x	x	x

Appendix 474

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "believing that euthanasia is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 475

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "Believing that children do 'not' need both a mother and a father to grow up happily"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 476

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "disapproving of women wanting a child as a single parent without a stable relationship with a man"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	x	x	r= -.112, p= .039	x

Appendix 477

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "being less involved in political parties"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	r= .156, p= .037	x	x	x

Appendix 478

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "being less involved in labour unions"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 479

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "being less involved in consumer organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	x	r= .110, p= .046	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 480

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "being less involved in sport and recreational organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	x	x	x	x

2012	r= .061, p= .061	x	x	x	x

Appendix 481

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "having less confidence in the UN"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	r= .051, p= .085	x	x	r= .128, p= .017	x
2012	x	r= .128, p= .090	x	x	x

Appendix 482

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "having less confidence in the civil service"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	x	r= -.102, p= .059	x	x
2012	r= .071, p= .028	x	x	r= .090, p= .099	r= .138, p= .072

Appendix 483

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "having less confidence in parliament"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	x	r= -.100, p= .067	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 484

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "having less confidence in political parties"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 485

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "having less confidence in the national government"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	r= .117, p= .074	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 486

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if

currently not employed) or current work" and "having less confidence in police"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	r= .146, p= .052	x	x	x

Appendix 487

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "having less confidence in the legal system"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	x	r= -.209, p= .000	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 488

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "having less confidence in major companies"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	r= .092, p= .002	r= .170, p= .009	x	x	r= .252, p= .000
2012	x	r= .215, p= .004	x	x	x

Appendix 489

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "having less confidence in charitable/humanitarian organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	x	x	x	r= .118, p= .099
2012	r= .071, p= .029	x	x	x	x

Appendix 490

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "having less confidence in the environmental protection movement"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	x	r= -.130, p= .017	x	r= .165, p= .021
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 491

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "Not believing in the importance of children learning obedience"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	x	x	r= .098, p= .068	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 492

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "Not believing in the importance of children learning unselfishness"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 493

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "Not believing in the importance of children learning religious faith"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	r= .120, p= .066	x	x	r= -.136, p= .055
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 494

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "Not believing in the importance of children learning determination/perseverance"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	r= -.063, p= .051	x	x	x	x

Appendix 495

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "Not believing in the importance of children learning thrift"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 496

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "Not believing in the importance of children learning tolerance"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 497

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "Not believing in the importance of children learning responsibility"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 498

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "Not believing in the importance of children learning hard work"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 499

Correlations between "having performed or having to perform mostly creative (rather than routine) tasks for previous (if currently not employed) or current work" and "Not believing in the importance of children learning independence"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 500

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "believing that most people 'cannot' be trusted"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	r= -.140, p= .000	r= -.110, p= .005	r= -.180, p= .000	r= -.208, p= .000	r= -.099, p= .095
2005	r= -.160, p= .000	r= -.197, p= .002	r= -.151, p= .004	r= -.187, p= .000	r= -.149, p= .030
2012	r= -.172, p= .000	x	r= -.168, p= .011	r= -.186, p= .000	r= -.201, p= .006

Appendix 501

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "being politically uninterested"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	r= -.274, p= .000	r= -.251, p= .000	r= -.288, p= .000	r= -.276, p= .000	r= -.239, p= .000
2005	r= -.134, p= .000	r= -.214, p= .001	r= -.148, p= .005	r= -.125, p= .018	x
2012	r= -.183, p= .000	r= -.185, p= .013	x	r= -.227, p= .000	r= -.169, p= .022

Appendix 502

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "Not discussing politics with friends and work colleagues"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= -.199, p= .000	r= -.237, p= .000	r= -.195, p= .021	x	x
1995	r= -.255, p= .000	r= -.244, p= .000	r= -.288, p= .000	r= -.254, p= .000	r= -.239, p= .009
2005	r= -.077, p= .008	x	r= -.210, p= .000	x	x
2012	r= -.060, p= .061	x	x	r= -.135, p= .011	x

Appendix 503

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "Not being willing to pay higher taxes to help poorer countries"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	r= -.176, p= .000	r= -.162, p= .000	r= -.206, p= .000	r= -.175, p= .001	r= -.119, p= .043
2005	r= -.164, p= .000	r= -.235, p= .000	r= -.180, p= .001	r= -.148, p= .005	x

Appendix 504

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "believing that one does not have the duty to respect and love parents who have not earned it by their behaviour and attitudes"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	r= .150, p= .000	r= .107, p= .006	r= .173, p= .000	r= .213, p= .000	r= .133, p= .025

Appendix 505

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "believing that parents should have a life of their own and should not be asked to sacrifice their own well-being for the sake of their children"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	r= .082, p= .000	x	r= .092, p= .033	x	x

Appendix 506

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "believing that children do 'not' need both a mother and father to grow up happily"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	r= .198, p= .040	x	x
1995	r= .053, p= .021	x	x	x	r= .107, p= .070
2005	r= .068, p= .019	x	x	x	x

Appendix 507

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "thinking that women do 'not' have to have children to be fulfilled"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	r= -.238, p= .065	x	x	r= .434, p= .044
1995	x	x	x	r= .124, p= .028	r= .102, p= .097

Appendix 508

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "disapproving of women wanting a child as a single parent without a stable relationship with a man"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	r= -.054, p= .063	x	x	x	x

Appendix 509

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "thinking that a working mother 'cannot' establish as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	r= -.055, p= .014	r= -.077, p= .047	r= -.104, p= .017	x	x

Appendix 510

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "believing that suicide is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= .166, p= .000	r= .154, p= .024	r= .187, p= .029	x	x
1995	r= .124, p= .000	x	r= .191, p= .000	r= .272, p= .000	x
2005	r= .136, p= .000	x	r= .155, p= .003	x	r= .254, p= .000
2012	r= .158, p= .000	x	r= .227, p= .001	r= .181, p= .001	x

Appendix 511

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "believing that euthanasia is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	r= .065, p= .005	x	r= .125, p= .004	x	x
2005	r= .066, p= .022	x	x	x	r= .205, p= .003

Appendix 512

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "believing that divorce is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	r= .151, p= .000	x	r= .231, p= .000	r= .234, p= .000	x
2005	r= .182, p= .000	r= .113, p= .079	x	r= .186, p= .000	r= .345, p= .000
2012	r= .142, p= .000	x	x	r= .114, p= .032	r= .227, p= .002

Appendix 513

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "believing that abortion is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= .104, p= .018	x	x	x	r= .398, p= .008
1995	r= .166, p= .000	r= .078, p= .044	r= .243, p= .000	r= .207, p= .000	r= .133, p= .026
2005	r= .160, p= .000	r= .152, p= .019	x	r= .125, p= .018	r= .333, p= .000
2012	r= .181, p= .000	r= .199, p= .008	r= .211, p= .001	r= .114, p= .032	r= .185, p= .012

Appendix 514

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "believing that prostitution is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+

1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	r= .168, p= .000	r= .110, p= .004	r= .209, p= .000	r= .253, p= .000	r= .108, p= .068
2005	r= .122, p= .000	x	r= .169, p= .001	r= .130, p= .014	r= .139, p= .047
2012	r= .059, p= .066	x	x	x	r= .122, p= .098

Appendix 515

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "believing that homosexuality is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= .178, p= .000	r= .120, p= .085	r= .261, p= .002	x	x
1995	r= .252, p= .000	r= .203, p= .000	r= .296, p= .000	r= .342, p= .000	r= .162, p= .006
2005	r= .213, p= .000	r= .236, p= .000	r= .195, p= .000	r= .204, p= .000	r= .209, p= .003
2012	r= .163, p= .000	x	r= .147, p= .028	r= .120, p= .025	r= .278, p= .000

Appendix 516

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "believing that sex before marriage is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2012	r= .135, p= .000	x	r= .145, p= .028	r= .119, p= .026	r= .162, p= .028

Appendix 517

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "Disagreeing that when jobs are scarce men should have more right to a job than women"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	r= .103, p= .000	x	r= .149, p= .001	r= .205, p= .000	x
2005	r= .085, p= .003	r= .158, p= .014	x	x	r= .147, p= .033
2012	r= .114, p= .000	x	r= .136, p= .040	x	r= .257, p= .000

Appendix 518

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "Disagreeing that when jobs are scarce older people should be forced to retire from work early"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	r= .130, p= .000	r= .112, p= .004	r= .139, p= .001	r= .229, p= .000	x

Appendix 519

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "Disagreeing that when jobs are scarce employers should give priority to Australians over immigrants"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	r= .176, p= .000	r= .130, p= .001	r= .146, p= .001	r= .325, p= .000	r= .119, p= .046
2005	r= .114, p= .000	r= .168, p= .009	r= .138, p= .010	r= .104, p= .049	x
2012	r= .185, p= .000	x	r= .140, p= .035	r= .233, p= .000	r= .229, p= .002

Appendix 520

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "believing that one should follow one's superior's instructions only when one is convinced that they are right"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	r= .108, p= .000	r= .136, p= .000	r= .135, p= .002	r= .092, p= .086	x

Appendix 521

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "Not believing in the importance of children learning imagination"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= -.138, p= .002	r= -.189, p= .006	r= -.140, p= .099	x	x
1995	r= -.137, p= .000	r= -.122, p= .001	r= -.165, p= .000	x	r= -.183, p= .002
2005	r= -.075, p= .009	x	r= -.094, p= .076	x	x
2012	r= -.084, p= .009	x	x	r= -.088, p= .098	r= -.143, p= .051

Appendix 522

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "Not believing in the importance of children learning self-expression"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2012	r= -.067, p= .037	x	x	x	r= -.125, p= .088

Appendix 523

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "Not believing in the importance of children learning obedience"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	r= .124, p= .000	r= .106, p= .006	r= .116, p= .007	r= .117, p= .028	r= .105, p= .074
2005	r= .187, p= .000	r= .129, p= .046	r= .177, p= .001	r= .261, p= .000	r= .126, p= .067
2012	r= .192, p= .000	r= .261, p= .000	r= .140, p= .034	r= .170, p= .001	r= .247, p= .001

Appendix 524

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "Not believing in the importance of children learning thrift"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	r= .088, p= .000	x	r= .074, p= .086	r= .131, p= .014	r= .104, p= .077
2005	r= .132, p= .000	r= .209, p= .001	r= .193, p= .000	r= .117, p= .027	x
2012	r= .175, p= .000	r= .260, p= .000	r= .140, p= .035	r= .109, p= .039	r= .285, p= .000

Appendix 525

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "Not believing in the importance of children learning hard work"

	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	r= .044, p= .050	x	r= .087, p= .044	x	x
2005	r= .085, p= .003	x	r= .103, p= .054	r= .098, p= .064	x
2012	r= .146, p= .000	r= .152, p= .041	r= .144, p= .030	r= .131, p= .013	r= .171, p= .019

Appendix 526

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "Not being proud to be Australian"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= .077, p= .089	x	x	x	x
1995	r= .123, p= .000	r= .113, p= .004	r= .089, p= .039	r= .097, p= .069	r= .170, p= .004
2005	r= .090, p= .002	x	r= .111, p= .036	r= .116, p= .029	x
2012	r= .164, p= .000	x	r= .121, p= .067	r= .161, p= .002	r= .246, p= .001

Appendix 527

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "believing that accepting bribes in the course of one's duties is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	r= -.042, p= .062	x	x	x	r= -.098, p= .097
2005	r= -.062, p= .034	x	x	r= -.138, p= .010	x
2012	x	r= .130, p= .083	x	x	x

Appendix 528

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "believing that buying something you knew was stolen is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	r= -.301, p= .047
1995	r= -.058, p= .010	x	x	x	x

Appendix 529

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "believing that cheating on taxes if you have a chance is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x	r= -.101, p= .085
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	r= .142, p= .058	x	x	x

Appendix 530

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "believing that avoiding a fare on public transport is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	r= -.333, p= .027
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	r= .119, p= .084
2012	r= .109, p= .001	r= .142, p= .057	x	r= .144, p= .006	x

Appendix 531

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "believing that claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	r= -.089, p= .000	x	r= -.124, p= .004	x	r= -.099, p= .092
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 532

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "believing that stealing property is justifiable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2012	r= .109, p= .001	r= .143, p= .056	x	r= .172, p= .001	x

Appendix 533

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "having attended peaceful demonstrations in the previous five years"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	r= .133, p= .000	r= .122, p= .060	r= .156, p= .003	r= .126, p= .018	x
2012	x	x	r= -.272, p= .067	x	x

Appendix 534

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "having joined in boycotts in the previous five years"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	r= .133, p= .000	x	r= .152, p= .004	r= .117, p= .028	r= .196, p= .005
2012	r= -.133, p= .088	x	x	x	x

Appendix 535

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "having signed petitions in the previous five years"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	r= .125, p= .000	x	r= .094, p= .077	r= .158, p= .003	r= .126, p= .066

2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 536

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "having less confidence in the UN"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	r= .106, p= .051	x
2005	r= -.068, p= .019	r= -.148, p= .022	x	x	x
2012	r= -.064, p= .047	x	x	r= -.093, p= .082	x

Appendix 537

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "having less confidence in the civil service"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	r= .122, p= .077	x	x	x
1995	x	x	r= -.089, p= .043	x	x
2005	r= -.069, p= .017	x	x	x	r= -.142, p= .040
2012	r= -.156, p= .000	x	r= -.144, p= .030	r= -.218, p= .000	x

Appendix 538

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "having less confidence in parliament"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	r= -.148, p= .000	r= -.161, p= .000	r= -.231, p= .000	r= -.110, p= .041	r= -.123, p= .038
2005	r= -.145, p= .000	r= -.164, p= .000	x	r= -.112, p= .034	r= -.290, p= .000
2012	r= -.189, p= .000	r= -.230, p= .002	r= -.205, p= .002	r= -.209, p= .000	x

Appendix 539

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "having less confidence in political parties"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	r= -.056, p= .015	r= -.139, p= .000	r= -.098, p= .025	x	x
2005	r= -.059, p= .042	r= -.116, p= .071	x	x	r= -.136, p= .050
2012	r= -.088, p= .006	x	x	r= -.098, p= .069	x

Appendix 540

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "having less confidence in the national government"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	r= -.102, p= .000	r= -.180, p= .000	r= -.183, p= .000	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	r= -.119, p= .088
2012	r= -.160, p= .000	x	r= -.227, p= .001	r= -.194, p= .000	x

Appendix 541

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "having less confidence in police"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	r= .138, p= .043	x	x	x
1995	r= .074, p= .001	x	x	r= .195, p= .000	r= .114, p= .054
2005	r= .057, p= .051	x	r= .105, p= .049	x	x
2012	r= .116, p= .000	x	x	r= .125, p= .019	r= .220, p= .003

Appendix 542

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "having less confidence in labour unions"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	r= -.146, p= .033	x	r= .240, p= .027	x
1995	r= -.041, p= .073	x	r= -.137, p= .002	x	x
2005	r= -.064, p= .028	x	r= -.090, p= .094	r= -.128, p= .015	x
2012	r= -.054, p= .097	x	x	r= -.108, p= .045	x

Appendix 543

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "having less confidence in TV"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	r= .107, p= .000	x	x	r= .102, p= .059	r= .154, p= .009
2005	r= .106, p= .000	x	r= .139, p= .009	r= .143, p= .007	x
2012	x	x	r= .152, p= .022	x	x

Appendix 544

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "having less confidence in the press"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	r= -.143, p= .095	r= .243, p= .026	x
1995	x	r= -.080, p= .038	x	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	r= -.150, p= .045	x	r= -.132, p= .013	x

Appendix 545

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "having less confidence in the legal system"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	r= -.047, p= .040	r= -.093, p= .016	r= -.090, p= .039	x	x
2005	r= -.082, p= .005	r= -.134, p= .037	x	r= -.088, p= .095	x
2012	r= -.147, p= .000	r= -.192, p= .010	r= -.253, p= .000	r= -.127, p= .018	x

Appendix 546

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "having less confidence in the Armed forces"

	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= .163, p= .000	r= .256, p= .000	x	x	x
1995	r= .086, p= .000	x	r= .119, p= .006	r= .161, p= .003	x
2005	r= .119, p= .000	x	r= .105, p= .049	r= .155, p= .003	x
2012	r= .148, p= .000	x	x	r= .137, p= .010	r= .205, p= .005

Appendix 547

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "having less confidence in churches"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	r= .251, p= .096
1995	x	x	x	r= .100, p= .063	x
2005	x	x	x	r= .096, p= .069	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 548

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "having less confidence in charitable/humanitarian organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	r= -.086, p= .003	x	r= -.102, p= .057	r= -.135, p= .011	x
2012	r= -.131, p= .000	x	r= -.179, p= .007	r= -.173, p= .001	r= -.147, p= .046

Appendix 549

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "having less confidence in the environmental protection movement"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	r= -.065, p= .025	x	r= -.109, p= .041	r= -.132, p= .012	x
2012	r= -.110, p= .001	x	x	r= -.165, p= .002	x

Appendix 550

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "having less confidence in banks"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 551

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "being less involved in charitable organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= -.093, p= .032	r= -.236, p= .000	x	x	x
1995	r= -.067, p= .003	x	r= -.078, p= .071	x	x
2005	r= .121, p= .000	x	x	r= .108, p= .048	r= .191, p= .007
2012	r= .100, p= .002	r= .138, p= .064	x	x	x

Appendix 552

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "being less involved in professional associations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= -.309, p= .000	r= -.333, p= .000	r= -.350, p= .000	x	x
1995	r= -.292, p= .000	r= -.227, p= .000	r= -.333, p= .000	r= -.311, p= .000	r= -.275, p= .000
2005	r= .203, p= .000	x	r= .170, p= .002	r= .236, p= .000	r= .177, p= .017
2012	r= .334, p= .000	r= .340, p= .000	r= .326, p= .000	r= .339, p= .000	r= .269, p= .000

Appendix 553

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "being less involved in environmental organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= -.076, p= .083	x	x	x	x
1995	r= -.104, p= .000	x	r= -156, p= .000	r= -.195, p= .000	x
2005	r= .099, p= .001	x	r= .118, p= .028	r= .098, p= .074	r= .126, p= .088
2012	r= .105, p= .001	r= .192, p= .010	x	r= .088, p= .097	x

Appendix 554

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "being less involved in political parties"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= -.081, p= .063	x	r= -.210, p= .013	x	x
1995	r= -.090, p= .000	x	r= -.164, p= .000	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 555

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "being less involved in labour unions"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	r= .062, p= .037	x	x	r= .149, p= .006	x
2012	r= .069, p= .034	x	x	r= .123, p= .021	x

Appendix 556

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "being less involved in art, music and educational organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= -.152, p= .000	x	r= -.254, p= .002	x	x
1995	r= -.207, p= .000	r= -.188, p= .000	r= -.320, p= .000	r= -.216, p= .000	r= -.207, p= .000
2005	r= .211, p= .000	x	r= .202, p= .000	r= .259, p= .000	r= .259, p= .000

2012	r= .238, p= .000	r= .283, p= .000	r= .232, p= .000	r= .232, p= .000	r= .256, p= .001

Appendix 557

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "being less involved in sport/recreational organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	r= -.041, p= .071	r= -.082, p= .032	r= -.075, p= .083	x	x
2005	x	x	x	x	r= .118, p= .098
2012	r= .094, p= .004	x	r= .194, p= .003	r= .104, p= .049	x

Appendix 558

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "being less involved in church/religious organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x	r= -.100, p= .090
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	r= -.119, p= .074	x	x

Appendix 559

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "being less involved in church/religious organisations when religious service attendance is not a control variable"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	r= -.085, p= .015	r= -.112, p= .032	x	x	x
1995	r= -.054, p= .015	r= -.109, p= .005	x	x	x
2005	r= .058, p= .048	x	x	x	x
2012	r= .145, p= .000	x	x	r= .147, p= .006	r= .258, p= .000

Appendix 560

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "being less involved in consumer organisations"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
2005	x	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 561

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "unhappiness"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	r= -.190, p= .005	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x	r= -.111, p= .059
2005	r= -.064, p= .027	x	r= -.113, p= .033	x	x

2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 562

Correlations between "having a higher level of formal education" and "Life Satisfaction"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	x	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	x	x
2005	r= .051, p= .079	x	x	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 563

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who rated their "feelings of autonomy" between 1 and 7 out of 10 i.e. feeling less autonomous					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	49.1	48.7	49.6	46.3	46.3
1995	41.3	42.8	43.1	41.3	33.8
2005	39.8	40.1	43.0	39.1	36.1
2012	34.5	36.1	35.7	35.5	30.9

Appendix 564

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who believed it was important for children to learn thrift					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	15.5	12.6	13.7	19.0	25.2
1995	18.5	18.2	14.1	20.2	24.0
2005	33.5	26.3	29.9	37.4	38.9
2012	30.7	26.3	24.8	35.3	32.0

Appendix 565

Correlations between "watching more TV" and "believing that most people 'cannot' be trusted"					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1995	x	x	x	x	x

Appendix 566

% of Australian WVS participants within different age groups who attended religious/church services at least once a month					
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1981	39.6	41.4	35.9	39.2	39.8
1995	24.6	19.7	23.6	25.1	32.4
2005	20.9	12.4	15.0	20.0	36.8
2012	19.2	16.7	14.6	15.4	29.1

Appendix 567

Correlations between "women being housewives (as opposed to working part-time)" and "believing that one's country is run for the benefit of all people, rather than for a few big interests"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1995	x	x	x	x

Appendix 568

Political participation and conflict avoidance: how network homogeneity affects the electoral and party engagement of Australian youth

Q1: What is your survey participation code number?

Q2: What is your date of birth

Q3: Which of the following best represents your ethnic heritage?

White/Caucasian; Australian Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander;
Black/Sub-Saharan African; Latino or Hispanic; East Asian;
South Asian/Indian Subcontinent; North African, Middle Eastern or Arab;
First Nations of USA, Canada or Greenland; Maori or Pacific Islander

Q4: Which of the following best represent your ancestry?

British; Irish; Italian; French, Greek; German; Chinese; Vietnamese;
other please specify ……

Q5: In which country were you born?

Q6: If you were born overseas, in what year did you first arrive in Australia to live here for one year or more?

Q7: In which country was your mother born?

Q8: In which country was your father born?

Q9: Is English the language you spoke first?

Q10: Do you speak a language other than English?

Q11: There is a difference between tolerance and agreement. You may disagree with beliefs and practices but tolerate them because you believe they are within the realm of legitimate/morally permissible views and behaviours. To what extent do you believe you are tolerant of people holding political views with which you disagree (i.e. how broad is your conception of the realm of legitimate beliefs and practices)?

Extremely tolerant; Very tolerant; Somewhat tolerant; Less tolerant than most; Very intolerant; Extremely intolerant

Q12: What is your Marital Status?

In a De facto relationship lasting more than two years; Never married;
Widowed; Divorced; Separated but not divorced;

Q13: In what city, suburb or town do you reside?

Q14: What is the postcode of your home address?

Q15: When was the last time your usual living address changed?

Q16: What is the approximate distance between your current/usual living address and your last?

Within:
10 minutes walking distance; 10 minutes driving distance;
30 minutes driving distance;
1 hours driving distance; more than 1 hours driving distance;

Reasonably a plane or long train journey is required;

Q17: How many children do you have (including adopted, foster and step children)?

Q18: How many siblings do you have (including adopted, foster and step siblings)?

Q19: Where would you place your mother on the following class scale at the time when you were 12 years old?

Unemployed or part-time-employed welfare recipient
Working class (Factory workers, clerical workers, retail sales, low paid crafts people)
Lower middle class (Semi-professionals and lower managers, craftspeople)
Upper middle class (Professionals and upper managers)
Upper class (Executives of large corporations and very wealthy investors)

Q20: Where would you place your father on the following class scale at the time when you were 12 years old?

Unemployed or part-time-employed welfare recipient
Working class (Factory workers, clerical workers, retail sales, low paid crafts people)
Lower middle class (Semi-professionals and lower managers, craftspeople)
Upper middle class (Professionals and upper managers)
Upper class (Executives of large corporations and very wealthy investors)

Q21: At that time what was the status of your parents' relationship?

Married; in a De Facto relationship; Separated or divorced; Widowed;

Other …… (specify)

Q22: Where would you place yourself on the following class scale?

Married; in a De Facto relationship; Separated or divorced; Widowed;

Other …… (specify)

Q23: Where would you have placed yourself on this class scale seven years ago?

Married; in a De Facto relationship; Separated or divorced; Widowed;

Other …… (specify)

Q24: What is your occupation?

Q25: How many hours per week do you work (includes any additional hours you work for home)?

Q26: What percentage of this time do you work from home?

Q27: To what extent does your work require you work in a team or group?

Always; Nearly always; Often; Occasionally; Rarely; Hardly ever; Never

Q28: How often do you converse with others in your work environment?

Constantly; Often; Occasionally; Rarely; Hardly ever; Never

Q29: How many other people live at your address?

Q30: On average, approximately how many hours do you spend each week looking at screens (TV, phone, computer, tablet and cinema) outside of working hours?

Q31: On average, approximately how many hours do you spend each week listening to music (or other audio) using a single person listening device (eg smartphone, ipod, walkman)?

Q32: On average, approximately how many hours do you spend each week communicating with people using the internet (e.g. sending and receiving emails, social media messages/posts and voice and video calls) outside of work hours?

Q33: Approximately what percentage of this time are you communicating with people who:

- you are unable to see in person on a regular basis due to geographical constraints/distance?
- you first met online?

Q34: What percentage of your close friends have you met initially online?

Q35: If you are currently in a romantic/long term committed relationship did you initially meet your partner online?

Q36: How often each year do you attend a religious service (excluding baptisms, marriages, and funerals)?

Q37: Approximately how many close friends, close work colleagues, close family members and close others do you have these days? Write numbers, not names, in the boxes below. These are people with whom you feel comfortable talking to about serious and private matters and who you can call on for help. Indicate at least 3 but no more than 15 of these people in total. (Write the names of these people on a separate piece of paper. This is for your benefit only. Do not submit this piece of paper with the survey. This list will assist you to answer questions later in the survey)

- Close friends
- Close work colleagues
- Close family members
- other

Q38: If you suddenly needed a small amount of money [RURAL: enough to pay for expenses for your household for one week; URBAN: equal to about one week's wages], how many people beyond your immediate household could you turn to who would be willing to provide this money?

Q39: If you suddenly had to go away for a day or two, could you count on your neighbours to take care of your children? (If you do not have young children imagine you did).

Q40: If you suddenly faced a long-term emergency such as the death of a breadwinner or [RURAL: harvest failure; URBAN: job loss], how many people beyond your immediate household could you turn to who would be willing to assist you?

Q41: In the past 12 months, how many people, close to you, with a significant personal problem have turned to you for assistance in the form of money or shelter?

Q42: In general, do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

- Most people can be trusted.
- You can't be too careful in your dealings with other people.

Q43: How much do you trust the people in these categories?

1. To a very small extent
2. To a small extent
3. Neither small nor great extent
4. To a great extent
5. To a very great extent

People from your ethnic or linguistic group:

People from other ethnic or linguistic groups:

Shopkeepers:

Local government officials:

State government officials:

Federal government officials:

Police:

Teachers:

Nurses and doctors:

Strangers:

Post office staff:

Judges and staff of courts:

Staff of NGOs:

Q44: In the last twelve months did you contribute any time or money to a voluntary charity which does not directly benefit you?

- Time hrs:
- Money $:

Q45: Suppose something unfortunate happened to someone in your town/neighbourhood, such as a serious illness, or the death of a parent. How likely is it that some people in the community would get together to help them?

1. Very likely
2. Somewhat likely
3. Neither likely or unlikely
4. Somewhat unlikely
5. Very unlikely

Q46: How many times in the last month have you read a newspaper, political/news journal or magazine or had one read to you?

Q47: What are your THREE most important sources of information concerning government policy and implementation?

1. Relatives, friends and neighbours
2. Community bulletin board
3. Local market
4. Community or local newspaper
5. National newspaper
6. Radio
7. Television
8. Groups and associates
9. Business or work associates
10. Political associates
11. Community leaders
12. An agent of the government
13. NGOs
14. Internet
15. Political/news Journal or Magazine

Q48: In the last month, how many times have you met with people (outside your immediate family) in a public place either to talk or to have food or drinks?

Q49: In the last month, how many times have people (outside your immediate family) visited you in your home?

Q50: In the last month, how many times have you visited people (outside your immediate family) in their home?

Q51: Were the people you met and visited with mostly

Yes/No

Of different ethnic or linguistic group:

Of different economic status:

Of different social status:

Of different religious group:

Q52: In the last THREE months, how many times have you gotten together with people (outside your immediate family) to play games, sports, or other recreational activities?

Q53: How many times in the past TWELVE months did you participate in a family/friends/community/town/neighbourhood festival or ceremony (wedding, funeral, religious festival, ANZAC day march etc.)?

Q54: In your opinion, is your town/neighbourhood generally peaceful or marked by violence?

1. Very peaceful
2. Moderately peaceful
3. Neither peaceful nor violent
4. Moderately violent
5. Very violent

Q55: How safe do you feel when walking down your street alone after dark?

1. Very safe
2. Moderately safe
3. Neither safe nor unsafe
4. Moderately unsafe
5. Very unsafe

Q56: In the past 12 months, have you or anyone in your household been the victim of a violent crime, such as assault or mugging? Yes/No

Q57: If "Yes". How many times?

Q58: In the past 12 months, has your house been burglarized or vandalized? Yes/No

Q59: If "Yes". How many times?

Q60: In general, how happy do you consider yourself to be?

1. Very happy
2. Moderately happy
3. Neither happy nor unhappy
4. Moderately unhappy
5. Very unhappy

Q61: How much control do you feel you have in making decisions that affect you and your life course? Do you have …

1. No control
2. Control over very few decisions
3. Control over some decisions
4. Control over most decisions
5. Control over all decisions

Q62: Generally speaking most people and politicians know and agree what has to be done. Most political debate, negotiation and compromise are therefore unnecessary, distract people and politicians from the big picture and slows/waters down widely accepted policy positions. To what extent do you agree?

1. Strongly agree 2. Mildly agree 3. Depends
4. Mildly disagree 5. Strongly disagree

Q63: There is little to be learnt or achieved by discussing politics informally with people who strongly disagree with your views. It's unpleasant and neither side is likely to change their mind. To what extent do you agree?

1. Strongly agree 2. Mildly agree 3. Depends
4. Mildly disagree 5. Strongly disagree

Q64: Formal politics is a win-lose zero-sum game between competing interests. Compromise is ultimately a loss for all parties involved. To what extent do you agree?

1. Strongly agree 2. Mildly agree 3. Depends
4. Mildly disagree 5. Strongly disagree

Q65: Some people say that no matter who people vote for, it won't make any difference to what happens. Others say that who people vote for can make a big difference to what happens. Where would you place yourself?

6. Can make an enormous difference
7. Can make a significant difference
8. Can make some difference
9. Will make little difference
10. Won't make any difference

Q66: To what extent are you able to persuade other people, with different political views from your own, of the merits of your political arguments?

1. A great extent 2. Some extent 3. Depends
4. Hardly ever 5. Never

Q67: How many times in the past month have you discussed and debated political issues with people who disagreed with your views regarding the issue(s) discussed?

Q68: Is voting at Federal and State elections worthwhile?

- Yes definitely
- Probably
- Not Sure
- Probably not
- Not at all

Q69: Would you say that local, state and federal governments are run by a few big interests looking out for themselves, or that they are run for the benefit of all the people?

1. Entirely run for the big interests
2. Mostly run for the big interests
3. About half and half
4. Mostly run for the benefit of all
5. Entirely run for the benefit of all

Local government:

State government:

Federal government:

Q70: To what extent do local, state and federal governments and politicians take into account concerns voiced by you and people like you when they make decisions that affect you? A lot, A little, or Not at all?

- Federal
- State
- Local

Q71: In the past 12 months, how many times have you done the following?

- Attended a town/neighbourhood council meeting, public hearing, or public discussion group
- Organised or signed a written or online petition

- Met with a politician, called him/her, or sent a letter/email
- Participated in a protest or demonstration
- Participated in an information or election campaign
- Alerted newspaper, radio or TV to a local problem
- Notified police or court about a local problem

Q72: To what extent do you believe these attempts at political influence, by others, are effective?

Somewhat effective

Q73: To what extent do you believe your own such attempts at political influence are (or would be) effective?

1. Very effective
2. Somewhat effective
3. usually ineffective
4. Not effective at all

Q74: How many different products have you bought or boycotted for moral or political reasons (excluding those you bought or boycotted because they were, or were not, Australian) in the past 12 months?

Q75: Generally speaking, how much interest do you usually have in what's going on in politics?

- A good deal
- Some
- Not much
- None

Q76: Would you have voted in the last federal election if voting had not been compulsory?

Definitely would have voted

Probably would have voted

Possibly

Probably would not have voted

Definitely would not have voted

Q77: Did you cast a 'formal vote' (a ballot that was correctly marked and would thus have been counted) in your last local government election?

- Yes
- No

Q78: Did you cast 'formal votes' (ballots that were correctly marked and would thus have been counted) at the last House of Assembly (lower house) and Legislative council (upper house) state elections? (If you reside in Queensland, the NT or the ACT write N/A under Legislative Council) Yes, No or N/A

- House of Assembly
- Legislative Council

Q79: If you intentionally cast an informal vote at the last state election, why and what form did it take?

Q80: Did you cast 'formal votes' (ballots that were correctly marked and would thus have been counted) at the last House of Representatives (lower house) and Senate (upper house) federal elections? Yes or No

- House of Representatives

- Senate

Q81: If you intentionally cast an informal vote at the last federal election, why and what form did it take?

Q82: Have your voting patterns (the parties you've voted for) in the House of Representatives changed over the last 10 years (for those younger than 28 since you began voting)?

1. Yes, both my 'primary vote' (first preference) and my 'two party preferred vote' (the major party, liberal or labor, I ranked higher) changed.
2. Yes, my primary vote changed but my two-party preferred vote stayed the same.
3. Yes, my two-party preferred vote changed but my primary vote staged the same.
4. No, neither my two-party preferred nor primary vote has changed.
5. I have not voted
6. I have not cast a formal/valid vote

Q83: Do you normally vote for minor parties and/or independents in senate elections?

1. Yes 2. No 3. Don't vote 4. Don't vote formally (cast a valid vote)

Q84: Do you normally vote '1' above the line, or number all candidates below the line, on senate ballots?

1. Vote above the line 2. Vote below the line 3. Don't vote
4. Don't vote formally (cast a valid vote)

Q85: Would you ever vote for a candidate who was not from your ethnic or linguistic group/race/caste/tribe? Yes/No

Q86: Which do you think is better – when the Federal Government has a majority in both the House of Representatives and the Senate, OR when the Federal Government in the House of Representatives does not control the Senate?

6. Much better when Government controls *both*
7. Better when Government controls *both*
8. Neither / doesn't matter
9. Better when Government *does not* control the Senate
10. Much better when Government *does not* control the Senate

Q87: On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in Australia?

Q88: Would you support changing the electoral system in the House of Representatives from The Alternative Vote: preferential voting in single member electorates in which a candidate must receive a majority (50% plus one) of the votes in a constituency to be elected to parliament. Voters do not have the choice of voting between members of the same party and the share of votes parties' receive in elections do not match the share of seats they win. Voters must rank order all candidates to cast a valid vote. The system tends to produce majority government (one party possessing a majority of seats).

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The Hare Clark system: preferential voting in multi member electorates (best between 5 and 7 per electorate) in which candidates must receive a quota (approx. 16.7% in 5 member electorates, 14.3% in 6 member electorates and 12.5% in 7 member electorates) of votes in a constituency to be elected to parliament. Voters have the choice of voting between members of the same as well as different parties and the share of votes parties' receive in elections better match the share of seats they win. Voters must rank order at least as many candidates as there are seats to fill in that electorate, but may rank order more or all if they wish. The system tends to produce coalition or minority government in which a government either is formed from multiple parties or must negotiate with other parties and independents to pass legislation.

Q89: To what extent do you trust Australian federal and state government institutions and processes to be fair and effective?

- I have no trust
- I have little trust
- It depends
- I have some trust
- I have a great deal of trust

Q90: I would like to know more about the groups or organisations, networks, associations to which you belong. These could be formally organised groups of just groups of people who get together regularly to do an activity or talk about things. Please indicate in the table below the number of groups (in each category) to which you belong, and how actively you participate in their decision making. If you indicated more than one group in any one category indicate how actively you participate in the decision making of the group you participate in the most. If you do not participate in any group within a category leave it blank.. Number of Organisations and Groups How actively do you participate in this group's decision making?

I would like to know more about the groups or organisations, networks, associations to which you belong. These could be formally organised groups of just groups of people who get together regularly to do an activity or talk about things. Please indicate in the table below the name of these groups and how actively you participate in their decision making.

Type of Organisation or Group	Number of Organisations and Groups	How actively do you participate in this group's decision making? 1 = Leader 2 = Very Active 3 = Somewhat Active 4 = Does not participate in decision making
A. Political party, group or movement		
B. Farmer/Fisherman group or cooperative		
C. Other production group		
D. Traders or Business Association		
E. Professional Association (doctors, Teachers, veterans)		
F. Trade or Labour Union		
G. Neighbourhood/Town Committee		
H. Religious or spiritual group (e.g. church, mosque, temple, informal religious group, religious study group)		
I. Cultural group or association (e.g. arts, music, theatre, film)		

J. Festival society		
K. Finance, credit or savings group		
L. Education group (e.g. parent-teacher association, school committee)		
M. Health group		
N. Water and waste management group		
O. Sports group		
P. Youth group		
Q. NGO or civic group (e.g. Rotary Club, Red Cross)		
R. Ethnic-based community group		
S. Other groups		

Q91: If you did not indicate belonging to any group in the previous set of questions skip to question 103. If you indicated belonging to at least one group continue. Of all the groups to which you belong, which two are the most important to you?

Group 1 …… Group 2 ……..

Q92: How many hours of work have you given to this group in the past 12 months e.g. by attending meetings, doing group work or volunteering as a member of this group?

Group 1 …… Group 2 ……..

Q93: How much money or goods have you contributed to this group in the past 12 months? Write the value in Australian dollars. If you are not comfortable answering this question skip it.

Group 1 …… Group 2 ……..

Q94: What is the main benefit from joining this group?

1. Improves my or my household's current livelihood or access to services
2. Important in times of emergency/in future
3. Benefits the community
4. Enjoyment/Recreation
5. Spiritual, social status, self-esteem
6. Other (specify)

Group 1 …… Group 2 ……..

Q95: Thinking about the membership of your most important group, are most of them of the same … Yes/No

A. Neighbourhood/Town

B. Family or Kin group

C. Religion

D. Gender

E. Age

F. Ethnic or linguistic group

Q96: Do members mostly have the same …

Yes/No

- Occupation
- Educational background or level

Q97: Are members mostly of the same political viewpoint or belong to the same political party? Yes/No

- Group 1 …….
- Group 2……..

Q98: Are some members richer or poorer than others, or do they all have mostly the same income level? Answers - Mixed rich/poor, Mostly the same, N/A

Group 1 …….

Group 2……..

Q99: In the past five years*, has membership in the group declined, remained the same, or increased?[*TIME PERIOD CAN BE CLARIFIED BY SITUATING IT BEFORE/AFTER MAJOR EVENT] Answers

1. Declined
2. Remained the same
3. Increased

Group 1 …… Group 2 ……..

Q100: When there is a decision to be made in the group, how does this usually come about? Answers

1. Decision is imposed from outside
2. The leader decides and informs the other group members
3. The leader asks group members what they think and then decides
4. The group members hold a discussion and decide together
5. Other (specify) ……

Group 1 …… Group 2 ……..

Q101: How are leaders in this group selected? Answers

1. By an outside person or entity
2. Each leader chooses his/her successor
3. By a small group of members
4. By decision/vote of all members
5. Other (specify)

Group 1 …… Group 2 ……..

Q102: Overall, how effective is the group's leadership? Answers

1. Very effective
2. Somewhat effective
3. Not effective

Group 1 …… Group 2 ……..

Q103-116 : In question 38 of the "Survey Monkey" component of this survey you were asked to write down the names of *close* friends, *close* work colleagues, *close* family members and *close* others on a separate piece of paper. For each question in the table below indicate which category best applies to you (Y) and those which best apply to your close friends (Fri), work colleagues (WC), family members (Fa) and others (Oth).

Below is an example of how to answer the first question on "Age" indicating that the respondent was aged 25-29 and had six people close to them in their life:

- Three close friends (one aged 18 - 24 and the other two aged 25-29)
- One close Work Colleague ages 60 -79
- Two close Family members both aged 45 – 59

The person had no other people close to them in their life.

Question	Category	Y	Fri	WC	Fa	Oth
Age	13 - 17					
	18 - 24		1			
	25 - 29	1	2			
	30 - 44					
	45 - 59				2	
	60 - 79			1		
	80+					
	Definitely do not know					

Question	Category	Y	Fri	WC	Fa	Oth
Q: 103 Age	13 - 17					
	18 - 24					
	25 - 29					
	30 - 44					
	45 - 59					
	60 - 79					
	80+					
	Definitely do not know					
Question	Category	Y	Fri	WC	Fa	Oth
Q: 104 Gender	Male					
	Female					
	Transgender or Other					
	Definitely do not know					
Question	Category	Y	Fri	WC	Fa	Oth
Q: 105 Sexuality	Exclusively Heterosexual					
	Exclusively Same Sex Attracted					
	Bisexual or Pansexual					
	Other					
	Don't know					
	Would prefer not to answer					
Question	Category	Y	Fri	WC	Fa	Oth
Q: 106	Born in Australia.					

Country of birth	Born in an English speaking country outside of Australia.					
	Born in a Non-English speaking country.					
	Definitely do not know					
Question	Category		Fri	WC	Fa	Oth
Q107: Are these members of your close social network also members of your ethnic or linguistic group	Yes					
	No					
	Definitely do not know					
Question	Category	Y	Fri	WC	Fa	Oth
Q:108 English Language Proficiency	Speak English very well					
	Speak English well					
	Speak English not well					
	Speak English not well at all					
	Definitely do not know					
Question	Category	Y	Fri	WC	Fa	Oth
Q: 109 Can speak another language other than English?	Yes					
	No					
	Definitely do not know					
Question	Category	Y	Fri	WC	Fa	Oth
Q: 110 Have or had a parent born in another country?	Yes, one or both parents born in an English speaking country outside Australia					
	Yes, one or both parents born in Non-English speaking country					
	No, both parents born in Australia					
	Definitely do not know					
Question	Category	Y	Fri	WC	Fa	Oth
Q: 111 What is the level of the *highest* qualification completed?	No qualification.					
	Year 12 (High school)					
	Certificate I or II					
	Trade Certificate or Certificate III or IV					
	Diploma					
	Advanced Diploma or Associate Degree					
	Bachelor Degree					
	Bachelor Honours Degree Graduate Certificate Graduate Diploma					
	Masters Degree					

	Doctoral Degree					
	Definitely do not know					
Question	Category	Y	Fri	WC	Fa	Oth
Q: 112 Main area of study for person's *highest* qualification completed	Creative and Performing Arts					
	Trade					
	Humanities and Social Science					
	Health Science					
	Hard, Computer and Mathematical Sciences, Engineering, and Aviation					
	Teaching					
	Law					
	Business					
	Agriculture					
	Other					
	Definitely do not know					
Question	Category	Y	Fri	WC	Fa	Oth
Q: 113 Socio-economic status	Unemployed or part-time-employed welfare recipient					
	Working class (Factory workers, clerical workers, retail sales, low paid crafts people)					
	Lower middle class (Semi-professionals and lower managers, craftspeople)					
	Upper middle class (Professionals and upper managers)					
	Upper class (Executives of large corporations and very wealthy investors)					
	Student					
	Definitely do not know					
Question	Category	Y	Fri	WC	Fa	Oth
Q: 114 Religion	Roman Catholic					
	Orthodox Christianity					
	Anglican					
	Evangelical/Pentecostal Christianity					
	Non-Anglican and Non-Evangelical/Pentecostal Protestant					
	Judaism					
	Islam					
	Buddhist					
	Hindu					
	No religion					

	Other					
	Definitely do not know					
Question	Answer	Y	Fri	WC	Fa	Oth
Q: 115 How important is religion to you and members of your close social network	Very important					
	Important					
	Somewhat important					
	Not at all important					
	No religion					
	Definitely do not know					
Question	Answer	Y	Fri	WC	Fa	Oth
Q: 116 How prepared are you and members of your close social network to discuss politics with others?	Try to avoid getting into political discussions because they can be unpleasant.					
	Enjoy discussing politics even though it sometimes leads to arguments.					
	Somewhere in between previous two answers.					
	Definitely do not know					

Q.117-146 Answer the following set of questions about your political views and those of your *close* friends, *close* work colleagues, *close* family members and *close* others (the same as you used in the previous set of questions). For every question in the table below indicate with which answer you most agree using a "1", and with an "X" indicate which views you deem society should *not* tolerate in public debate about these issues (remember there is a difference between tolerating views in public debate and agreeing with them). Also, indicate with which answer each of those close to you are most likely to agree, given what you know about them and their politics.

Below is an example of how to answer the first question on "Abortion." It indicates that the respondent most supports the answer "Ban after the first trimester unless there is a significant danger to the mother or child's health" and believes the answers "Pro-choice, no matter the circumstances or stage of the pregnancy" and "Pro-life, from conception, no matter the circumstances" should not be tolerated in public debate. This answer also indicates that the respondent had six people close to them in their life:

- Three close friends (one who the respondents believes would most support "Ban after the first trimester unless there is a significant danger to the mother or child's health", another who the respondent believes would most support "Pro-life, but allow in cases of rape, incest, or danger to the mother or child's health", and another who the respondent believes would most support "Pro-choice, I don't agree with it but it's not my right or the government's to ban abortion")
- One close Work Colleague who the respondent believes would most support "Pro-choice, I don't agree with it but it's not my right or the government's to ban abortion".
- Two close Family members who the respondent believes would both most support "Ban after the first trimester unless there is a significant danger to the mother or child's health".

The person had no other people close to them in their life.

Question	Answers	Y	Fri	WC	Fa	Oth

What is your stance on abortion?	Pro-choice, no matter the circumstances or stage of the pregnancy	X				
	Pro-life, from conception, no matter the circumstances	X				
	Ban after the first trimester unless there is a significant danger to the mother or child's health	1	1		2	
	Pro-life, but allow in cases of rape, incest, or danger to the mother or child's health		1			
	Pro-choice, I don't agree with it but it's not my right or the government's to ban abortion		1	1		
	Definitely do not know					

Question	Answers	Y	Fri	WC	Fa	Oth
Q: 117 What is your stance on abortion?	Pro-choice, no matter the circumstances or stage of the pregnancy					
	Pro-life, from conception, no matter the circumstances					
	Ban after the first trimester unless there is a significant danger to the mother or child's health					
	Pro-life, but allow in cases of rape, incest, or danger to the mother or child's health					
	Pro-choice, I don't agree with it but it's not my right or the government's to ban abortion					
	Definitely do not know					
Question	Answers	Y	Fri	WC	Fa	Oth
Q: 118 Should section 18C of the Racial Discrimination Act be repealed or amended to protect freedom of speech.	Yes, people should have the right to say and publish offensive words and ideas. Freedom of expression is an essential component of a liberal democratic society in which ideas, including mainstream and conservative ideas, can be challenged.					
	No, there are rightly limitations on free speech and expression and the limitations prescribed in 18C are necessary and justified in a multicultural, multiethnic society.					
	Definitely do not know					
Question	Answers	Y	Fri	WC	Fa	Oth
Q: 119 Should Australia allow same sex marriage?	Yes, and obligate churches to marry homosexual couples					
	Yes, but allow churches the right to refuse gay marriage ceremonies					

	No, allow civil unions for same-sex couples but don't call it marriage					
	No					
	Take the government out of marriage and the recognition of marriage and instead allow religious and private institutions decide who they marry and recognise as married					
	Definitely do not know					
Question	Answers	Y	Fri	WC	Fa	Oth
Q:120 Should parental leave payments increase based on the mother's wage?	Yes					
	No, there should be no paid parental leave					
	No, all mothers should get paid the same amount					
	No, but increase the equal pay amount and duration of leave					
	Definitely do not know					
Question	Answers	Y	Fri	WC	Fa	Oth
Q:121 Should terminally ill patients be allowed to end their lives via lethal injection?	Yes					
	Yes, but only after a psychological examination to prove they are in a sound mental state					
	No					
	No, but they should be able to refuse artificial life support					
	Definitely do not know					
Question	Answers	Y	Fri	WC	Fa	Oth
Q: 122 Should the government make it mandatory for both the public sector and private corporations to meet quotas for employing women, and people of aboriginal descent, in senior positions?	Yes, women and indigenous people remain discriminated against in the job market and are grossly underrepresented in senior management and corporate boards. Only affirmative action can bring about meaningful change.					
	There should only be such quotas for public sector positions. Even though Australia is a federation, government/the public sector is largely monopolistic and should therefore not be allowed to discriminate. However, private corporations must compete not only in the consumer but also in the labour market. If a group is being “unfairly” discriminated against in the job market by certain corporations others are likely to make use of this under-tapped resource.					
	There should be no such quotas. People should always be employed on merit.					

	Definitely do not know					
Question	Answers	Y	Fri	WC	Fa	Oth
Q: 123 Should Australia set a price on carbon emissions?	No					
	No, we should instead Provide a tax break for companies who fund and apply R&D into reducing their carbon footprint					
	Yes, a Carbon Tax with a fixed price					
	Yes, an Emissions Trading Scheme with a floating price					
	Definitely do not know					
Question	Answers	Y	Fri	WC	Fa	Oth
Q: 124 Should the government allow the mining and export of Uranium?	Yes					
	No					
	Yes, but only if exports go to countries which have signed the nuclear non-proliferation treaty					
	Definitely do not know					
Question	Answers	Y	Fri	WC	Fa	Oth
Q: 125 Should the Australian government invest billions of dollars into the development of the National Broadband Network?	Yes, a national high-speed fibre optic network is crucial for the future of Australia's economy					
	No, there should be no government investment in this area. It should be entirely private					
	No, focus on a wireless solution instead					
	No, a more cost effective solution should be developed such as fibre to the node					
	Definitely do not know					
Question	Answers	Y	Fri	WC	Fa	Oth
Q: 126 Should Australia raise taxes on the rich to increase spending on social services?	Yes, but only on the rich					
	No, lower taxes on all income brackets					
	Reform to a flat tax					
	Reform to a flat tax of 25% and grant each adult citizen the same refundable income tax credit equal to 25% of the average income per capita (i.e. provide those with lower (than average), and no, incomes with an income subsidy known as a Negative Income Tax). Then broaden and raise the GST. This scheme would help simplify both the tax and welfare systems.					
	No, but lower taxes for the poor					
	No, keep the current tax structure					
	Yes, and raise taxes on all income brackets					
	Abolish the income tax, disallow all deductions and					

	increase the GST					
	Lower income tax rates and remove all existing tax loopholes for large corporations					
	Definitely do not know					
Question	Answers	Y	Fri	WC	Fa	Oth
Q: 127 Should the government deregulate the labour markets to increase employment, productivity and flexibility	Yes, bring back 'Work Choices'					
	Yes, replace the minimum wage and collective bargaining with an income subsidy/minimum income in the form of a Negative Income Tax, like the one described in the fourth option to the previous question.					
	No, it is better to have relatively higher unemployment but higher wages for the many, than to have lower unemployment and reduced wages for the many.					
	No, increase industrial relations regulations to raise minimum wages and conditions for those who retain their jobs and hours.					
	Definitely do not know					
Question	Answers	Y	Fri	WC	Fa	Oth
Q: 128 Should the government always aim to achieve balanced budgets even in a recession?	Yes, because governments which stimulate the economy through fiscal policy cannot be trusted to reduce/eliminate national debt in times of healthy economic growth.					
	Yes, because fiscal stimulus raises inflation and interest rates					
	Yes, instead governments should rely entirely on market forces and supply side stimulus (such as labour market deregulation)					
	No, governments should spend more than they raise in taxes during recessions and spend less than they raise in taxes during booms					
	No, governments should primarily rely on market forces and supply side stimulus (such as labour market deregulation) but should on rare occasions pursue fiscal stimulus in the face of a major recession.					
	Definitely do not know					
Question	Answers	Y	Fri	WC	Fa	Oth
Q: 129 Should able-bodied, mentally	Yes, adults who receive government benefits should be required to work					

capable adults who receive welfare be required to work?	No, "workfare" is a form of slave labour					
	No, but their benefits should expire after two years of unemployment					
	No, but in order to receive benefits they should be looking for a job or enrolled in education and job training programs					
	No, the unemployed and people with low incomes should be entitled to a minimum income/income-subsidy in the form of a negative income tax.					
	Definitely do not know					
Question	Answers	Y	Fri	WC	Fa	Oth
Q: 130 Should the federal government regulate the internet?	No, do not censor or monitor data					
	Yes, but only to prevent child pornography and copyright infringement					
	Yes, but allow citizens the option to use a government funded internet filter and do not require ISPs to retain data					
	Yes, maintain a blacklist of censored websites and require ISPs to retain data for two years for police investigations					
	Definitely do not know					
Question	Answers	Y	Fri	WC	Fa	Oth
Q: 131 Should the government allow the export of live animals to foreign countries?	Yes, live exports are crucial to the farming industry					
	Yes, allow exports to countries which enforce animal cruelty laws					
	No, ban all live exports					
	Definitely do not know					
Question	Answers	Y	Fri	WC	Fa	Oth
Q: 132 Should Australian governments increase funding for mental health research and treatment?	No, we cannot afford this right now					
	No, this funding is not needed					
	Yes, this additional funding is needed and should be a priority					
	Definitely do not know					
Question	Answers	Y	Fri	WC	Fa	Oth
Q: 133 Should marijuana be legalized in Australia?	Yes					
	No					
	Yes, but only for medical use					
	Yes, and immediately free all citizens jailed for drug offenses					

	Yes. Legalize, tax, and regulate marijuana instead of criminalizing it					
	No, and increase penalties for all non-violent drug offenders					
	Definitely do not know					
Question	Answers	Y	Fri	WC	Fa	Oth
Q: 134 Should the government introduce a $7 GP co-payment to help bring the budget back into surplus?	Yes, people generally should be expected to contribute some money to their medical costs so long as there are exemptions (and limits on the number of co-payments a person shall be obliged to pay per year) for the elderly and people with chronic medical conditions.					
	No, even a small co-payment undermines the fundamental principle of Medicare. There are far more fair and equitable ways to raise money.					
	Definitely do not know					
Question	Answers	Y	Fri	WC	Fa	Oth
Q: 135 Australia currently spends $26.2B on military spending per year, roughly 1.5% of the world share, and 1.7% of GDP. Should the government increase military spending?	Yes					
	No					
	No, reduce military spending					
	Definitely do not know					
Question	Answers	Y	Fri	WC	Fa	Oth
Q: 136 *Australia currently gives $5.44B in aid per year, ranked #8 in the world.* Should the government increase foreign aid spending?	No, maintain current level of foreign aid spending					
	No, reduce foreign aid spending					
	No, abolish foreign aid spending					
	Yes					
	Definitely do not know					
Question	Answers	Y	Fri	WC	Fa	Oth
Q: 137 Should Australia accept asylum-seeking boat immigrants?	Yes, do not turn back boats and process them onshore					
	Yes, they should be treated the same as those arriving by air					
	No, turn the boats back at sea and process them offshore with hard security checks and temporary protection visas					
	No, turn the boats back at sea and process them offshore with hard security checks and no					

	temporary protection visas					
	Definitely do not know					
Question	Answers	Y	Fri	WC	Fa	Oth
Q: 138 Should all primary and secondary schools be privatised and parents granted education vouchers to spend in the education market.	Yes, such a system would increase competition between education providers and enable greater diversity in the school system so as to better cater for the diverse needs and potential of Australian school children.					
	No, this would increase the number of children attending religious schools. We are a secular country.					
	Yes, so long as there is a skeletal framework to protect children from discrimination based on religion and sexual orientation and to ensure the quality of the education provided.					
	No, all children should have the same quality education. Ban private schools.					
	No, for other reasons					
	Definitely do not know					
Question	Answers	Y	Fri	WC	Fa	Oth
Q: 139 Should voting be compulsory	Yes					
	No					
	Definitely do not know					
Question	Answers	Y	Fri	WC	Fa	Oth
Q: 140 Regardless of where you and those close to you sit on these matters, how important are economic policy issues? (tax, welfare, industrial relations etc)	Extremely important					
	Quite important					
	Not very important					
	Definitely do not know					
Question	Answers	Y	Fri	WC	Fa	Oth
Q: 141 Regardless of where you and those close to you sit on these matters, how important are social policy issues? (same sex marriage, voluntary euthanasia, treatment of animals etc)	Extremely important					
	Quite important					
	Not very important					
	Definitely do not know					
Question	Answers	Y	Fri	WC	Fa	Oth
Q: 142 Regardless of where you and those close to you sit on these matters, how important are symbolic issues? (the Rudd government's apology to the stolen generation, an Australian republic,	Extremely important					
	Quite important					
	Not very important					
	Definitely do not know					

changing the flag etc)						
Question	Answers	Y	Fri	WC	Fa	Oth
Q: 143 Regardless of where you and those close to you sit on these matters, how important are environmental issues? (climate change, management of the Murray-Darling basin, recycling etc)	Extremely important					
	Quite important					
	Not very important					
	Definitely do not know					
Question	Answers	Y	Fri	WC	Fa	Oth
Q: 144 Regardless of where you and those close to you sit on these matters, how important are national security and foreign affairs issues?	Extremely important					
	Quite important					
	Not very important					
	Definitely do not know					
Question	Answers	Y	Fri	WC	Fa	Oth
Q: 145 Regardless of where you and those close to you sit on these matters, how important are democracy and civil liberties issues? (electoral reform, internet filtering, compulsory voting, freedom of speech and assembly)	Extremely important					
	Quite important					
	Not very important					
	Definitely do not know					
Question	Answers	Y	Fri	WC	Fa	Oth
Q: 146 Regardless of their chance of winning, which political party has the best philosophy and policies for Australia's future?	Liberal Party of Australia					
	Australian Labor Party (ALP)					
	National Party					
	Australian Democrats					
	Australian Greens					
	Liberal Democratic Party (Libertarians)					
	Family First Party					
	Democratic Labor Party (economically interventionist social conservatives)					
	One Nation					
	Palmer United Party					
	Socialist Alliance					
	Katter's Australian Party					
	Nick Xenophon Team					
	Definitely do not know					

Q147-149:

	Q: 147 Regardless of their chance of winning, rank order "all"	Q: 148 Please rate each party on a scale from 0 to 20,	Q: 149/150 Simply place an *"F"* in the box below corresponding to the

	these parties placing a "1" in the box corresponding to the party you believe has the best philosophy and policies for Australia's future, then a "2" for your second choice etc	where 0 means you strongly *dislike* that party and 20 means that you strongly *like* that party. You may give multiple parties the same rating.	party you know/think your father voted for at the last federal election and an *"M"* in the box below corresponding to the party you know/think your mother voted for at the last federal election.
Liberal Party of Australia			
Australian Labor Party (ALP)			
National Party			
Australian Democrats			
Australian Greens			
Liberal Democratic Party (Libertarians)			
Family First Party			
Democratic Labor Party (economically interventionist social conservatives)			
One Nation			
Palmer United Party			
Socialist Alliance			
Katter's Australian Party			
Nick Xenophon Team			

Below are definitions of some ultimate political values. You may need to refer to these as you answer the next several questions.

Tolerance: the acceptance of individuals and communities being free from external/cultural/government restraint to the extent that they do not limit the same freedoms of others within society. Individuals must also be able to voluntarily leave communities within society if they wish.

Autonomy: the possession of the power and resources to pursue one's own goals and fulfill one's own potential. Depending on the context this may, or may not, include government social and/or economic intervention. For example, mandating that all girls, regardless of social or cultural background, attend school is an example of individual empowerment through government intervention. The same is true of redistributing some wealth, from rich to poor, to increase the aggregate amount of power that individuals within a society have to shape their own lives. Autonomy may also be served by reducing the sphere of government intervention; for example abolishing the discriminatory aspects of the marriage act enhances the autonomy of individuals.

Tradition: beliefs, practices, institutions, norms and behaviors passed down within a group or society with symbolic meaning or special significance with origins in the past.

Equality of outcome: People having the same or similar quality and quantity of the central and valuable things in life e.g. approximately the same or similar rights, material wealth and economic conditions.

Equality of opportunity: a political ideal that opposes limitation on social mobility based on race, gender, sexual orientation, parentage (the effect of parents' economic status, education, values and decision making on a person's upbringing) and other accidents of birth over which a person cannot reasonably have control.

Security: resistance to, or protection from, harm.

Utility: the greatest happiness for the greatest number

Community: A social unit of any size which shares common values and is based on social networks between individuals as well as the trust, shared norms and reciprocities that underpin and in turn arise from such connections.

National identity/sovereignty: identifying oneself as belonging, and having a special social and political allegiance, to a large group of people who share a common language, culture, ethnicity, descent or history.

Sustainability: the endurance of systems and processes. The organizing principle for sustainability is sustainable development, which includes four interconnected domains: ecology, economics, politics and culture

Turn page

Q151: Individuals will prioritize each one of these ultimate values over others in at least some contexts/situations, at least some of the time. In the table below you are asked to distribute 40 points between 10 such ultimate values based on how many *political* contexts you, as an individual, tend to prioritize each of these values over others, relative to the average Australian. You must give each individual value at least 1 point but no more than 7 points. If the average Australian would distribute their 40 points by placing a 4 in the cell corresponding to each ultimate value, how would you distribute your 40 points?

	Distribute your 40 points between the ultimate values below. No value can be given more than 7 or less than 1 point.
Tolerance	
Autonomy	
Stability/Tradition (particularly your own community's/culture's traditions)	
Equality of outcome	
Equality of opportunity	
Security	
Utility	
Community	
National Identity/Sovereignty	
Sustainability	

Q152: Now indicate how you would distribute the 40 points of each of those close to you based on what you know of their politics (the same people you used to answer questions 3.1, and 3.2). The easiest way to do this is with a tally e.g. \, \\, \\\, \\\\, ~~\\\\~~, ~~\\\\~~ \, etc. Determine the distribution of each person's points on a separate piece of paper before you begin the tally (make it clear and legible).

Below is an example answer to the first value in the table (tolerance). It indicates that the respondent:

- has six people close to them.
- believes one of those six people should be given 3 points for tolerance
- believes five of those six people should be given 7 points for tolerance

	1 point	2 points	3 points	4 points	5 points	6 points	7 points
Tolerance			\				~~\\\\~~

	1 point	2 points	3 points	4 points	5 points	6 points	7 points
Tolerance							
Autonomy							
Tradition/stability							

Equality of Outcome							
Equality of opportunity							
Security							
Utility							
Community							
National Identity/sovereignty							
Sustainability							

Q153: Do you have ambitions to become a politician? No

Q154: For participants who are not a member of a political party skip to question 161. Question 147 asked you to rank order a list of 13 parties according to those you believe have the best philosophy and policies for Australia's future. If the party to which you are a member is not the party you ranked first in question 147, explain why that is in a few sentences. If there is no discrepancy skip to question 157.

Q155: If there is a discrepancy between the party to which you are a member and the party you ranked first in question 147 what would make you more inclined to join the party you ranked first? For example, would you be more likely to consider joining the party you ranked first if

a) - the electoral system was changed to increase the likelihood that your most preferred party won a share of the seats in parliament equal to its share of votes?

b) that party allowed each of its members an equal vote for the party leader and equal votes for candidate selection and policy making decisions?

c) – some other reason(s)

Q156: How actively do you participate in party campaigning and fundraising?

Q157: Do you feel you're making a real and positive difference to the governance in this country through membership of, and involvement in, a party?

Q158: How difficult is it to have a real say in your party's policy and decision making?

Q159: Is there a lot of conflict and hostility between competing factions and interests in your party?

Q160: To what extent do you agree with the following quote regarding life in a political party? "Every action and every word that will affect the perceptions of other active members is possessed with colossal significance, must be premeditated and pondered, and the political landscape scrutinised with as much care and for as long as possible. … Every situation is political. You only tell people things if there is a reason to do so, … You think carefully in particular about how people will react. Political success above all else is about managing relationships with other people and managing perceptions. Will they be supportive, hostile or disinterested?"[802]

[802] Page, John, Hyde. (2006) The Education of a Young Liberal, p.97

Q161: Would you ever consider becoming a member of a political party? Why?
Q162: If the party you ranked first in question 147 is a minor party, would you be more likely to consider joining if the electoral system was changed to make it more likely for that party to win a share of the seats in parliament equal to its share of votes?
Q163: If the party you ranked first in question 147 allowed each of its members to have an equal vote for the party leader and equal votes for candidate selection and policy making decisions would you be more likely to consider joining?
Q164: If you were to become a member of a party would you have enough time to be involved in party activities?
Q165: Do you think it is possible for you to make a real and positive difference to the governance in this country through membership of and involvement in a party?
Q166: How difficult do you think it is to have a real say in a political party's policy and decision making?
Q167: Do you imagine there would be a lot of conflict and hostility between competing factions and interests in a political party?
Q168: To what extent do you believe you would have to self-censor what you say and the thoughts you expressed to have any real influence in a party's policy and decision making?

Appendix 569
Methodology for calculating participants' Ideological Social Network Difference Scores (ISNDSs).
Relevant survey questions: 117-146

- survey questions regarding economic policy issues: 120, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129 & 134
- survey questions regarding social policy issues: 117, 119, 121, 122, 131, 132, 133 & 138
- survey question regarding environmental issues: 123
- survey questions regarding national security and foreign affairs issues: 124, 135, 136 & 137
- survey questions regarding democracy and civil liberties issues: 118, 130 & 139
- survey questions regarding emphases placed on policy areas: 140-145
- survey question regarding party preferences: 146

Step 1 – counted were the number of members of a participant's close social network that the participant thought would have a different political party preference (question 146) to the participant.
Step 2 - this area of possible political disagreement suggests the likelihood of other areas of significant political difference. Additionally, views pertaining to electoral preferences and the reasons for them are particularly important because they influence electoral and policy outcomes. Consequently, discussion about different electoral preferences with members of one's close social network is likely to prompt more extensive discussion concerning values and policy. Hence, the numbers counted in Step 1 were multiplied by four. These numbers were added to participants' ISNDSs. More figures will be added to participants' ISNDSs in subsequent steps.
Step 3 – counted were the number of members of participants' close social networks that the participant thought would emphasise/prioritise policy areas differently to the participant. This was done for each policy area (questions 140-145) and the sums were added to participants' ISNDSs.
Step 4 – counted were the number of members of participants' close social network that the participant thought would have different views to the participant on economic policy issues. This was done for each economic policy issue (questions 120, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129 & 134). These numbers were multiplied by the importance participants placed on economic policy issues (question 140). That is, if 'Extremely important' they were multiplied by three, if 'Quite important' they were multiplied by two and if 'Not very important' they were multiplied by one. These figures were added to participants' ISNDSs.

Step 5 - Step 4 was repeated for social, environmental, national security and foreign affairs and democracy and civil liberties issues (using relevant responses to relevant survey questions).

Below is a table of the Participation Code Numbers (PCNs) as well as the ISNDSs of the participants that answered the relevant questions and indicated positions they believed were held by members of their close social networks.

PCNs	ISNDSs
0069	21
0074	43
0078	238
0073	281
0066	104
0083	238
0080	74
0068	65
0016	105
0042	105
0058	129
0054	0
0049	78
0037	119
0035	279
0024	222
0009	203
0017	417
0008	222
0007	87
0006	151
0001	127
0000	401

Appendix 570

Methodology for calculating participants' Average Ideological Social Network Difference Scores (AISNDSs).

Participants' AISNDSs were determined by dividing their ISNDSs (discussed in the previous appendix) by the number of close social network members whose positions participants indicated in their responses to questions 117-146. Participants were asked to consider the same close social network members when responding to each of these questions. If they did not know and could not guess the positions of one or more of their close social network members regarding an issue they were asked to place them in the 'Definitely do not know' category. However, not all participants indicated the same number of positions held by their close social network members from question to question. This variation was very minor for all but one of these participants. Their AISNDSs were determined by dividing their ISNDSs by the number of close social network members they considered in a 'majority' of the relevant questions (questions 117 to 146). The one participant who responded to the relevant questions but was extremely inconsistent regarding the number of close social network members they considered

in each question was not given an AISNDS. Neither were those participants who failed to indicate any policy position held by any member of their close social network.

Below is a table of participants' PCNs,[803] ISNDSs,[804] AISNDSs and number of close social network members.

PCNs	ISNDSs	Network Size	AISNDSs
0069	21	26	0.81
0074	43	17	2.53
0078	238	14	17
0073	281	No consistency	-
0066	104	11	9.45
0083	238	11	21.64
0080	74	15	4.93
0068	65	24	2.71
0016	105	19	5.53
0042	105	6	17.5
0058	129	13	9.92
0054	0	2	0.00
0049	78	6	13.00
0037	119	5	23.8
0035	279	15	18.6
0024	222	7	31.71
0009	203	17	11.94
0017	417	33	12.64
0008	222	7	31.71
0007	87	15	5.80
0006	151	15	10.07
0001	127	7	18.14
0000	401	8	50.13

Appendix 571

Methodology for calculating participants' Average Structural Social Network Difference Scores (ASSNDSs)

Relevant survey questions: 103 – 115.

Responses to these questions were used to assess the degree to which members of participants' networks were structurally (as opposed ideologically/politically) unlike the participant. Structural variables considered included age, gender, sexuality, country of birth, ethnicity, English/foreign language proficiency, education, socio-economic status, religion and religiosity.

Step 1 - For each of the relevant questions (questions 103 – 115) the number of members of participants' close social networks that the participant had indicated had different structural traits/characteristics to the participant were counted. The sum of these numbers became the participants' Structural Social Network Difference Scores (SSNDSs).

Step 2 – Participants' SSNDSs were divided by the number of close social network members whose structural traits/characteristics the participants indicated in their responses to questions 103 – 1115. Participants were asked to

[803] Defined in Appendix 569

[804] Defined in Appendix 569

consider the same number of social network members when responding to each of these questions. If they did not know and could not guess the traits/characteristics of one or more of their close social network members regarding a structural variable they were asked to place them in the 'Definitely do not know' category. However, not all participants indicated the same number of mutually exclusive traits/characteristics for their close social network members from question to question. This variation was very minor for all but one of the participants. Their ASSNDSs were determined by dividing their SSNDSs by the number of close social network members they considered when responding to a majority of the relevant questions (questions 103-115). The one participant who responded to the relevant questions but was extremely inconsistent regarding the number of close social network members they considered when answering each question was not given an ASSNDS. Below is a table of the Participants' PCNs,[805] SSNDSs, and ASSNDSs as well as the number of close social network members considered by participants.

PCNs	SSNDSs	Network Size	ASSNDSs
0069	64	26	2.46
0074	103	17	6.06
0078	84	14	6.00
0073	93	No consistency	-
0066	48	11	4.36
0083	51	11	4.64
0080	46	15	3.07
0084	69	24	2.88
0068	110	24	4.58
0016	36	19	1.89
0042	44	6	7.33
0058	54	13	4.15
0044	29	8	3.63
0054	7	2	3.50
0049	38	6	6.33
0045	15	4	3.75
0037	29	5	5.80
0035	92	15	6.13
0024	68	7	9.71
0009	53	18	2.94
0017	159	33	4.82
0008	26	7	3.71
0007	61	15	4.07
0006	76	15	5.07
0001	42	7	6.00
0000	34	8	4.25

Appendix 572

Methodology for calculating participants' Average Value Social Network Difference Scores (AVSNDSs)

[805] Defined in Appendix 569

Relevant survey questions: 151/152

Question 151 asked participants to distribute 40 points between 10 ultimate values (values that are not derived from other values); giving no one value more than seven points or less than one point. Participants were asked to distribute these points based on how many political contexts they, as individuals, tend to prioritise each of these values over others, relative to the average Australian. It was stated that the average Australian would distribute their 40 points by placing a 4 in each cell corresponding to each ultimate value.

Question 152 asked participants to indicate how they would distribute the 40 points of each member of their close network based on what they know of their politics (the same people they used to answer questions 103-146).

Step 1 - The difference between 'the number of points participants indicated represented their own overall level of emphasis on a value' and 'the numbers of points participants indicated was representative of the overall level of emphasis placed on this value by each member of their close social network' was added to participants' Value Social Network Difference Scores (VSNDSs).

Step 2 - This was repeated for each value.

Step 3 – Participants VSNDSs were divided by the number of close social network members whose value emphases the participants indicated in their responses to question 152. Participants were asked to consider the value emphases of the same close social network members per value. However, not all participants indicated the same number of value emphases per value. Therefore, AVSNDSs were determined by dividing VSNDSs by the number of value emphases considered for at least five of the 10 values. Again, as discussed in the previous two appendices one participant (with PCN 0073) who responded to the relevant questions but was extremely inconsistent regarding the number of close social network members they considered when answering questions 103 – 146, and 152 was not given an AVSNDS.

Below is a table of participants' PCNs,[806] VSNDSs and AVSNDSs of participants as well as the number of close social network members whose value emphases participants considered.

PCN	VSNDSs	Network Size	AVSNDSs
0074	190	17	11.18
0078	179	14	12.79
0066	66	11	6.00
0080	64	15	4.27
0042	106	6	17.67
0044	77	10	7.70
0054	0	2	0.00
0049	0	6	0.00
0045	18	1	18.00
0037	0	5	0.00
0035	196	15	13.07
0024	161	7	23.00
0017	416	33	12.61
0008	72	7	10.29
0007	15	15	1.00
0006	234	13	18.00
0001	119	7	17.00

[806] Defined in Appendix 569

0000	124	8	15.50

Appendix 573

Methodology for calculating participants' Frequency of Meeting Informally with Members of their Social Networks.

Relevant survey questions: 48, 49 and 50.

The sums of the figures given by each participant in response to questions 48 to 50 are used to gauge the frequency of their informal meetings with members of their social networks.

Below is a table of participants' PCNs[807] and the frequencies of their informal meetings with members of their social networks over the months prior to their participation in my survey.

PCNs	Frequency of informal meetings with members of participants' social networks
0069	7
0074	40
0078	60
0073	8
0066	23
0083	28
0080	4
0084	10
0068	15
0016	13
0042	5
0058	8
0044	35
0054	1
0049	10
0045	12
0037	8
0035	38
0024	4
0009	37
0017	8
0008	44
0007	40
0006	21
0001	10
0000	2
0002	11
0005	14

[807] Defined in Appendix 569

0013	13
0027	30
0040	29
0053	17
0048	13
0003	19
0051	25
0072	100

Appendix 574

Methodology for calculating participants' Formal Organisational Engagement Score

Relevant survey question: 90

Question 90 asked participants to indicate the number of groups (per category of group) to which they belonged as well as how actively they were involved in the decision-making of the groups they most participated in per category.

They could choose between for levels of decision-making:

- leader (four points)
- very active (three points)
- somewhat active (two points), and
- does not participate in decision-making (one point).

The number of organisations/groups to which participants belonged per category was multiplied by the corresponding level of decision-making involvement participants had per category. The sum of these figures became each participant's Formal Organisational Engagement Score.

Below is a table of participants' PCNs[808] and their Formal Organisational Engagement Scores.

PCNs	Formal Organisational Engagement Scores
0069	9
0074	4
0078	5
0073	25
0066	6
0083	10
0080	4
0084	8
0068	1
0016	0
0042	2
0058	0
0044	0
0054	2
0045	7

[808] Defined in Appendix 569

0037	7
0035	2
0024	3
0009	35
0017	6
0008	10
0007	1
0006	6
0001	5
0000	1
0003	12
0072	32

Appendix 575

Methodology for calculating the relative membership growth of the two most important formal groups in which participants are involved.

Relevant survey question: 99

Question 99 asked participants to indicate whether membership in each of (what they deemed to be) their two most important formal groups had declined (one point), remained the same (two points), or increased (three points) in the previous five years.

Below are two tables. The first shows the relative membership growth scores of participants two most important formal groups in which participants are involved in separate columns. The second table presents the relative membership growth scores of the two most important formal groups in the same column.

PCNs	Relative membership growth Scores of Participants' most important formal groups	Relative membership growth Scores of Participants' second most important formal groups
0069	3	-
0074	3	-
0078	2	2
0073	3	2
0066	2	2
0083	2	2
0080	2	-
0084	1	1
0068	2	-
0042	3	3
0045	2	1
0037	1	2
0035	2	3
0024	3	2
0009	2	3

0017	3	2
0006	-	3
0001	3	3
0003	1	2
0072	2	2

PCNs	Relative membership growth Scores of Participants' two most important formal groups
0069	3
0074	3
0078	2
0073	3
0066	2
0083	2
0080	2
0084	1
0068	2
0042	3
0045	2
0037	1
0035	2
0024	3
0009	2
0017	3
0001	3
0003	1
0072	2
0078	2
0073	2
0066	2
0083	2
0084	1
0042	3
0045	1
0037	2
0035	3
0024	2
0009	3
0017	2
0006	3

0001	3
0003	2
0072	2

Appendix 576

Methodology for calculating the degree to which participants' most important formal groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian decision-making processes.

Relevant survey question: 100

Question 100 asked participants to indicate how decisions are usually made in their most important formal groups. The options were:

- decisions are imposed from outside the group (one point)
- the leader decides and informs other group members (two points)
- the leader asks group members what they think, then decides (three points)
- the group members hold a discussion and decide together (four points).

The more egalitarian the decision-making process of the group, the greater the number of points.

Below is a table of participants' PCNs[809] and the number of points indicating the extent to which participants' most important formal groups had egalitarian decision-making processes.

PCNs	Extent to which participants' most important formal groups had egalitarian decision-making processes
0069	3
0074	4
0078	4
0073	4
0066	4
0083	3
0080	4
0084	4
0068	4
0042	1
0054	2
0045	1
0037	3
0035	3
0009	4
0017	1
0008	2
0007	4
0006	4
0001	3

[809] Defined in Appendix 569

0000	2
0003	4

Appendix 577

Methodology for calculating the degree to which participants' two most important formal groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian decision-making processes.

Relevant survey question: 100

Question 100 asked participants not only to indicate how decisions are usually made in their most important formal groups, but also how they are usually made in their second most important formal groups (if they had one).

The same procedure used to determine the degree to which participants' most important formal groups have egalitarian decision-making processes (discussed in Appendix 576) was employed to assess the extent to which participants' second most important formal groups have egalitarian decision-making processes.

Below is a table of participants' PCNs[810] and the number of points indicating the extent to which participants' two most important formal groups had egalitarian the decision-making processes.

PCNs	Extent to which participants' two most important formal groups had egalitarian the decision-making processes
0069	3
0074	4
0078	4
0073	4
0066	4
0083	3
0080	4
0084	4
0068	4
0042	1
0054	2
0045	1
0037	3
0035	3
0009	4
0017	1
0008	2
0007	4
0006	4
0001	3
0000	2
0003	4
0078	4

[810] Defined in Appendix 569

0073	2
0066	4
0083	4
0084	4
0042	1
0045	3
0037	3
0035	3
0024	2
0009	4
0017	3
0008	4
0006	3
0001	2
0003	3

Appendix 578

Methodology for calculating the degree to which participants' most important formal groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian leadership selection processes.

Relevant survey question: 101

Question 101 asked participants to indicate how leaders are usually selected in their most important formal groups. The options were:

- by an outside person or entity (one point)
- each leader chooses his/her successor (two points)
- by a small group of members (three points)
- by decision/vote of all members (four points)

The more egalitarian the leadership selection procedure of the group, the greater the number of points.

Below is a table of participants' PCNs[811] and the number of points indicating the extent to which participants' most important formal groups had egalitarian leadership selection procedures.

PCNs	Extent to which participants' most important formal groups had egalitarian leadership selection procedures
0069	3
0074	4
0078	4
0073	3
0066	3
0080	4
0084	4
0068	4

[811] Defined in Appendix 569

0042	4
0054	1
0045	1
0037	3
0035	4
0009	4
0017	1
0008	4
0007	4
0006	3
0001	4
0000	3

Appendix 579

Methodology for calculating the degree to which participants' two most important formal groups (in which they are involved) have egalitarian leadership selection procedures.

Relevant survey question: 101

Question 101 asked participants not only to indicate how leaders are usually selected in their most important formal groups, but also how leaders are usually selected in their second most important formal groups (if they had one).

The same procedure used to determine the degree to which participants' most important formal groups have egalitarian leadership selection processes (discussed in Appendix 578) was employed to assess the extent to which participants second most important formal groups have egalitarian leadership selection processes.

Below is a table of participants' PCNs[812] and the number of points indicating the extent to which participants' two most important formal groups had egalitarian leadership selection processes.

PCNs	Extent to which participants' two most important formal groups had egalitarian leadership selection processes
0069	3
0074	4
0078	4
0073	3
0066	3
0080	4
0084	4
0068	4
0042	4
0054	1
0045	1
0037	3
0035	4

[812] Defined in Appendix 569

0009	4
0017	1
0008	4
0007	4
0006	3
0001	4
0000	3
0078	4
0073	1
0066	4
0083	4
0084	4
0042	4
0045	4
0037	3
0035	4
0024	1
0009	4
0017	1
0008	4
0006	3
0001	3

Appendix 580

Methodology for calculating the degree to which participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) are structurally (ethnically/linguistically, economically, socially and religiously) diverse.

Relevant survey questions: 51A - 51D

Questions 48 to 50 asked participants about the number of times they had met/visited informally with people outside their immediate families over the previous month. Questions 51A to 51D asked participants whether these people were mostly of a different (or different):

- ethnic/linguistic group(s) (51A),
- economic status (51B),
- social status (51C), and/or
- religious group(s) (51D)

to the participant. To gauge the extent to which each participant's informal social network was structurally diverse the sum of the number of times they responded yes to these yes/no questions became their overall informal network structural diversity score. The lowest possible score was zero and the highest was four.

Below is a table of participants' PCNs[813] and the number of points measuring the extent to which participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) are structurally unlike the participants. This second variable is usually a good indication of the degree to which a network is structurally diverse.

PCNs	Extent to which participants' informal social networks (outside the immediate family) are structurally unlike the participants
0069	1
0074	0
0078	1
0073	3
0066	0
0083	1
0080	1
0084	0
0068	1
0016	0
0042	2
0058	0
0044	2
0054	0
0049	0
0045	0
0037	1
0035	3
0024	2
0009	0
0017	2
0008	1
0007	2
0006	2
0001	3
0000	3
0002	0
0005	4
0013	2
0027	4
0040	4
0053	1
0048	1

[813] Defined in Appendix 569

0003	1
0051	4
0072	2

Appendix 581

Methodology for calculating the degree to which the members of the most important formal organisations in which participants are involved have similar incomes/wealth.

Relevant survey question: 98

- participants who indicated that the two most important formal groups in which they were involved had a mix of rich and poor members were given one point;
- Participants who indicated belonging to only a single formal group which had a mix of rich and poor members were also given one point;
- participants who indicated that one of the two most important formal groups in which they were involved had a mix of rich and poor members but that the other group had members with mostly the same level of income/wealth were given one and half points;
- participants who indicated that their only or two most important group(s) in which they were involved had members with mostly the same level of income/wealth were given two points.

These points indicate the degree to which members of the most important formal groups in which participants were involved had similar levels of income/wealth.

Below is a table of participants' PCNs[814] and the number of points gauging the extent to which the members of the most important formal groups in which participants are involved have similar levels of income/wealth.

PCNs	Extent to which the members of the most important formal groups in which participants are involved have similar levels of income/wealth
0069	1
0074	1
0078	1
0073	2
0066	2
0083	2
0080	1
0084	1
0068	1
0042	1.5
0054	1
0045	1.5
0037	1
0035	1
0024	1

[814] Defined in Appendix 569

0009	2
0017	1.5
0008	1
0007	1
0006	1.5
0001	1.5
0000	1
0003	1.5
0072	1

Appendix 582

Methodology for calculating 'membership of / willingness to join, a political party.'

Relevant survey questions: 156, 157 and 161

Questions 156 and 157 asked participants about their engagement in political parties. Non-party-members were asked to skip ahead. Therefore, those participants who skipped ahead were assumed to be non-party-members. Question 161 asked if participants would ever consider becoming a member of a political party.

- Party members were given two points
- Non-party-members who might consider becoming a political party member were given one point
- Those who were not presently nor would ever consider becoming a political party member received zero points

These points indicate that the degree to which participants are willing to join a political party. Obviously, those who were already party members were the most willing.

Below is a table of participants' PCNs[815] and the number of points indicating the extent to which participants are willing to join a political party.

PCNs	Membership of / willingness to join, a political party
0069	0
0074	0
0078	1
0073	0
0066	1
0083	1
0080	1
0084	0
0068	0
0016	0
0042	1
0058	0
0044	1
0054	0
0049	0

[815] Defined in Appendix 569

0045	0
0037	2
0035	1
0024	2
0009	2
0017	1
0008	2
0007	0
0006	2
0001	0
0000	0

Appendix 583

Methodology for calculating non-party-member participants' willingness to join a political party

Relevant survey question: 161

Question 161 asked if participants would ever consider becoming a member of a political party. Participants that were already party members were asked to skip this question.

Non-party-member participants who indicated that they may consider joining a political party were given one point.

Non-party-member participants who indicated that they would never consider joining a political party were given zero points.

Below is a table of non-party-member participants' PCNs and their number of points indicating the willingness to join a political party in the future.

PCNs	Non-party-member participants' willingness to join a political party
0069	0
0074	0
0078	1
0073	0
0066	1
0083	1
0080	1
0084	0
0068	0
0016	0
0042	1
0058	0
0044	1
0054	0
0049	0
0045	0
0037	2

0035	1
0024	2
0009	2
0017	1
0008	2
0007	0
0006	2
0001	0
0000	0

Appendix 584

816

Appendix 585

816 Sterbenz, Christina. (2014) 'This Chart Explains Every Culture In The World', *Business Insider: Australia,* viewed 10 February 2018, https://www.businessinsider.com.au/inglehart-welzel-culture-map-2014-7?r=US&IR=T

Correlations between "women being part (as opposed to full) time employed" and "Not discussing politics with friends and work colleagues"				
	All	18-34	35-49	50-64
1981	x	x	x	x
1995	x	x	x	r= .306, p= .015
2005	x	r= .234, p= .013	x	x
2012	x	x	x	x

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